Microsoft partnered with mainstream chip and computer makers to deliver hardware protection of firmware right out of the box: the so-called Secured-core PCs are aimed at foiling attackers who rely on exploiting firmware vulnerabilities to surreptitiously gain access to computer systems. Firmware is an attractive target Attackers are always looking for new and easier ways to compromise target systems, as well as ways to keep that compromise concealed from the system owners for as long … More →
Cyber attacks on critical and industrial infrastructure are on the rise, impacting operational reliability and business risk across all industries, including utilities, manufacturing and oil & gas. Threats to operational technology (OT) can disrupt operations, negatively impact productivity, cause ecological damage and compromise human safety. To help mitigate this risk, a new global alliance focused on cyber security just launched. The Operational Technology Cyber Security Alliance (OTCSA) was established to help companies address the OT … More →
Microsoft is currently rolling out a new Office 365 feature dubbed 'Unverified Sender' and designed to help users identify potential spam or phishing emails that reach their Outlook client's inbox. [...]
Microsoft introduced a new range of devices called Secured-core PCs which come with built-in protection against firmware attacks that have been increasingly used by state-sponsored hacking groups. [...]
Fair elections are the lifelines of democracy, but in recent years election hacking has become a hot topic worldwide.
Whether it's American voting machines during the 2016 presidential election or India's EVMs during 2014 general elections, the integrity, transparency, and security of electronic voting machines remained questionable, leaving a wound in the minds of many that is difficult to
Microsoft announced the addition of an Azure Active Directory (AD) sign-in history feature that would allow users to get an overview of past sign-ins and quickly detect any unusual login activity. [...]
The Windows Developer Team detailed in a blog post published today the new additions developers should be aware of with the imminent release of Windows 10, version 1909 (19H2), now known as November 2019 Update. [...]
Microsoft released this month's optional Windows 10 cumulative updates with KB4520062 being the most noteworthy as it fixes an issue leading to a black screen being displayed at startup during the first sign in after installing an update. [...]
Microsoft Defender, the anti-malware component of Microsoft Windows, has been equipped with a new protective feature called Tamper Protection, which should prevent malware from disabling it. The feature will be rolled out to Windows 10 users and enabled by default for home users. Enterprise administrators will be able to enable it for endpoints via Intune (the Microsoft 365 Device Management portal). About Tamper Protection “Tamper protection prevents unwanted changes to security settings on devices. With … More →
Microsoft has announced today that the Windows 10 Tamper Protection security feature is now officially generally available for the Enterprise and consumers. Along with this announcement, Microsoft will be enabling this security feature on all Windows 10 devices by default. [...]
Windows 10 1903 users continue to complain that Start Menu is giving a critical error message and that Edge now will not launch after installing the latest KB4517389 cumulative update. For some, uninstalling the recent cumulative update has fixed these issues, but for others the Start Menu problem persists. [...]
Windows 10 1903 users continue to complain that Start Menu is giving a critical error message and that Edge now will not launch after installing the latest KB4517389 cumulative update. For some, uninstalling the recent cumulative update has fixed these issues, but for others the Start Menu problem persists. [...]
Microsoft has officially announced that Windows 10 version 1909 (19H2) is being called the November 2019 Update. This latest feature update is expected to be released at the end of October or in the beginning of November. [...]
Microsoft has released a new version of the Windows 10 Update Assistant in order to fix a local privilege escalation vulnerability. While there is no imminent threat, the only way to fix this vulnerability is to uninstall the program or download the latest version. [...]
A recent study commissioned by Microsoft and Intel reported that the cost of using a PC older than four years is more than buying a new one. As per StatsCanada, the country is home to around 1.2 million small and medium businesses. These businesses comprise 98.8 per cent of the total employee businesses in the…
Microsoft announced that 16 new Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) lower-privileged roles are available today in preview to help admins improve security by decreasing the number of Global administrators, and to enhance Azure and Microsoft 365 granular delegation capabilities. [...]
Preempt researchers have discovered two vulnerabilities that may allow attackers to bypass a number of protections and mitigations against NTLM relay attacks and, in some cases, to achieve full domain compromise of a network. What is NTLM? NT LAN Manager (NTLM) is an authentication protocol developed by Microsoft, used to authenticate a client to resources on an Active Directory domain. “Interactive NTLM authentication over a network typically involves two systems: a client system, where the … More →
Two security vulnerabilities in Microsoft's NTLM authentication protocol allow attackers to bypass the MIC (Message Integrity Code) protection and downgrade NTLM security features leading to full domain compromise of a network. [...]
As predicted by Ivanti’s Chris Goettl, October 2019 Patch Tuesday came with a relatively small number of Microsoft updates and, curiously enough, with no security updates from Adobe. There is no report of any of the Microsoft bugs being exploited, but there is public PoC code for and info about a local privilege escalation flaw in Windows Error Reporting (CVE-2019-1315). Microsoft’s patches Microsoft has addressed nearly 60 vulnerabilities, nine of which are critical. Seven of … More →
Microsoft October 2019 Patch Tuesday addressed a total of 59 vulnerabilities. 9 of which are rated as critical and 49 as important.
The tech giant released its October 2019 Patch Tuesday security updates to address a total of 59 vulnerabilities in Windows operating systems and other software, 9 of which are rated as ‘critical’, 49 are ‘important’, and one ‘moderate’.
None of the vulnerabilities addressed by Microsoft was exploited by attackers in the wild or was publicly known.
Microsoft addressed two critical remote code execution flaws, tracked as CVE-2019-1238 and CVE-2019-1239, in the VBScript engine, both tie the way VBScript handles objects in memory. An attacker could exploit the flaw to cause memory corruption and execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user.
An attacker could trigger the flaws by tricking the victims into visiting a specially crafted website through Internet Explorer.
The attacker could also exploit these flaws using an application or Microsoft Office document that embeds an ActiveX control marked ‘safe for initialization’ that leverages the Internet Explorer rendering engine.
Microsoft addressed three critical memory corruption flaws in the Chakra scripting engine that could lead to remote code execution. The vulnerabilities affect the way Chakra scripting engine handles objects in memory in Microsoft Edge.
Microsoft has addressed a reverse RDP attack, an attacker could exploit the flaw to compromise client computers connecting to a malicious RDP server by exploiting a critical remote code execution issue in Windows built-in Remote Desktop Client application.
The attack scenario sees threat actors tricking victims into connecting to a malicious RDP server.
October 2019 Patch Tuesday security updates also addressed two NTLM authentication vulnerabilities, tracked as CVE 2019-1166 and CVE-2019-1338 that could be exploited by attackers to bypass the MIC (Message Integrity Code) protection on NTLM authentication.
“A tampering vulnerability exists in Microsoft Windows when a man-in-the-middle attacker is able to successfully bypass the NTLM MIC (Message Integrity Check) protection. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the ability to downgrade NTLM security features.” reads the security advisory for the CVE 2019-1166.
“To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker would need to tamper with the NTLM exchange. The attacker could then modify flags of the NTLM packet without invalidating the signature.”
The full list of vulnerabilities addressed with the release of October 2019 Patch Tuesday updates is available here.
Microsoft today rolling out its October 2019 Patch Tuesday security updates to fix a total of 59 vulnerabilities in Windows operating systems and related software, 9 of which are rated as critical, 49 are important, and one is moderate in severity.
What’s good about this month’s patch update is that after a very long time, none of the security vulnerabilities patched by the tech giant this
It's Patch Tuesday and Microsoft is servicing all supported version of Windows. If you use Windows 10 May 2019 Update and Windows 10 October 2018 Update on your computer at home or office, a new cumulative update is out with fixes and improvements. [...]
Microsoft released the October 2019 Microsoft Office security updates, bundling a total of 14 security updates and four cumulative updates across seven different products, nine of them patching remote code execution flaws. [...]
Today is Microsoft's October 2019 Patch Tuesday, which means your Windows admins are not having a good day. So be particularly nice to them! With the release of the October 2019 security updates, Microsoft has released 1 advisory (Windows 10 Servicing Stack Update) and updates for 59 vulnerabilities [...]
Microsoft’s Surface Pro X, unveiled in New York at its Surface launch event last week and landing in stores on Nov. 5th, is powered by the Microsoft SQ1 system-on-chip (SoC). Its release marked the first time in seven years that an ARM processor has appeared in a Surface device. The SQ1 is the birthchild of…
Microsoft has started to display a warning to users running Windows 10 1803, otherwise known as the April 2018 Update, that states the version is nearing end of support and that they should update to the latest version of Windows. [...]
Patches for Internet Explorer Zero-Day Causing Problems for Many Users
Microsoft released a new set of patches for a zero-day flaw in Internet Explorer recently fixed due to problems reported by users with the previous patch.
On September 23, Microsoft released an out-of-band patch to address a zero-day memory corruption flaw in Internet Explorer (CVE-2019-1367) that has been exploited in attacks in the wild.
The vulnerability resides in the Internet Explorer’s scripting engine, it affects the way that objects in memory are handled.
An attacker could exploit the vulnerability to gain the same privileges as the current user, the attack could be critical if the current user gains administrative privileges.
In order to exploit the vulnerability, an attacker could host a specially crafted website that is designed to trigger the flaw when Internet Explorer users will visit it. The attacker only has to trick victims into visiting the malicious website, for example, by sending to the victims a link to the malicious website via email or in a malicious email attachment (HTML file, PDF file, Microsoft Office document) that supports embedding the scripting engine content.
“A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that the scripting engine handles objects in memory in Internet Explorer. The vulnerability could corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user.” reads the security advisory published by Microsoft. “An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. “
On October 3, Microsoft released another set of patches for the zero-day vulnerability, because some users experienced certain printing issues following the installation of the initially released by the tech giant.
“To address a known printing issue customers might experience after installing the Security Updates or IE Cumulative updates that were released on September 23, 2019 for CVE-2019-1367, Microsoft is releasing new Security Updates, IE Cumulative Updates, and Monthly Rollup updates for all applicable installations of Internet Explorer 9, 10, or 11 on Microsoft Windows,” reads Microsoft Security Update Releases notification email sent to the users.
Several users reported that the cumulative update released by Microsoft is causing also boot issues and the crash of the start menu.
Microsoft pointed out that the IE Cumulative updates are separate from the October Patch Tuesday updates which are scheduled for October 8.
Mozilla says in an update to the Firefox 69.0.2 changelog that downloading files from the Internet may not work for Windows 10 users who have the Parental Controls feature toggled on and are part of a family group. [...]
Windows 10 1903 users have started reporting boot, printing, and Start Menu issues after installing the KB4524147 cumulative update that go away once the update is uninstalled. Microsoft has not acknowledged any of these issues as of yet, but the amount of reports indicate that there is something going on with this update. [...]
Microsoft says that a state-sponsored Iranian cyber-espionage group tracked as Phosphorus by the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) attempted to get account info on over 2,700 of its customers, attack 241 of them, and compromised four accounts between August and September. [...]
The apparent ease with which SIM hijacking attacks are being perpetrated to get the targets’ second authentication factor for crucial accounts (online banking, cryptocurrency exchange, online wallet) must have raised some doubts about the security of multi-factor authentication (MFA) – and rightly so. What users need to know and accept is that not all MFA options are equally secure but that, generally, they are all a safer option than using just a password. “Use of … More →
School is back in session across most of the world, and here in the United States most students look forward to a school holiday called ‘fall break.’ While we never have a Patch Tuesday off, this may actually be a bit of fall break for most us because I don’t anticipate many updates this month. Before we get into the forecast details, I’d like to provide some information around service stack updates (SSUs) and how … More →
The Abilities Centre has honoured Microsoft Canada with the 2019 Jim Flaherty Award for Leadership, Inclusion and Accessibility. The award was presented in recognition to the inclusion strategy of the company. The Office 365 applications by Microsoft, for example, offer various built-in capabilities aimed at making content creation easier for everyone and ensuring that the…
Microsoft is working on including a new tenant-wide idle session timeout feature for Microsoft 365 web apps to prevent information exposure that might stem from unauthorized access to systems left unattended. [...]
Microsoft is working on including a new tenant-wide idle session timeout feature for Microsoft 365 web apps designed to prevent information exposure that might stem from unauthorized access to systems left unattended. [...]
The last time Microsoft put an ARM processor in a Surface was in 2012 when the series first launched. Powered by an Nvidia Tegra chip, the Surface RT (Run Time) was ill-received due to the lack of native apps and the ultra-restrictive Windows 8 RT operating system. But ARM has resurfaced in the Surface Pro…
Anyone over the age of 40 in the UK will remember patiently browsing for holidays bargains on their TV via Teletext. While the TV version of Teletext Holidays died out years ago due to the creation of the world-wide-web, Teletext Holidays, a trading name of Truly Travel, continued as an online and telephone travel agent business. Verdict Media discovered an unsecured Amazon Web Services Service (Cloud Server) used by Teletext Holidays and was able to access 212,000call centre audio recordings with their UK customers. The audio recordings were taken between 10th April and 10th August 2016 and were found in a data repository called 'speechanalytics'. Businesses neglecting to properly secure their cloud services is an evermore common culprit behind mass data breaches of late. Utilising cloud-based IT systems does not absolve businesses of their IT security responsibilities at their cloud service provider.
Booking Holidays on Ceefax in the 1980s
Within the Teletext Holidays call recordings, customers can be heard arranging holiday bookings, providing call-centre agents partial payment card details, their full names and dates of birth of accompanying passengers. In some call recordings, Verdict Media advised customers private conversations were recorded while they were put on hold. Teletext Holidays said they have reported the data breach to the ICO.
Wikipedia was the subject to a major DDoS attack, which impacted the availability of the online encyclopaedia website in the UK and parts of Europe. While the culprit(s) behind the DDoS attack remains unknown, Wikipedia was quick to condemn it, it said was not just about taking Wikipedia offline, "Takedown attacks threaten everyone’s fundamental rights to freely access and share information. We in the Wikimedia movement and Foundation are committed to protecting these rights for everyone."
Criminals are increasingly targeting UK business executives and finance staff with ‘CEO Fraud’, commonly referred to as ‘whaling’ or Business Email Compromise (BEC) by cybersecurity professionals. CEO fraud involves the impersonation of a senior company executive or a supplier, to social engineer fraudulent payments. CEO fraud phishing emails are difficult for cybersecurity defence technologies to prevent, as such emails are specifically crafted (i.e. spear phishing) for individual recipients, do not contain malware-infected attachments or malicious weblinks for cyber defences to detect and block.
Criminals do their research, gaining a thorough understanding of business executives, clients, suppliers, and even staff role and responsibilities through websites and social media sites such as LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter. Once they determine who they need to target for maximum likelihood of a financial reward return, they customise a social engineering communication to an individual, typically through email, but sometimes through text messages (i.e. smishing), or over the phone, and even by postal letters to support their scam. They often create a tremendous sense of urgency, demanding an immediate action to complete a payment, impersonating someone in the business with high authority, such as the MD or CEO. The criminal’s ultimate goal is to pressurise and rush their targetted staff member into authorising and making a payment transaction to them. Such attacks are relatively simple to arrange, require little effort, and can have high financial rewards for criminals. Such attacks require little technical expertise, as email spoofing tools and instructions are freely available on the open and dark web. And thanks to the internet, fraudsters globally can effortless target UK businesses with CEO fraud scams.
UK Universities are being targetted by Iranian hackers in an attempt to steal secrets, according to the UK National Cyber Security Centre and the UK Foreign Office. The warning came after the US deputy attorney general Rod Rosenstein said: “Iranian nationals allegedly stole more than 31 terabytes of documents and data from more than 140 American universities, 30 American companies, five American government agencies, and also more than 176 universities in 21 foreign countries."
On 23rd September 2019, Microsoft released an ‘emergency update’ (Out-of-Band) for Internet Explorer (versions 9, 10 & 11), which addresses a serious vulnerability (CVE-2019-1367) discovered by a Google researcher and is said to be known to be actively exploited. The flaw allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a victim's computer through a specially crafted website, enabling an attacker to gain the same user rights as the user and to infect the computer with malware. It is a particularly dangerous exploit if the user has local administrator rights, in such instances an attacker gain full control over a user's computer remotely. This vulnerability is rated as 'Critical' by Microsoft and has a CVSS score of 7.6. Microsoft recommends that customers apply Critical updates immediately.
Research by AT&T Cybersecurity found 58% of IT security professionals would refuse to pay following a ransomware attack, while 31% said they would only pay as a last resort. A further 11% stated paying was, in their opinion, the easiest way to get their data back. While 40% of IT Security Pros Would Outlaw Ransomware Payments. It is clear from the latest threat intelligence reports, that the paying of ransomware ransoms is fuelling further ransomware attacks, including targetted attacks UK businesses.
A new update is now available for Microsoft Edge Insiders within the Dev channel and the main focus of today's update is the introduction of dark mode for the new tab page (NTP) and media autoplay blocking settings. There are a host of stability improvements, fixes and enhancement as well. [...]
Microsoft released the October 2019 non-security Microsoft Office updates that fix issues and add improvements to Windows Installer (MSI) editions of Office 2013 2010, Office 2013, and Office 2016. [...]
Microsoft announced that Windows 7 Extended Security Updates (ESU) will also be made available for small and midsize businesses (SMBs) to allow them to stay secure during the Windows 10 migration process. [...]
Microsoft acknowledged a new issue leading to intermittent issues when printing or completely breaking the printing capabilities of Windows devices after installing cumulative updates issued during late September. [...]
Microsoft announced last week it is going to expand the list of file extensions that are blocked in Outlook on the web.
Microsoft announced that it will immediately block other file extensions for its Outlook web users, it will impossible for them to download this type of attachments.
Microsoft pointed out that the newly blocked file types are rarely used, this means that most organizations will face no problems with the change.
The list of file types that will be blocked by Microsoft include ones used by popular programing languages such as “.py“, “.pyc“, “.pyo“, “.pyw“, “.pyz“, “.pyzw” (used by Python); “.ps1″, “.ps1xml”, “.ps2″, “.ps2xml”, “.psc1″, “.psc2″, “.psd1″, “.psdm1″, “.psd1″, “.psdm1″, “.cdxml” and “.pssc” (used by PowerShell); and “.jar” and “.jnlp” (used by Java).
Microsoft announced it will block also “.appcontent-ms“, “.settingcontent-ms“, “.cnt“, “.hpj“, “.website”, “.webpnp“, “.mcf“, “.printerexport“, “.pl“, “.theme”, “.vbp“, “.xbap“, “.xll“, “.xnk“, “.msu“, “.diagcab” and “.grp“.
Other file types that will be blocked by the tech giant are the ones having the “.appref-ms” extension used by Windows ClickOnce, the “.udl” extension used by Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC), the “.wsb” extension used by Windows sandbox, and the “.cer“, “.crt” and “.der” extensions associated with digital certificates.
“The following extensions are used by various applications.” reads the post published by Microsoft.”While the associated vulnerabilities have been patched (for years, in most cases), they are being blocked for the benefit of organizations that might still have older versions of the application software in use:
In case organizations have to allow for the use of a particular file type, admins could add specific extensions to the AllowedFileTypes property of users’ OwaMailboxPolicy objects.
“If you want a particular file type to be allowed, you can add that file type to the AllowedFileTypes property of your users’ OwaMailboxPolicy objects.” continues the post.“To add a file extension to the AllowedFileTypes list:
“Security of our customer’s data is our utmost priority, and we hope our customers will understand and appreciate this change. Change can be disruptive, so we hope the information here explains what we’re doing and why,” Microsoft concludes.
Windows 10 version 1903 on ARM has gotten an additional virtualization-based security feature that creates secured regions of memory that are isolated from the operating system. These secured and isolated regions of memory can then be used by security solutions so that they are better protected from vulnerabilities in the operating s [...]
The Windows 10 1909 Feature Update is around the corner and is expected to be released sometime next week. Unlike previous Feature Updates, Windows 10 1909, codenamed 19H2, is more like a larger-than-normal cumulative update or service pack, but does contain some new features that we describe below. [...]
The Microsoft Edge Team is looking for Linux developers to provide feedback on how they use web browsers in their development environment. This feedback will then be used to flesh out the requirements for Microsoft Edge on Linux. [...]
Microsoft is currently working on adding a new Automated Incident Response playbook to Office 365 Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) to allow Security Operations (SecOps) teams to automatically investigate and remediate hacked accounts. [...]
Watch out Windows users!
There's a new strain of malware making rounds on the Internet that has already infected thousands of computers worldwide and most likely, your antivirus program would not be able to detect it.
Why? That's because, first, it's an advanced fileless malware and second, it leverages only legitimate built-in system utilities and third-party tools to extend its
Microsoft has decided to roll back their decision to add CCleaner to a blacklist that would prevent the software's official site, www.ccleaner.com, from be posted in the Microsoft Community Forums. [...]
A new fileless malicious campaign, dubbed Nodersok by Microsoft Defender ATP Research Team researchers who discovered it, drops its own LOLBins to infect Windows computers with a Node.js-based malware that will turn the devices into proxies. [...]
Microsoft released the first update to the Microsoft Edge Beta channel that brings the web browser to the 78.0.276.8 build, enables the tracking prevention feature by default, and adds new sign-in and sync features. [...]
Microsoft will soon be blocking an additional 38 file extension from being downloaded as attachments in Outlook on the Web in order to protect users from malicious files. These additional extensions includes files used by Java, PowerShell, Python, and various vulnerabilities. [...]
Microsoft has unexpectedly released out-of-band security updates to fix vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer and Microsoft Defender. The IE zero-day bug is deemed “critical”, as it’s being actively exploited to achieve partial or complete control of a vulnerable systems. The Internet Explorer vulnerability (CVE-2019-1367) CVE-2019-1367 is a memory corruption vulnerability in the scripting engine that could be exploited to achieve remote code execution. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same user rights … More →
With the end-of-life of Windows 7 and Server 2008, their users will no more receive security patches, the only way to remain protected is to trust in micropatches.
On January 14, 2020, support for Window 7, Windows Server 2008 and 2008 R2 will end, this means that users will no longer receive security updates.
In order to address security issued in their operating systems, users can install micropatches provided by third-party researchers.
0Patch platform from ACROS Security announced that it will released micropatches to address security flaws discovered in the Microsoft OSs after their end-on-life.
Micropatches are usually small stub of code that addresses security flaws in software products.
“Once we have a POC and know how the vulnerability was fixed by the people who know the vulnerable code best (i.e., Microsoft developers), we’ll port their fix, functionally speaking, as a series of micropatches to the vulnerable code in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008, and test them against the POC.” reads the post published by 0Patch. “After additional side-effect testing we‘ll publish the micropatches and have them delivered to users’ online machines within 60 minutes.”
The experts at 0Patch will review Microsoft’s security advisories to determine which flaws could affect Windows versions that reached the EOF. Then they will provide micropatches for most critical ones.
0Patch researchers will provide micropatches for critical and easy exploitable flaws that could be exploited by remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems.
Of course, the time to release a micropatch depends on the complexity of porting the official patch and the time to get a working proof-of-concept (PoC) code to test the vulnerability.
Micropatches for high-risk flaws will be available to non-paying customers too.
0Patch will providesmicro patches for both Windows 7 and Server 2008 for at least one year.
Amid a wider range of issues to handle, a majority of board members and senior executives responsible for their organization’s cyber risk management had less than a day in the last year to spend focused on cyber risk issues, the 2019 Marsh Microsoft Global Cyber Risk Perception Survey results have revealed. This lack of time for senior leaders to focus on cyber risk comes as concern over cyber threats hits an all-time high, and as … More →
Microsoft has released a fix for a bug that made its Windows Defender Antivirus fail after a few seconds when users opted for a Quick or Full scan of the system. Users are advised to implement security intelligence update (virus definitions) v1.301.1684.0 or later to get the software back on track. Bundled antivirus protection Windows Defender Antivirus is an anti-malware component of Microsoft Windows 10 – in essence, free antivirus software. The software used to … More →
Red Hat, the world’s leading provider of open source solutions, announced that more than four million customer systems worldwide are now automated by Red Hat Ansible Automation. Customers, including Energy Market Company, Microsoft, Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Surescripts all use Red Hat Ansible Automation to automate and orchestrate their IT operations, helping to expand automation across IT stacks. According to a blog post by Chris Gardner with Forrester Research, who was the author … More →
Twitter boss, Jack Doresy, had his Twitter account was hacked at the end of August, with hackers using his account to send a stream of offensive messages to his 4.2 million followers. It appears Jack was using his mobile phone to provide multi-factor authentication access to his Twitter account, a good solid security practice to adopt, however, it appears his Twitter account password and his mobile phone SMS service were both compromised, the latter probably due to either sim card swap fraud social engineering by the hacker, or by an insider at his mobile network service provider.
It was another bumper 'Patch Tuesday', with Microsoft releasing security updates for 93 security vulnerabilities, including 31 which are 'critical' rated in Windows, Server 2019, IE, Office, SharePoint and Chakra Core.
Amongst the Microsoft patch release were patches for two serious 'bluekeep' or 'WannaCry' wormable vulnerabilities in Windows Remote Desktop Services, CVE-2019-1181 and CVE-2019-1182. A Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) blog post said Microsoft had found the vulnerabilities as part of a project to make Remote Desktop Services more secure, and stated 'future malware that exploits these could propagate from vulnerable computer to vulnerable computer without user interaction.” The fixes for these are available for download in the Microsoft Security Update Guide.
A United Nations report concluded North Korea funded its weapons programme to the tune of $2 billion from profits from cyber attacks. 'Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cyber actors, many operating under the direction of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, raise money for its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programmes, with total proceeds to date estimated at up to two billion US dollars,' the UN report said. The report referred at least 35 instances of North Korean-sponsored cryptomining activity or attacks on financial companies and cryptocurrency exchanges. The attacks spanned a total of 17 countries and were designed to generate funds the would be hard to trace and elude regulatory oversight.
Paying ransomware demands will fuel further ransomware attacks, so I expect ransomware attacks to further escalate. So the big question is, can we expect UK further local government authorities and large organisations to be hard hit by mass ransomware outbreaks? The answer to that will come down to how well their patch management is, and whether lessons have been truly learnt from the destructive 2017 WannaCry ransomware outbreaks, which took down a number of NHS services. Given the recent BlueKeep Microsoft Windows critical vulnerabilityis expected to spark new strains of ransomware in the coming months, ransomware very much like WannaCry with the devasting capability of rapidly infecting and propagating via unpatched Microsoft Windows systems connected to flat networks, we shall soon find out.
An interesting article by Reuters revealed eight of the world’s biggest technology service providers were successfully hacked by APT10 aka 'StonePanda'. APT10, linked to China hackers, operated a sustained campaign over a number of years dubbed “Cloud Hopper”, which Reuters revealed affected Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE), IBM, Fujitsu, Tata Consultancy Services, NTT Data, Dimension Data, Computer Sciences Corporation, and DXC Technology. The ATP10 attackers searched for access points into networks an IT systems, when found, extracted confidential information and potential trade secrets. These reported hacks may well be the tip of the iceberg. The Register stated, having gained access to the major service providers, the APT10 group may have gained access to many of their customers. Those customers run into the millions, “dramatically increasing the pool of valuable industrial and aerospace data stolen.”
The headlines this week further ramps up the pressure on the UK government to follow suit, by implementing a similar ban on the use of Huawei smartphones and network devices within the UK, a step beyond their initial 5G critical infrastructure ban announced last month. But is this really about a foreign nation-state security threat? Or is it more about it geo-economics and international politicking?
Huawei: A Security Threat or an Economic Threat?
It’s no secret that Huawei was founded in 1987 by Ren Zhengfei, a former engineer in the People's Liberation Army, and the company was quickly built with the backing of major Chinese state and military contracts. But the US government, secret services and military are also known to invest heavily in Silicon Valley and US tech firms. In recent weeks there have been a number of accusations about deliberate backdoors placed within Huawei devices, implying the usage of Huawei devices could aid Chinese forces in conducting covert surveillance, and with potentially causing catastrophic impacting cyber attacks.
The reality is all software and IT hardware will have a history of exploitable vulnerabilities, and it is pretty much impossible to determine which could be intentionally placed covert backdoors, especially as an advanced and sophisticated nation-state actor would seek to obfuscate any deliberately placed backdoor as an unintentional vulnerability.
For instance, the following are critical security vulnerabilities reported within tech made by US firms in just the last 9 days, no suggestion any of these are intentionally placed backdoors:
Secret Backdoors are already unintentionally there to be discovered
The more usual approach taken by nation-state intelligence and offensive cyber agencies is to invest in finding the unintentional backdoors already present in software and hardware. The discovery of new and completely unknown 'zero-day' security vulnerability is their primary aim. Non-published zero-days vulnerabilities are extremely valuable, clearly, a value lost if they were to inform the vendors about the vulnerability, as they would seek to quickly mitigate with a software patch.
The WhatsApp vulnerability reported last week was another public example of this approach, where a private Israeli firm NSO Group found a serious vulnerability within WhatsApp. But instead of informing Facebook to fix it, NSO created a tool to exploit the vulnerability, which it sold to various governments. The ethics of that is a debate for another day.
The Laws which allows Nation-States to Conduct Cyber Surveillance
The United States has significant surveillance powers with the "Patriot Act", the Freedom Act and spying internationally with FISA. China has its equivalent surveillance powers publicly released called the "2017 National Intelligence Law". This law states Chinese organisations are "obliged to support, cooperate with, and collaborate with national intelligence work". But just like Apple, Microsoft and Google, Huawei has categorically said it would refuse to comply with any such government requests, in a letter in UK MPs in February 2019. Huawei also confirmed "no Chinese law obliges any company to install backdoors", a position they have backed up by an international law firm based in London. The letter went on to say that Huawei would refuse requests by the Chinese government to plant backdoors, eavesdropping or spyware on its telecommunications equipment.
Why the UK Gov is stuck between a Rock and Hard Place
The UK government continue to be stuck between a rock and a hard place, playing a balancing act of trying to keep both the United States and China happy, in a bid to score lucrative post-Brexit multi-billion-pound trade deals. This status-quo leaves UK Huawei smartphone consumers and UK businesses using Huawei network devices, caught in the middle. However, due to the relentless US pressure causing regular negative mainstream media headlines about the security of Huawei products, the Chinese tech giant may well be driven out of UK markets without a UK government ban.
Quickly applying software updates (patching) to mitigate security vulnerabilities is a cornerstone of both a home and business security strategy. So it was interesting to see how the mainstream news media reported the disclosure of three separate ‘major’ security vulnerabilities this week, within WhatsApp, Microsoft Windows and Intel Processors.
WhatsApp The WhatsApp security flaw by far received the most the attention of the media and was very much the leading frontpage news story for a day. The WhatsApp vulnerability (CVE-2019-3568) impacts both iPhone and Android versions of the mobile messaging app, allowing an attacker to install surveillance software, namely, spyware called Pegasus, which access can the smartphone's call logs, text messages, and can covertly enable and record the camera and microphone. From a technical perspective, the vulnerability (CVE-2019-3568) can be exploited with a buffer overflow attack against WhatsApp's VOIP stack, this makes remote code execution possible by sending specially crafted SRTCP packets to the phone, a sophisticated exploit.
Should you be concerned? WhatsApp said it believed only a "select number of users were targeted through this vulnerability by an advanced cyber actor." According to the FT, that threat actor was an Israeli company called ‘NSO Group’. NSO developed the exploit to sell on, NSO advertises it sells products to government agencies "for fighting terrorism and aiding law enforcement investigations". NSO products (aka "spyware") is known to be used by government agencies in UAE, Saudi Arabia and Mexico.
So, if you are one of the 1.5 billion WhatsApp users, not a middle-east political activist or a Mexican criminal, you probably shouldn’t too worry about your smartphone being exploited in the past. If you were exploited, there would be signs, with unusual cliches and activity on your phone. Despite the low risk at present, all WhatsApp users should quickly update their WhatsApp app before criminals attempt to ‘copycat’ NSO Group exploitation.
How to Prevent Update the WhatsApp app. iOS
Open the Apple AppStore App
Search for WhatsApp Messenger
Tap 'Update' and the latest version of WhatsApp will be installed
App Version 2.19.51 and above fixes the vulnerability
Open Google Play Store
Tap the menu in the top left corner
Go to “My Apps & Games”
Tap ‘Update’ next to WhatsApp Messenger and the latest version of WhatsApp will be installed
App Version 2.19.134 and above fixes the vulnerability
Microsoft Worm Vulnerability CVE-2019-0708
Making fewer media headlines was the announcement of a new “wormable” vulnerability discovered within the various versions of the Microsoft’s Windows operating system. The vulnerability CVE-2019-0708 is within Window's “remote desktop services” component.
This vulnerability is by far the most dangerous vulnerability reported this week, probably this year, it is a similar flaw to what the WannaCry malware exploited on mass in May 2017. WannaCry was a ransomware worm which severely impacted the operation of several large organisations, including the NHS. It exploited a similar Microsoft Windows vulnerability which enabled the malware to quickly self-propagate (worm) across networks and infecting vulnerable systems on mass with ransomware, rendering such systems unusable.
Such is the concern of a second WannaCry style attack due to this flaw, Microsoft has taken the rare step of releasing security patches for their unsupported versions of the Windows operating system, such as Windows XP and Windows Server 2003.
How to Prevent Apply the latest Microsoft Windows Update. Microsoft has said anti-virus products will not provide any protection against the exploitation of this vulnerability, therefore applying the Microsoft May 2019 Security Update, as released on Tuesday 14th May 2019, is the only way to be certain of protecting against the exploitation of this critical vulnerability
Ensure automatic updates is always kept switched on. Windows by default should attempt to download and install the latest security updates, typically you will be prompted to apply the update and accept a reboot, do this without delay.
To double check, select the Start menu, followed by the gear cog icon on the left. Then, select Update & Security and Windows Update.
Businesses must also seek to apply Microsoft security updates as soon as they are released. Typically large organisations control the release of Microsoft security patches centrally, they should monitor and risk assess the importance of newly released security updates, and then apply across their IT estate at a rate based on risk.
Intel CPU ZombieLoad Vulnerability
There was little mainstream coverage about a third major security vulnerability reported this week. Coined 'ZombieLoad side-channel processor', this vulnerability is present in almost every Intel processor made since 2011. This hardware vulnerability is a concern to businesses which use or provide cloud services. This flaw can also be mitigated by patching, with Microsoft, Apple, Amazon and Google all releasing security patches. For further information about the Intel CPU vulnerability, read the following posts.
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) launched a free online tool called "Exercise in a Box", designed by the UK cyber intelligence boffins to help organisations prepare in managing major cyber attacks. The premise, is the tool will help UK organisations avoid scenarios such as the 2017’s Wannacry attacks, which devastated NHS IT systems and placed patient lives at risk.
German drug manufacturing giant, Beyer, found a malware infection, said to originate from a Chinese group called "Wicked Panda". The malware in question was WINNIT, which is known in the security industry and allows remote access into networks, allowing hackers to deliver further malware and to conduct exploits. In my view, the presence of WINNIT is a sure sign a covert and sustained campaign by a sophisticated threat actor, likely focused on espionage given the company's sector. Beyer stressed there was no evidence of data theft, but were are still investigating.
Another manufacturing giant severely hit by a cyber attack this month was Aebi Schmidt. A ransomware outbreak impacted its business' operations globally, with most of the damage occurring at their European base. The ransomware wasn't named, but it left multiple Windows systems, on their presumably flat network infrastructure, paralyzed.
I am aware of school children getting sucked into this illicit world, typically starts with them seeking to take over better online game accounts after their own account is compromised, they quickly end up with more money than they can spend. Aside from keeping an eye on what your children are up to online as a parent, it goes to underline the importance of using unique complex passwords with every web account (use a password manager or vault to help you - see password security section on the Security Expert website). And always use Multi-Factor Authentication where available, and if you suspect or have are informed your account 'may' have compromised, change your password straight away.
I was a panellist at the e-Crime & Cybersecurity Congress last week, the discussion was titled 'What's happening to your business? Cloud security, new business metrics and future risks and priorities for 2019 and beyond", a recap of the points I made.
Cloud is the 'Default Model' for Business
Cloud is now the default model for IT services in the UK; cloud ticks all the efficiency boxes successful business continually craves. Indeed, the 'scales of economy' benefits are not just most cost-effective and more agile IT services, but also include better cybersecurity (by the major cloud service providers), even for the largest of enterprises. It is not the CISO's role to challenge the business' cloud service mitigation, which is typically part of a wider digital transformation strategy, but to ensure cloud services are delivered and managed to legal, regulatory and client security requirements, and in satisfaction of the board's risk appetite, given they ultimately own the cybersecurity risk, which is an operational business risk.
There are security pitfalls with cloud services, the marketing gloss of 'the cloud' should not distract security professionals into assuming IT security will be delivered as per the shiny sales brochure, as after all, cloud service providers should be considered and assessed in the same way as any other traditional third-party IT supplier to the business.
Cloud Security should not be an afterthought It is essential for security to be baked into a new cloud services design, requirements determination, and in the procurement process. In particular, defining and documenting the areas of security responsibility with the intended cloud service provider.
Cloud does not absolve the business of their security responsibilities All cloud service models, whether the standard models of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) or Software as a Service (SaaS), always involve three areas of security responsibilities to define and document:
Cloud Service Provider Owned
Shared (Cloud Service Provider & Business)
For example with a PaaS model, the business is fully responsible for application deployment onto the cloud platform, and therefore the security of applications. The cloud service provider is responsible for the security of the physical infrastructure, network and operating system layers. The example of the 'shared' responsibility with this model, are the processes in providing and managing privileged operating system accounts within the cloud environment.
Regardless of the cloud model, data is always the responsibility of the business.
A "Trust but Verify" approach should be taken with cloud service providers when assuring the security controls they are responsible for. Where those security responsibilities are owned by or shared with the cloud service provider, ensure the specific controls and processes are detailed within a contract or in a supporting agreement as service deliverables, then oversight the controls and processes through regular assessments.
The cloud security guidance resources I recommended were:
If that's the case, let's talk - I'd like to respectfully ask the entire RSA Conference just 1 simple cyber security question -
Question: What lies at the very foundation of cyber security and privileged access of not just the RSAs, EMCs, Dells, CyberArks, Gartners, Googles, Amazons, Facebooks and Microsofts of the world, but also at the foundation of virtually all cyber security and cloud companies and at the foundation of over 85% of organizations worldwide?
For those who may not know the answer to this ONE simple cyber security question, the answer's in line 1 here.
For those who may know the answer, and I sincerely hope that most of the world's CIOs, CISOs, Domain Admins, Cyber Security Analysts, Penetration Testers and Ethical Hackers know the answer, here are 4 simple follow-up questions -
Q 1. Should your organization's foundational Active Directory be compromised, what could be its impact?
Q 2. Would you agree that the (unintentional, intentional or coerced) compromise of a single Active Directory privileged user could result in the compromise of your organization's entire foundational Active Directory?
Q 3. If so, then do you know that there is only one correct way to accurately identify/audit privileged users in your organization's foundational Active Directory, and do you possess the capability to correctly be able to do so?
Q 4.If you don't, then how could you possibly know exactly how many privileged users there are in your organization's foundational Active Directory deployment today, and if you don't know so, ...OMG... ?!
You see, if even the world's top cyber security and cloud computing companies themselves don't know the answers to such simple, fundamental Kindergarten-level cyber security questions, how can we expect 85% of the world's organizations to know the answer, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, what's the point of all this fancy peripheral cyber security talk at such conferences when organizations don't even know how many (hundreds if not thousands of) people have the Keys to their Kingdom(s)?!
Today Active Directory is at the very heartof Cyber Security and Privileged Access at over 85% of organizations worldwide, and if you can find me even ONE company at the prestigious RSA Conference 2019 that can help organizations accurately identify privileged users/access in 1000s of foundational Active Directory deployments worldwide, you'll have impressed me.
Those who truly understand Windows Security know that organizations can neither adequately secure their foundational Active Directory deployments nor accomplish any of these recent buzzword initiatives like Privileged Access Management, Privileged Account Discovery, Zero-Trust etc. without first being able to accurately identify privileged users in Active Directory.
Today, to give a hint for the answer to this1 question, I asked possibly the most important cyber security question in the world, one that directly impacts the foundational security of 1000s of organizations worldwide, and thus one that impacts the financial security of billions of people worldwide -
What's the World's Most Important Active Directory Security Capability?
A few days ago I asked a (seemingly) very simple question ; no I'm not referring to this one, I'm referring to this one here -
Can Anyone (i.e. any Cyber Security Company or Expert) Help Thousands of Microsoft's Customers MITIGATE the Risk Posed by Mimikatz DCSync?
Here's why I did so - While there's a lot of info out there on the WWW about how to use Mimikatz DCSync, and/or how to detect its use, there isn't one other* single correct piece of guidance out there on how to mitigate the risk posed by Mimkatz DCSync.
So, as promised, today I am (literally) going to show you exactly how thousands of organizations worldwide can now easily and demonstrably actually mitigate the very serious cyber security risk posed to their foundational security by Mimikatz DCSync.
In light of what I've shared below, organizations worldwide can now easily mitigate the serious risk posed by Mimikatz DCSync.
First, A Quick Overview
For those who may not know, and there are millions who don't, there are three quick things to know about Mimikatz DCSync.
Mimikatz DCSync, a Windows security tool, is the creation of the brilliant technical expertise of Mr. Benjamin Delpy, whose work over the years has very likely (caused Microsoft a lot of pain ;-) but/and) helped substantially enhance Windows Security.
Mimikatz DCSync targets an organization's foundational Active Directory domains, and instantly gives any attacker who has sufficient privileges to be able to replicate sensitive content from Active Directory, access to literally everyone's credentials!
Thus far, the only guidance out there is on how to DETECT its use, but this is one of those situations wherein if you're having to rely on detection as a security measure, then its unfortunately already TOO late, because the damage has already been done.
Detection Is Hardly Sufficient
They say a picture's worth a thousand words, so perhaps I'll paint a picture for you. Relying on detection as a security measure against Mimikatz DCSync is akin to this -
Lets say a nuclear weapon just detonated in a city, and the moment it did, detection sensors alerted the city officials about the detonation. Well, within the few seconds in which they received the alert, the whole city would've already been obliterated i.e. by the time you get the alert, literally everyone's credentials (including of all privileged users) would've already been compromised!
Make not mistake about it - a single successful use of Mimikatz DCSync against an organization's foundational Active Directory domain is tantamount to a complete forest-wide compromise, and should be considered a massive organizational cyber security breach, the only way to recover from which is to completely rebuild the entire Active Directory forest from the ground up!
This is why detection is grossly insufficient as a security measure, and what organizations need is the ability to prevent the use of Mimikatz DCSync's against their foundational Active Directory domains & thus the ability to mitigate this risk is paramount.
How to Mitigate Mimikatz DCSync The key to mitigating this risk lies in identifying what it technically takes to be able to successfully use Mimikatz DCSync.
Specifically, if you know exactly what privileges an attacker needs to be able to successfully use Mimikatz DCSync against your Active Directory domain, then by ensuring that only highly-trustworthy, authorized individuals (and not a single other individual) actually currently possess those required privileges in your IT infrastructure, you can easily mitigate this risk.
Technically speaking, all that an attacker needs to successfully use Mimikatz DCSync is sufficient Get Replication Changes All effective permissions on the domain root object of an Active Directory domain, so all that organizations need to do is accurately identify exactly who has these effective permissions on the domain root object of each of their Active Directory domains.
While by default only the default administrative Active Directory security groups are granted this permission, since most Active Directory deployments have been around for years, and have likely gone through a substantial amount of access provisioning, in most Active Directory, a lot many more individuals than merely the members of the default AD admin groups may likely have this highly sensitive effective permission granted to them, either directly or via group membership, some of which may be direct, whilst others may be via nested group memberships, resulting in a potentially large and unknown attack surface today.
Now, it is paramount to understand ONE subtle but profound difference here - it is NOT who has what permissions on the domain root that matters, but who has what effective permissions on the domain root that matters, and this difference could be the difference between a $100 B organization being completely compromised or being completely protected from compromise.
The Key - Active Directory Effective Permissions If you've followed what I've shared above, then you'll agree and understand that the key to being able to successfully mitigate the serious risk posed by Mimikatz DCSync lies in being able to accurately determine effective permissions in Active Directory.
In fact Effective Permissions are so important, essential and fundamental to Windows and Active Directory Security, that of the four tabs in all of Microsoft's Active Directory Management Tooling, one entire tab is dedicated to Effective Permissions.
Unfortunately, it turns out that not only is Microsoft's native Effective Permissions Tab not always accurate, it is substantially inadequate, and while I could elaborate on that, I'd rather let you come to the same conclusion yourself, and this ONE glaring inadequacy will be self-evident the moment you attempt to use it to try and find out exactly whom amongst the thousands of domain user account holders in your Active Directory domain(s), actually has the required effective permissions. In fact, the same is true of all tools/scripts that involve the use of Microsoft's APIs to do so, such as this dangerously inaccurate free tool.
Fortunately, in a world whose population is 7,000,000,000+ today, thanks to one (1) inconsequential individual, there's hope...
Finally, How to Easily and Reliably Mitigate the Risk Posed by Mimikatz DCSync
Here's a very short (and perhaps boring but insightful) video on how organizations worldwide can reliably mitigate this risk -
Note: This is NOT intended to demonstrate our unique tooling. It is solely intended to show what it takes to mitigate this serious risk. We have no particular interest in licensing our unique tooling to anyone. As such, over the years, we have NEVER, not once pitched our tooling to anyone; we've had almost 10,000 organizations worldwide knock at our doors completely unsolicited, so I hope that makes this point unequivocally.
Thus, as seen in the short video above, with the right guidance (knowledge) and capability (tooling), organizations worldwide can now easily and reliably mitigate the serious cyber security risk posed by Mimikatz DCSync to their foundational security.
Complete, illustrated, step-by-step details on how to easily and correctly mitigate Mimikatz DCSync can now be found here.
I'll say this one last time - a single successful use of Mimikatz DCSync against an organization's foundational Active Directory is tantamount to a forest-wide compromise and constitutes a massive cyber security breach, which is why mitigation is paramount.
Hello again. Today onwards, as I had promised, it is finally TIME for us to help SAFEGUARD Microsoft's Global Ecosystem.
Before I share how we uniquely do so, or answer this paramount question, or ask more such ones, I thought I'd ask likely the most important question that today DIRECTLY impacts the foundational cyber security of 1000s of organizations worldwide.
HereIt Is -
What Is the 1 Essential Cyber Security Capability Without Which NOT a single Active Directory object, domain, forest or deployment can be adequately secured?
A Hint I'll give you a hint. It controls exactly who is denied and who is granted access to literally everything within Active Directory.
In fact, it comes into play every time anyone accesses anything in any Active Directory domain in any organization worldwide.
Make No Mistake
Make no mistake about it - one simply CANNOT adequately protect anything in any Active Directory WITHOUT possessing this ONE capability, and thus one simply cannot protect the very foundation of an organization's cyber security without possessing this ONE paramount cyber security capability. It unequivocally is as remarkably simple, elemental and fundamental as this.
Only 2 Kinds of Organizations Thus, today there are only two kinds of organizations worldwide - those that possess this paramount cyber security capability, and those that don't. Those that don't possess this essential capability do not have the means to, and thus cannot adequately protect, their foundational Active Directory deployments, and thus by logic are provably and demonstrably insecure.
If you know the answer, feel free to leave a comment below. I'll answer this question right here, likely on July04, 2018.
Given what it is I do, I don't squander a minute of precious time, unless something is very important, and this is very important.
Let me explain why this is so alarming, concerning and so important to cyber security, and why at many organizations (e.g. U.S. Govt., Paramount Defenses etc.), this could've either possibly resulted in, or in itself, be considered a cyber security breach.
Disclaimer: I'm not making any value judgment about Lenovo ; I'm merely basing this on what's already been said.
As you know, Microsoft's been brazenly leaving billions of people and thousands of organizations worldwide with no real choice but to upgrade to their latest operating system, Windows 10, which albeit is far from perfect, is much better than Windows Vista, Windows 8 etc., even though Windows 10's default settings could be considered an egregious affront to Privacy.
Consequently, at Paramount Defenses, we too felt that perhaps it was time to consider moving on to Windows 10, so we too figured we'd refresh our workforce's PCs. Now, of the major choices available from amongst several reputable PC vendors out there, Microsoft's Surface was one of the top trustworthy contenders, considering that the entirety of the hardware and software was from the same vendor (, and one that was decently trustworthy (considering that most of the world is running their operating system,)) and that there seemed to be no* pre-installed drivers or software that may have been written in China, Russia etc.
Side-note: Based on information available in the public domain, in all likelihood, software written in / maintained from within Russia, may still likely be running as System on Domain Controllers within the U.S. Government.
So we decided to consider evaluating Microsoft Surface devices and thus purchased a couple of brand-new Microsoft Surface devices from our local Microsoft Store for an initial PoC, and I decided to personally test-drive one of them -
The very first thing we did after unsealing them, walking through the initial setup and locking down Windows 10's unacceptable default privacy settings, was to connect it to the Internet over a secure channel, and perform a Windows Update.
I should mention that there was no other device attached to this Microsoft Surface, except for a Microsoft Signature Type Cover, and in particular there were no mice of any kind, attached to this new Microsoft surface device, whether via USB or Bluetooth.
Now, you're not going to believe what happened within minutes of having clicked the Check for Updatesbutton!
Windows Update Downloaded and Installed anUntrusted Self-Signed Lenovo Device Driver on Microsoft Surface! -
Within minutes, Windows Update automatically downloaded and had installed, amongst other packages (notably Surface Firmware,) an untrusted self-signed Kernel-mode device-driver, purportedly Lenovo - Keyboard, Other hardware - Lenovo Optical Mouse (HID), on this brand-new Microsoft Surface device, i.e. one signed with an untrusted WDK Test Certificate!
Here's a snapshot of Windows Update indicating that it had successfully downloaded and installed a Lenovo driver on this Surface device, and it specifically states "Lenovo - Keyboard, Other hardware - Lenovo Optical Mouse (HID)" -
We couldn't quite believe this. How could this be possible? i.e. how could a Lenovo driver have been installed on a Microsoft Surface device?
So we checked the Windows Update Log, and sure enough, as seen in the snapshot below, the Windows Update Log too confirmed that Windows Update had just downloaded and installed a Lenovo driver -
We wondered if there might have been any Lenovo hardware components installed on the Surface so we checked the Device Manager, and we could not find a single device that seemed to indicate the presence of any Lenovo hardware. (Later, we even took it back to the Microsoft Store, and their skilled tech personnel confirmed the same finding i.e. no Lenovo hardware on it.)
Specifically, as you can see below, we again checked the Device Manager, this time to see if it might indicate the presence of any Lenovo HID, such as a Lenovo Optical Mouse, and as you can see in the snapshot below, the only two Mice and other pointing devices installed on the system were from Microsoft - i.e. no Lenovo mouse presence indicated by Device Manager -
Next, we performed a keyword search of the Registry, and came across a suspicious Driver Package, as seen below -
It seemed suspicious to us because as can be seen in the snapshot above, all of the other legitimate driver package keys in the Registry had (as they should) three child sub-keys i.e. Configurations, Descriptors and Strings, but this specific one only had one subkey titled Properties, and when we tried to open it, we received an Access Denied message!
As you can see above, it seemed to indicate that the provider was Lenovo and that the INF file name was phidmou.inf, and the OEM path was "C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\Install", so we looked at the file system but this path didn't seem to exist on the file-system. So we performed a simple file-system search "dir /s phidmou.*" and as seen in the snapshot below, we found one instance of such a file, located in C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\.
Here's that exact location on the file-system, and as evidenced by the Created date and time for that folder, one can see that this folder (and thus all of its contents), were created on April 01, 2018 at around 1:50 am, which is just around the time the Windows Update log too confirmed that it had installed the Lenovo Driver -
When we opened that location, we found thirteen items, including six drivers -
Next, we checked the Digital Signature on one of the drivers, PELMOUSE.SYS, and we found that it was signed using a self-signed test Windows Driver certificate, i.e. the .sys files were SELF-SIGNED by a WDKTestCert and their digital signatures were NOT OK, in that they terminated in a root certificate that is not trusted by the trust provider -
Finally, when we clicked on the View Certificate button, as can be seen below, we could see that this driver was in fact merely signed by a test certificate, which is only supposed to be used for testing purposes during the creation and development of Kernel-mode drivers. Quoting from Microsoft's documentation on Driver Testing "However, eventually it will become necessary to test-sign your driver during its development, and ultimately release-sign your driver before publishing it to users." -
Clearly, the certificate seen above is NOT one that is intended to be used for release signing, yet, here we have a Kernel-mode driver downloaded by Windows Update and installed on a brand new Microsoft surface, and all its signed by is a test certificate, and who knows who wrote this driver!
Again, per Microsoft's guidelines on driver signing, which can also be found here, "After completing test signing and verifying that the driver is ready for release, the driver package has to be release signed", and AFAIK, release signing not only requires the signer to obtain and use a code-signing certificate from a code-signing CA, it also requires a cross cert issued by Microsoft.
If that is indeed the case, then a Kernel-mode driver that is not signed with a valid code-signing certificate, and one whose digital signature does not contain Microsoft's cross cert, should not even be accepted into the Windows Update catalog.
It is thus hard to believe that a Windows Kernel-Mode Driver that is merely self-signed using a test certificate would even make it into the Windows Update catalog, and further it seems that in this case, not only did it make it in, it was downloaded, and in fact successfully installed onto a system, which clearly seems highly suspicious, and is fact alarming and deeply-concerning!
How could this be? How could Windows Update (a trusted system process of the operating system), which we all (have no choice but to) trust (and have to do so blindly and completely) have itself installed an untrusted self-signed Lenovo driver (i.e. code running in Kernel-Mode) on a Microsoft Surface device?
Frankly, since this piece of software was signed using a self-signed test cert, who's to say this was even a real Lenovo driver? It could very well be some malicious code purporting to be a Lenovo driver. Or, there is also the remote possibility that it could be a legitimate Lenovo driver, that is self-signed, but if that is the case, its installation should not have been allowed to succeed.
To us, this is unacceptable, alarming and deeply concerning, and here's why.
We just had, on a device we consider trustworthy (, and could possibly have engaged in business on,) procured from a vendor we consider trustworthy (considering that the entire world's cyber security ultimately depends on them), an unknown, unsigned piece of software of Chinese origin that is now running in Kernel-mode, installed on the device, by this device's vendor's (i.e. Microsoft's) own product (Windows operating system's) update program!
We have not had an opportunity to analyze this code, but if it is indeed malicious in any way, in effect, it would've, unbeknownst to us and for no fault of ours, granted System-level control over a trusted device within our perimeter, to some entity in China.
How much damage could that have caused? Well, suffice it to say that, for they who know Windows Security well, if this was indeed malicious, it would've been sufficient to potentially compromise any organization within which this potentially suspect and malicious package may have been auto-installed by Windows update. (I've elaborated a bit on this below.)
In the simplest scenario, if a company's Domain Admins had been using this device, it would've been Game Over right there!
This leads me to the next question - we can't help but wonder how many such identical Surface devices exist out there today, perhaps at 1000s of organizations, on which this suspicious unsigned Lenovo driver may have been downloaded and installed?
This also leads me to another very important question - Just how much trust can we, the world, impose in Windows Update?
In our case, it just so happened to be, that we happened to be in front of this device during this Windows update process, and that's how we noticed this, and by the way, after it was done, it gave the familiar Your device is upto date message.
Speaking which, here's another equally important question - For all organizations that are using Windows Surface, and may be using it for mission-critical or sensitive purposes (e.g. AD administration), what is the guarantee that this won't happen again?
I ask because if you understand cyber security, then you know, that it ONLY takes ONE instance of ONE malicious piece of software to be installed on a system, to compromise the security of that system, and if that system was a highly-trusted internal system (e.g. that machine's domain computer account had the "Trusted for Unconstrained Delegation" bit set), then this could very likely also aid perpetrators in ultimately gaining complete command and control of the entire IT infrastructure. As I have already alluded to above, if by chance the target/compromised computer was one that was being used by an Active Directory Privileged User, then, it would be tantamount to Game Over right then and there!
Think about it - this could have happened at any organization, from say the U.S. Government to the British Government, or from say a Goldman Sachs to a Palantir, or say from a stock-exchange to an airline, or say at a clandestine national security agency to say at a nuclear reactor, or even Microsoft itself. In short, for absolutely no fault of theirs, an organization could potentially have been breached by a likely malicious piece of software that the operating system's own update utility had downloaded and installed on the System, and in 99% of situations, because hardly anyone checks what gets installed by Windows Update (now that we have to download and install a whopping 600MB patch every Tuesday), this would likely have gone unnoticed!
Again, to be perfectly clear, I'm not saying that a provably malicious piece of software was in fact downloaded and installed on a Microsoft Surface device by Windows Update. What I'm saying is that a highly suspicious piece of software, one that was built and intended to run in Kernel-mode and yet was merely signed with a test certificate, somehow was automatically downloaded and installed on a Microsoft Surface device, and that to us is deeply concerning, because in essence, if this could happen, then even at organizations that may be spending millions on cyber security, a single such piece of software quietly making its way in through such a trusted channel, could possibly instantly render their entire multi-million dollar cyber security apparatus useless, and jeopardize the security of the entire organization, and this could happen at thousands of organizations worldwide.
With full respect to Microsoft and Mr. Nadella, this is deeply concerning and unacceptable, and I'd like some assurance, as I'm sure would 1000s of other CEOs and CISOs, that this will never happen again, on any Surface device, in any organization.
In our case, this was very important, because had we put that brand new Surface device that we procured from none other than the Microsoft Store, into operation (even it we had re-imaged it with an ultra-secure locked-down internal image), from minute one, post the initial Windows update, we would likely have had a potentially compromised device running within our internal network, and it could perhaps have led to us being breached.
If I Were Microsoft, I'd Send a Plane Dear Microsoft, we immediately quarantined that Microsoft Surface device, and we have it in our possession.
If I were you, I'd send a plane to get it picked up ASAP, so you can thoroughly investigate every little aspect of this to figure out how this possibly happened, and get to the bottom of it! (Petty process note: The Microsoft Store let us keep the device for a bit longer, but will not let us return the device past June 24, and the only reason we've kept it, is in case you'd want to analyze it.) Here's why. At the very least, if I were still at Microsoft, and in charge of Cyber Security -
I'd want to know how an untrusted Kernel-mode device driver made it into the Windows Catalog
I'd want to know why a Microsoft Surface device downloaded a purportedly Lenovo driver
I'd want to know how Windows 10 permitted and in fact itself installed an untrusted driver
I'd want to know exactly which SKUs of Microsoft Surface this may have happened on
I'd want to know exactly how many such Microsoft Surface devices out there may have downloaded this package
Further, and as such, considering that Microsoft Corp itself may easily have thousands of Surface devices being used within Microsoft itself, if I were still with Microsoft CorpSec, I'd certainly want to know how many of their own Surface devices may have automatically downloaded and installed this highly suspicious piece of untrusted self-signed software.
In short, Microsoft, if you care as deeply about cyber security as you say you do, and by that I'm referring to what Mr. Nadella, the CEO of Microsoft, recently said (see video below: 0:40 - 0:44) and I quote "we spend over a billion dollars of R&D each year, in building security into our mainstream products", then you'll want to get to the bottom of this, because other than the Cloud, what else could be a more mainstream product for Microsoft today than, Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Surface ?! -
Folks, the only reason I decided to publicly share this is because I care deeply about cyber security, and I believe that this could potentially have impacted the foundational cyber security of any, and potentially, of thousands of organizations worldwide.
Hopefully, as you'll agree, a trusted component (i.e. Windows Update) of an operating system that virtually the whole world will soon be running on (i.e. Windows 10), should not be downloading and installing a piece of software that runs in Kernel-mode, when that piece of software isn't even digitally signed by a valid digital certificate, because if that piece of software happened to be malicious, then in doing so, it could likely, automatically, and for no fault of its users, instantly compromise the cyber security of possibly thousands of organizations worldwide. This is really as simple, as fundamental and as concerning, as that.
All in all, the Microsoft Surface is an incredible device, and because, like Apple's computers, the entire hardware and software is in control of a single vendor, Microsoft has a huge opportunity to deliver a trustworthy computing device to the world, and we'd love to embrace it. Thus, it is vital for Microsoft to ensure that its other components (e.g. Update) do not let the security of its mainstream products down, because per the Principle of Weakest Link, "a system is only as secure as is its weakest link."
For those may not know what Active Directory Security is (i.e. most CEOs, a few CISOs, and most employees and citizens,) suffice it to say that global security may depend on Active Directory Security, and thus may be a matter of paramount defenses.
Most respectfully, Sanjay
PS: Full Disclosure: I had also immediately brought this matter to the attention of the Microsoft Store. They escalated it to Tier-3 support (based out of New Delhi, India), who then asked me to use the Windows Feedback utility to share the relevant evidence with Microsoft, which I immediately and dutifully did, but/and I never heard back from anyone at Microsoft in this regard again.
PS2: Another small request to Microsoft - Dear Microsoft, while at it, could you please also educate your global customer base about the paramount importance of Active Directory Effective Permissions, which is the ONE capability without which not a single object in any Active Directory deployment can be adequately secured! Considering that Active Directory is the foundation of cyber security of over 85% of all organizations worldwide, this is important. Over the last few years, we've had almost 10,000 organizations from 150+ countries knock at our doors, and virtually none of them seem to know this most basic and cardinal fact of Windows Security. I couldn't begin to tell you how shocking it is for us to learn that most Domain Admins and many CISOs out there don't have a clue. Can you imagine just how insecure and vulnerable an organization whose Domain Admins don't even know what Active Directory Effective Permissions are, let alone possessing this paramount capability, could be today?
As we get ready to bid farewell to 2017, it may be fitting to recap notable happenings in Active Directory Security this year.
This appears to have been the year in which the mainstream Cyber Security community finally seems to have realized just how important and in fact paramount Active Directory Security is to cyber security worldwide, in that it appears that they may have finally realized that Active Directory is the very heart and foundation of privileged access at 85% of organizations worldwide!
I say so only because it appears to have been in this year that the following terms seem to have become mainstream cyber security buzzwords worldwide - Privileged User, Privileged Access, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Mimikatz DCSync, AdminSDHolder, Active Directory ACLs, Active Directory Privilege Escalation, Sneaky Persistence in Active Directory, Stealthy Admins in Active Directory, Shadow Admins in Active Directory, Domain Controllers, Active Directory Botnets, etc. etc.
Active Directory Security Goes Mainstream Cyber Security
Here are the 10 notable events in Active Directory Security that helped it get mainstream cyber security attention this year -
Since the beginning on the year, i.e. January 01, 2017, Mimikatz DCSync, an incredibly and dangerously powerful tool built by Benjamin Delpy, that can be used to instantly compromise the credentials of all Active Directory domain user accounts in an organization, including those of all privileged user accounts, has been gaining immense popularity, and appears to have become a must-have tool in every hacker, perpetrator and cyber security penetration-tester's arsenal.
On May 15, 2017, the developers of BloodHound introduced version 1.3, with the objective of enhancing its ability to find privilege escalation paths in Active Directory that could help find out "Who can become Domain Admin?" From that point on, Bloodhound, which is massively inaccurate, seems to have started becoming very popular in the hacking community.
On June 08, 2017, CyberArk a Billion+ $ cyber-security company, and the self-proclaimed leader in Privileged Account Security, introduced the concept of Shadow Admins in Active Directory, as well as released a (massively inaccurate) tool called ACLight to help organizations identify all such Shadow Admins in Active Directory deployments worldwide.
On June 14, 2017, Sean Metcalf, an Active Directory security enthusiast penned an entry-level post "Scanning for Active Directory Privileges and Privileged Accounts" citing that Active Directory Recon is the new hotness since attackers, Red Teamers and penetration testers have realized that control of Active Directory provides power over the organization!
On July 11, 2017, Preempt, a Cyber Security announced that they had found a vulnerability in Microsoft's implementation of LDAP-S that permits the enactment of an NTLM relay attack, and in effect could allow an individual to effectively impersonate a(n already) privileged user and enact certain LDAP operations to gain privileged access.
On July 26, 2017, the developers of (massively inaccurate) BloodHound gave a presentation titled An ACE Up the Sleeve - Designing Active Directory DACL Backdoors at the famed Black Hat Conference USA 2017. This presentation at Black Hat likely played a big role in bringing Active Directory Security to the forefront of mainstream Cyber Security.
Also on July 26, 2017, a second presentation on Active Directory Security at the Black Hat Conference titled The Active Directory Botnet introduced the world to a new attack technique that exploits the default access granted to all Active Directory users, to setup command and control servers within organizations worldwide. This too made waves.
On September 18, 2017, Microsoft's Advanced Threat Analytics (ATA) Team penned a detailed and insightful blog post titled Active Directory Access Control List - Attacks and Defense, citing that recently there has been a lot of attention regarding the use of Active Directory ACLs for privilege escalation in Active Directory environments. Unfortunately, in doing so Microsoft inadvertently ended up revealing just how little its ATA team seems to know about the subject.
On December 12, 2017, Preempt, a Cyber Security announced that they had found a flaw in Microsoft's Azure Active Directory Connect software that could allow Stealthy Admins to gain full domain control. They also suggested that organizations worldwide use their (massively inaccurate) tooling to find these Stealthy Admins in Active Directory.
Helping Defend Microsoft's Global Customer Base ( i.e. 85% of Organizations Worldwide )
Folks, since January 01, 2017, both, as former Microsoft Program Manager for Active Directory Security and as the CEO of Paramount Defenses, I've penned 50+ insightful blog posts to help educate thousands of organizations worldwide about...
...not just the paramount importance of Active Directory Security to their foundational security, but also about how to correctlysecure and defend their foundational Active Directory from every cyber security risk/challenge covered in points 1- 9 above.
I trust you're well. Today, I just wanted to take a few minutes to answer a few questions that I've been asked so many times.
Here are the answers to the Top-5 questions I am frequently asked -
You're the CEO of a company (Paramount Defenses), so why do you blog so often, and how do you have time to do so?
Good question. This is a bit of a unique situation, in that whilst I am the CEO of a company, I am also a subject matter expert in Active Directory Security (simply by virtue of my background) and thus I feel that it is my civic duty to help organizations understand the paramount importance of securing their foundational Active Directory deployments.
In fact, over the last 7+ years, I've penned 150+ blog posts on Active Directory Security (here) and Cyber Security (here) on various topics such as Active Directory Privilege Escalation, the OPM Breach, Kerberos Token Bloat, Eff Perms, AdminSDHolder, Mimikatz DCSync, Sneaky Persistence, How to Correctly Identify Stealthy Admins in Active Directory, How to Correctly Identify Shadow Admins in Active Directory etc. and most recently on Active Directory Botnets.
As to how I have the time to do so, that's actually not that difficult. We have a world-class team at Paramount Defenses, and I've been able to delegate a substantial amount of my CEO-related work amongst our executive leadership team.
Speaking of which, how big is Paramount Defenses?
At Paramount Defenses, we believe that less is more, so our entire global team is less than a 100 people. For security reasons, 100% of our staff are U.S. Citizens, and to-date, the entirety of our R&D team are former Microsoft employees.
If by how big we are, you meant how many organizations we impact, today our unique high-value cyber security solutions and insights help adequately secure and defend thousands of prominent organizations across six continents worldwide.
Why is it just you (and why aren't your employees) on Social Media (e.g. LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter etc.)?
The simple answer to this question - For Security Reasons.
At Paramount Defenses, we care deeply about cyber security, so we also strive to lead by example in every way.
As it pertains to cyber security, we have found that the presence of an organization's employees on social-media almost always results in excessive information disclosure that could be very valuable for hackers and various other entities who may have malicious intent, so our corporate policies do not permit a social media presence.
Also, we're not huge fans of Twitter, and we certainly don't care about being on Facebook. We do like and appreciate LinkedIn, and in fact, we lead the world's largest community of Active Directory Security Professionals on LinkedIn.
You see, the Crown Jewels of cyber security reside in Active Directory, and if they're compromised, its Game Over. By Crown Jewels, I'm referring to privileged access, or as commonly known, Domain Admin equivalent accounts.
It is a fact that 100% of all major recent cyber security breaches (except Equifax) involved the compromise of a single Active Directory privileged user account. Such accounts are Target #1 for hackers, which is why it is so very important that organizations be able to exactly identify and minimize the number of such privileged accounts in Active Directory.
Now, when it comes to identifying privileged user accounts in Active Directory, most organizations focus on enumerating the memberships of their default administrative groups in Active Directory, and that's it. Unfortunately, that's just the Tip of the Iceberg, and we have found that most of them do not even seem to know that in fact there are FAR many more accounts with varying levels of elevated admin/privileged access in Active Directory than they seem to know about.
This isn't a secret; its something you know if you've ever heard about Active Directory's most powerful and capable cyber security feature - Delegation of Administration. The truth is that at most organizations, a substantial amount of delegation has been done over the years, yet no one seems to have a clue as to who has what privileged access. Here's why.
In fact, Active Directory privileged access accounts have been getting a lot of attention lately, because so many cyber security experts and companies are starting to realize that there exists a treasure-trove of privileged access in Active Directory. Thus, recently many such cyber security expert and companies have started shedding light on them (for example, one, two, three etc.), and some have even started developing amateur tools to identify such accounts.
What these experts and companies may not know is that their amateur tools are substantially inaccurate since they rely on finding out "Who has what Permissions in Active Directory" WHEREAS the ONLY way to correctly identify privileged user accounts in Active Directory is by accurately finding out "Who has what Effective Permissions in Active Directory?"
On a lighter note, I find it rather amusing that for lack of knowing better, most cyber security experts and vendors that may be new to Active Directory Security have been referring to such accounts as Stealthy Admins, Shadow Admins etc.
To make matters worse, there are many prominent vendors in the Active Directory space that merely offer basic Active Directory Permissions Analysis/Audit Tooling, yet they mislead organizations by claiming to help them "Find out who has what privileged access in Active Directory," and since so many IT personnel don't seem to know better, they get misled.
Thus, there's an imperative need to help organizations learn how to correctly audit privileged users in Active Directory.
Consequently, the intention of my blogging is to HELP thousands of organizations and cyber security experts worldwide UNDERSTAND that the ONLY correct way to identify privileged users in Active Directory is by accurately determining effective permissions / effective access in Active Directory. There is only ONE correct way to accomplish this objective.
Why have you been a little hard on Microsoft lately?
Let me begin by saying that I deeply love and care for Microsoft. It may appear that I may have been a tad hard on them, but that is all well-intentioned and only meant to help them realize that they have an obligation to their global customer base to adequately educate them about various aspects of cyber security in Windows, particularly the most vital aspects.
In that regard, if you truly understand cyber security in Windows environments, you know that Active Directory Effective Permissions and Active Directory Effective Access play an absolutely paramount role in securing Windows deployments worldwide, and since Active Directory has been around for almost two decades by now, one would expect the world to unequivocally understand this by now. Unfortunately, we found that (as evidenced above) no one seems to have a clue.
You may be surprised if I were to share with you that at most organizations worldwide, hardly anyone seems to even know about what Active Directory Effective Permissions are, let alone why they're paramount to their security, and this a highly concerning fact, because this means that most organizations worldwide are operating in the proverbial dark today.
It is upon looking into the reason for this that we realized that in the last decade, it appears that (for whatever reason) Microsoft may not have educated its global customer based about Active Directory Effective Permissions at all - Proof.
Thus, it is in the best interest of organizations worldwide that we felt a need to substantially raise awareness.
As to how on earth Microsoft may have completely forgotten to educate the world about this, I can only guess that perhaps they must've gotten so involved in building their Cloud offering and dealing with the menace of local-machine credential-theft attack vectors that they completely seem to have missed this one paramount aspect of Windows security.
Fortunately for them and the world, we've had our eye on this problem for a decade know and we've been laser-focused. Besides, actions speak louder than words, so once you understand what it is we do at Paramount Defenses, you'll see that we've done more to help secure Microsoft's global customer base than possibly any other company on the planet.
Those who understand what we've built, know that we may be Microsoft's most strategic ally in the cyber security space.
Finally, the most important reason as to why I do, what I do is because I care deeply and passionately about cyber security.
(A Must-Read for all CEOs, CFOs, CIOs, CISOs, Board Members & Shareholders Today)
Today was supposed to be an exciting Friday morning at a Multi-Billion $ organization since the world's top Cloud Computing companies were going to make their final pitches to the company's C-Suite today, as it was considering moving to the "Cloud."
With Cloud Computing companies spending billions to market their latest Kool-Aid to organizations worldwide (even though much of this may actually not be ready for mission-critical stuff), how could this company too NOT be considering the Cloud?
The C-Suite Meeting
Today was a HUGE day for this multi-billion dollar company, for today after several months of researching and evaluating their choices and options, the company's leadership would finally be deciding as to which Cloud Computing provider to go with.
This meeting is being chaired by the Chairman of the Board and attended by the following organizational employees -
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
Chief Information Officer (CIO)
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)
Also in attendance are about a dozen Vice Presidents, representing Sales, Marketing, Research and Development etc.
After breakfast, the presentations began at 9:00 am. The organization's CIO kicked off the meeting, rattling off the numerous benefits that the company could enjoy by moving to the Cloud, and minutes later the Vice President of Cloud Computing from the first Cloud Computing company vying for their business started his presentation. His presentation lasted two hours.
The C-Suite then took a break for lunch.
The next presentation began at 1:00 pm and was expected to last till about 4:00 pm. The Vice President of Cloud Computing from the second Cloud Computing company had started her presentation and was almost an hour into it, when all of a sudden this happened...
... the CISO's assistant unexpectedly entered the room, went straight to the CISO and whispered something into his ear.
Everyone was surprised, and all eyes were on the CISO, who grimly asked his assistant - "Are you 100% sure?" He said "Yes."
Houston, We Have a Problem
The CISO walked up to the CIO and whispered something into his ear. The CIO sat there in complete shock for a moment!
He then gathered himself and proceeded to request everyone except the C-Suite to immediately leave the conference room.
He told the Vice President of this Cloud Computing company - "Hopefully, we'll get back to you in a few weeks."
He then looked at the CEO and the Chairman of the Board, and he said - "Sir, we have a problem!"
The CEO asked the CIO - "What's wrong? What happened?"
The CIO replied - "Sir, about 30 minutes ago, an intruder compromised the credentials of each one of our 20,000 employees!"
The CEO was almost in shock, and just couldn't believe what he had just heard, so he asked - "Everyone's credentials?!"
The CIO replied - "I'm afraid yes Sir, yours, mine, literally everyone's, including that of all our privileged users!"
The CEO could sense that there was more bad news, so he asked - "Is there something else I should know?"
The CIO replied - "Sir, 15 minutes ago, the intruder logged on as an Enterprise Admin, disabled the accounts of each one of our privileged users, and used Group Policy to deploy malicious software to each one of our 30,000 domain-joined computers! By now, he could have stolen, exfiltrated and destroyed the entirety of our digital assets! We may have lost literally everything!"
The CEO was shocked! They'd just been breached, and what a massive breach it was - "How could this have happened?"
The CIO turned to the CISO, who stepped in, and answered the question - "Sir, an intruder used a tool called Mimikatz DCSync to basically request and instantly obtain the credentials of every single user from our foundational Active Directory deployment."
The CEO asked - "What is Active Directory?"
The CISO replied - "Sir, simply put, it is the very foundation of our cyber security"
The CEO then asked - "Wait.Can just anyone request and extract credentials from Active Directory?"
The CISO replied - "Sir, not everyone can. Only those individuals whose have sufficient access to do so, and by that I mean, specifically only those who have Get-Replication-Changes-All effective-permissions on the domain root object, can do so."
The CEO then said - "This does not sound right to me. I'm no technical genius, but shouldn't we have known exactly who all have this, whatever you just said, er yes that Get-Replication-Changes-All effective permissions in our Active Directory?!"
The CISO replied - "Sir, it turns out that accurate determination of effective permissions in Active Directory is actually very difficult, and as a result it is almost impossible to figure out exactly who has this effective permissions on our domain root!" The CEO figured it out - "So you're saying that the intruder had compromised the account of someone who was not on your radar and not supposed to have this access, but actually did, and the intruder used that access to steal everyone's credentials?"
The CISO replied - "That's right. It appears we did not know that this someone had sufficient access (i.e. effective permissions) to be able to replicate secrets from Active Directory, because it is very difficult to accurately figure this out in Active Directory."
The CEO was furious! - "You're kidding right?! Microsoft's spent billions on this new fad called the "Cloud", yet it doesn't even have a solution to help figure out something as vital as this in Active Directory? How long has Active Directory been around ?!
The CISO replied - "Seventeen years."
The CEO then said in disbelief - "Did you just 17 years, as in S-E-V-E-N-T-E-E-N years?! Get Satya Nadella on the line now! Perhaps I should #REFRESH his memory that we're a customer, and that we may have just lost a few B-I-L-L-I-O-N dollars!"
This is for Real
Make NO mistake about it. As amusing as it might sound, the scenario shared above is very REAL, and in fact today, most business and government organizations worldwide that operate on Active Directory have no idea as to exactly who has sufficient effective permissions to be able to replicate secrets out of their Active Directory. None whatsoever!
We can demonstrate the enactment of this exact scenario, and its underlying cause, to any organizations that wishes to see it.
This Could've Been (and Can Be) Easily Prevented
This situation could easily have been prevented, if this organization's IT personnel had only possessed the ability to adequately and accurately determine effective permissions in their foundational Active Directory deployments.
Unfortunately, Mimikatz DCSync is just the Tip of the Iceberg. Today most organizations are likely operating in the dark and have no idea about the actual attack surface, and thus about exactly who can create, delete and manage the entirety of their domain user accounts, domain computer accounts, domain security groups, GPOs, service connection points (SCPs), OUs etc. even though every insider and intruder could try and figure this out and misuse this insight to compromise their security.
Technically speaking, with even just minimal education and the right tooling, here is how easy it is for organizations to figure this out and lock this down today, i.e. to lock this down before an intruder can exploit it to inflict colossal damage - RIGHT HERE.
Oh, and you don't need to call Microsoft for this, although you certainly can and should. If you do, they'll likely have no answer, yet they might use even this to pitch you their latest toy, Microsoft ATA, and of course, their Cloud offering, Microsoft Azure.
Wait, weren't these C*O discussing the Cloud (and likely Microsoft Azure) just a few hours (and a few billion dollars) ago?!
Unfortunately, given the massive scale of this breach, the company did not survive the attack, and had to declare bankruptcy. The C*Os of this company are still looking for suitable employment, and its shareholders ended up losing billions of dollars.
All of this could've been prevented, if they only knew about something as elemental as this, and had the ability to determine this.
The moral of the story is that while its fine to fall for the latest fad, i.e. consider moving to the "Cloud" and all, but as AND while you consider and plan to do so, you just cannot let you on-prem cyber defenses down even for a moment, because if you do so, you may not have a company left to move to the Cloud. A single excessive effective permission in Active Directory is all it takes.
I'll say this one more time and one last time - what I've shared above could easily happen at almost any organization today.
PS: If this sounds too simple and high-level i.e. hardly technical, that is by intent, as it is written for a non-technical audience. This isn't to showcase our technical depth; examples of our technical depth can be found here, here, here, here, hereetc.etc.
Here's why - Mimikatz DCSync, which embodies the technical brilliance of a certain Mr. Benjamin Delpy, may be the simplest example of how someone could attack Active Directory ACLs to instantly and completely compromise Active Directory. On the other hand, Gold Finger, which embodies the technical expertise of a certain former Microsoft employee, may be the simplest example of how one could defend Active Directory ACLs by being able to instantly identify/audit effective permissions/access in/across Active Directory, and thus lockdown any and all unauthorized access in Active Directory ACLs, making it impossible for an(y) unauthorized user to use Mimikatz DCSync against Active Directory.
PS3: They say to the wise, a hint is enough. I just painted the whole picture out for you. (You may also want to read this & this.)
You'll want to read this short blog post very carefully because it not only impacts Microsoft, it likely impacts you, as well as the foundational security of 85% of all business and government organizations worldwide, and it does so in a positive way.
A Quick and Short Background
From the White House to the Fortune 1000, Microsoft Active Directory is the very foundation of cyber security at over 85% of organizations worldwide. In fact, it is also the foundation of cyber security of almost every cyber security company worldwide.
Active Directory is the Foundation of Cyber Security Worldwide
The entirety of an organization's building blocks of cyber security, including the user accounts used by the entirety its workforce, as well as the user accounts of all its privileged users, the computer accounts of the entirety of its computers, and the security groups used to provision access to the entirety of its IT resources, are stored, managed and protected in Active Directory.
During the past few years, credential-theft attacks aimed at the compromise of an organization's privileged users (e.g. Domain Admins) have resulted in a substantial number of reported and unreported breaches at numerous organizations worldwide. In response, to help organizations combat the menace of these credential-theft attacks, Microsoft has had to make substantial enhancements to its Windows Operating Systems as well as acquire and introduce a technology called Microsoft ATA.
These enhancements have made it harder for perpetrators to find success with traditional credential-theft attacks, so they've started focusing their efforts on trying to find ways to attack the Active Directory itself, as evidenced by the fact that in the last year alone, we've seen the introduction of Mimikatz DCSync, BloodHound and recently the advent of Active Directory Botnets.
Make no mistake about it. There's no dearth of opportunity to find ways to exploit weaknesses in Active Directory deployments because there exists an ocean of access within Active Directory, and sadly due to an almost total lack of awareness, education, understanding and tooling, organizations have no idea as to exactly what lies within their Active Directory, particularly in regards to privileged access entitlements, and thus today there likely are 1000s of privilege escalation paths in most Active Directory deployments, waiting to be identified and exploited. All that perpetrators seem to lack today is the know-how and the tooling.
Unfortunately, since the cat's out of the bag, perpetrators seem to be learning fast, and building rapidly, so unless organizations act swiftly and decisively to adequately lock-down vast amount of access that currently exists in their foundational Active Directory deployments, sadly the next big wave of cyber breaches could involve compromise of Active Directory deployments.
Clearly, Microsoft Has No Answers
It gives me absolutely no pleasure to share with you that unfortunately, and sadly as always, Microsoft yet again seems to be playing catch-up, and in fact, it has no clue or any real answers, ideas or solutions to help organizations in this vital regard.
Here's Proof - Last week, on September 18, 2017, Microsoft's Advanced Threat Analytics (ATA) Team posted this -
If and when you read it, it will likely be unequivocally clear to you as to just how little Microsoft understands about not just the sheer depth and breadth of this monumental challenge, but about the sheer impact it could have on organizations worldwide!
You see, if you understand the subject of Active Directory Security well enough, then you know that Active Directory access control lists (ACLs) today don't just impact organizational security worldwide, they likely impact national and global security!
That said, in that post, the best Microsoft could do isconcede that this could be a problem, wonder why organizations might ever need to change AdminSDHolder, falsely assume that it may not impact privileged users, praise a massively inaccurate tool for shedding light on this attack vector, and end by saying - "if you find a path with no obstacles, it probably leads somewhere."
Oh, and the very last thing they tell you that is their nascent ATA technology can detect AD multiple recon methods.
In contrast, here's what they should have said- "We care deeply about cyber security and we understand that left unaddressed, this could pose a serious cyber security risk to our customers. Be rest assured that Microsoft Active Directory is a highly robust and securable technology, and here's exactly how organizations can adequately and reliably identify and lock-down privileged access in their Active Directory deployments, leaving no room for perpetrators to identify and exploit any weaknesses."
The reason I say that should've been the response is because if you know enough about this problem, then you also know that it can actually be completely and sufficiently addressed, and that you don't need to rely on detection as a security measure.
BTW, to appreciate how little Microsoft seems to understand about this huge cyber security challenge, you'll want a yardstick to compare Microsoft's response with, so here it is (; you'll want to read the posts) - Active Directory Security School for Microsoft.
Er, I'm really sorry but you are Microsoft, a US$ 550 Billion corporation, not a kid in college. If the best you can do concerning such a profoundly important cyber security challenge is show how little you seem to know about and understand this problem, and only have detection to offer as a solution, frankly, that's not just disappointing, that's deeply concerning, to say the least.
Further, if this is how little you seem to understand about such a profoundly important cyber security challenge concerning your own technology, I cannot help but wonder how well your customers might actually be protected in your recent Cloud offering.
Fortunately There's Help and Good News For Microsoft
I may appear to be critical of Microsoft, and I do still believe that they ought to at least have educated their customers about this and this huge cyber security challenge, but I also love Microsoft, because I've been (at) Microsoft, so I'm going to help them.
To my former colleagues at Microsoft I say - "Each one of us at Microsoft are passionate, care deeply and always strive to do and be the best we can, and even though I may no longer be at Microsoft, (and I still can't believe how you missed this one), luckily and fortunately for you, we've got this covered, and we're going to help you out."
So, over the next few days, not only am I going to help reduce the almost total lack of awareness, education and understanding that exists at organizations today concerning Active Directory Security, I am also going to help organizations worldwide learn just how they can adequately and swiftly address this massive cyber security challenge before it becomes a huge problem.
What Constitutes a Privileged User in Active Directory
How to Correctly Audit Privileged Users/Access in Active Directory
How to Render Mimikatz DCSync Useless in an Active Directory Environment
How to Easily Identify and Thwart Sneaky Persistence in Active Directory
How to Easily Solve The Difficult Problem of Active Directory Botnets
The World's Top Active Directory Permissions Analysis Tools(and Why They're Mostly Useless)
The Paramount Need to Lockdown Access Privileges in Active Directory
How to Attain and Maintain Least Privileged Access (LPA) in Active Directory
How to Securely Delegate and Correctly Audit Administrative Access in Active Directory
How to Easily Secure Active Directory and Operate a Bulletproof Active Directory Deployment
You see, each one of these Active Directory security focused objectives can be easily accomplished, but and in order to do so, what is required is the capability to accurately audit effective access in Active Directory. Sadly, let alone possessing this paramount cyber security capability, Microsoft doesn't even seem to have a clue about it.
Each one of these posts is absolutely essential for organizational cyber security worldwide, and if you know of even one other entity (e.g. individual, company etc.) on the planet that can help the world address each one of these today, do let me know.
Together, we can help adequately secure and defend organizations worldwide and deny perpetrators the opportunities and avenues they seek to compromise our foundational Active Directory deployments, because we must and because we can.
As some of you may know, over the past few weeks, I have been publicly taking the $ 550 Billion Microsoft (Nasdaq: MSFT) to Active Directory Security School (see PS3 below) because today global security literally depends on Active Directory Security.
In case you're wondering why, here's why -
The Importance of Active Directory Security
From the White House to the British Houses of Parliament, and from Microsoft to the Fortune 1000, at the very foundation of IT, identity and access management, and cyber security at over 85% of all organizations worldwide today lies Active Directory.
In other words, the foundational security of thousands of government and business organizations depends on Active Directory.
To paint a picture - Governments, Militaries, Law Enforcement Agencies, Banks, Stock Exchanges, Energy Suppliers, Defense Contractors, Hospitals, Airlines, Airports, Hotels, Oil and Gas Companies, Internet, Tech and Cyber Security Companies, Manufacturing Companies, Pharmaceutical Companies, Retail Giants ... <the list is long> all run on Active Directory.
Operating in the Dark Given my background, experience and whatever little I know about the subject, I have reason to believe that most organizations worldwide that operate on Active Directory are operating in the dark today, and have absolutely no idea as to exactly who has what level of privileged access in their foundational Active Directory!
Further, because over the last decade, almost 10,000 organizations from across 150+ countries worldwide have knocked at our doors unsolicited, we know exactly how much these organizations know about Active Directory Security, and we're shocked to know that 99% of them don't even know what "Active Directory Effective Permissions" are, and upon giving this due thought, we have arrived at the conclusion that the world's complete ignorance on this most paramount aspect of organizational cyber security can be attributed to the fact that Microsoft has likely not even once educated its customers about its importance!
Let There Be Light
So, I made an executive decision that we need to educate the $ 550 Billion Microsoft Corp about the paramount importance of "Active Directory Effective Permissions", so that they can in turn educate the thousands of vital business and government organizations at whose very foundation lies Active Directory about its sheer and cardinal importance.
Make no mistake about it - no organization that operates on Microsoft Active Directory today can be adequately secured without possessing the ability to determine effective permissions on the thousands of building blocks of cyber security (i.e. thousands of domain user accounts, computer accounts, security groups and policies) that reside in its Active Directory. Its really that simple.
A 1000 Cyber Security Companies!
Speaking of which, although there are supposedly over a 1000 cyber security companies in the world (, and incidentally at their very foundation too lies Microsoft Active Directory) not a single one of them has the ability, the expertise or even a single solution to help the world accurately determine "effective permissions" in Active Directory. Not a single one of them!
The FireEye Labs team has identified two new zero-day vulnerabilities
as part of limited, targeted attacks against some major corporations.
Both zero-days exploit the Windows Kernel, with Microsoft assigning
CVE-2014-4148 and CVE-2014-4113 to and addressing the vulnerabilities
in their October
2014 Security Bulletin.
FireEye Labs have identified 16 total zero-day attacks in the last
two years – uncovering 11 in 2013 and five in 2014 so far.
Microsoft commented: “On October 14, 2014, Microsoft released MS14-058
to fully address these vulnerabilities and help protect customers. We
appreciate FireEye Labs using Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure to
assist us in working toward a fix in a collaborative manner that helps
keep customers safe.”
In the case of CVE-2014-4148, the attackers exploited a
vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows TrueType Font (TTF) processing
subsystem, using a Microsoft Office document to embed and deliver a
malicious TTF to an international organization. Since the embedded TTF
is processed in kernel-mode, successful exploitation granted the
attackers kernel-mode access. Though the TTF is delivered in a
Microsoft Office document, the vulnerability does not reside within
CVE-2014-4148 impacted both 32-bit and 64-bit Windows operating
systems shown in MS14-058,
though the attacks only targeted 32-bit systems. The malware contained
within the exploit has specific functions adapted to the following
operating system platform categories:
Windows 8.1/Windows Server 2012 R2
Windows 7/Windows Server 2008 R2 (Service Pack
0 and 1)
Windows XP Service Pack 3
CVE-2014-4113 rendered Microsoft Windows 7, Vista, XP, Windows 2000,
Windows Server 2003/R2, and Windows Server 2008/R2 vulnerable to a
local Elevation of Privilege (EoP) attack. This means that the
vulnerability cannot be used on its own to compromise a customer’s
security. An attacker would first need to gain access to a remote
system running any of the above operating systems before they could
execute code within the context of the Windows Kernel. Investigation
by FireEye Labs has revealed evidence that attackers have likely used
variations of these exploits for a while. Windows 8 and Windows
Server 2012 and later do not have these same vulnerabilities.
Information on the companies affected, as well as threat actors, is
not available at this time. We have no evidence of these exploits
being used by the same actors. Instead, we have only observed each
exploit being used separately, in unrelated attacks.
Microsoft has released security update MS14-058
that addresses CVE-2014-4148.
Since TTF exploits target the underlying operating system, the
vulnerability can be exploited through multiple attack vectors,
including web pages. In the past, exploit kit authors have converted a
similar exploit (CVE-2011-3402) for use in browser-based attacks. More
information about this scenario is available under Microsoft’s
response to CVE-2011-3402: MS11-087.
This TTF exploit is packaged within a Microsoft Office file. Upon
opening the file, the font will exploit a vulnerability in the Windows
TTF subsystem located within the win32k.sys kernel-mode driver.
The attacker’s shellcode resides within the Font Program (fpgm)
section of the TTF. The font program begins with a short sequence of
instructions that quickly return. The remainder of the font program
section is treated as unreachable code for the purposes of the font
program and is ignored when initially parsing the font.
During exploitation, the attacker’s shellcode uses Asynchronous
Procedure Calls (APC) to inject the second stage from kernel-mode into
the user-mode process winlogon.exe (in XP) or lsass.exe (in other
OSes). From the injected process, the attacker writes and executes a
third stage (executable).
The third stage decodes an embedded DLL to, and runs it from,
memory. This DLL is a full-featured remote access tool that connects
back to the attacker.
Plenty of evidence supports the attacker’s high level of
sophistication. Beyond the fact that the attack is zero-day
kernel-level exploit, the attack also showed the following:
a usable hard-coded area of kernel memory is used like a mutex
to avoid running the shellcode multiple times
has an expiration date: if the current time is after October 31,
2014, the exploit shellcode will exit silently
shellcode has implementation customizations for four different types
of OS platforms/service pack levels, suggesting that testing for
multiple OS platforms was conducted
the dropped malware
individually decodes each string when that string is used to prevent
the dropped malware is specifically customized for
the targeted environment
the dropped remote access
capability is full-featured and customized: it does not rely on
generally available implementations (like Poison Ivy)
dropped remote access capability is a loader that decrypts the
actual DLL remote access capability into memory and never writes the
decrypted remote access capability to disk
Microsoft has released security update MS14-058
that addresses this vulnerability.
Vulnerability and Exploit Details
The 32-bit exploit triggers an out-of-bounds memory access that
dereferences offsets from a high memory address, and inadvertently
wraps into the null page. In user-mode, memory dereferences within the
null page are generally assumed to be non-exploitable. Since the null
page is usually not mapped – the exception being 16-bit legacy
applications emulated by ntvdm.exe--null pointer dereferences will
simply crash the running process. In contrast, memory dereferences
within the null page in the kernel are commonly exploited because the
attacker can first map the null page from user-mode, as is the case
with this exploits. The steps taken for successful 32-bit exploitation are:
Build a malformed
win32k!tagWND structure at the null page such that it is properly
validated in the kernel
Attacker’s callback in win32k!tagWND.lpfnWndProc executes in
EPROCESS.Token to elevate privileges
Spawns a child process that inherits the
elevated access token
32-bit Windows 8 and later users are not affected by this
exploit. The Windows 8 Null Page protection prohibits user-mode
processes from mapping the null page and causes the exploits to fail.
In the 64-bit version of the exploit, dereferencing offsets from a
high 32-bit memory address do not wrap, as it is well within the
addressable memory range for a 64-bit user-mode process. As such, the
Null Page protection implemented in Windows versions 7 (after
MS13-031) and later does not apply. The steps taken by the 64-bit
exploit variants are:
Map memory page:
Build a malformed win32k!tagWND structure at the
mapped page such that it is properly validated in the kernel
Attacker’s callback in
win32k!tagWND.lpfnWndProc executes in kernel-mode
Callback overwrites EPROCESS.Token to elevate
a child process that inherits the elevated access token
64-bit Windows 8 and later users are not affected by this
exploit. Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP) blocks the
attacker’s user-mode callback from executing within kernel-mode and
causes the exploits to fail.
Exploits Tool History
The exploits are implemented as a command line tool that accepts a
single command line argument – a shell command to execute with SYSTEM
privileges. This tool appears to be an updated version of an earlier
tool. The earlier tool exploited CVE-2011-1249, and displays the
following usage message to stdout when run:
Windows Kernel Local Privilege Exploits
The vast majority of samples of the earlier tool have compile dates
in December 2009. Only two samples were discovered with compile dates
in March 2011. Although the two samples exploit the same CVE, they
carry a slightly modified usage message of:
Windows local Exploits
The most recent version of the tool, which implements CVE-2014-4113,
eliminates all usage messages.
The tool appears to have gone through at least three iterations over
time. The initial tool and exploits is believed to have had limited
availability, and may have been employed by a handful of distinct
attack groups. As the exploited vulnerability was remediated, someone
with access to the tool modified it to use a newer exploit when one
became available. These two newer versions likely did not achieve the
widespread distribution that the original tool/exploits did and may
have been retained privately, not necessarily even by the same actors.
We would like to thank Barry Vengerik, Joshua Homan, Steve Davis,
Ned Moran, Corbin Souffrant, Xiaobo Chen for their assistance on this research.
I am excited to be speaking at SyScan Singapore 2012 today. SyScan
has a reputation for being a high-quality, extremely technical
conference, as you can tell by the impressive line-up of speakers.
In my presentation, I/O, You Own: Regaining Control of your Disk
in the Presence of Bootkits," I will debut operating
system research I've been working on for the past few months.
As the title suggests, the research introduces a novel technique
to side-step MBR rootkits ("bootkits"). The secret sauce
in this technique involves utilizing (note: not tampering with or
altering) the crash dump mechanism provided by the Windows operating
system in order to read/write to disk. All software that runs on
Windows (including forensic tools) uses the "Normal I/O
path" to disk in order to save or open files. The Normal I/O
Path consists of various drivers (port, miniport, class, file
system, volume, partition, and so on) that provide access to the
physical hardware. Over the past 20 years, rootkits and bootkits
have been infecting various drivers in this Normal I/O path in order
to hide malicious files. As I will show in my presentation, the
mysterious crash dump mechanism, which is largely undocumented by
Microsoft, provides an alternative path to disk (the "Crash
Dump I/O Path") that can be used to locate data hidden by
rootkits. To my knowledge, there is no malware in the wild today
that hooks or alters the crash dump I/O path. That means it is a
pristine path which effectively defeats all known disk I/O-hooking
The naysayers will be quick to point out the fight
against rootkits is a cat-and-mouse game and that within weeks there
will be some new rootkit that defeats this technique. While this
might be true on some level (every defense mechanism in software can
be undermined in some way), I would argue that tampering with the
crash dump mechanism presents a unique challenge to rootkit authors.
In short, it is much harder to tamper with due to technical
restrictions which I will leave up to the rootkit authors to
discover. Additionally, infecting the crash dump mechanism presents
a conundrum for an attacker. If it is corrupted or rendered
inoperable, the attacker's presence would be revealed, because the
system would not be able to "blue screen" and generate a
crash dump. Either way, I look forward to the debate.
addition to covering the technique to use the crash dump mechanism
outside of the operating system, my presentation will cover details
of how the crash dump process itself works, from Windows 2000 up to
Windows 7. This material is a result of weeks reversing the Windows
kernel and related crash dump drivers, as well as port and miniport
drivers for SCSI and IDE drives.
I hope this post has piqued
your interest. Stay tuned to the M-unition blog for links to the
slides and whitepaper, which will be released after the