Monthly Archives: August 2019

Define Your Unique Security Threats with These Tools

It takes only minutes from the first action of an attack with 5 or less steps for an asset to be compromised, according to the 2019 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR).  However, it takes days—an average of 279 days—to identify and contain a breach (Ponemon Institute). And the longer it takes to discover the source, the more money the incident ends up costing the organization.  Luckily, you can reduce your chance of falling victim to these attacks by proactively anticipating your greatest threats and taking measures to mitigate these.

This blog post breaks down two tools to help you determine just that: your most at-risk data, how this data can be accessed, and the attacker’s motives and abilities.  Once you have an understanding of these, it will be much easier to implement countermeasures to protect your organization from those attacks.

I recommend first reading through the DBIR sections pertaining to your industry in order to further your understanding of patterns seen in the principal assets being targeted and the attacker’s motives.  This will assist in understanding how to use the two tools: Method-Opportunity-Motive, by Shari and Charles Pfleeger and Attack Trees, as discussed by Bruce Schneier.

Defining Method-Opportunity-Motive:

Method

Methods are skills, knowledge and tools available to the hacker, which are similar to Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures used by the Military and MITTR. Jose Esteves et. al. wrote, “Although it used to be common for hackers to work independently, few of today’s hackers operate alone. They are often part of an organized hacking group, where they are members providing specialized illegal services….” A hacker’s methods are improved when part of a team, which has a motive and looks for opportunities to attack principle assets.

Opportunity

Opportunities are the amount of time and ability required for an attacker to access their objective.  The 2019 DBIR authors’ note, “Defenders fail to stop short paths substantially more often than long paths.” It’s critical to apply the correct controls to assets and to monitor those tools in order to quickly detect threats.

 Motive

The motive is the reason to attack; for instance, is the attacker trying to access financial information or intellectual property? The 2019 DBIR notes that most attacks are for financial gains or intellectual property (IP), varying by industry.

Using Attack Trees to Visually Detail Method-Opportunity-Motive:

Bruce Schneier (Schneier on Security) provides an analytics tool for systematically reviewing why and how an attack might occur. After defining what assets are most valuable to an attacker (motive), you can identify the attacker’s objective, referred to as the root node in an attack tree. From here, you can look at all the possible actions an attacker might use to compromise the primary assets (method).  The most probable and timely method shows the most likely path (opportunity).

I like using divergent and convergent thinking described by Chris Grivas and Gerard Puccio to discover plausible motive, opportunity, and methods used by a potential threat actor. Divergent thinking is the generation of ideas, using techniques like brainstorming. Convergent thinking is the limiting of ideas based on certain criteria. Using this process, you and your security team can generate objectives and then decide which objectives pose the greatest threat. You can then use this process again to determine the possible methods, referred to as leaf nodes, that could be used to access the objective. Then, you can apply values, such as time, to visualize possible opportunities and attack paths.

To further your understanding of how to create an attack tree, let’s look at an example:

1.  First, decide what primary assets your company has that an intruder is interested in accessing.

The 2019 DBIR provides some useful categories to determine attack patterns within specific industries.  For this example, let’s look at a financial institution. One likely asset that a threat actor is attempting to access is the email server, so this is our root node, or objective. Again, using divergent and convergent thinking can help a team develop and clarify possible objectives.

2.  After deciding on the objective, the second step in developing an attack tree is to define methods to access the objective.

The 2019 DBIR describes some likely methods threat actors might use, or you can use divergent and convergent thinking. In the example below, I’ve included some possible methods to access the email server.

Attack Tree Visualization

3.  As you analyze the threat, continue working through the tree and building out the methods to develop specific paths to the asset.

The diagram below shows some potential paths to access and harvest information from the email server, using OR nodes, which are alternative paths, and AND nodes, which require combined activities to achieve the objective (this is represented using ). Note that every method that isn’t an AND node is an OR node.

Attack Tree Visualization

4.  The fourth step is to apply binary values to decide what paths the attack is most likely to follow.

For example, I’m going to use likely (l) and unlikely (u) based on the methods my research has shown is available to the attacking team. Then, use a dotted line to show the all likely paths, which are those in which all methods of the path are assigned a likely value.

Attack Tree Visualization

5.  The fifth step is to apply numeric values to the sub-nodes to decide on what path, specifically, the threat actor might attempt.

I’m going to use minutes in this scenario; however, other values such as associated costs or probability of success could also be used. These are subjective values and will vary amongst teams. Paths with supporting data would provide a more accurate model, but Attack Trees are still useful even without objective data.

Attack Tree Visualization

In the above example, I have determined the path with the shortest amount of time to be phishing (credential harvesting), assuming the credentials are the same for the user accounts as they are for admin accounts. Since I have already determined that this path is likely and I now know it takes the shortest amount of time, I can determine that this is the most at-risk and likely path to accessing the email server.  In this example, the least likely path is stolen credentials.

6.  After examining the possible motives, opportunities, and methods, you can decide how you want to protect your assets.

For example, I determined that phishing is likely with the attack tree above, so I might decide to outsource monitoring, detection, and training to a Managed Security Service Provider (MSSP) that can provide this at a lower cost than an in-house staff. I might also consider purchasing software to detect, report, and prevent phishing emails, limiting the possibility of a phishing attempt. If social engineering is determined to be a concern, you could conduct end-user training, look for ways to secure the physical environment (guards, better door locks), or make the work environment more desirable (cafeteria, exercise room, recreation area, etc.)

The models discussed work together to provide ways to determine, analyze, and proactively protect against the greatest threats to your valuable assets. Ultimately, thinking through scenarios using these tools will provide a more thoughtful and cost-effective approach to security.

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GRA Quantum Launches Comprehensive Security Services

​Global cybersecurity firm GRA Quantum announces the launch of its comprehensive offering, Scalable Security Suite, providing solutions based on a combination of Managed Security Services and professional services, tailored to the specific needs of each client. Scalable Security Suite was created to give small to mid-sized organizations a running start when it comes to security, providing the same standard of security controls as large enterprises.

According to GRA Quantum’s President Tom Boyden, “Small and medium-sized firms are prime targets for cybercrime, but many don’t have the necessary resources or guidance to properly strengthen their security stance.  Our Scalable Security Suite is designed to help these organizations prioritize their greatest vulnerabilities and provide them a security solution that aligns with their business needs and evolves as these needs and the threat landscapes change.”

Managed Security Services (MSS), launched in December 2018, is the foundation of Scalable Security Suite. Through comprehensive security assessments, GRA Quantum experts identify vulnerabilities and provide recommendations for a custom combination of professional service offerings to best address these vulnerabilities. Professional services can be added to Managed Security Services to overcome vulnerabilities and build a more comprehensive, proactive security program.

Jen Greulich, GRA Quantum’s Director of Managed Security Services, has seen the need arise among current MSS clients for these supplemental services.  “Oftentimes, it becomes clear in a scoping call that clients’ needs extend beyond what we offer through MSS. Our new flexible offering allows us to work with the clients to develop a custom security solution for them that compliments MSS — whether they need incident response or penetration testing services.”

Aligned with GRA Quantum’s mission, Scalable Security Suite goes beyond the ordinary cyber assessment to understand and remediate acute physical and human-centric vulnerabilities as well.

To learn more about Scalable Security Suite, visit us on our website or begin to build your cybersecurity strategy with The Complete Guide to Building a Cybersecurity Strategy from Scratch.

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7 Steps to Building a Cybersecurity Strategy from Scratch

When your organization is young and growing, you may find yourself overwhelmed with a never-ending to-do list.  It can be easy to overlook security when you’re hiring new employees, finding infrastructure, and adopting policies.  Without a proper cybersecurity strategy, however, the business that you’ve put your heart and soul into, or the brilliant idea that you’ve spent years bringing to life, are on the line. Every year, businesses face significant financial, brand, and reputational damage resulting from a data breach, and many small businesses don’t ever recover.

Not only that, but as you grow you may be looking to gain investors or strategic partners.  Many of these firms are not willing to give organizations that don’t take security seriously a chance. A strong security stance can be your differentiator among your customers and within the Venture Capital landscape.

One thing’s for sure: you’ve spent a great deal of time creating a business of your own, so why throw it all away by neglecting your security?  You can begin building your own cybersecurity strategy by following these steps:

1.  Start by identifying your greatest business needs.

This understanding is critical when determining how your vulnerabilities could affect your organization.  Possible business needs could include manufacturing, developing software, or gaining new customers. Make a list of your most important business priorities.

2.  Conduct a third-party security assessment to identify and remediate the greatest vulnerabilities to your business needs.

 The assessment should evaluate your organization’s overall security posture, as well as the security of your partners and contractors.

Once you understand the greatest risks to your business needs, you can prioritize your efforts and budget based on ways to remediate these.

3.  Engage a Network Specialist to set-up a secure network or review your existing network.

A properly designed and configured network can help prevent unwanted users from getting into your environment and is a bare necessity when protecting your sensitive data.

Don’t have a set office space?  If you and your team are working from home or communal office spaces, be sure to never conduct sensitive business on a shared network.

4.  Implement onboarding (and offboarding) policies to combat insider threat, including a third-party vendor risk management assessment.

 Your team is your first line of defense, but as you grow, managing the risk of bringing on more employees can be challenging.  Whether attempting to maliciously steal data or clicking a bad link unknowingly, employees pose great threats to organizations.

As part of your onboarding policy, be sure to conduct thorough background checks and monitor users’ access privileges.  This goes for your employees, as well as any third parties and contractors you bring on.

5.  Implement a security awareness training program and take steps to make security awareness part of your company culture.

Make sure your training program includes topics such as password best practices, phishing identification and secure travel training.  Keep in mind, though, that company-wide security awareness should be more than once-a-year training.  Instead, focus on fostering a culture of cybersecurity awareness.

6.  Set-up multi-factor authentication and anti-phishing measures.

Technology should simplify your security initiatives, not complicate them.  Reduce the number of administrative notifications to only what is necessary and consider improvements that don’t necessarily require memorizing more passwords, such as password managers and multi-factor authentication for access to business-critical data.

7.  Monitor your data and endpoints continuously with a Managed Security Services Provider.

As you grow, so does the amount of endpoints you have to manage and data you have to protect. One of the best ways to truly ensure this data is protected is to have analysts monitoring your data at all hours. A managed security services provider will monitor your data through a 24/7 security operations center, keeping eyes out for any suspicious activity such as: phishing emails, malicious sites, and any unusual network activity.

You’re not done yet: revisit your security strategy as you evolve.  

It’s important to remember that effective cybersecurity strategies vary among organizations. As you grow, you’ll want to consider performing regular penetration testing and implementing an Incident Response Plan.  

And, as your business changes, you must continually reassess your security strategy and threat landscape.

For more information, get the Comprehensive Guide to Building a Cybersecurity Strategy from Scratch.

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APT41: A Dual Espionage and Cyber Crime Operation

Today, FireEye Intelligence is releasing a comprehensive report detailing APT41, a prolific Chinese cyber threat group that carries out state-sponsored espionage activity in parallel with financially motivated operations. APT41 is unique among tracked China-based actors in that it leverages non-public malware typically reserved for espionage campaigns in what appears to be activity for personal gain. Explicit financially-motivated targeting is unusual among Chinese state-sponsored threat groups, and evidence suggests APT41 has conducted simultaneous cyber crime and cyber espionage operations from 2014 onward.

The full published report covers historical and ongoing activity attributed to APT41, the evolution of the group’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), information on the individual actors, an overview of their malware toolset, and how these identifiers overlap with other known Chinese espionage operators. APT41 partially coincides with public reporting on groups including BARIUM (Microsoft) and Winnti (Kaspersky, ESET, Clearsky).

Who Does APT41 Target?

Like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 espionage targeting has generally aligned with China's Five-Year economic development plans. The group has established and maintained strategic access to organizations in the healthcare, high-tech, and telecommunications sectors. APT41 operations against higher education, travel services, and news/media firms provide some indication that the group also tracks individuals and conducts surveillance. For example, the group has repeatedly targeted call record information at telecom companies. In another instance, APT41 targeted a hotel’s reservation systems ahead of Chinese officials staying there, suggesting the group was tasked to reconnoiter the facility for security reasons.

The group’s financially motivated activity has primarily focused on the video game industry, where APT41 has manipulated virtual currencies and even attempted to deploy ransomware. The group is adept at moving laterally within targeted networks, including pivoting between Windows and Linux systems, until it can access game production environments. From there, the group steals source code as well as digital certificates which are then used to sign malware. More importantly, APT41 is known to use its access to production environments to inject malicious code into legitimate files which are later distributed to victim organizations. These supply chain compromise tactics have also been characteristic of APT41’s best known and most recent espionage campaigns.

Interestingly, despite the significant effort required to execute supply chain compromises and the large number of affected organizations, APT41 limits the deployment of follow-on malware to specific victim systems by matching against individual system identifiers. These multi-stage operations restrict malware delivery only to intended victims and significantly obfuscate the intended targets. In contrast, a typical spear-phishing campaign’s desired targeting can be discerned based on recipients' email addresses.

A breakdown of industries directly targeted by APT41 over time can be found in Figure 1.

 


Figure 1: Timeline of industries directly targeted by APT41

Probable Chinese Espionage Contractors

Two identified personas using the monikers “Zhang Xuguang” and “Wolfzhi” linked to APT41 operations have also been identified in Chinese-language forums. These individuals advertised their skills and services and indicated that they could be hired. Zhang listed his online hours as 4:00pm to 6:00am, similar to APT41 operational times against online gaming targets and suggesting that he is moonlighting. Mapping the group’s activities since 2012 (Figure 2) also provides some indication that APT41 primarily conducts financially motivated operations outside of their normal day jobs.

Attribution to these individuals is backed by identified persona information, their previous work and apparent expertise in programming skills, and their targeting of Chinese market-specific online games. The latter is especially notable because APT41 has repeatedly returned to targeting the video game industry and we believe these activities were formative in the group’s later espionage operations.


Figure 2: Operational activity for gaming versus non-gaming-related targeting based on observed operations since 2012

The Right Tool for the Job

APT41 leverages an arsenal of over 46 different malware families and tools to accomplish their missions, including publicly available utilities, malware shared with other Chinese espionage operations, and tools unique to the group. The group often relies on spear-phishing emails with attachments such as compiled HTML (.chm) files to initially compromise their victims. Once in a victim organization, APT41 can leverage more sophisticated TTPs and deploy additional malware. For example, in a campaign running almost a year, APT41 compromised hundreds of systems and used close to 150 unique pieces of malware including backdoors, credential stealers, keyloggers, and rootkits.

APT41 has also deployed rootkits and Master Boot Record (MBR) bootkits on a limited basis to hide their malware and maintain persistence on select victim systems. The use of bootkits in particular adds an extra layer of stealth because the code is executed prior to the operating system initializing. The limited use of these tools by APT41 suggests the group reserves more advanced TTPs and malware only for high-value targets.

Fast and Relentless

APT41 quickly identifies and compromises intermediary systems that provide access to otherwise segmented parts of an organization’s network. In one case, the group compromised hundreds of systems across multiple network segments and several geographic regions in as little as two weeks.

The group is also highly agile and persistent, responding quickly to changes in victim environments and incident responder activity. Hours after a victimized organization made changes to thwart APT41, for example, the group compiled a new version of a backdoor using a freshly registered command-and-control domain and compromised several systems across multiple geographic regions. In a different instance, APT41 sent spear-phishing emails to multiple HR employees three days after an intrusion had been remediated and systems were brought back online. Within hours of a user opening a malicious attachment sent by APT41, the group had regained a foothold within the organization's servers across multiple geographic regions.

Looking Ahead

APT41 is a creative, skilled, and well-resourced adversary, as highlighted by the operation’s distinct use of supply chain compromises to target select individuals, consistent signing of malware using compromised digital certificates, and deployment of bootkits (which is rare among Chinese APT groups).

Like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 appears to have moved toward strategic intelligence collection and establishing access and away from direct intellectual property theft since 2015. This shift, however, has not affected the group's consistent interest in targeting the video game industry for financially motivated reasons. The group's capabilities and targeting have both broadened over time, signaling the potential for additional supply chain compromises affecting a variety of victims in additional verticals.

APT41's links to both underground marketplaces and state-sponsored activity may indicate the group enjoys protections that enables it to conduct its own for-profit activities, or authorities are willing to overlook them. It is also possible that APT41 has simply evaded scrutiny from Chinese authorities. Regardless, these operations underscore a blurred line between state power and crime that lies at the heart of threat ecosystems and is exemplified by APT41.

Read the report today to learn more.