Daily Archives: May 14, 2018

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IDG Contributor Network: IBM and thumb drives: epoxy or beacons?

IBM recently announced a startling company-wide policy for all of its employees that bans use of removable storage devices. It seems remarkable that this policy was announced in 2018. The Department of Defense (DoD) banned removable media more than a decade ago, in 2008. While DoD has functioned just fine without them, its data loss problem hasn’t gone away. I predict that IBM’s problem won’t disappear either.

To read this article in full, please click here

A Deep Dive Into RIG Exploit Kit Delivering Grobios Trojan

As discussed in previous blogs, exploit kit activity has been on the decline since the latter half of 2016. However, we do still periodically observe significant developments in this space, and we have been observing interesting ongoing activity involving RIG Exploit Kit (EK). Although the volume of its traffic observed in-the-wild has been on the decline, RIG EK remains active, with a wide range of associated crimeware payloads.

In this recent finding, RIG EK was observed delivering a Trojan named Grobios. This blog post will discuss this Trojan in depth with a focus on its evasion and anti-sandbox techniques, but first let’s take a quick look at the attack flow. Figure 1 shows the entire infection chain for the activity we observed.


Figure 1: Infection chain

We first observed redirects to RIG EK on Mar. 10, 2018, from the compromised domain, latorre[.]com[.]au, which had a malicious iframe injected to it (Figure 2).


Figure 2: Malicious Iframe injected in latorre[.]com

The iframe loads a malvertisement domain, which communicates over SSL (certificate shown in Figure 3) and leads to the RIG EK landing page that loads the malicious Flash file (Figure 4).


Figure 3: Malicious SSL flow


Figure 4: RIG EK SWF download request

When opened, the Flash file drops the Grobios Trojan. Figure 5 shows the callback traffic from the Grobios Trojan.


Figure 5: Grobios callback

Analysis of the Dropped Malware

Grobios uses various techniques to evade detection and gain persistence on the machine, which makes it hard for it to be uninstalled or to go inactive on the victim machine. It also uses multiple anti-debugging, anti-analysis and anti-VM techniques to hide its behavior. After successful installation on the victim machine, it connects to its command and control (C2) server, which responds with commands.

In an effort to evade static detection, the authors have packed the sample with PECompact 2.xx. The unpacked sample has no function entries in the import table. It uses API hashing to obfuscate the names of API functions it calls and parses the PE header of the DLL files to match the name of a function to its hash. The malware also uses stack strings. Figure 6 shows an example of the malware calling WinApi using the hashes.


Figure 6: An example of calling WinAPI using their hashes.

Loading

The malware sample starts a copy of itself, which further injects its code into svchost.exe or IEXPLORE.EXE depending on the user privilege level. Both parent and child quit after injection is complete. Only svchost.exe/IEXPLORE.EXE keeps running. Figure 7 shows the process tree.


Figure 7: Process tree of the malware

Persistence

The malware has an aggressive approach to persistence. It employs the following techniques:

  • It drops a copy of itself into the %APPDATA% folder, masquerading as a version of legitimate software installed on the victim machine. It creates an Autorun registry key and a shortcut in the Windows Startup folder. During our analysis, it dropped itself to the following path:

%APPDATA%\Google\v2.1.13554\<RandomName>.exe. 

The path can vary depending on the folders the malware finds in %APPDATA%.

  • It drops multiple copies of itself in subfolders of a program at the path %ProgramFiles%/%PROGRAMFILES(X86)%,  again masquerading as a different version of the installed program, and sets an Autorun registry key or creates a scheduled task.
  • It drops a copy itself in the %Temp% folder, and creates a scheduled task to run it.

On an infected system, the malware creates two scheduled tasks, as shown in Figure 8.


Figure 8: Scheduled tasks created by the malware

The malware changes the file Created, Modified, and Accessed times of all of its dropped copies to the Last Modified time of ntdll.dll. To bypass the “File Downloaded from the Internet” warning, the malware removes the :Zone.Identifier flag using DeleteFile API, as shown in Figure 9.


Figure 9: Call to DeleteFileW to remove the :Zone.Identifier Flag from the dropped copy

An interesting behavior of this malware is that it protects its copy in the %TEMP% folder using EFS (Windows Encrypted File System), as seen in Figure 10.


Figure 10: Cipher Command Shows the Malware Copy Protected by EFS

Detecting VM and Malware Analysis Tools

Just before connecting to the C2, the malware does a series of checks to detect the VM and malware analysis environment. It can detect almost all well-known VM software, including Xen, QEMU, VMWare, Virtualbox, Hyper-V, and so on. The following is the list of checks it performs on the victim system:

  • Using the FindWindowEx API, it checks whether any of the analysis tools in Table 1 are running on the system.

Analysis Tools

PacketSniffer

FileMon

WinDbg

Process Explorer

OllyDbg

SmartSniff

cwmonitor

Sniffer

Wireshark

Table 1: Analysis tools detected by malware

  • The malware contains a list of hashes of blacklisted process names. It checks whether the hash of any of running process matches a hash on the blacklist, as shown in Figure 11. 


Figure 11: Check for blacklisted processes

We were able to crack the hashes of the blacklisted processes shown in Table 2.

Hash

Process

283ADE38h

vmware.exe

8A64214Bh

vmount2.exe

13A5F93h

vmusrvc.exe

0F00A9026h

vmsrvc.exe

0C96B0F73h

vboxservice.exe

0A1308D40h

vboxtray.exe

0E7A01D35h

xenservice.exe

205FAB41h

joeboxserver.exe

6F651D58h

joeboxcontrol.exe

8A703DD9h

wireshark.exe

1F758DBh

Sniffhit.exe

0CEF3A27Ch

sysAnalyzer.exe

6FDE1C18h

Filemon.exe

54A04220h

procexp.exe

0A17C90B4h

Procmon.exe

7215026Ah

Regmon.exe

788FCF87h

autoruns.exe

0A2BF507Ch

 

0A9046A7Dh

 

Table 2: Blacklisted processes

  • The malware enumerates registry keys in the following paths to see if they contain the words xen or VBOX:
    • HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT
    • HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\FADT
    • HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\RSDT
  • It checks whether services installed on the system contain any of the keywords in Table 3:

vmmouse

vmdebug

vmicexchange

vmicshutdown

vmicvss

vmicheartbeat

msvmmouf

VBoxMouse

vpcuhub

vpc-s3

vpcbus

vmx86

vmware

VMMEMCTL

VMTools

XenVMM

xenvdb

xensvc

xennet6

xennet

xenevtchn

VBoxSF

VBoxGuest

   

Table 3: Blacklisted service names

  • It checks whether the username contains any of these words:  MALWARE, VIRUS, SANDBOX, MALTEST
  • It has a list of hashes of blacklisted driver names. It traverses the windows driver directory %WINDIR%\system32\drivers\ using FindFirstFile/FindNextFile APIs to check if the hash of the name of any drivers matches with that of any blacklisted driver's name, as shown in Table 4.

Hash

Driver

0E687412Fh

hgfs.sys

5A6850A1h

vmhgfs.sys

0CA5B452h

prleth.sys

0F9E3EE20h

prlfs.sys

0E79628D7h

prlmouse.sys

68C96B8Ah

prlvideo.sys

0EEA0F1C2h

prl_pv32.sys

443458C9h

vpcs3.sys

2F337B97h

vmsrvc.sys

4D95FD80h

vmx86.sys

0EB7E0625h

vmnet.sys

Table 4: Hashes of blacklisted driver names

  • It calculates the hash of ProductId and matches it with three blacklisted hashes to detect public sandboxes, shown in Table 5.

Hash

Product Id

Sandbox Name

4D8711F4h

76487-337-8429955-22614

Anubis Sanbox

7EBAB69Ch

76487-644-3177037-23510

CWSandbox

D573F44D

55274-640-2673064-23950

Joe Sandbox

Table 5: Blacklisted product IDs

  • The malware calculates the hash of loaded module (DLL) names and compares them with the list of hashes of blacklisted module names shown in Table 6. These are the DLLs commonly loaded into the process being debugged, such as dbhelp.dll and api_log.dll.    

6FEC47C1h

6C8B2973h

0AF6D9F74h

49A4A30h

3FA86C7Dh

Table 6: Blacklisted module names hashes

Figure 12 shows the flow of code that checks for blacklisted module hashes.


Figure 12: Code checks for blacklisted module hashes

  • It checks whether Registry keys present at the path HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum and HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Disk\Enum contain any of these words: QEMU, VBOX, VMWARE, VIRTUAL
  • It checks whether registry keys at the path HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft, HKLM\SOFTWARE  contain these words: VirtualMachine, vmware, Hyber-V
  • It checks whether the system bios version present at registry path HKLM\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion contains these words: QEMU, BOCHS, VBOX
  • It checks whether the video bios version present at registry path HKLM\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion contains  VIRTUALBOX substring.
  • It checks whether the registry key at path HKLM\HARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 0\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0\Identifier contains any of these words: QEMU,vbox, vmware
  • It checks whether the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions  exists on the system.

Network Communication

The malware contains two hardcoded obfuscated C2s. After de-obfuscating the C2 URLs, it generates a random string of 20 characters, appends it to the end of URL, and sends the request for commands. Before it executes the commands, the malware verifies the identity of the C2. It calculates the hash of 4 bytes of data using the CALG_MD5 algorithm. It then uses the Base64 data from the CERT command as a Public Key in CryptVerifySignature to verify the hash signature (Figure 13). If the signature is verified, the malware executes the commands.


Figure 13: Malware verifies the C2 hash

During our initial analysis, we found that the malware supports the commands shown in Table 7. 

Command

Description

CERT <Base64 data>

Contains the data used to verify the identity of the C2

CONNECT <IP:Port>

Connect to given host for further commands

DISCONNECT

Close all the connections

WAIT <Number of seconds>

Wait for the number of seconds before executing the next commands

REJECT

Kind of NOP. Move on to next command after waiting for 5 second

Table 7: Commands supported by malware

Figure 14 shows commands being issued by the C2 server.


Figure 14: Commands issued by the C2 server

Conclusion

Despite the decline in activity, exploit kits still continue to put users at risk – especially those running older versions of software. Enterprises need to make sure their network nodes are fully patched.

All FireEye products detect the malware in our MVX engine. Additionally, FireEye Network Security blocks delivery at the infection point.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • 30f03b09d2073e415a843a4a1d8341af
  • 99787d194cbd629d12ef172874e82738
  • 169.239.129[.]17
  • grobiosgueng[.]su

Acknowledgments 

We acknowledge Mariam Muntaha for her contribution to the blog regarding malicious traffic analysis.