The enterprise faces a brand new world when it comes to data privacy and security. New regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) have joined PCI-DSS, HIPAA, and more than 25,000 other cybersecurity regulations passed since 2008. Together, these regulations have vastly increased the workload on security teams already stretched thin by the sheer scale and complexity of modern software business services. The challenge posed by these … More
This spring, Facebook addressed the issue of permanence across its messaging platforms – from Instagram to Messenger to WhatsApp – with the aim to “set a new standard” for consumers’ private communication platforms. Shortly after, Telegram took it further, announcing new capabilities that enable users to delete any message in both ends of any private chat, at any time. While these announcements focus on the consumer audience, global businesses have been grappling with the same … More
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When enforcement of the GDPR went into effect on May 25, 2018, it had worldwide implications on data protection and privacy legislation. One year later, there are conflicting sentiments from the global workforce about whether the regulation has been effective, according to Snow Software. A new survey, which polled 3,000 professionals in the United States, Europe and Asia Pacific region, found that only 39% of respondents feel their personal data is better protected since GDPR … More
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More than one third (36%) of adults aged 16–75 trust companies and organizations with their personal data more since GDPR came into effect one year ago, according to TrustArc. There are positive sentiments toward enforcement activity, and half (47%) of respondents have exercised some of their GDPR privacy rights. 57% of respondents are also more likely to use websites that have a certification mark or seal to demonstrate GDPR compliance. “The research tells a tale … More
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With GDPR reaching its one year anniversary May 25, Airship revealed top-level results of its global benchmark study, examining the state of mobile app user permissions across nearly 700 million people worldwide. Meet new regulatory requirements While marketers trimmed customer lists to meet new regulatory requirements for “traditional” channels (i.e., email), mobile app audiences continue to grow — up globally by +16.6 percent year over year. Businesses are also sending more notifications — averaging 36 … More
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The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) went into effect in the European Union a year ago this month. GDPR, which gives EU citizens more control over their personal data by mandating how businesses must handle that information, has attracted great interest around the world. In addition, it has inspired government officials elsewhere in the world to develop laws addressing consumer data privacy concerns. In recognition of GDPR’s first anniversary, nCipher Security conducted a survey to … More
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Even if given two years notice to achieve GDPR compliance, only half of companies self-reported as compliant by May 25, 2018, a DataGrail survey reveals. “The Age of Privacy: The Cost of Continuous Compliance” report benchmarks the operational impact of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), as well as sharing insights into lessons learned and attitudes toward privacy regulations. DataGrail surveyed more than 300 U.S. privacy management … More
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According to recent reporting, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced that its Cyber Operations Center (COC) is expected to be fully staffed and functional by 2023. The new COC marks NATO’s understanding of the importance that cyberspace plays in conflict, particularly in times of political tensions that has resulted in cyber malfeasance that has targeted elections and critical infrastructure. The establishment of the COC is a natural evolution in how to address cyber attacks in a more timely manner by integrating cyber actions with more conventional military capabilities. In early 2014, after notable cyber incidents were a part of international incidents that occurred in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, the Alliance updated its cyber defense policy to classify digital attacks as the equivalent of kinetic attacks under its collective security arrangement under Article 5 of the treaty.
In those particular instances, Russia was suspected in orchestrating or at least tacitly supporting the cyber attacks that afflicted both states. Since then, Russia’s alleged cyber activities have only become more brazen in their scale and aggressiveness. From suspected involvement in launching cyber attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure to launching a variety of cyber operations to meddle in the elections of foreign governments, Russia has taken advantage of the uncertainty of cyberspace where there is little consensus on key issues such as Internet governance, cyber norms of state behavior, or the criteria by which cyber attacks escalate to a point of war.
NATO has always provided a strong military counterpoint to Russian influence in the European region and projecting a credible threat in cyberspace is an important complement to NATO capabilities. However, previously, NATO didn’t have any of its own cyber weapons, a significant problem given Russia’s perceived position of a near-peer level adversary of the United States. With the establishment of the cyber command, the United States, United Kingdom, and Estonia have offered the Alliance their cyber capabilities. As described in one news article, the alliance hopes to integrate individual nations’ cyber capabilities into alliance operations, coordinated through the COC and under the command of NATO’s top general. With this in hand, it will be interesting to see if this will serve as the deterrent it’s intended to be and how Russia may adjust their cyber activities, particularly against NATO member countries.
However, there is still the lingering problem the Alliance faces with regards to the rules of engagement. Classifying cyber attacks under Article 5 is a start but doesn’t help provide a path forward to how NATO can and should engage and respond to cyber attacks. While this provides NATO a certain flexibility in addressing cyber attacks allowing the Alliance to take each on a case-by-case basis in determining the extent of its response, it does not provide adversarial states an idea of tolerated and intolerable cyber activities. This shortcoming serves only to provide states like Russia enough wiggle-room to continue their offensive cyber operations as long as they don’t cross an undefined threshold. It’s long been hypothesized that attacks crippling critical infrastructures would meet that threshold, but as seen in Ukraine, this bar keeps being pushed a little farther each time.
The COC is a much-needed instrument in NATO’s overall toolbox, strengthening the capacity of the Alliance to deter, and where appropriate, retaliate against cyber attacks. That said, the longer there are no clear lines of what will and will not be deemed acceptable in cyber space will keep the status quo pretty much in place. Once fully operational, the first test of the COC will be how the it will respond and in what proportion to an attack against a member state. And it’s at this time all eyes will turn to Russia to see how it will react and alter how and where it conducts its operations.
This is a guest post by Emilio Iasiello
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The White House has recently published its new National Cyber Strategy, rescinding an Obama-era memorandum Presidential Policy Directive-20 (PPD-20) that laid forth the process by which the United States would undertake cyber attacks against cyber foes, to include foreign state actors. The Strategy consists of four primary pillars designed to guide how the United States will undergo defensive, and perhaps more importantly, offensive actions in order to preserve its interests in cyberspace. Per the Strategy, the four pillars are:
- Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life. The themes in the first pillar focus on key aspects of U.S. homeland security to include critical infrastructure protection, securing federal networks, supply chain management, third party contractors, and improving incident reporting to mitigate the threat of cyber crime.
- Promote American Prosperity. This pillar focuses on technology that supports the digital infrastructure. The themes of innovation, protecting intellectual property, designing and implementing next generation infrastructure, and developing and sustaining workforce capability to support the talent pipeline.
- Preserve Peace through Strength. The third pillar focuses on responsible state behavior in cyberspace and implementing deterrent strategies to influence state behavior. Such activities include building a credible deterrence strategy, imposing consequences to hostile actors, and countering influence operations.
- Advance American Influence. The fourth pillar addresses collaborating with other governments in order to make the Internet safer and more reliable. Focus in on a multi-stakeholder approach involving government and private sector to come to consensus on topics such as Internet freedom and Internet governance.
The Strategy follows in line with the President’s May 2018 Executive Order that called for government agency cybersecurity audits designed to identify “areas of improvement, or areas where specific legislation would be needed.” The EO primarily focused on defensive aspects of the larger cyber umbrella, focusing on federal agencies need to adopt the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, largely considered the gold standard for security guidelines. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has frequently given poor marks for cyber security to U.S. government agencies, and as observed in the recent U.S. State Department breach, challenges persist in improving agency cyber security postures.
Nevertheless, the part of the Strategy that has garnered attention – and correctly so – is the language that clearly removes the tethers that has traditionally restrained the United States from engaging in offensive cyber actions. Where PPD-20 appeared to be hindered by interagency wrangling, the new Strategy makes it clear that the United States is unburdening itself from such bureaucratic wrangling positioning itself to launch counter attacks quickly and resolutely. This shift in U.S. cyber policy comes at a time when Russian suspected involvement in the 2016 U.S. elections failed to elicit a “forceful response” either by the then-Obama or the current Trump Administrations, a frequent criticism levied by politicians.
There have been several iterations of a national cyber security strategy over the last decade. The Clinton Administration had its National Plan for Information Systems, the Bush Administration had its National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and the Obama Administration had its Cybersecurity National Action Plan. While there have been consistent themes in these strategies (e.g., an open and free Internet, the focus on critical infrastructure protection), the latest Strategy shows a more progressive evolution of thinking on how the cyber landscape has changed and how the United States needs to adapt to it. Noticeably absent in the title is “security”; it is only the National Cyber Strategy, which accurately conveys the fact that “security” cannot be addressed independently without addressing how offensive actions can play a supporting role. This is not to condemn or criticize past administrations’ strategies; cyber conflict has been evolutionary, and as such, requires each subsequent administration to review the prior one to ensure that it meets the needs and conditions of its environment.
And indeed, as cyber attacks have grown more prolific and increasingly severe, trying to figure out how to use counter attacks as punishment, retaliation, deterrence, or a combination thereof, is critical for governments. Acknowledging that cyber threats are more than just disruptive/destructive attacks, but can leverage social media platforms, as well as regular and fabricated media outlets to spread propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation to influence targets, must be considered when determining a cyber retaliatory course of action. Adversaries have typically not suffered any official punitive cyber response from the United States, which may serve to encourage follow on activities such as cyber spying, intellectual property theft, or undue influence operations. The Strategy clearly articulates its intention to use all of its domestic and collaborative resources with like-minded states to immediately mitigate the threat. There is no gray area open for misinterpretation.
Unquestionably, the ability for agile actions is necessary in a domain in which attacks happen instantaneously, and in which attribution can be murky at best. Depending on the intent for conducting a punishing cyber retaliation, the ability to respond quickly to demonstrate that cyber hostility is not tolerated is critical. However, one big caveat is that prior to launching a counter attack, is to ensure that striking back is done in an appropriate, proportional manner. There is little doubt that the U.S. possesses the means and resources to conduct such counter strikes. The biggest challenge for U.S. cyber retaliation – guaranteeing that the target is viable and not hiding behind some civilian façade or operating out of a third country. The more the U.S. counters these activities, the more adversaries will invariably learn and adjust their operations accordingly, thereby balancing the scales again. And all eyes will be on the U.S. once more seeing how it will react.
This is a guest blog post by Emilio Iasiello
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A recent article revealed that the United States government has gotten better at providing unclassified cyber threat information to the private sector. Law enforcement and intelligence organizations have greatly cut down the time it takes to provide unclassified versions of cyber threat indicators (a term that can reference that can refer to a variety of technical data that includes but is not limited to IP addresses, malware, e-mail addresses, etc.) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to disseminate promptly to the private sector. The process had traditionally been slow as it involves an originating agency to determine if the indicator has been properly vetted without exposing sources and methods, per the article.
Speed of delivering pertinent threat information is certainly an improvement in a domain where attacks occur in seconds. A November 2017 report from the DHS Office of the Inspector General provided a report on actions taken during 2016 in fulfillment of direction mandated by the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 with regards to the sharing of threat indicators. Per the report, despite successfully classifying indicators and defensive measures, it still faced challenges effectively sharing such information across the public and private sectors. The report advocated enhanced outreach and a cross-domain information processing solution.
One of the steps taken to ameliorate this situation is the improvement of releasing indicators promptly may have to do with DHS’ Cyber Information Sharing Tool that was set to be updated and upgraded in 2018. Via the automatic indicator sharing tool (a capability that enables the exchange of cyber threat indicators between the Federal Government and the private sector at machine speed), DHS is able to disseminate such information directly to those organizations that have signed up for it. As of January 2018, more than 200 private sector and government entities had done so, though it appeared per the article that it was believed that most weren’t using the information that they received to automatically block hostile network traffic.
Information sharing continues to be an important endeavor between the public and private sector as such data greatly assists in the detection, mitigation, and remediation efforts of organizations. It also is a confidence building measure to strengthen the relationship between private companies and a government that has been criticized for not doing an adequate job in cyber security. Much of this private sector outreach falls on DHS’ National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). Per its website, the NICCIC serves as the hub of information sharing activities for the Department to increase awareness of vulnerabilities, incidents, and mitigations. The NCCIC’s Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program is the cornerstone on which the public-private information sharing rests.
An April 2018 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that DHS needed to enhance its efforts to improve the security of public and private sectors. Per the GAO findings, DHS had not developed most of the planned functionality for its National Cybersecurity Protection System information-sharing capability, and moreover; “DHS did not always agree about whether notifications of potentially malicious activity had been sent or received, and agencies had mixed views about the usefulness of these notifications.”
It’s good to see that bureaucratic red tape is being reduced especially since cyber threats are pervasive, ongoing, and quick. Any effort that reduces the time to get information out of the classified realm and into the hands of the private sector that has often been cited as owning approximately 85 percent of critical infrastructure, a target-rich environment that is increasingly attracting hostile actor interest. With only 200 customers signed up to DHS, such an undertaking is destined to spin its wheels. DHS seems to be making the right moves to improve cyber security to include the recent establishment of its new Risk Management Center. However, what is consistently lacking is getting private sector organizations on board, a critical component of information-sharing. While it does not appear that the private sector can be mandated to get on board, something needs to be done to get everyone on the same page whether that be an articulate communications strategy, an incentive-based program, or some combination thereof. Regardless, DHS is demonstrating its commitment to bringing the private sector on board. When the private sector will finally accept the outstretched hand it’s been given still remains to be seen.
This is a guest post by Emilio Iasiello
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The ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) legislation details what measures businesses and individuals must take to comply with ITAR requirements and specifies severe penalties, both civil and criminal, for non-compliance. The reach of the regulations is broad and suppliers of all kinds may be subject to requirements to keep sensitive information secure and restricted.