Category Archives: Mobile

Jeff Bezos phone was hacked by Saudi crown prince

The phone of the Amazon billionaire Jeff Bezos was hacked in 2018 after receiving a WhatsApp message from the personal account of the crown prince of Saudi Arabia.

In April 2019, Gavin de Becker, the investigator hired by Amazon chief Jeff Bezos to investigate into the release of his intimate images revealed that Saudi Arabian authorities hacked the Bezos’s phone to access his personal data.

Gavin de Becker explained that the hack was linked to the coverage by The Washington Post newspaper, that is owned by Bezos, of the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

Gavin De Becker investigated the publication in January of leaked text messages between Bezos and Lauren Sanchez, a former television anchor who the National Enquirer tabloid newspaper said Bezos was dating.

Jeff Bezos hired Gavin de Becker & Associates to find out how his intimate text messages and photos were obtained by the Enquirer.
Jeff Bezos blamed the Enquirer publisher American Media Inc of “blackmail” for threatening to publish the private photos if he did not stop the investigation. Jeff Bezos refused and decided to publicly disclose copies of emails from AMI.

In an article for The Daily Beast website, De Becker wrote that the parent company of the National Enquirer, American Media Inc., had demanded that De Becker deny finding any evidence of “electronic eavesdropping or hacking in their newsgathering process.”

“Our investigators and several experts concluded with high confidence that the Saudis had access to Bezos’ phone, and gained private
 leaked text messages between Bezos and Lauren Sanchez, a former television anchor who the National Enquirer tabloid newspaper said Bezos was dating. ,” de Becker wrote on The Daily Beast website.

Now The Guardian provides additional details on the spying asserting that the intimate pictures were obtained through a sophisticated hacking operation directed by the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammad bin Salman.

According to anonymous sources of The Guardian, Bezos’ phone was hacked using a WhatsApp message from the personal account of bin Salman himself.

“The Amazon billionaire Jeff Bezos had his mobile phone “hacked” in 2018 after receiving a WhatsApp message that had apparently been sent from the personal account of the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, sources have told the Guardian.” reads the article published by The Guardian.

“The encrypted message from the number used by Mohammed bin Salman is believed to have included a malicious file that infiltrated the phone of the world’s richest man, according to the results of a digital forensic analysis. “

According to the sources, Bezos received a bait video file sent on May 1, 2018, that allowed it to infect its mobile device. The malicious code was used to spy on Bezos siphoning large amounts of data from his phone. The paper pointed out that at the time, the relationship between Bezos and the prince was good and the two were exchanging friendly messages.

The revelation could have severe repercussions, first of all it will complicate the position of Mohammad bin Salman and his alleged involvement in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi embassy in Istanbul, Turkey, in October 2018.

Saudi Arabia has previously denied its involvement in the murder of Khashoggi that was attributed to a “rogue operation”. In December, a Saudi court convicted eight people of involvement in the murder after a secret trial that was criticised as a sham by human rights experts.

The revelation will have a significant impact on the business relationships of the Saudi “MBS” with western investors in Saudi Arabia.

Another aspect to evaluate is the impact on the personal relationship between Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner with the crown prince.

US President always ignored the warning of the US intelligence and publicly expressed dislike of Jeff Bezos.

The Guardian asked the Saudi embassy in Washington about the claims, and later a message on Twitter refused any accusation and labeled them as “absurd”.

The UN as announced the imminent release of an investigation.

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – Bezos, hacking)

The post Jeff Bezos phone was hacked by Saudi crown prince appeared first on Security Affairs.

Hundreds of million users installed Android fleeceware apps from Google Play

Security experts from Sophos discovered 25 Android apps on the official Google Play that were involved in financial fraud, 600 million affected.

Security researchers from Sophos discovered a set of so-called fleeceware apps that have been installed by more than 600 million Android users.

Fleeceware apps are malicious applications uploaded to the official Google Play Store that were involved in fraudulent activities, these apps offer a short free trial period and if users don’t cancel the “subscription” they charge an excessive amount of money to the Android users.

“The total number of installations of these apps, as reported on Google’s own Play pages, is high: nearly 600 million in total, across fewer than 25 apps; A few of the apps on the store appear to have been installed on 100 million+ devices, which would rival some of the top, legitimate app publishers on Google Play.” reads the analysis published by Sophos.

“We have good reason to believe that the install count may have, in some cases, been manipulated. But some of the apps, including a popular keyboard app that allegedly transmits the full text of whatever its users type back to China, may legitimately have that many downloads.”

Experts warn of the business model behind the Fleeceware apps that can pose significant risks to the Android users,

In September Sophos published a first report that was warning of this phenomenon, the company discovered a first set of 24 Android apps that were charging huge fees (between $100 and $240 per year) for several generic apps (i.e. QR/barcode readers).

Now Sophos discovered a new set of Android “fleeceware” apps that attempt to monetize with this fraudulent behavior. have continued to abuse the app trial mechanism to impose charges to users after they uninstalled an app.

The fleeceware apps have a high install count, some of them have tens millions of installs, a circumstance that suggests that threat actors behind these apps may have used third-party pay-per-install services to increase the number of installed apps

“Some of these apps are very unprofessional looking. Based on past experience, it may have been the case that these app developers could have used a paid service to bloat their install counts and forge a large number of four- and five-star reviews.” continues the report. “You can identify some of these falsified user review clusters if you scrutinize the recent 5 star reviews; one-to-three word, five star reviews have a propensity to be “sockpuppet” reviews.”

Sophos has published a list of the apps classified as fleeceware.

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – fleeceware apps, fraud)

The post Hundreds of million users installed Android fleeceware apps from Google Play appeared first on Security Affairs.

Apps are sharing more of your data with ad industry than you may think

Apps like Grindr, Tinder and Happn are (over-)sharing data about sexuality, religion, and location with a shadowy network of data brokers. And it's not just dating apps that are doing it...

Apple says no to unlocking shooter’s phone; AG and Trump lash back

Attorney General Barr and President Trump are demanding Apple unlock the mass shooter's iPhone. Apple replies: You can't break just 1 phone.

Just Published: PCI Contactless Payments on COTS


The PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) has published a new data security standard for solutions that enable merchants to accept contactless payments using a smartphone or other commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) mobile device with near-field communication (NFC). Here’s what you need to know about the new PCI Contactless Payments on COTS (CPoC™) Standard and its supporting validation program.

MESSAGETAP: Who’s Reading Your Text Messages?

FireEye Mandiant recently discovered a new malware family used by APT41 (a Chinese APT group) that is designed to monitor and save SMS traffic from specific phone numbers, IMSI numbers and keywords for subsequent theft. Named MESSAGETAP, the tool was deployed by APT41 in a telecommunications network provider in support of Chinese espionage efforts. APT41’s operations have included state-sponsored cyber espionage missions as well as financially-motivated intrusions. These operations have spanned from as early as 2012 to the present day. For an overview of APT41, see our August 2019 blog post or our full published report. MESSAGETAP was first reported to FireEye Threat Intelligence subscribers in August 2019 and initially discussed publicly in an APT41 presentation at FireEye Cyber Defense Summit 2019.

MESSAGETAP Overview

APT41's newest espionage tool, MESSAGETAP, was discovered during a 2019 investigation at a telecommunications network provider within a cluster of Linux servers. Specifically, these Linux servers operated as Short Message Service Center (SMSC) servers. In mobile networks, SMSCs are responsible for routing Short Message Service (SMS) messages to an intended recipient or storing them until the recipient has come online. With this background, let's dig more into the malware itself.

MESSAGETAP is a 64-bit ELF data miner initially loaded by an installation script. Once installed, the malware checks for the existence of two files: keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt and attempts to read the configuration files every 30 seconds.  If either exist, the contents are read and XOR decoded with the string:

  • http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123000_123099/123040/04.02.00_60/ts_123040v040200p.pdf
    • Interestingly, this XOR key leads to a URL owned by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). The document explains the Short Message Service (SMS) for GSM and UMTS Networks. It describes architecture as well as requirements and protocols for SMS.

These two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt contain instructions for MESSAGETAP to target and save contents of SMS messages.

  • The first file (parm.txt) is a file containing two lists:
    • imsiMap: This list contains International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) numbers. IMSI numbers identify subscribers on a cellular network.
    • phoneMap: The phoneMap list contains phone numbers.
  • The second file (keyword_parm.txt) is a list of keywords that is read into keywordVec.

Both files are deleted from disk once the configuration files are read and loaded into memory. After loading the keyword and phone data files, MESSAGETAP begins monitoring all network connections to and from the server. It uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. It continues parsing protocol layers including SCTP, SCCP, and TCAP. Finally, the malware parses and extracts SMS message data from the network traffic:

  1. SMS message contents
  2. The IMSI number
  3. The source and destination phone numbers

The malware searches the SMS message contents for keywords from the keywordVec list, compares the IMSI number with numbers from the imsiMap list, and checks the extracted phone numbers with the numbers in the phoneMap list.


Figure 1: General Overview Diagram of MESSAGETAP

If the SMS message text contains one of the keywordVec values, the contents are XORed and saved to a path with the following format:

  • /etc/<redacted>/kw_<year><month><day>.csv

The malware compares the IMSI number and phone numbers with the values from the imsiMap and phoneMap lists. If found, the malware XORs the contents and stores the data in a path with the following format:

  • /etc/<redacted>/<year><month><day>.csv

If the malware fails to parse a message correctly, it dumps it to the following location:

  • /etc/<redacted>/<year><month><day>_<count>.dump

Significance of Input Files

The configuration files provide context into the targets of this information gathering and monitoring campaign. The data in keyword_parm.txt contained terms of geopolitical interest to Chinese intelligence collection. The two lists phoneMap and imsiMap from parm.txt contained a high volume of phone numbers and IMSI numbers.

For a quick review, IMSI numbers are used in both GSM (Global System for Mobiles) and UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) mobile phone networks and consists of three parts:

  1. Mobile Country Code (MCC)
  2. Mobile Network Code (MNC)
  3. Mobile Station Identification Number (MSIN)

The Mobile Country Code corresponds to the subscriber’s country, the Mobile Network Code corresponds to the specific provider and the Mobile Station Identification Number is uniquely tied to a specific subscriber.


Figure 2: IMSI number description

The inclusion of both phone and IMSI numbers show the highly targeted nature of this cyber intrusion. If an SMS message contained either a phone number or an IMSI number that matched the predefined list, it was saved to a CSV file for later theft by the threat actor.

Similarly, the keyword list contained items of geopolitical interest for Chinese intelligence collection. Sanitized examples include the names of political leaders, military and intelligence organizations and political movements at odds with the Chinese government. If any SMS messages contained these keywords, MESSAGETAP would save the SMS message to a CSV file for later theft by the threat actor.

In addition to MESSAGETAP SMS theft, FireEye Mandiant also identified the threat actor interacting with call detail record (CDR) databases to query, save and steal records during this same intrusion. The CDR records corresponded to foreign high-ranking individuals of interest to the Chinese intelligence services. Targeting CDR information provides a high-level overview of phone calls between individuals, including time, duration, and phone numbers. In contrast, MESSAGETAP captures the contents of specific text messages.

Looking Ahead

The use of MESSAGETAP and targeting of sensitive text messages and call detail records at scale is representative of the evolving nature of Chinese cyber espionage campaigns observed by FireEye. APT41 and multiple other threat groups attributed to Chinese state-sponsored actors have increased their targeting of upstream data entities since 2017. These organizations, located multiple layers above end-users, occupy critical information junctures in which data from multitudes of sources converge into single or concentrated nodes. Strategic access into these organizations, such as telecommunication providers, enables the Chinese intelligence services an ability to obtain sensitive data at scale for a wide range of priority intelligence requirements.

In 2019, FireEye observed four telecommunication organizations targeted by APT41 actors. Further, four additional telecommunications entities were targeted in 2019 by separate threat groups with suspected Chinese state-sponsored associations. Beyond telecommunication organizations, other client verticals that possess sensitive records related to specific individuals of interest, such as major travel services and healthcare providers, were also targeted by APT41. This is reflective of an evolving Chinese targeting trend focused on both upstream data and targeted surveillance. For deeper analysis regarding recent Chinese cyber espionage targeting trends, customers may refer to the FireEye Threat Intelligence Portal. This topic was also briefed at FireEye Cyber Defense Summit 2019.

FireEye assesses this trend will continue in the future. Accordingly, both users and organizations must consider the risk of unencrypted data being intercepted several layers upstream in their cellular communication chain. This is especially critical for highly targeted individuals such as dissidents, journalists and officials that handle highly sensitive information. Appropriate safeguards such as utilizing a communication program that enforces end-to-end encryption can mitigate a degree of this risk. Additionally, user education must impart the risks of transmitting sensitive data over SMS. More broadly, the threat to organizations that operate at critical information junctures will only increase as the incentives for determined nation-state actors to obtain data that directly support key geopolitical interests remains.

FireEye Detections

  • FE_APT_Controller_SH_MESSAGETAP_1
  • FE_APT_Trojan_Linux64_MESSAGETAP_1
  • FE_APT_Trojan_Linux_MESSAGETAP_1   
  • FE_APT_Trojan_Linux_MESSAGETAP_2    
  • FE_APT_Trojan_Linux_MESSAGETAP_3

Example File

  • File name: mtlserver
  • MD5 hash: 8D3B3D5B68A1D08485773D70C186D877

*This sample was identified by FireEye on VirusTotal and provides an example for readers to reference. The file is a less robust version than instances of MESSAGETAP identified in intrusions and may represent an earlier test of the malware. The file and any of its embedded data were not observed in any Mandiant Consulting engagement*

References

Acknowledgements

Thank you to Adrian Pisarczyk, Matias Bevilacqua and Marcin Siedlarz for identification and analysis of MESSAGETAP at a FireEye Mandiant Consulting engagement.