Category Archives: 0-day

80% of successful breaches are from zero-day exploits

Organizations are not making progress in reducing their endpoint security risk, especially against new and unknown threats, a Ponemon Institute study reveals. 68% IT security professionals say their company experienced one or more endpoint attacks that compromised data assets or IT infrastructure in 2019, an increase from 54% of respondents in 2017. Zero-day attacks continue to increase in frequency Of those incidents that were successful, 80% were new or unknown, zero-day attacks. These attacks either … More

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FireEye Uncovers CVE-2017-8759: Zero-Day Used in the Wild to Distribute FINSPY,FireEye Uncovers CVE-2017-8759: Zero-Day Used in the Wild to Distribute FINSPY

FireEye recently detected a malicious Microsoft Office RTF document that leveraged CVE-2017-8759, a SOAP WSDL parser code injection vulnerability. This vulnerability allows a malicious actor to inject arbitrary code during the parsing of SOAP WSDL definition contents. Mandiant analyzed a Microsoft Word document where attackers used the arbitrary code injection to download and execute a Visual Basic script that contained PowerShell commands.

FireEye shared the details of the vulnerability with Microsoft and has been coordinating public disclosure timed with the release of a patch to address the vulnerability and security guidance, which can be found here.

FireEye email, endpoint and network products detected the malicious documents.

Vulnerability Used to Target Russian Speakers

The malicious document, “Проект.doc” (MD5: fe5c4d6bb78e170abf5cf3741868ea4c), might have been used to target a Russian speaker. Upon successful exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, the document downloads multiple components (details follow), and eventually launches a FINSPY payload (MD5: a7b990d5f57b244dd17e9a937a41e7f5).

FINSPY malware, also reported as FinFisher or WingBird, is available for purchase as part of a “lawful intercept” capability. Based on this and previous use of FINSPY, we assess with moderate confidence that this malicious document was used by a nation-state to target a Russian-speaking entity for cyber espionage purposes. Additional detections by FireEye’s Dynamic Threat Intelligence system indicates that related activity, though potentially for a different client, might have occurred as early as July 2017.

CVE-2017-8759 WSDL Parser Code Injection

A code injection vulnerability exists in the WSDL parser module within the PrintClientProxy method (http://referencesource.microsoft.com/ - System.Runtime.Remoting/metadata/wsdlparser.cs,6111). The IsValidUrl does not perform correct validation if provided data that contains a CRLF sequence. This allows an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary code. A portion of the vulnerable code is shown in Figure 1.


Figure 1: Vulnerable WSDL Parser

When multiple address definitions are provided in a SOAP response, the code inserts the “//base.ConfigureProxy(this.GetType(),” string after the first address, commenting out the remaining addresses. However, if a CRLF sequence is in the additional addresses, the code following the CRLF will not be commented out. Figure 2 shows that due to lack validation of CRLF, a System.Diagnostics.Process.Start method call is injected. The generated code will be compiled by csc.exe of .NET framework, and loaded by the Office executables as a DLL.


Figure 2: SOAP definition VS Generated code

The In-the-Wild Attacks

The attacks that FireEye observed in the wild leveraged a Rich Text Format (RTF) document, similar to the CVE-2017-0199 documents we previously reported on. The malicious sampled contained an embedded SOAP monikers to facilitate exploitation (Figure 3).


Figure 3: SOAP Moniker

The payload retrieves the malicious SOAP WSDL definition from an attacker-controlled server. The WSDL parser, implemented in System.Runtime.Remoting.ni.dll of .NET framework, parses the content and generates a .cs source code at the working directory. The csc.exe of .NET framework then compiles the generated source code into a library, namely http[url path].dll. Microsoft Office then loads the library, completing the exploitation stage.  Figure 4 shows an example library loaded as a result of exploitation.


Figure 4: DLL loaded

Upon successful exploitation, the injected code creates a new process and leverages mshta.exe to retrieve a HTA script named “word.db” from the same server. The HTA script removes the source code, compiled DLL and the PDB files from disk and then downloads and executes the FINSPY malware named “left.jpg,” which in spite of the .jpg extension and “image/jpeg” content-type, is actually an executable. Figure 5 shows the details of the PCAP of this malware transfer.


Figure 5: Live requests

The malware will be placed at %appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\OfficeUpdte-KB[ 6 random numbers ].exe. Figure 6 shows the process create chain under Process Monitor.


Figure 6: Process Created Chain

The Malware

The “left.jpg” (md5: a7b990d5f57b244dd17e9a937a41e7f5) is a variant of FINSPY. It leverages heavily obfuscated code that employs a built-in virtual machine – among other anti-analysis techniques – to make reversing more difficult. As likely another unique anti-analysis technique, it parses its own full path and searches for the string representation of its own MD5 hash. Many resources, such as analysis tools and sandboxes, rename files/samples to their MD5 hash in order to ensure unique filenames. This variant runs with a mutex of "WininetStartupMutex0".

Conclusion

CVE-2017-8759 is the second zero-day vulnerability used to distribute FINSPY uncovered by FireEye in 2017. These exposures demonstrate the significant resources available to “lawful intercept” companies and their customers. Furthermore, FINSPY has been sold to multiple clients, suggesting the vulnerability was being used against other targets.

It is possible that CVE-2017-8759 was being used by additional actors. While we have not found evidence of this, the zero day being used to distribute FINSPY in April 2017, CVE-2017-0199 was simultaneously being used by a financially motivated actor. If the actors behind FINSPY obtained this vulnerability from the same source used previously, it is possible that source sold it to additional actors.

Acknowledgement

Thank you to Dhanesh Kizhakkinan, Joseph Reyes, FireEye Labs Team, FireEye FLARE Team and FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence for their contributions to this blog. We also thank everyone from the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) who worked with us on this issue.

Second Adobe Flash Zero-Day CVE-2015-5122 from HackingTeam Exploited in Strategic Web Compromise Targeting Japanese Victims

On July 14, FireEye researchers discovered attacks exploiting the Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2015-5122, just four days after Adobe released a patch. CVE-2015-5122 was the second Adobe Flash zero-day revealed in the leak of HackingTeam’s internal data. The campaign targeted Japanese organizations by using at least two legitimate Japanese websites to host a strategic web compromise (SWC), where victims ultimately downloaded a variant of the SOGU malware.

Strategic Web Compromise

At least two different Japanese websites were compromised to host the exploit framework and malicious downloads:

  • Japan’s International Hospitality and Conference Service Association (IHCSA) website (hxxp://www.ihcsa[.]or[.]jp) in Figure 1

    Figure 1: IHCSA website

  • Japan’s Cosmetech Inc. website (hxxp://cosmetech[.]co[.]jp)

The main landing page for the attacks is a specific URL seeded on the IHCSA website (hxxp://www.ihcsa[.]or[.]jp/zaigaikoukan/zaigaikoukansencho-1/), where users are redirected to the HackingTeam Adobe Flash framework hosted on the second compromised Japanese website. We observed in the past week this same basic framework across several different SWCs exploiting the “older” CVE-2015-5119 Adobe Flash vulnerability in Figure 2.

    Figure 2: First portion of exploit chain

The webpage (hxxp://cosmetech[.]co[.]jp/css/movie.html) is built with the open source framework Adobe Flex and checks if the user has at least Adobe Flash Player version 11.4.0 installed. If the victim has the correct version of Flash, the user is directed to run a different, more in-depth profiling script (hxxp://cosmetech.co.jp/css/swfobject.js), which checks for several more conditions in addition to their version of Flash. If the conditions are not met then the script will not attempt to load the Adobe Flash (SWF) file into the user’s browser. In at least two of the incidents we observed, the victims were running Internet Explorer 11 on Windows 7 machines.

The final component is delivering a malicious SWF file, which we confirmed exploits CVE-2015-5122 on Adobe Version 18.0.0.203 for Windows in Figure 3.

    Figure 3: Malicious SWF download

SOGU Malware, Possible New Variant

After successful exploitation, the SWF file dropped a SOGU variant—a backdoor widely used by Chinese threat groups and also known as “Kaba”—in a temporary directory under “AppData\Local\”. The directory contains the properties and configuration in Figure 4.

    Filename: Rdws.exe

    Size: 413696 bytes

    MD5: 5a22e5aee4da2fe363b77f1351265a00

    Compile Time: 2015-07-13 08:11:01

    SHA256: df5f1b802d553cddd3b99d1901a87d0d1f42431b366cfb0ed25f465285e38d27

    SSDeep:6144:Na/PSOE9OPXCQpA3abFUntBrDP3FVPsCE2NiYfFei78GlGeYO:IPSOE9OPXCQ
    pAK5YBvPPPrZVkiY2Y

    Import Hash: ae984e4ab41d192d631d4f923d9210e4

    PEHash: 57e6b26eac0f34714252957d26287bc93ef07db2

    .text: e683e1f9fb674f97cf4420d15dc09a2b

    .rdata: 3a92b98a74d7ffb095fe70cf8acacc75

    .data: b5d4f68badfd6e3454f8ad29da54481f

    .rsrc: 474f9723420a3f2d0512b99932a50ca7

    C2 Password: gogogod<

    Memo: 201507122359

    Process Inject Targets: %windir%\system32\svchost.exe

    Sogu Config Encoder: sogu_20140307

    Mutex Name: ZucFCoeHa8KvZcj1FO838HN&*wz4xSdmm1

    Figure 4: SOGU Binary ‘Rdws.exe’

The compile timestamp indicates the malware was assembled on July 13, less than a day before we observed the SWC. We believe the time stamp in this case is likely genuine, based on the time line of the incident. The SOGU binary also appears to masquerade as a legitimate Trend Micro file named “VizorHtmlDialog.exe” in Figure 5.

    LegalCopyright: Copyright (C) 2009-2010 Trend Micro Incorporated. All rights reserved.

    InternalName: VizorHtmlDialog

    FileVersion: 3.0.0.1303

    CompanyName: Trend Micro Inc.

    PrivateBuild: Build 1303 - 8/8/2010

    LegalTrademarks: Trend Micro Titanium is a registered trademark of Trend Micro Incorporated.

    Comments:

    ProductName: Trend Micro Titanium

    SpecialBuild: 1303

    ProductVersion: 3.0

    FileDescription: Trend Titanium

    OriginalFilename: VizorHtmlDialog.exe

    Figure 5: Rdws.exe version information

The threat group likely used Trend Micro, a security software company headquartered in Japan, as the basis for the fake file version information deliberately, given the focus of this campaign on Japanese organizations.

SOGU Command and Control

The SOGU variant calls out to a previously unobserved command and control (CnC) domain, “amxil[.]opmuert[.]org” over port 443 in Figure 6. It uses modified DNS TXT record beaconing with an encoding we have not previously observed with SOGU malware, along with a non-standard header, indicating that this is possibly a new variant.

    Figure 6: SOGU C2 beaconing

The WHOIS registrant email address for the domain did not indicate any prior malicious activity, and the current IP resolution (54.169.89.240) is for an Amazon Web Services IP address.

Another Quick Turnaround on Leveraging HackingTeam Zero-Days

Similar to the short turnaround time highlighted in our blog on the recent APT3/APT18 phishing attacks, the threat actor quickly employed the leaked zero-day vulnerability into a SWC campaign. The threat group appears to have used procured and compromised infrastructure to target Japanese organizations. In two days we have observed at least two victims related to this attack.

We cannot confirm how the organizations were targeted, though similar incidents involving SWC and exploitation of the Flash vulnerability CVE-2015-5119 lured victims with phishing emails. Additionally, the limited popularity of the niche site also contributes to our suspicion that phishing emails may have been the lure, and not incidental web browsing.

Malware Overlap with Other Chinese Threat Groups

We believe that this is a concerted campaign against Japanese companies given the nature of the SWC. The use of SOGU malware and dissemination method is consistent with the tactics of Chinese APT groups that we track. Chinese APT groups have previously targeted the affected Japanese organizations, but we have yet to confirm which group is responsible for this campaign.

Why Japan?

In this case, we do not have enough information to discern specifically what the threat actors may have been pursuing. The Japanese economy’s technological innovation and strengths in high-tech and precision goods have attracted the interest of multiple Chinese APT groups, who almost certainly view Japanese companies as a rich source of intellectual property and competitive intelligence. The Japanese government and military organizations are also frequent targets of cyber espionage.[1]  Japan’s economic influence, alliance with the United States, regional disputes, and evolving defense policies make the Japanese government a dedicated target of foreign intelligence.

Recommendations

FireEye maintains endpoint and network detection for CVE-2015-5122 and the backdoor used in this campaign. FireEye products and services identify this activity as SOGU/Kaba within the user interface. Additionally, we highly recommend:

  • Applying Adobe’s newest patch for Flash immediately;
  • Querying for additional activity by the indicators from the compromised Japanese websites and the SOGU malware callbacks;
  • Blocking CnC addresses via outbound communications; and
  • Scope the environment to prepare for incident response.

     

    [1] Humber, Yuriy and Gearoid Reidy. “Yahoo Hacks Highlight Cyber Flaws Japan Rushing to Twart.” BloombergBusiness. 8 July 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-08/yahoo-hacks-highlight-cyber-flaws-japan-rushing-to-thwart

    Japanese Ministry of Defense. “Trends Concerning Cyber Space.” Defense of Japan 2014.  http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_1-2-5_web_1031.pdf

    LAC Corporation. “Cyber Grid View, Vol. 1.” http://www.lac.co.jp/security/report/pdf/apt_report_vol1_en.pdf

    Otake, Tomoko. “Japan Pension Service hack used classic attack method.” Japan Times. 2 June 2015. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/02/national/social-issues/japan-pension-service-hack-used-classic-attack-method/