Daily Archives: July 18, 2018

CVE-2018-14403 (mp4v2)

MP4NameFirstMatches in mp4util.cpp in MP4v2 2.0.0 mishandles substrings of atom names, leading to use of an inappropriate data type for associated atoms. The resulting type confusion can cause out-of-bounds memory access.

CVE-2018-14399 (phpcms)

libs\classes\attachment.class.php in PHPCMS 9.6.0 allows remote attackers to upload and execute arbitrary PHP code via a .txt?.php#.jpg URI in the SRC attribute of an IMG element within info[content] JSON data to the index.php?m=member&c=index&a=register URI.

CVE-2018-0394 (cloud_services_platform_2100)

A vulnerability in the web upload function of Cisco Cloud Services Platform 2100 could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to obtain restricted shell access on an affected system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation of parameters passed to a specific function within the user interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting code into a function parameter. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi12935.

CVE-2018-0393 (mobility_services_engine_3310_firmware, mobility_services_engine_3355_firmware, mobility_services_engine_3365_firmware)

A Read-Only User Effect Change vulnerability in the Policy Builder interface of Cisco Policy Suite could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to make policy changes in the Policy Builder interface. The vulnerability is due to insufficient authorization controls. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by accessing the Policy Builder interface and modifying an HTTP request. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to make changes to existing policies. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi35007.

CVE-2018-0392 (mobility_services_engine_3310_firmware, mobility_services_engine_3355_firmware, mobility_services_engine_3365_firmware)

A vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco Policy Suite could allow an authenticated, local attacker to access files owned by another user. The vulnerability is due to insufficient access control permissions (i.e., World-Readable). An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by logging in to the CLI. An exploit could allow the attacker to access potentially sensitive files that are owned by a different user. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvh18087.

CVE-2018-0380 (webex_meetings_online)

Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the Cisco Webex Network Recording Player for Advanced Recording Format (ARF) and Webex Recording Format (WRF) files. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by providing a user with a malicious .arf or .wrf file via email or URL and convincing the user to launch the file in the Webex recording players. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities could cause an affected player to crash, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. The Cisco Webex players are applications that are used to play back Webex meetings that have been recorded by an online meeting attendee. The Webex Network Recording Player for .arf files can be automatically installed when the user accesses a recording that is hosted on a Webex server. The Webex Player for .wrf files can be downloaded manually. These vulnerabilities affect ARF and WRF recording players available from Cisco Webex Meetings Suite sites, Cisco Webex Meetings Online sites, and Cisco Webex Meetings Server. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvh70253, CSCvh70268, CSCvh72272, CSCvh72281, CSCvh72285, CSCvi60477, CSCvi60485, CSCvi60490, CSCvi60520, CSCvi60529, CSCvi60533.

CVE-2018-0387 (webex_teams)

A vulnerability in Cisco Webex Teams (for Windows and macOS) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the user's device, possibly with elevated privileges. The vulnerability occurs because Cisco Webex Teams does not properly sanitize input. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a user a malicious link and persuading the user to follow the link. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the user's system. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvh66250.

CVE-2018-0390 (webex_meetings)

A vulnerability in the web framework of Cisco Webex could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct a Document Object Model-based (DOM-based) cross-site scripting (XSS) attack against the user of the web interface of an affected system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation of certain parameters that are passed to the affected software by using the HTTP POST method. An attacker who can submit malicious scripts to the affected user interface element could execute arbitrary script or HTML code in the user's browser in the context of the affected site. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvj33287.

CVE-2018-0396 (unified_communications_manager_im_and_presence_service)

A vulnerability in the web framework of the Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM and Presence Service software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to conduct a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack against the user of the web interface of an affected system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation of certain parameters passed to the web server. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by convincing the user to access a malicious link or by intercepting the user request and injecting certain malicious code. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary script code in the context of the affected site or allow the attacker to access sensitive browser-based information. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCve25985.

CVE-2018-0372 (nx-os)

A vulnerability in the DHCPv6 feature of the Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches in Application-Centric Infrastructure (ACI) Mode could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the device to run low on system memory, which could result in a Denial of Service (DoS) condition on an affected system. The vulnerability is due to improper memory management when DHCPv6 packets are received on an interface of the targeted device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a high number of malicious DHCPv6 packets to be processed by an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the system to run low on memory, which could cause an eventual reboot of an affected device. The vulnerability only applies to IPv6 protocol packets and not for IPv4 protocol packets. This vulnerability affects Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches in ACI Mode running software version 13.0(1k). The vulnerability can only be exploited when unicast routing is enabled on the Bridge Domain (BD). DHCP and DHCP relay do not have to be configured for the vulnerability to be exploited. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvg38918.

CVE-2018-0350 (vbond_orchestrator, vedge-100_firmware, vedge-1000_firmware, vedge-2000_firmware, vedge-5000_firmware, vedge-plus, vedge-pro, vedge_100b_firmware, vedge_100m_firmware, vedge_100wm_firmware, vmanage_network_management, vsmart_controller)

A vulnerability in the VPN subsystem configuration in the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to inject arbitrary commands that are executed with root privileges. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the device and submitting crafted input to the affected parameter in a web page. The attacker must be authenticated to access the affected parameter. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands with root privileges. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vBond Orchestrator Software, vEdge 100 Series Routers, vEdge 1000 Series Routers, vEdge 2000 Series Routers, vEdge 5000 Series Routers, vEdge Cloud Router Platform, vManage Network Management Software, vSmart Controller Software. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi69808, CSCvi69810, CSCvi69814, CSCvi69822, CSCvi69827, CSCvi69828, CSCvi69836.

CVE-2018-0379 (webex_business_suite, webex_meeting_server, webex_meetings_online)

Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the Cisco Webex Network Recording Player for Advanced Recording Format (ARF) and Webex Recording Format (WRF) files. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by providing a user with a malicious .arf or .wrf file via email or URL and convincing the user to launch the file in the Webex recording players. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow arbitrary code execution on the system of a targeted user. These vulnerabilities affect ARF and WRF recording players available from Cisco Webex Meetings Suite sites, Cisco Webex Meetings Online sites, and Cisco Webex Meetings Server. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi02621, CSCvi02965, CSCvi63329, CSCvi63333, CSCvi63335, CSCvi63374, CSCvi63376, CSCvi63377, CSCvi63391, CSCvi63392, CSCvi63396, CSCvi63495, CSCvi63497, CSCvi63498, CSCvi82684, CSCvi82700, CSCvi82705, CSCvi82725, CSCvi82737, CSCvi82742, CSCvi82760, CSCvi82771, CSCvj51284, CSCvj51294.

CVE-2018-0376 (mobility_services_engine, policy_suite)

A vulnerability in the Policy Builder interface of Cisco Policy Suite before 18.2.0 could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access the Policy Builder interface. The vulnerability is due to a lack of authentication. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by accessing the Policy Builder interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to make changes to existing repositories and create new repositories. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi35109.

CVE-2018-0343 (vbond_orchestrator, vedge-100_firmware, vedge-1000_firmware, vedge-2000_firmware, vedge-5000_firmware, vedge-plus, vedge-pro, vedge_100b_firmware, vedge_100m_firmware, vedge_100wm_firmware, vmanage_network_management, vsmart_controller)

A vulnerability in the configuration and management service of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with vmanage user privileges or cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient access restrictions to the HTTP management interface of the affected solution. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious HTTP request to the affected management service through an authenticated device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code with vmanage user privileges or stop HTTP services on an affected system. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vBond Orchestrator Software, vEdge 100 Series Routers, vEdge 1000 Series Routers, vEdge 2000 Series Routers, vEdge 5000 Series Routers, vEdge Cloud Router Platform, vManage Network Management Software, vSmart Controller Software. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi69976.

CVE-2018-0342 (vbond_orchestrator, vedge-100_firmware, vedge-1000_firmware, vedge-2000_firmware, vedge-5000_firmware, vedge-plus, vedge-pro, vedge_100b_firmware, vedge_100m_firmware, vedge_100wm_firmware, vmanage_network_management, vsmart_controller)

A vulnerability in the configuration and monitoring service of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an authenticated, local attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges or cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to incomplete bounds checks for data that is provided by the configuration and monitoring service of the affected solution. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending malicious data to the vDaemon listening service on an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a buffer overflow condition on the affected device, which could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the device or cause the vDaemon listening service to reload and result in a DoS condition on the device. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vBond Orchestrator Software, vEdge 100 Series Routers, vEdge 1000 Series Routers, vEdge 2000 Series Routers, vEdge 5000 Series Routers, vEdge Cloud Router Platform, vManage Network Management Software, vSmart Controller Software. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi70003.

CVE-2018-0375 (mobility_services_engine, policy_suite)

A vulnerability in the Cluster Manager of Cisco Policy Suite before 18.2.0 could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to log in to an affected system using the root account, which has default, static user credentials. The vulnerability is due to the presence of undocumented, static user credentials for the root account. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by using the account to log in to an affected system. An exploit could allow the attacker to log in to the affected system and execute arbitrary commands as the root user. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvh02680.

CVE-2018-0377 (mobility_services_engine, policy_suite)

A vulnerability in the Open Systems Gateway initiative (OSGi) interface of Cisco Policy Suite before 18.1.0 could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to directly connect to the OSGi interface. The vulnerability is due to a lack of authentication. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by directly connecting to the OSGi interface. An exploit could allow the attacker to access or change any files that are accessible by the OSGi process. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvh18017.

CVE-2018-0344 (vbond_orchestrator, vedge-100_firmware, vedge-1000_firmware, vedge-2000_firmware, vedge-5000_firmware, vedge-plus, vedge-pro, vedge_100b_firmware, vedge_100m_firmware, vedge_100wm_firmware, vmanage_network_management, vsmart_controller)

A vulnerability in the vManage dashboard for the configuration and management service of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to inject and execute arbitrary commands with vmanage user privileges on an affected system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation of data parameters for certain fields in the affected solution. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by configuring a malicious username on the login page of the affected solution. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to inject and execute arbitrary commands with vmanage user privileges on an affected system. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vBond Orchestrator Software, vEdge 100 Series Routers, vEdge 1000 Series Routers, vEdge 2000 Series Routers, vEdge 5000 Series Routers, vEdge Cloud Router Platform, vManage Network Management Software, vSmart Controller Software. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi69974.

CVE-2018-0351 (vbond_orchestrator, vedge-100_firmware, vedge-1000_firmware, vedge-2000_firmware, vedge-5000_firmware, vedge-plus, vedge-pro, vedge_100b_firmware, vedge_100m_firmware, vedge_100wm_firmware, vmanage_network_management, vsmart_controller)

A vulnerability in the command-line tcpdump utility in the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an authenticated, local attacker to inject arbitrary commands that are executed with root privileges. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the device and submitting crafted input to the tcpdump utility. The attacker must be authenticated to access the tcpdump utility. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands with root privileges. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vBond Orchestrator Software, vEdge 100 Series Routers, vEdge 1000 Series Routers, vEdge 2000 Series Routers, vEdge 5000 Series Routers, vEdge Cloud Router Platform, vManage Network Management Software, vSmart Controller Software. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi69751.

CVE-2018-0349 (vbond_orchestrator, vedge-100_firmware, vedge-1000_firmware, vedge-2000_firmware, vedge-5000_firmware, vedge-plus, vedge-pro, vedge_100b_firmware, vedge_100m_firmware, vedge_100wm_firmware, vmanage_network_management, vsmart_controller)

A vulnerability in the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to overwrite arbitrary files on the underlying operating system of an affected device. The vulnerability is due to improper input validation of the request admin-tech command in the CLI of the affected software. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by modifying the request admin-tech command in the CLI of an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to overwrite arbitrary files on the underlying operating system of an affected device and escalate their privileges to the root user. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vBond Orchestrator Software, vEdge 100 Series Routers, vEdge 1000 Series Routers, vEdge 2000 Series Routers, vEdge 5000 Series Routers, vEdge Cloud Router Platform, vManage Network Management Software, vSmart Controller Software. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi69852, CSCvi69856.

CVE-2018-0347 (vbond_orchestrator, vedge-100_firmware, vedge-1000_firmware, vedge-2000_firmware, vedge-5000_firmware, vedge-plus, vedge-pro, vedge_100b_firmware, vedge_100m_firmware, vedge_100wm_firmware, vmanage_network_management, vsmart_controller)

A vulnerability in the Zero Touch Provisioning (ZTP) subsystem of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an authenticated, local attacker to inject arbitrary commands that are executed with root privileges. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the device and submitting malicious input to the affected parameter. The attacker must be authenticated to access the affected parameter. A successful exploit could allow an attacker to execute commands with root privileges. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vEdge 100 Series Routers, vEdge 1000 Series Routers, vEdge 2000 Series Routers, vEdge 5000 Series Routers. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi69906.

CVE-2018-0346 (vbond_orchestrator, vedge-100_firmware, vedge-1000_firmware, vedge-2000_firmware, vedge-5000_firmware, vedge-plus, vedge-pro, vedge_100b_firmware, vedge_100m_firmware, vedge_100wm_firmware, vmanage_network_management, vsmart_controller)

A vulnerability in the Zero Touch Provisioning service of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to incorrect bounds checks for certain values in packets that are sent to the Zero Touch Provisioning service of the affected software. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending malicious packets to the affected software for processing. When the software processes the packets, a buffer overflow condition could occur and cause an affected device to reload. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a temporary DoS condition while the device reloads. This vulnerability can be exploited only by traffic that is destined for an affected device. It cannot be exploited by traffic that is transiting a device. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vBond Orchestrator Software, vManage Network Management Software, vSmart Controller Software. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi69914.

CVE-2018-0348 (vbond_orchestrator, vedge-100_firmware, vedge-1000_firmware, vedge-2000_firmware, vedge-5000_firmware, vedge-plus, vedge-pro, vedge_100b_firmware, vedge_100m_firmware, vedge_100wm_firmware, vmanage_network_management, vsmart_controller)

A vulnerability in the CLI of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to inject arbitrary commands that are executed with root privileges. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the device and submitting malicious input to the load command within the VPN subsystem. The attacker must be authenticated to access the affected CLI parameter. A successful exploit could allow an attacker to execute commands with root privileges. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vBond Orchestrator Software, vEdge 100 Series Routers, vEdge 1000 Series Routers, vEdge 2000 Series Routers, vEdge 5000 Series Routers, vEdge Cloud Router Platform, vManage Network Management Software, vSmart Controller Software. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi69866.

CVE-2018-0345 (vbond_orchestrator, vedge-100_firmware, vedge-1000_firmware, vedge-2000_firmware, vedge-5000_firmware, vedge-plus, vedge-pro, vedge_100b_firmware, vedge_100m_firmware, vedge_100wm_firmware, vmanage_network_management, vsmart_controller)

A vulnerability in the configuration and management database of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the vmanage user in the configuration management system of the affected software. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of command arguments that are passed to the configuration and management database of the affected software. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by creating custom functions that contain malicious code and are executed as the vmanage user of the configuration management system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the vmanage user in the configuration management system of the affected software. This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are running a release of the Cisco SD-WAN Solution prior to Release 18.3.0: vBond Orchestrator Software, vManage Network Management Software, vSmart Controller Software. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvi69937.

CVE-2018-0374 (mobility_services_engine)

A vulnerability in the Policy Builder database of Cisco Policy Suite before 18.2.0 could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to connect directly to the Policy Builder database. The vulnerability is due to a lack of authentication. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by connecting directly to the Policy Builder database. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access and change any data in the Policy Builder database. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvh06134.

CVE-2018-14387 (wondercms)

An issue was discovered in WonderCMS before 2.5.2. An attacker can create a new session on a web application and record the associated session identifier. The attacker then causes the victim to authenticate against the server using the same session identifier. The attacker can access the user's account through the active session. The Session Fixation attack fixes a session on the victim's browser, so the attack starts before the user logs in.

CVE-2018-14364 (gitlab)

GitLab Community and Enterprise Edition before 10.7.7, 10.8.x before 10.8.6, and 11.x before 11.0.4 allows Directory Traversal with write access and resultant remote code execution via the GitLab projects import component.

iPhone Users: This Mobile Malware Could Allow Cybercriminals to Track Your Location

The iPhone and many of the apps designed to live on the device have the ability to track our location. Whenever they set up these apps, however, users get the option to opt in or out of location tracking services. But what happens when a malicious campaign doesn’t give users the option to opt of having their location tracked by cybercriminals? In fact, just this week, it has been discovered that iPhone users may be faced with that very possibility, as a sophisticated mobile malware campaign is gaining access to devices by tricking users into downloading an open-source mobile device management (MDM) software package.

First, let’s back up – how does a mobile device management software package work, exactly? Well, according to Continuum, Mobile device management (MDM) is a type of software used by an IT department to monitor, manage, and secure employees’ mobile devices. Therefore, once hijacked by hackers, this software could be used to gain almost complete access to a mobile device.

So, with this malicious MDM campaign, cybercriminals can gain access to a device and steal various forms of sensitive information, including the phone number, serial number, location, contact details, user’s photos, SMS messages, and Telegram and WhatsApp chat messages.

As of now, it’s not entirely clear how this campaign is being spread – though many signs point to social engineering. So, given the information we do know – the next question is what should iPhone users do next to stay secure? Start by following these tips:

  • Keep up-to-date on the latest social engineering scams. It’s important you stay in the loop so you know what scams to look out for. This means reading up the latest security news and knowing what’s real and what’s fake when it comes to random emails, phone calls, and text messages.
  • Turn off location services. It’s one thing for a cybercriminal to have ahold of your data, but it’s another thing entirely if they have the ability to track your location. This hack could not only impact your digital security but your physical security as well. So, turn off the location services immediately on your phone – that way if they gain access to your device, they won’t be able to track you.
  • Use a mobile security solution. As schemes like this MDM campaign continue to impact mobile users, make sure your devices are prepared for any threat coming their way. To do just that, cover these devices with a mobile security solution, such as McAfee Mobile Security.

And, of course, to stay on top of the latest consumer and mobile security threats, be sure to follow me and @McAfee_Home on Twitter, listen to our podcast Hackable? and ‘Like’ us on Facebook.

The post iPhone Users: This Mobile Malware Could Allow Cybercriminals to Track Your Location appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

CVE-2018-8042 (ambari)

Apache Ambari, version 2.5.0 to 2.6.2, passwords for Hadoop credential stores are exposed in Ambari Agent informational log messages when the credential store feature is enabled for eligible services. For example, Hive and Oozie.

CVE-2018-5232 (jira)

The EditIssue.jspa resource in Atlassian Jira before version 7.6.7 and from version 7.7.0 before version 7.10.1 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript via a cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the issuetype parameter.

How the Rise of Cryptocurrencies Is Shaping the Cyber Crime Landscape: The Growth of Miners

Introduction

Cyber criminals tend to favor cryptocurrencies because they provide a certain level of anonymity and can be easily monetized. This interest has increased in recent years, stemming far beyond the desire to simply use cryptocurrencies as a method of payment for illicit tools and services. Many actors have also attempted to capitalize on the growing popularity of cryptocurrencies, and subsequent rising price, by conducting various operations aimed at them. These operations include malicious cryptocurrency mining (also referred to as cryptojacking), the collection of cryptocurrency wallet credentials, extortion activity, and the targeting of cryptocurrency exchanges.

This blog post discusses the various trends that we have been observing related to cryptojacking activity, including cryptojacking modules being added to popular malware families, an increase in drive-by cryptomining attacks, the use of mobile apps containing cryptojacking code, cryptojacking as a threat to critical infrastructure, and observed distribution mechanisms.

What Is Mining?

As transactions occur on a blockchain, those transactions must be validated and propagated across the network. As computers connected to the blockchain network (aka nodes) validate and propagate the transactions across the network, the miners include those transactions into "blocks" so that they can be added onto the chain. Each block is cryptographically hashed, and must include the hash of the previous block, thus forming the "chain" in blockchain. In order for miners to compute the complex hashing of each valid block, they must use a machine's computational resources. The more blocks that are mined, the more resource-intensive solving the hash becomes. To overcome this, and accelerate the mining process, many miners will join collections of computers called "pools" that work together to calculate the block hashes. The more computational resources a pool harnesses, the greater the pool's chance of mining a new block. When a new block is mined, the pool's participants are rewarded with coins. Figure 1 illustrates the roles miners play in the blockchain network.


Figure 1: The role of miners

Underground Interest

FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence has identified eCrime actor interest in cryptocurrency mining-related topics dating back to at least 2009 within underground communities. Keywords that yielded significant volumes include miner, cryptonight, stratum, xmrig, and cpuminer. While searches for certain keywords fail to provide context, the frequency of these cryptocurrency mining-related keywords shows a sharp increase in conversations beginning in 2017 (Figure 2). It is probable that at least a subset of actors prefer cryptojacking over other types of financially motivated operations due to the perception that it does not attract as much attention from law enforcement.


Figure 2: Underground keyword mentions

Monero Is King

The majority of recent cryptojacking operations have overwhelmingly focused on mining Monero, an open-source cryptocurrency based on the CryptoNote protocol, as a fork of Bytecoin. Unlike many cryptocurrencies, Monero uses a unique technology called "ring signatures," which shuffles users' public keys to eliminate the possibility of identifying a particular user, ensuring it is untraceable. Monero also employs a protocol that generates multiple, unique single-use addresses that can only be associated with the payment recipient and are unfeasible to be revealed through blockchain analysis, ensuring that Monero transactions are unable to be linked while also being cryptographically secure.

The Monero blockchain also uses what's called a "memory-hard" hashing algorithm called CryptoNight and, unlike Bitcoin's SHA-256 algorithm, it deters application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) chip mining. This feature is critical to the Monero developers and allows for CPU mining to remain feasible and profitable. Due to these inherent privacy-focused features and CPU-mining profitability, Monero has become an attractive option for cyber criminals.

Underground Advertisements for Miners

Because most miner utilities are small, open-sourced tools, many criminals rely on crypters. Crypters are tools that employ encryption, obfuscation, and code manipulation techniques to keep their tools and malware fully undetectable (FUD). Table 1 highlights some of the most commonly repurposed Monero miner utilities.

XMR Mining Utilities

XMR-STACK

MINERGATE

XMRMINER

CCMINER

XMRIG

CLAYMORE

SGMINER

CAST XMR

LUKMINER

CPUMINER-MULTI

Table 1: Commonly used Monero miner utilities

The following are sample advertisements for miner utilities commonly observed in underground forums and markets. Advertisements typically range from stand-alone miner utilities to those bundled with other functions, such as credential harvesters, remote administration tool (RAT) behavior, USB spreaders, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) capabilities.

Sample Advertisement #1 (Smart Miner + Builder)

In early April 2018, actor "Mon£y" was observed by FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence selling a Monero miner for $80 USD – payable via Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Ether, Litecoin, or Monero – that included unlimited builds, free automatic updates, and 24/7 support. The tool, dubbed Monero Madness (Figure 3), featured a setting called Madness Mode that configures the miner to only run when the infected machine is idle for at least 60 seconds. This allows the miner to work at its full potential without running the risk of being identified by the user. According to the actor, Monero Madness also provides the following features:

  • Unlimited builds
  • Builder GUI (Figure 4)
  • Written in AutoIT (no dependencies)
  • FUD
  • Safer error handling
  • Uses most recent XMRig code
  • Customizable pool/port
  • Packed with UPX
  • Works on all Windows OS (32- and 64-bit)
  • Madness Mode option


Figure 3: Monero Madness


Figure 4: Monero Madness builder

Sample Advertisement #2 (Miner + Telegram Bot Builder)

In March 2018, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence observed actor "kent9876" advertising a Monero cryptocurrency miner called Goldig Miner (Figure 5). The actor requested payment of $23 USD for either CPU or GPU build or $50 USD for both. Payments could be made with Bitcoin, Ether, Litecoin, Dash, or PayPal. The miner ostensibly offers the following features:

  • Written in C/C++
  • Build size is small (about 100–150 kB)
  • Hides miner process from popular task managers
  • Can run without Administrator privileges (user-mode)
  • Auto-update ability
  • All data encoded with 256-bit key
  • Access to Telegram bot-builder
  • Lifetime support (24/7) via Telegram


Figure 5: Goldig Miner advertisement

Sample Advertisement #3 (Miner + Credential Stealer)

In March 2018, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence observed actor "TH3FR3D" offering a tool dubbed Felix (Figure 6) that combines a cryptocurrency miner and credential stealer. The actor requested payment of $50 USD payable via Bitcoin or Ether. According to the advertisement, the Felix tool boasted the following features:

  • Written in C# (Version 1.0.1.0)
  • Browser stealer for all major browsers (cookies, saved passwords, auto-fill)
  • Monero miner (uses minergate.com pool by default, but can be configured)
  • Filezilla stealer
  • Desktop file grabber (.txt and more)
  • Can download and execute files
  • Update ability
  • USB spreader functionality
  • PHP web panel


Figure 6: Felix HTTP

Sample Advertisement #4 (Miner + RAT)

In January 2018, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence observed actor "ups" selling a miner for any Cryptonight-based cryptocurrency (e.g., Monero and Dashcoin) for either Linux or Windows operating systems. In addition to being a miner, the tool allegedly provides local privilege escalation through the CVE-2016-0099 exploit, can download and execute remote files, and receive commands. Buyers could purchase the Windows or Linux tool for €200 EUR, or €325 EUR for both the Linux and Windows builds, payable via Monero, bitcoin, ether, or dash. According to the actor, the tool offered the following:

Windows Build Specifics

  • Written in C++ (no dependencies)
  • Miner component based on XMRig
  • Easy cryptor and VPS hosting options
  • Web panel (Figure 7)
  • Uses TLS for secured communication
  • Download and execute
  • Auto-update ability
  • Cleanup routine
  • Receive remote commands
  • Perform privilege escalation
  • Features "game mode" (mining stops if user plays game)
  • Proxy feature (based on XMRig)
  • Support (for €20/month)
  • Kills other miners from list
  • Hidden from TaskManager
  • Configurable pool, coin, and wallet (via panel)
  • Can mine the following Cryptonight-based coins:
    • Monero
    • Bytecoin
    • Electroneum
    • DigitalNote
    • Karbowanec
    • Sumokoin
    • Fantomcoin
    • Dinastycoin
    • Dashcoin
    • LeviarCoin
    • BipCoin
    • QuazarCoin
    • Bitcedi

Linux Build Specifics

  • Issues running on Linux servers (higher performance on desktop OS)
  • Compatible with AMD64 processors on Ubuntu, Debian, Mint (support for CentOS later)


Figure 7: Miner bot web panel

Sample Advertisement #5 (Miner + USB Spreader + DDoS Tool)

In August 2017, actor "MeatyBanana" was observed by FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence selling a Monero miner utility that included the ability to download and execute files and perform DDoS attacks. The actor offered the software for $30 USD, payable via Bitcoin. Ostensibly, the tool works with CPUs only and offers the following features:

  • Configurable miner pool and port (default to minergate)
  • Compatible with both 64- and 86-bit Windows OS
  • Hides from the following popular task managers:
  • Windows Task Manager
  • Process Killer
  • KillProcess
  • System Explorer
  • Process Explorer
  • AnVir
  • Process Hacker
  • Masked as a system driver
  • Does not require administrator privileges
  • No dependencies
  • Registry persistence mechanism
  • Ability to perform "tasks" (download and execute files, navigate to a site, and perform DDoS)
  • USB spreader
  • Support after purchase

The Cost of Cryptojacking

The presence of mining software on a network can generate costs on three fronts as the miner surreptitiously allocates resources:

  1. Degradation in system performance
  2. Increased cost in electricity
  3. Potential exposure of security holes

Cryptojacking targets computer processing power, which can lead to high CPU load and degraded performance. In extreme cases, CPU overload may even cause the operating system to crash. Infected machines may also attempt to infect neighboring machines and therefore generate large amounts of traffic that can overload victims' computer networks.

In the case of operational technology (OT) networks, the consequences could be severe. Supervisory control and data acquisition/industrial control systems (SCADA/ICS) environments predominately rely on decades-old hardware and low-bandwidth networks, therefore even a slight increase in CPU load or the network could leave industrial infrastructures unresponsive, impeding operators from interacting with the controlled process in real-time.

The electricity cost, measured in kilowatt hour (kWh), is dependent upon several factors: how often the malicious miner software is configured to run, how many threads it's configured to use while running, and the number of machines mining on the victim's network. The cost per kWh is also highly variable and depends on geolocation. For example, security researchers who ran Coinhive on a machine for 24 hours found that the electrical consumption was 1.212kWh. They estimated that this equated to electrical costs per month of $10.50 USD in the United States, $5.45 USD in Singapore, and $12.30 USD in Germany.

Cryptojacking can also highlight often overlooked security holes in a company's network. Organizations infected with cryptomining malware are also likely vulnerable to more severe exploits and attacks, ranging from ransomware to ICS-specific malware such as TRITON.

Cryptocurrency Miner Distribution Techniques

In order to maximize profits, cyber criminals widely disseminate their miners using various techniques such as incorporating cryptojacking modules into existing botnets, drive-by cryptomining attacks, the use of mobile apps containing cryptojacking code, and distributing cryptojacking utilities via spam and self-propagating utilities. Threat actors can use cryptojacking to affect numerous devices and secretly siphon their computing power. Some of the most commonly observed devices targeted by these cryptojacking schemes are:

  • User endpoint machines
  • Enterprise servers
  • Websites
  • Mobile devices
  • Industrial control systems
Cryptojacking in the Cloud

Private sector companies and governments alike are increasingly moving their data and applications to the cloud, and cyber threat groups have been moving with them. Recently, there have been various reports of actors conducting cryptocurrency mining operations specifically targeting cloud infrastructure. Cloud infrastructure is increasingly a target for cryptojacking operations because it offers actors an attack surface with large amounts of processing power in an environment where CPU usage and electricity costs are already expected to be high, thus allowing their operations to potentially go unnoticed. We assess with high confidence that threat actors will continue to target enterprise cloud networks in efforts to harness their collective computational resources for the foreseeable future.

The following are some real-world examples of cryptojacking in the cloud:

  • In February 2018, FireEye researchers published a blog detailing various techniques actors used in order to deliver malicious miner payloads (specifically to vulnerable Oracle servers) by abusing CVE-2017-10271. Refer to our blog post for more detailed information regarding the post-exploitation and pre-mining dissemination techniques used in those campaigns.
  • In March 2018, Bleeping Computer reported on the trend of cryptocurrency mining campaigns moving to the cloud via vulnerable Docker and Kubernetes applications, which are two software tools used by developers to help scale a company's cloud infrastructure. In most cases, successful attacks occur due to misconfigured applications and/or weak security controls and passwords.
  • In February 2018, Bleeping Computer also reported on hackers who breached Tesla's cloud servers to mine Monero. Attackers identified a Kubernetes console that was not password protected, allowing them to discover login credentials for the broader Tesla Amazon Web services (AWS) S3 cloud environment. Once the attackers gained access to the AWS environment via the harvested credentials, they effectively launched their cryptojacking operations.
  • Reports of cryptojacking activity due to misconfigured AWS S3 cloud storage buckets have also been observed, as was the case in the LA Times online compromise in February 2018. The presence of vulnerable AWS S3 buckets allows anyone on the internet to access and change hosted content, including the ability to inject mining scripts or other malicious software.
Incorporation of Cryptojacking into Existing Botnets

FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence has observed multiple prominent botnets such as Dridex and Trickbot incorporate cryptocurrency mining into their existing operations. Many of these families are modular in nature and have the ability to download and execute remote files, thus allowing the operators to easily turn their infections into cryptojacking bots. While these operations have traditionally been aimed at credential theft (particularly of banking credentials), adding mining modules or downloading secondary mining payloads provides the operators another avenue to generate additional revenue with little effort. This is especially true in cases where the victims were deemed unprofitable or have already been exploited in the original scheme.

The following are some real-world examples of cryptojacking being incorporated into existing botnets:

  • In early February 2018, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence observed Dridex botnet ID 2040 download a Monero cryptocurrency miner based on the open-source XMRig miner.
  • On Feb. 12, 2018, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence observed the banking malware IcedID injecting Monero-mining JavaScript into webpages for specific, targeted URLs. The IcedID injects launched an anonymous miner using the mining code from Coinhive's AuthedMine.
  • In late 2017, Bleeping Computer reported that security researchers with Radware observed the hacking group CodeFork leveraging the popular downloader Andromeda (aka Gamarue) to distribute a miner module to their existing botnets.
  • In late 2017, FireEye researchers observed Trickbot operators deploy a new module named "testWormDLL" that is a statically compiled copy of the popular XMRig Monero miner.
  • On Aug. 29, 2017, Security Week reported on a variant of the popular Neutrino banking Trojan, including a Monero miner module. According to their reporting, the new variant no longer aims at stealing bank card data, but instead is limited to downloading and executing modules from a remote server.

Drive-By Cryptojacking

In-Browser

FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence has examined various customer reports of browser-based cryptocurrency mining. Browser-based mining scripts have been observed on compromised websites, third-party advertising platforms, and have been legitimately placed on websites by publishers. While coin mining scripts can be embedded directly into a webpage's source code, they are frequently loaded from third-party websites. Identifying and detecting websites that have embedded coin mining code can be difficult since not all coin mining scripts are authorized by website publishers, such as in the case of a compromised website. Further, in cases where coin mining scripts were authorized by a website owner, they are not always clearly communicated to site visitors. At the time of reporting, the most popular script being deployed in the wild is Coinhive. Coinhive is an open-source JavaScript library that, when loaded on a vulnerable website, can mine Monero using the site visitor's CPU resources, unbeknownst to the user, as they browse the site.

The following are some real-world examples of Coinhive being deployed in the wild:

  • In September 2017, Bleeping Computer reported that the authors of SafeBrowse, a Chrome extension with more than 140,000 users, had embedded the Coinhive script in the extension's code that allowed for the mining of Monero using users' computers and without getting their consent.
  • During mid-September 2017, users on Reddit began complaining about increased CPU usage when they navigated to a popular torrent site, The Pirate Bay (TPB). The spike in CPU usage was a result of Coinhive's script being embedded within the site's footer. According to TPB operators, it was implemented as a test to generate passive revenue for the site (Figure 8).
  • In December 2017, researchers with Sucuri reported on the presence of the Coinhive script being hosted on GitHub.io, which allows users to publish web pages directly from GitHub repositories.
  • Other reporting disclosed the Coinhive script being embedded on the Showtime domain as well as on the LA Times website, both surreptitiously mining Monero.
  • A majority of in-browser cryptojacking activity is transitory in nature and will last only as long as the user’s web browser is open. However, researchers with Malwarebytes Labs uncovered a technique that allows for continued mining activity even after the browser window is closed. The technique leverages a pop-under window surreptitiously hidden under the taskbar. As researchers pointed out, closing the browser window may not be enough to interrupt the activity, and that more advanced actions like running the Task Manager may be required.


Figure 8: Statement from TPB operators on Coinhive script

Malvertising and Exploit Kits

Malvertisements – malicious ads on legitimate websites – commonly redirect visitors of a site to an exploit kit landing page. These landing pages are designed to scan a system for vulnerabilities, exploit those vulnerabilities, and download and execute malicious code onto the system. Notably, the malicious advertisements can be placed on legitimate sites and visitors can become infected with little to no user interaction. This distribution tactic is commonly used by threat actors to widely distribute malware and has been employed in various cryptocurrency mining operations.

The following are some real-world examples of this activity:

  • In early 2018, researchers with Trend Micro reported that a modified miner script was being disseminated across YouTube via Google's DoubleClick ad delivery platform. The script was configured to generate a random number variable between 1 and 100, and when the variable was above 10 it would launch the Coinhive script coinhive.min.js, which harnessed 80 percent of the CPU power to mine Monero. When the variable was below 10 it launched a modified Coinhive script that was also configured to harness 80 percent CPU power to mine Monero. This custom miner connected to the mining pool wss[:]//ws[.]l33tsite[.]info:8443, which was likely done to avoid Coinhive's fees.
  • In April 2018, researchers with Trend Micro also discovered a JavaScript code based on Coinhive injected into an AOL ad platform. The miner used the following private mining pools: wss[:]//wsX[.]www.datasecu[.]download/proxy and wss[:]//www[.]jqcdn[.]download:8893/proxy. Examination of other sites compromised by this campaign showed that in at least some cases the operators were hosting malicious content on unsecured AWS S3 buckets.
  • Since July 16, 2017, FireEye has observed the Neptune Exploit Kit redirect to ads for hiking clubs and MP3 converter domains. Payloads associated with the latter include Monero CPU miners that are surreptitiously installed on victims' computers.
  • In January 2018, Check Point researchers discovered a malvertising campaign leading to the Rig Exploit Kit, which served the XMRig Monero miner utility to unsuspecting victims.

Mobile Cryptojacking

In addition to targeting enterprise servers and user machines, threat actors have also targeted mobile devices for cryptojacking operations. While this technique is less common, likely due to the limited processing power afforded by mobile devices, cryptojacking on mobile devices remains a threat as sustained power consumption can damage the device and dramatically shorten the battery life. Threat actors have been observed targeting mobile devices by hosting malicious cryptojacking apps on popular app stores and through drive-by malvertising campaigns that identify users of mobile browsers.

The following are some real-world examples of mobile devices being used for cryptojacking:

  • During 2014, FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence reported on multiple Android malware apps capable of mining cryptocurrency:
    • In March 2014, Android malware named "CoinKrypt" was discovered, which mined Litecoin, Dogecoin, and CasinoCoin currencies.
    • In March 2014, another form of Android malware – "Android.Trojan.MuchSad.A" or "ANDROIDOS_KAGECOIN.HBT" – was observed mining Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Dogecoin currencies. The malware was disguised as copies of popular applications, including "Football Manager Handheld" and "TuneIn Radio." Variants of this malware have reportedly been downloaded by millions of Google Play users.
    • In April 2014, Android malware named "BadLepricon," which mined Bitcoin, was identified. The malware was reportedly being bundled into wallpaper applications hosted on the Google Play store, at least several of which received 100 to 500 installations before being removed.
    • In October 2014, a type of mobile malware called "Android Slave" was observed in China; the malware was reportedly capable of mining multiple virtual currencies.
  • In December 2017, researchers with Kaspersky Labs reported on a new multi-faceted Android malware capable of a variety of actions including mining cryptocurrencies and launching DDoS attacks. The resource load created by the malware has reportedly been high enough that it can cause the battery to bulge and physically destroy the device. The malware, dubbed Loapi, is unique in the breadth of its potential actions. It has a modular framework that includes modules for malicious advertising, texting, web crawling, Monero mining, and other activities. Loapi is thought to be the work of the same developers behind the 2015 Android malware Podec, and is usually disguised as an anti-virus app.
  • In January 2018, SophosLabs released a report detailing their discovery of 19 mobile apps hosted on Google Play that contained embedded Coinhive-based cryptojacking code, some of which were downloaded anywhere from 100,000 to 500,000 times.
  • Between November 2017 and January 2018, researchers with Malwarebytes Labs reported on a drive-by cryptojacking campaign that affected millions of Android mobile browsers to mine Monero.

Cryptojacking Spam Campaigns

FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence has observed several cryptocurrency miners distributed via spam campaigns, which is a commonly used tactic to indiscriminately distribute malware. We expect malicious actors will continue to use this method to disseminate cryptojacking code as for long as cryptocurrency mining remains profitable.

In late November 2017, FireEye researchers identified a spam campaign delivering a malicious PDF attachment designed to appear as a legitimate invoice from the largest port and container service in New Zealand: Lyttelton Port of Chistchurch (Figure 9). Once opened, the PDF would launch a PowerShell script that downloaded a Monero miner from a remote host. The malicious miner connected to the pools supportxmr.com and nanopool.org.


Figure 9: Sample lure attachment (PDF) that downloads malicious cryptocurrency miner

Additionally, a massive cryptojacking spam campaign was discovered by FireEye researchers during January 2018 that was designed to look like legitimate financial services-related emails. The spam email directed victims to an infection link that ultimately dropped a malicious ZIP file onto the victim's machine. Contained within the ZIP file was a cryptocurrency miner utility (MD5: 80b8a2d705d5b21718a6e6efe531d493) configured to mine Monero and connect to the minergate.com pool. While each of the spam email lures and associated ZIP filenames were different, the same cryptocurrency miner sample was dropped across all observed instances (Table 2).

ZIP Filenames

california_540_tax_form_2013_instructions.exe

state_bank_of_india_money_transfer_agency.exe

format_transfer_sms_banking_bni_ke_bca.exe

confirmation_receipt_letter_sample.exe

sbi_online_apply_2015_po.exe

estimated_tax_payment_coupon_irs.exe

how_to_add_a_non_us_bank_account_to_paypal.exe

western_union_money_transfer_from_uk_to_bangladesh.exe

can_i_transfer_money_from_bank_of_ireland_to_aib_online.exe

how_to_open_a_business_bank_account_with_bad_credit_history.exe

apply_for_sbi_credit_card_online.exe

list_of_lucky_winners_in_dda_housing_scheme_2014.exe

Table 2: Sampling of observed ZIP filenames delivering cryptocurrency miner

Cryptojacking Worms

Following the WannaCry attacks, actors began to increasingly incorporate self-propagating functionality within their malware. Some of the observed self-spreading techniques have included copying to removable drives, brute forcing SSH logins, and leveraging the leaked NSA exploit EternalBlue. Cryptocurrency mining operations significantly benefit from this functionality since wider distribution of the malware multiplies the amount of CPU resources available to them for mining. Consequently, we expect that additional actors will continue to develop this capability.

The following are some real-world examples of cryptojacking worms:

  • In May 2017, Proofpoint reported a large campaign distributing mining malware "Adylkuzz." This cryptocurrency miner was observed leveraging the EternalBlue exploit to rapidly spread itself over corporate LANs and wireless networks. This activity included the use of the DoublePulsar backdoor to download Adylkuzz. Adylkuzz infections create botnets of Windows computers that focus on mining Monero.
  • Security researchers with Sensors identified a Monero miner worm, dubbed "Rarogminer," in April 2018 that would copy itself to removable drives each time a user inserted a flash drive or external HDD.
  • In January 2018, researchers at F5 discovered a new Monero cryptomining botnet that targets Linux machines. PyCryptoMiner is based on Python script and spreads via the SSH protocol. The bot can also use Pastebin for its command and control (C2) infrastructure. The malware spreads by trying to guess the SSH login credentials of target Linux systems. Once that is achieved, the bot deploys a simple base64-encoded Python script that connects to the C2 server to download and execute more malicious Python code.

Detection Avoidance Methods

Another trend worth noting is the use of proxies to avoid detection. The implementation of mining proxies presents an attractive option for cyber criminals because it allows them to avoid developer and commission fees of 30 percent or more. Avoiding the use of common cryptojacking services such as Coinhive, Cryptloot, and Deepminer, and instead hosting cryptojacking scripts on actor-controlled infrastructure, can circumvent many of the common strategies taken to block this activity via domain or file name blacklisting.

In March 2018, Bleeping Computer reported on the use of cryptojacking proxy servers and determined that as the use of cryptojacking proxy services increases, the effectiveness of ad blockers and browser extensions that rely on blacklists decreases significantly.

Several mining proxy tools can be found on GitHub, such as the XMRig Proxy tool, which greatly reduces the number of active pool connections, and the CoinHive Stratum Mining Proxy, which uses Coinhive’s JavaScript mining library to provide an alternative to using official Coinhive scripts and infrastructure.

In addition to using proxies, actors may also establish their own self-hosted miner apps, either on private servers or cloud-based servers that supports Node.js. Although private servers may provide some benefit over using a commercial mining service, they are still subject to easy blacklisting and require more operational effort to maintain. According to Sucuri researchers, cloud-based servers provide many benefits to actors looking to host their own mining applications, including:

  • Available free or at low-cost
  • No maintenance, just upload the crypto-miner app
  • Harder to block as blacklisting the host address could potentially impact access to legitimate services
  • Resilient to permanent takedown as new hosting accounts can more easily be created using disposable accounts

The combination of proxies and crypto-miners hosted on actor-controlled cloud infrastructure presents a significant hurdle to security professionals, as both make cryptojacking operations more difficult to detect and take down.

Mining Victim Demographics

Based on data from FireEye detection technologies, the detection of cryptocurrency miner malware has increased significantly since the beginning of 2018 (Figure 10), with the most popular mining pools being minergate and nanopool (Figure 11), and the most heavily affected country being the U.S. (Figure 12). Consistent with other reporting, the education sector remains most affected, likely due to more relaxed security controls across university networks and students taking advantage of free electricity to mine cryptocurrencies (Figure 13).


Figure 10: Cryptocurrency miner detection activity per month


Figure 11: Commonly observed pools and associated ports


Figure 12: Top 10 affected countries


Figure 13: Top five affected industries


Figure 14: Top affected industries by country

Mitigation Techniques

Unencrypted Stratum Sessions

According to security researchers at Cato Networks, in order for a miner to participate in pool mining, the infected machine will have to run native or JavaScript-based code that uses the Stratum protocol over TCP or HTTP/S. The Stratum protocol uses a publish/subscribe architecture where clients will send subscription requests to join a pool and servers will send messages (publish) to its subscribed clients. These messages are simple, readable, JSON-RPC messages. Subscription requests will include the following entities: id, method, and params (Figure 15). A deep packet inspection (DPI) engine can be configured to look for these parameters in order to block Stratum over unencrypted TCP.


Figure 15: Stratum subscription request parameters

Encrypted Stratum Sessions

In the case of JavaScript-based miners running Stratum over HTTPS, detection is more difficult for DPI engines that do not decrypt TLS traffic. To mitigate encrypted mining traffic on a network, organizations may blacklist the IP addresses and domains of popular mining pools. However, the downside to this is identifying and updating the blacklist, as locating a reliable and continually updated list of popular mining pools can prove difficult and time consuming.

Browser-Based Sessions

Identifying and detecting websites that have embedded coin mining code can be difficult since not all coin mining scripts are authorized by website publishers (as in the case of a compromised website). Further, in cases where coin mining scripts were authorized by a website owner, they are not always clearly communicated to site visitors.

As defenses evolve to prevent unauthorized coin mining activities, so will the techniques used by actors; however, blocking some of the most common indicators that we have observed to date may be effective in combatting a significant amount of the CPU-draining mining activities that customers have reported. Generic detection strategies for browser-based cryptocurrency mining include:

  • Blocking domains known to have hosted coin mining scripts
  • Blocking websites of known mining project websites, such as Coinhive
  • Blocking scripts altogether
  • Using an ad-blocker or coin mining-specific browser add-ons
  • Detecting commonly used naming conventions
  • Alerting and blocking traffic destined for known popular mining pools

Some of these detection strategies may also be of use in blocking some mining functionality included in existing financial malware as well as mining-specific malware families.

It is important to note that JavaScript used in browser-based cryptojacking activity cannot access files on disk. However, if a host has inadvertently navigated to a website hosting mining scripts, we recommend purging cache and other browser data.

Outlook

In underground communities and marketplaces there has been significant interest in cryptojacking operations, and numerous campaigns have been observed and reported by security researchers. These developments demonstrate the continued upward trend of threat actors conducting cryptocurrency mining operations, which we expect to see a continued focus on throughout 2018. Notably, malicious cryptocurrency mining may be seen as preferable due to the perception that it does not attract as much attention from law enforcement as compared to other forms of fraud or theft. Further, victims may not realize their computer is infected beyond a slowdown in system performance.

Due to its inherent privacy-focused features and CPU-mining profitability, Monero has become one of the most attractive cryptocurrency options for cyber criminals. We believe that it will continue to be threat actors' primary cryptocurrency of choice, so long as the Monero blockchain maintains privacy-focused standards and is ASIC-resistant. If in the future the Monero protocol ever downgrades its security and privacy-focused features, then we assess with high confidence that threat actors will move to use another privacy-focused coin as an alternative.

Because of the anonymity associated with the Monero cryptocurrency and electronic wallets, as well as the availability of numerous cryptocurrency exchanges and tumblers, attribution of malicious cryptocurrency mining is very challenging for authorities, and malicious actors behind such operations typically remain unidentified. Threat actors will undoubtedly continue to demonstrate high interest in malicious cryptomining so long as it remains profitable and relatively low risk.

CA Veracode Dynamic Analysis: Reduce the Risk of a Breach

CA Veracode Dynamic Analysis is a dynamic scanning solution that features automation, depth of coverage, and unmatched scalability. Built on microservices and cloud technologies, the CA Veracode Dynamic Analysis solution is available on the Veracode SaaS platform. CA Veracode Dynamic Analysis helps both vulnerability managers tasked with safeguarding the entire web application portfolio, and AppSec managers tasked with safeguarding critical applications in pre-production. With the frameworks developers use to build web applications changing often, and the push toward single page applications, CA Veracode Dynamic Analysis gives you the automated dynamic scanning you need to find vulnerabilities quickly and accurately.

Benefits of Scheduling Automation

Consistent dynamic scanning is key to keeping your web applications safe, and consistent scanning is achievable with an automated dynamic scanning solution. Imagine your CISO tells you to scan your web apps as often as feasible. Depending on remediation frequency, you come up with a quarterly, monthly, or weekly scanning schedule. To add additional complexity, IT gives you a maintenance window when dynamic scanning cannot occur. If you’re part of a global company, you also have time zones to contend with, making it virtually impossible to depend on a manual pause and resume, not to mention the inconvenience of waking up at 3:00 AM to pause a running scan. With all these variables to handle, you need a dynamic scanning solution that provides true automation to handle scheduling and IT maintenance windows, so you can “set it and forget it.” 

Recurring Scan Scheduling provides the ability to set up a schedule such that the application can be automatically scanned on a weekly, monthly, or quarterly cadence (or anything in between). Once the schedule has been set up, the dynamic scan will kick off automatically at the defined cadence. If the scan has been set up to start on a Tuesday, it will maintain that start day for the weekly scans to avoid running into weekends and holidays.

Automated Pause & Resume provides the ability to designate a maintenance window when the applications won’t be scanned. Dynamic scanning will be automatically paused when the IT maintenance window begins and automatically resume when the applications can be scanned. The pause and resume functionality has been built to ensure scanning resumes where it left off, with the goal of full coverage.

The screenshot below shows how to set up a weekly recurring scan that runs year round, pauses at midnight, and resumes at 4:00 AM each day.

  • Each week the application is dynamically scanned with the automated schedule and scan kick-off.
  • The system automatically pauses at the start of the maintenance window at 12:00 AM and resumes scanning at 4:00 AM.
  • You can adjust the duration based on the size of the application and the number of applications scanned in the batch to get the best coverage.

Authenticated Batch Scanning provides the ability to increase coverage by scanning behind the login screen, using a multitude of login mechanisms such as auto login, basic authentication, or uploading a login script. You can depend on the pre-scan feature to provide accurate feedback on the connection and authentication for the application under test, so you can fix any access issues ahead of the scheduled start time. In addition, a batch of scans can be kicked off at the same time to allow concurrent scanning with authentication. You save a lot of time when all applications can be concurrently scanned, with coverage for single page application frameworks and the ability to cover large web applications quickly.

Dynamic Analysis makes it easy to onboard applications and provides multiple input mechanisms. Uploading a CSV file is a quick way for large and small companies to take advantage of scanning applications concurrently.

Show Me the Results: Consolidated View

CA Veracode Dynamic Analysis provides visibility into the scanning process to give you peace of mind and comprehensive results once the scanning is complete. The CA Veracode Platform’s Triage Flaw Viewer provides CWE details, vulnerability severity, along with request/response. In addition, the Platform provides reports to show scan coverage, summary reports for executives, and detailed reports for AppSec teams.

The goal of dynamic scanning is to find exploitable vulnerabilities at runtime, and remediate the issues found. The Dynamic Flaw Inventory provides a dashboard that provides historical vulnerability information, allowing AppSec managers to track team progress toward fixing vulnerabilities. 

CA Veracode Dynamic Analysis gives you a solution to scan your entire portfolio of web applications with ease, provides accurate results, and puts you on the path to remediate the findings. Even if you are running static scans early in the SDLC, dynamically scanning your web application at runtime uncovers exploitable vulnerabilities that static scans won’t find. Use our dynamic scanning solution to find and remediate flaws before a hacker exploits the vulnerability, resulting in a breach.

I’d love to hear your feedback

Would CA Veracode Dynamic Analysis benefit your AppSec program and reduce the risk of a breach? I’d like to hear your thoughts. To learn more please visit us online or to schedule a demo now, click here.

CVE-2018-10871 (389_directory_server, debian_linux)

389-ds-base before versions 1.3.8.5, 1.4.0.12 is vulnerable to a Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information. By default, when the Replica and/or retroChangeLog plugins are enabled, 389-ds-base stores passwords in plaintext format in their respective changelog files. An attacker with sufficiently high privileges, such as root or Directory Manager, can query these files in order to retrieve plaintext passwords.

CVE-2018-14371 (mojarra)

The getLocalePrefix function in ResourceManager.java in Eclipse Mojarra before 2.3.7 is affected by Directory Traversal via the loc parameter. A remote attacker can download configuration files or Java bytecodes from applications.

When Disaster Comes Calling

There are times like this when I can’t help but wonder about disaster recovery plans. A large number of companies that I have worked at or spoken with over the years seemed to pay little more than lip service to this rather significant elephant in the room. This came to mind today while I was reading about the storm that ran roughshod over Toronto. In the midst of all the flooding I read about the servers at Toronto’s Pearson airport (YYZ).They had become, well, rather wet. There was “flooding in server rooms.” according to their tweet July 8th at 9:16 pm.

This really got me thinking as to how this could have happened in the first place.

At one organization that I worked for the role of disaster recovery planning fell to an individual that had neither the interest nor the wherewithal to accomplish the task. This is a real problem for many companies and organizations. The fate of their operations can, at times, reside in the hands of someone who is disinclined to properly perform the task.

Of course this is not a truism of every company. But, there are many instances where it is the sheer force of will of the staff needed to restore service in the event of an outage. One company that I had worked for suffered an SAP outage that made it such that invoices could not be paid. The impact of this was a massive financial burden and it took the better part of a month to sort out. There was no disaster recovery plan. There was no system back up. There was no failover. In this case the DR plan was not even in existence. Through the Herculean efforts of the staff, invoices were paid manually.

A second example that I can’t help but pull from the archives was when I was working for a certain power company. It was the end of the day and I was heading for the door with my coworker. We came upon our head of IT operations and one of the building security guards working feverishly to contain a water leak in the janitorial closet. The faucet would not close. We dropped our bags and pitched in to help.

In relatively short order the tap sheered off from the wall and the real flooding began. The difficulty that presented itself in short order was that the main water shut off valve was no where to be found. There was no disaster recovery plan that covered this contingency. To make matters worse, the computer control room was located on the floor directly below the janitor closet.

Um, yeah.

Ultimately the situation was resolved and the control room was saved. But, it should have never gotten to that point.

So what is the actionable take away to had from this post? Take some time to review your organizations disaster recovery plans. Are backups taken? Are they tested? Are they stored offsite? Does the disaster recovery plan even exist anywhere on paper? Has that plan been tested with the staff? No plan survives first contact with the “enemy” but, it is far better to be well trained and prepared than to be caught unawares.

Even if you’re not directly involved with the plans in your shop be sure to ask the question. Are we prepared?

Originally posted on CSO Online by me.

The post When Disaster Comes Calling appeared first on Liquidmatrix Security Digest.

Here Are the Biggest Cybersecurity Threats to Watch out for in 2018

Cybercriminals are always evolving their tactics in order to steal and compromise data. To stay ahead of them, we compiled the biggest cybersecurity threats in 2018, from cryptojacking to already-infected smartphones, and provided actionable tips for you to stay safe online. As the old saying goes, prevention is better than the cure!

1. Getting their info compromised in massive data leaks

There’s no question about it, the biggest risk for users comes without them even having a choice or an input in the matter. It’s, of course, data leaks.

Beyond the Equifax hack and the Cambridge Analytica scandal and their far-reaching implications, it seems that every month brings a new data leak from a major company.

To help combat this, Firefox announced that they will implement Troy Hunt’s Have I Been Pwned tool into their browser, allowing users to check if their email address was compromised. It’s a great start but it’s not enough.

Firefox-Monitor-Website---General-Homepage-1

Unfortunately, as a user, there’s not much you can do about the big services getting hacked. You can, however, protect yourself to the best of your ability, which will eliminate a large number of attack angles on your data and finances.

How to protect yourself:

  1. For non-essential services like newsletters, promotions and various sign-ups, use one or more “burner” email addresses that are not used for your important accounts
  2. Periodically check if your main email address shows up in Have I Been Pwned or Firefox Monitor
  3. Secure every login with two-factor authentication
  4. Carefully consider how much personal information you give away on social media

 


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2. Smartphones shipping with malware and malicious apps

Mobile malware is one of the fastest growing types of malware and this trend has continued for a few years. Because smartphones have become replacements for desktop computers and laptops for many people, the data they collect and contain is a very appealing target for cybercriminals.

It goes without saying that you should never download apps from unknown sources and stick to the official app stores. However, malicious apps can regularly bypass security measures in the Google Play Store or Apple’s App Store.

Trend Micro actually uncovered apps that promised “smartphone security”, not to mention a host of malicious apps that claimed to clean up storage space or optimize battery usage. All of them actually harvested user data and location, while also pushing advertising in multiple ways. Even the App Store, usually having strict review processes, accidentally allowed a calendar app to secretly mine cryptocurrency in the background.

Just how bad is it?

In 2017, out of around 3.5 million apps in Google Play Store, 700.000 of them were deemed “problematic” – they were either app clones or they were designed to steal information, intercept text messages and send phishing links to the user’s list of contacts.

Maybe 2018 is better. Well, that’s a big maybe. Even with Google Play Protect and other measures from other smartphone or OS makers, things slip by.

top mobile malware families 2018 sophos

Source

Some devices actually ship with malware on them, straight from the factory floor!

In 2017, cybersecurity experts from Checkpoint pointed out that more than 30 high-end smartphones were infected with malware somewhere in the supply chain, before even reaching consumers.

In 2018, Dr. Web drew the alarm that dozens of low-cost Android phones were shipping with the powerful banking Trojan called Triada.

How to protect yourself:

  1. Don’t be lured by the appeal of cheap smartphones if you don’t know the brand – do research before buying a device and make sure the brand has an established community.
  2. Update your apps everytime you receive a notification or let them update automatically. A security patch applied immediately can and will protect you from a lot of malicious attacks on your smartphone.
  3. Take the time to review app permissions when you install them and periodically check those permissions in case they were reset after an update. Does a photo scanning app actually need permission to access your location? No, it does not.
  4. When searching for and installing an app, take a minute and read some reviews about it, checking both the high and low scores. If it doesn’t have reviews yet promises a widely-needed functionality, steer clear of it.
  5. Try to back up your smartphone data at least twice a month

Smartphones are shipping with #malware. Here’s what you should know.
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3. Ransomware attacks on cloud services

Ransomware is one of the biggest threats for both home users and organizations. Attacks that will encrypt data and then demand hefty ransoms are obviously a profitable endeavor for criminals.

What’s really bad is that usually, a ransomware attack can be minimized if someone has a back-up of their data. That data is usually in the cloud and the cloud can be hit by ransomware.

Petya itself, one of the most virulent strains, was spread through an infected file on Dropbox, one of the most popular backup solutions. Clearly, ransomware in the cloud is a major problem for everyone.

According to MIT, this is one of the six biggest cyber threats. Just like in the case of data breaches, you cannot stop your cloud provider from getting infected, but you can take measures to protect yourself from ransomware.

ransomware statistics 2018 kaspersky

How to protect yourself:

We put together this mega-guide on ransomware protection, but in short, here’s what you should do:

  1. Keep your valuable data backed up, both locally and in the cloud, preferably in multiple locations
  2. Don’t rely on Antivirus alone, as this reactionary software can’t handle the newest strains. Use a proactive tool capable of blocking infections at their source and stopping dangerous links

 

4. Cryptojacking that affects their hardware

As we explained in our protection guide against cryptojacking, this type of attack involves hijacking your computer’s hardware in order to mine cryptocurrency for the criminals.

One of the most popular ways to do this was to target a vulnerable website and inject a script (Coinhive has been the most popular). Then, unprotected visitors on that website had their computers enslaved in order to mine cryptocurrency.

Cryptojacking has been one of the most popular attacks this year, almost surpassing ransomware, and it’s constantly evolving.

How to protect yourself:

  1. Use a reputable antivirus and, alongside it, an anti-malware solution that constantly scans traffic and blocks infected domains
  2. On any browser, use an Adblocker that has can stop cryptocurrency-mining scripts. One example is uBlock Origin but you can also use the popular extension NoScript
  3. Always update your software, especially your browser, since some cryptojacking targets the browser directly

 

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5. Financial losses and data compromise due to cryptocurrency trading

The end of 2017 marked a crazy in the world of cryptocurrency, with the value of Bitcoin reaching $20K. At the same time, cybercriminals also had an even bigger incentive to get creative with their attacks.

Beyond cryptojacking, which usually affects those who are not invested in cryptocurrencies, those who owned any type of virtual coins were prime candidates to lose their money.

In  June, the sixth-biggest crypto exchange in the world, Bithumb, was hacked, and around $30 million was lost. Fortunately, those users who kept their coins there were reimbursed, but others were not so lucky.

In February, another crypto exchange (BitGrail) was hacked. The attackers took off with $195 million worth of Nano cryptocurrency belonging to users. That incident blew up in a scandal after the company initially refused to refund users. And that’s only the attacks on the exchanges themselves.

cryptojacking cryptocurrency hacks

Cryptocurrency holders around the world are constantly targeted by ever-evolving attacks aimed at their virtual wallets.

One cryptocurrency trader and YouTube personality, Ian Balina, was targeted in a hack and lost almost $2 million dollars. Another, Peter Saddington, told the press that someone used social engineering on Verizon’s customer service then targeted him. He lost a “significant amount” of money and a lot of valuable data.

“It fundamentally changed my life. I lost everything. I lost 13 years of emails,” he said.

In January, a criminal stole $150.000 by tricking would-be investors in an ICO sale to send their payments to a fraudulent wallet address using good, old-fashioned phishing. Wired had a great write-up on why it’s so easy to hack a cryptocurrency fundraiser.

Even the popular Hola VPN chrome extension was hacked and replaced with a compromised one designed to steal cryptocurrency.

How to protect yourself:

While it’s impossible to control for all outcomes, especially a data breach, there are some steps you can take:

  1. If you invest in cryptocurrency do not tell others about this. Specifically, don’t post on social media about it.
  2. Use this guide to secure your assets before even considering investing, as security best practices will help you have a good base.
  3. Keep your funds in multiple wallets
  4. Secure all your logins with two-factor authentication
  5. Stay on top of the news to keep up with the latest types of scams. A dose of paranoia when involved in crypto is one of the healthiest things you can do.

Actionable tips to safely use #cryptocurrency
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6. Scams with advanced social engineering tactics

We try to keep up with the most popular or creative online scams and gather them in our prevention guides so that you can stay safe. Fossbytes wrote a very good rundown on the types of social engineering techniques that can compromise your info, from phishing to baiting and the “quid pro quo”, where criminals pose as support employees.

However, with the rise of AI and machine learning, those criminals can efficiently automate their attacks in order to maximize their reach.

“Machine learning models can now match humans at the art of crafting convincing fake messages, and they can churn them out without tiring,” warns MIT Technology Review.

How to protect yourself:

  1. Learn how to spot a phishing link and understand how other techniques like vishing or spear phishing work
  2. Install a traffic scanner on your PC that can block malicious links and attempts to connect to infected domains
  3. Avoid posting too much personal information on social media

 

7. IoT devices like smart locks or smart assistants being hacked

In May, an NYTimes piece perfectly articulated privacy advocates’ biggest concerns and one of the biggest cybersecurity threats, citing a group of Berkeley researchers who managed to attack Alexa.

“Inside university labs, the researchers have been able to secretly activate the artificial intelligence systems on smartphones and smart speakers, making them dial phone numbers or open websites. In the wrong hands, the technology could be used to unlock doors, wire money or buy stuff online — simply with music playing over the radio.

A group of students from University of California, Berkeley, and Georgetown University showed in 2016 that they could hide commands in white noise played over loudspeakers and through YouTube videos to get smart devices to turn on airplane mode or open a website.

This month, some of those Berkeley researchers published a research paper that went further, saying they could embed commands directly into recordings of music or spoken text. So while a human listener hears someone talking or an orchestra playing, Amazon’s Echo speaker might hear an instruction to add something to your shopping list.”

amazon echo

While the reporter and researchers underlined that, to the extent of their knowledge, fortunately, no such attacks have been spotted in the wild.

By exploiting the “re-prompt” feature that makes Alexa clarify an order, Checkmarx tricked Amazon Echo to record everything spoken even if the wake word wasn’t used. It was just this year’s headline, as in 2017 one security researcher, Mark Barnes, showed off how to install malware on an Amazon Echo.

Of course, Amazon is a huge company, so it invests plenty in securing their devices and their reputation. However, there is no such thing as unhackable software, so you need to exercise caution.

How to protect yourself:

  1. Consider if you do need to have a device like a voice assistant connected to every smart appliance you own. “Convenience versus privacy and security” is a debate everyone should have with themselves before purchasing devices and software.
  2. If you own a device like this, make sure you connect it to a secure WiFi. Use this guide to enhance the security of your home network.
  3. Be careful about allowing smart devices access to your credit card. Last year, an Amazon Echo owner woke up to find Alexa had purchased a lot of dollhouses.
  4. Take stock of who visits your home and what kind of access your friends and family have to your voice assistant

 

While not all of them are new and most are based on tactics already seen, these are the biggest cybersecurity threats for users in 2018. If you have one more to add to the list (or even a great security tip!) let us know below. We’d love your input!

The post Here Are the Biggest Cybersecurity Threats to Watch out for in 2018 appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog.