Monthly Archives: December 2017

Why I Do, What I Do

Folks,

I trust you're well. Today, I just wanted to take a few minutes to answer a few questions that I've been asked so many times.


Here are the answers to the Top-5 questions I am frequently asked -

  1. You're the CEO of a company (Paramount Defenses), so why do you blog so often, and how do you have time to do so?

    Good question. This is a bit of a unique situation, in that whilst I am the CEO of a company, I am also a subject matter expert in Active Directory Security (simply by virtue of my background) and thus I feel that it is my civic duty to help organizations understand the paramount importance of securing their foundational Active Directory deployments.

    In fact, over the last 7+ years, I've penned 150+ blog posts on Active Directory Security (here) and Cyber Security (here) on various topics such as Active Directory Privilege Escalation, the OPM Breach, Kerberos Token Bloat, Eff Perms, AdminSDHolder, Mimikatz DCSync, Sneaky Persistence, How to Correctly Identify Stealthy Admins in Active Directory, How to Correctly Identify Shadow Admins in Active Directory etc. and most recently on Active Directory Botnets.

    As to how I have the time to do so, that's actually not that difficult. We have a world-class team at Paramount Defenses, and I've been able to delegate a substantial amount of my CEO-related work amongst our executive leadership team.




  2. Speaking of which, how big is Paramount Defenses?

    At Paramount Defenses, we believe that less is more, so our entire global team is less than a 100 people. For security reasons, 100% of our staff are U.S. Citizens, and to-date, the entirety of our R&D team are former Microsoft employees.

    If by how big we are, you meant how many organizations we impact, today our unique high-value cyber security solutions and insights help adequately secure and defend thousands of prominent organizations across six continents worldwide.




  3. Why is it just you (and why aren't your employees) on Social Media (e.g. LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter etc.)?

    The simple answer to this question - For Security Reasons.

    At Paramount Defenses, we care deeply about cyber security, so we also strive to lead by example in every way.

    As it pertains to cyber security, we have found that the presence of an organization's employees on social-media almost always results in excessive information disclosure that could be very valuable for hackers and various other entities who may have malicious intent, so our corporate policies do not permit a social media presence.

    Also, we're not huge fans of Twitter, and we certainly don't care about being on Facebook. We do like and appreciate LinkedIn, and in fact, we lead the world's largest community of Active Directory Security Professionals on LinkedIn.




  4. What do you intend to accomplish by blogging?

    The intention is to help organizations worldwide understand just how profoundly important Active Directory Security is to organizational cyber security, and how paramount Active Directory Effective Permissions are to Active Directory Security.

    That's because this impacts global security today, and here's why -




    You see, the Crown Jewels of cyber security reside in Active Directory, and if they're compromised, its Game Over. By Crown Jewels, I'm referring to privileged access, or as commonly known, Domain Admin equivalent accounts.

    It is a fact that 100% of all major recent cyber security breaches (except Equifax) involved the compromise of a single Active Directory privileged user account. Such accounts are Target #1 for hackers, which is why it is so very important that organizations be able to exactly identify and minimize the number of such privileged accounts in Active Directory.

    Now, when it comes to identifying privileged user accounts in Active Directory, most organizations focus on enumerating the memberships of their default administrative groups in Active Directory, and that's it. Unfortunately, that's just the Tip of the Iceberg, and we have found that most of them do not even seem to know that in fact there are FAR many more accounts with varying levels of elevated admin/privileged access in Active Directory than they seem to know about.

    This isn't a secret; its something you know if you've ever heard about Active Directory's most powerful and capable cyber security feature - Delegation of Administration. The truth is that at most organizations, a substantial amount of delegation has been done over the years, yet no one seems to have a clue as to who has what privileged access. Here's why.

    In fact, Active Directory privileged access accounts have been getting a lot of attention lately, because so many cyber security experts and companies are starting to realize that there exists a treasure-trove of privileged access in Active Directory. Thus, recently many such cyber security expert and companies have started shedding light on them (for example, one, two, three etc.), and some have even started developing amateur tools to identify such accounts.

    What these experts and companies may not know is that their amateur tools are substantially inaccurate since they rely on finding out "Who has what Permissions in Active Directory" WHEREAS the ONLY way to correctly identify privileged user accounts in Active Directory is by accurately finding out "Who has what Effective Permissions in Active Directory?"

    On a lighter note, I find it rather amusing that for lack of knowing better, most cyber security experts and vendors that may be new to Active Directory Security have been referring to such accounts as Stealthy Admins, Shadow Admins etc.

    To make matters worse, there are many prominent vendors in the Active Directory space that merely offer basic Active Directory Permissions Analysis/Audit Tooling, yet they mislead organizations by claiming to help them "Find out who has what privileged access in Active Directory," and since so many IT personnel don't seem to know better, they get misled.

    Thus, there's an imperative need to help organizations learn how to correctly audit privileged users in Active Directory.

    Consequently, the intention of my blogging is to HELP thousands of organizations and cyber security experts worldwide UNDERSTAND that the ONLY correct way to identify privileged users in Active Directory is by accurately determining effective permissions / effective access in Active Directory. There is only ONE correct way to accomplish this objective.




  5. Why have you been a little hard on Microsoft lately?

    Let me begin by saying that I deeply love and care for Microsoft. It may appear that I may have been a tad hard on them, but that is all well-intentioned and only meant to help them realize that they have an obligation to their global customer base to adequately educate them about various aspects of cyber security in Windows, particularly the most vital aspects.

    In that regard, if you truly understand cyber security in Windows environments, you know that Active Directory Effective Permissions and Active Directory Effective Access play an absolutely paramount role in securing Windows deployments worldwide, and since Active Directory has been around for almost two decades by now, one would expect the world to unequivocally understand this by now. Unfortunately, we found that (as evidenced above) no one seems to have a clue.

    You may be surprised if I were to share with you that at most organizations worldwide, hardly anyone seems to even know about what Active Directory Effective Permissions are, let alone why they're paramount to their security, and this a highly concerning fact, because this means that most organizations worldwide are operating in the proverbial dark today.

    It is upon looking into the reason for this that we realized that in the last decade, it appears that (for whatever reason) Microsoft may not have educated its global customer based about Active Directory Effective Permissions at all - Proof.

    Thus, it is in the best interest of organizations worldwide that we felt a need to substantially raise awareness.

    As to how on earth Microsoft may have completely forgotten to educate the world about this, I can only guess that perhaps they must've gotten so involved in building their Cloud offering and dealing with the menace of local-machine credential-theft attack vectors that they completely seem to have missed this one paramount aspect of Windows security.

    Fortunately for them and the world, we've had our eye on this problem for a decade know and we've been laser-focused. Besides, actions speak louder than words, so once you understand what it is we do at Paramount Defenses, you'll see that we've done more to help secure Microsoft's global customer base than possibly any other company on the planet.

    Those who understand what we've built, know that we may be Microsoft's most strategic ally in the cyber security space.


Finally, the most important reason as to why I do, what I do is because I care deeply and passionately about cyber security.

Best wishes,

DEMANDS ON ETHICAL HACKERS ARE RAPIDLY GROWING

SINGAPORE: The Ministry of Interior and Defence (Mindef) will be inviting about 300 international and local hackers to hunt for vulnerabilities in its Internet-connected systems next year (2018), in a bid to guard against ever-evolving cyber threats.

From Jan 15 to Feb 4, these selected experts will try to penetrate eight of Mindef's Internet-facing systems, such as the Mindef website, the NS Portal and LearNet 2 Portal, a learning resource portal for trainees.

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These registered hackers can earn cash rewards - or bounties - between $150 and $20,000, based on how critical the flaws discovered are. Called the Mindef Bug Bounty Programme, it will be the Government's first crowdsourced hacking programme.


This follows an incident earlier this year when Mindef discovered that hackers had stolen the NRIC numbers, telephone numbers and birth dates of 854 personnel through a breach of its I-Net system.

One of the systems being tested, Defence Mail, uses the I-Net system for Mindef and SAF personnel to connect to the Internet.

On Tuesday (Dec 12), defence cyber chief David Koh announced the new programme after a visit to the Cyber Defence Test and Evaluation Centre (CyTEC) - a cyber "live-firing range" where servicemen train against simulated cyber-attacks - at Stagmont Camp in Choa Chu Kang.

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UPDATES: “Ransomware assaults seem to be getting increasingly dangerous,” said Marty P. Kamden, CMO of NordVPN. “Besides, system administrators are not ready to protect their networks from more sophisticated breaches. We believe that attacks will only keep getting worse.”
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On the significance of the "Hack Mindef" initiative, he told reporters: "The SAF is a highly networked force. How we conduct our military operations depends on networking across the army, navy, air force and the joint staff.

"Every day, we see new cyber attacks launched by malicious actors who are constantly seeking new ways to breach our systems... Clearly, this is a fast-evolving environment and increasingly, you see that it is one that is of relevance to the defence and security domain."

The bigger picture is that cyberspace is emerging as the next battlefield, said Mr Koh, who is also deputy secretary for special projects at Mindef.

"Some countries have begun to recognise cyber as a domain similar to air, land and sea. Some have even gone so far as to say that the next major conflict will see cyber activity as the first activity of a major conflict," he added.



While there will be some risks in inviting hackers to test the systems, such as an increase in website traffic and the chance that these "white hat" hackers will turn over discovered vulnerabilities to the dark Web, measures will be put in place.

"(If) we can't even manage the increase in traffic, that in itself would be a vulnerability that we would need to address," said Mr Koh.

White-hat hackers are those who break into protected systems to improve security, while black-hat hackers are malicious ones who aim to exploit flaws.

The programme conducted by US-based bug bounty company HackerOne is expected to cost about $100,000, depending on the bugs found. But Mr Koh noted that this would be less than hiring a dedicated vulnerability assessment team, which might cost up to a million dollars.

Mr Teo Chin Hock, deputy chief executive for development at the Cyber Security Agency (CSA), said: "By embarking on a bug bounty programme, companies have the advantage of uncovering security vulnerabilities on their own by harnessing the collective intelligence and capabilities of these experts and addressing these vulnerabilities before the black hats do."


In a statement, he added that the CSA is currently in discussions with some of Singapore's 11 designated critical information infrastructure sectors which have expressed interest in exploring a similar programme for their public-facing systems.

Large organisations, such as Facebook and the United States Department of Defence, have embarked on similar initiatives with some success.

For instance, a similar Hack the Pentagon programme, also conducted by HackerOne, was launched by the US defence department in 2016. A total of 138 bugs were found by more than a thousand individuals within three weeks.

The initiative caps a year in which Singapore has been gearing up for the battlefront in cyberspace.


In March, it was announced that the Defence Cyber Organisation will be set up to bolster Singapore's cyber defence, with a force of cyber defenders trained to help in this fight.

Time to DEMONSTRATE Thought Leadership in the Cyber Security Space

Folks,

Hope you're all well. Last year I had said that it was time for us to provide Thought Leadership to the Cyber Security space.


Since then, I've penned over 50 blog posts, on numerous important topics,
and helped 1000s of organizations worldwide better understand -

  1. The Importance of Active Directory Security

  2. Insight into Active Directory ACLs - Attack and Defense

  3. How to Defend Active Directory Against Cyber Attacks

  4. How to Mitigate the Risk Posed by Mimikatz DCSync

  5. How to Thwart Sneaky Persistence in Active Directory

  1. How to Identify Stealthy Admins in Active Directory

  2. Understand Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

  3. Illustrate Active Directory Privilege Escalation

  4. Correctly Identify Privileged Users in Active Directory

  5. Importance of Active Directory Effective Permissions
There's so much more to share, and I will continue to do so.





A Paramount Global Cyber Security Need

Today, I wanted to take a moment to touch upon one (not so) little aspect of cyber security that today profoundly impacts the foundational security of 85% of all business and government organizations worldwide, including most cyber security companies.

Folks, I am talking about empowering organizations worldwide identify exactly who holds the proverbial "Keys to the Kingdom" i.e. helping them accurately identify exactly who actually possesses what privileged access in Active Directory deployments.


The reason this is so important is because 100% of all major recent cyber security breaches (e.g. Snowden, Target, JP Morgan, Sony, Anthem, OPM) involved the compromise and misuse of guess what - just ONE Active Directory Privileged User Account.

Since we've been silently working on this 2006, we've a head start of about a decade. Over the last few months, we've seen several prominent vendors finally realize the importance of doing so, and we've seen them share guidance to this subject.

Unfortunately, just about every piece of advice out there, whether it be from prominent cyber security experts or billion dollar cyber security companies, on how to actually correctly audit privileged access in Active Directory, is dangerously inaccurate.





Thought Leadership

There's an old saying - "Actions Speak Louder Than Words." While there's no dearth of talk by so many big names out there on how to improve cyber security, identify privileged users etc., the key to actually (demonstrably and provably) enhancing cyber security lies in actually helping organizations do so, and we've been silently at work for a decade to help organizations do so.

So, in days to come, right here on this blog, I'm going to (hopefully for one last time), share exactly how organizations worldwide can today accurately and efficiently identify privileged access in their foundational Active Directory deployments worldwide.


In doing so, we will yet again demonstrate Thought Leadership in the Cyber Security space. By the way, this is neither about us, nor about pride. I've already said I'm just a nobody (, whose work possibly impacts everybody.) This is about a desire to help.

So, that post should be out right here on this blog next week, possibly as early as Monday morning.

Best wishes,
Sanjay

New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit

Less than a week after Microsoft issued a patch for CVE-2017-11882 on Nov. 14, 2017, FireEye observed an attacker using an exploit for the Microsoft Office vulnerability to target a government organization in the Middle East. We assess this activity was carried out by a suspected Iranian cyber espionage threat group, whom we refer to as APT34, using a custom PowerShell backdoor to achieve its objectives.

We believe APT34 is involved in a long-term cyber espionage operation largely focused on reconnaissance efforts to benefit Iranian nation-state interests and has been operational since at least 2014. This threat group has conducted broad targeting across a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. We assess that APT34 works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.

APT34 uses a mix of public and non-public tools, often conducting spear phishing operations using compromised accounts, sometimes coupled with social engineering tactics. In May 2016, we published a blog detailing a spear phishing campaign targeting banks in the Middle East region that used macro-enabled attachments to distribute POWBAT malware. We now attribute that campaign to APT34. In July 2017, we observed APT34 targeting a Middle East organization using a PowerShell-based backdoor that we call POWRUNER and a downloader with domain generation algorithm functionality that we call BONDUPDATER, based on strings within the malware. The backdoor was delivered via a malicious .rtf file that exploited CVE-2017-0199.

In this latest campaign, APT34 leveraged the recent Microsoft Office vulnerability CVE-2017-11882 to deploy POWRUNER and BONDUPDATER.

The full report on APT34 is available to our MySIGHT customer community. APT34 loosely aligns with public reporting related to the group "OilRig". As individual organizations may track adversaries using varied data sets, it is possible that our classifications of activity may not wholly align.

CVE-2017-11882: Microsoft Office Stack Memory Corruption Vulnerability

CVE-2017-11882 affects several versions of Microsoft Office and, when exploited, allows a remote user to run arbitrary code in the context of the current user as a result of improperly handling objects in memory. The vulnerability was patched by Microsoft on Nov. 14, 2017. A full proof of concept (POC) was publicly released a week later by the reporter of the vulnerability.

The vulnerability exists in the old Equation Editor (EQNEDT32.EXE), a component of Microsoft Office that is used to insert and evaluate mathematical formulas. The Equation Editor is embedded in Office documents using object linking and embedding (OLE) technology. It is created as a separate process instead of child process of Office applications. If a crafted formula is passed to the Equation Editor, it does not check the data length properly while copying the data, which results in stack memory corruption. As the EQNEDT32.exe is compiled using an older compiler and does not support address space layout randomization (ASLR), a technique that guards against the exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities, the attacker can easily alter the flow of program execution.

Analysis

APT34 sent a malicious .rtf file (MD5: a0e6933f4e0497269620f44a083b2ed4) as an attachment in a malicious spear phishing email sent to the victim organization. The malicious file exploits CVE-2017-11882, which corrupts the memory on the stack and then proceeds to push the malicious data to the stack. The malware then overwrites the function address with the address of an existing instruction from EQNEDT32.EXE. The overwritten instruction (displayed in Figure 1) is used to call the “WinExec” function from kernel32.dll, as depicted in the instruction at 00430c12, which calls the “WinExec” function.


Figure 1: Disassembly of overwritten function address

After exploitation, the ‘WinExec’ function is successfully called to create a child process, “mshta.exe”, in the context of current logged on user. The process “mshta.exe” downloads a malicious script from hxxp://mumbai-m[.]site/b.txt and executes it, as seen in Figure 2.


Figure 2: Attacker data copied to corrupt stack buffer

Execution Workflow

The malicious script goes through a series of steps to successfully execute and ultimately establish a connection to the command and control (C2) server. The full sequence of events starting with the exploit document is illustrated in Figure 3.


Figure 3: CVE-2017-11882 and POWRUNER attack sequence

  1. The malicious .rtf file exploits CVE-2017-11882.
  2. The malware overwrites the function address with an existing instruction from EQNEDT32.EXE.
  3. The malware creates a child process, “mshta.exe,” which downloads a file from: hxxp://mumbai-m[.]site/b.txt.
  4. b.txt contains a PowerShell command to download a dropper from: hxxp://dns-update[.]club/v.txt. The PowerShell command also renames the downloaded file from v.txt to v.vbs and executes the script.
  5. The v.vbs script drops four components (hUpdateCheckers.base, dUpdateCheckers.base, cUpdateCheckers.bat, and GoogleUpdateschecker.vbs) to the directory: C:\ProgramData\Windows\Microsoft\java\
  6. v.vbs uses CertUtil.exe, a legitimate Microsoft command-line program installed as part of Certificate Services, to decode the base64-encoded files hUpdateCheckers.base and dUpdateCheckers.base, and drop hUpdateCheckers.ps1 and dUpdateCheckers.ps1 to the staging directory.
  7. cUpdateCheckers.bat is launched and creates a scheduled task for GoogleUpdateschecker.vbs persistence.
  8. GoogleUpdateschecker.vbs is executed after sleeping for five seconds.
  9. cUpdateCheckers.bat and *.base are deleted from the staging directory.

Figure 4 contains an excerpt of the v.vbs script pertaining to the Execution Workflow section.


Figure 4: Execution Workflow Section of v.vbs

After successful execution of the steps mentioned in the Execution Workflow section, the Task Scheduler will launch GoogleUpdateschecker.vbs every minute, which in turn executes the dUpdateCheckers.ps1 and hUpdateCheckers.ps1 scripts. These PowerShell scripts are final stage payloads – they include a downloader with domain generation algorithm (DGA) functionality and the backdoor component, which connect to the C2 server to receive commands and perform additional malicious activities. 

hUpdateCheckers.ps1 (POWRUNER)

The backdoor component, POWRUNER, is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server. POWRUNER is executed every minute by the Task Scheduler. Figure 5 contains an excerpt of the POWRUNER backdoor.


Figure 5: POWRUNER PowerShell script hUpdateCheckers.ps1

POWRUNER begins by sending a random GET request to the C2 server and waits for a response. The server will respond with either “not_now” or a random 11-digit number. If the response is a random number, POWRUNER will send another random GET request to the server and store the response in a string. POWRUNER will then check the last digit of the stored random number response, interpret the value as a command, and perform an action based on that command. The command values and the associated actions are described in Table 1.

Command

Description

Action

0

Server response string contains batch commands

Execute batch commands and send results back to server

1

Server response string is a file path

Check for file path and upload (PUT) the file to server

2

Server response string is a file path

Check for file path and download (GET) the file

Table 1: POWRUNER commands

After successfully executing the command, POWRUNER sends the results back to the C2 server and stops execution.

The C2 server can also send a PowerShell command to capture and store a screenshot of a victim’s system. POWRUNER will send the captured screenshot image file to the C2 server if the “fileupload” command is issued. Figure 6 shows the PowerShell “Get-Screenshot” function sent by the C2 server.


Figure 6: Powershell Screenshot Functionality

dUpdateCheckers.ps1 (BONDUPDATER)

One of the recent advancements by APT34 is the use of DGA to generate subdomains. The BONDUPDATER script, which was named based on the hard-coded string “B007”, uses a custom DGA algorithm to generate subdomains for communication with the C2 server.

DGA Implementation

Figure 7 provides a breakdown of how an example domain (456341921300006B0C8B2CE9C9B007.mumbai-m[.]site) is generated using BONDUPDATER’s custom DGA.


Figure 7: Breakdown of subdomain created by BONDUPDATER

  1. This is a randomly generated number created using the following expression: $rnd = -join (Get-Random -InputObject (10..99) -Count (%{ Get-Random -InputObject (1..6)}));
  2. This value is either 0 or 1. It is initially set to 0. If the first resolved domain IP address starts with 24.125.X.X, then it is set to 1.
  3. Initially set to 000, then incremented by 3 after every DNS request
  4. First 12 characters of system UUID.
  5. “B007” hardcoded string.
  6. Hardcoded domain “mumbai-m[.]site”

BONDUPDATER will attempt to resolve the resulting DGA domain and will take the following actions based on the IP address resolution:

  1. Create a temporary file in %temp% location
    • The file created will have the last two octets of the resolved IP addresses as its filename.
  2. BONDUPDATER will evaluate the last character of the file name and perform the corresponding action found in Table 2.

Character

Description

0

File contains batch commands, it executes the batch commands

1

Rename the temporary file as .ps1 extension

2

Rename the temporary file as .vbs extension

Table 2: BONDUPDATER Actions

Figure 8 is a screenshot of BONDUPDATER’s DGA implementation.


Figure 8: Domain Generation Algorithm

Some examples of the generated subdomains observed at time of execution include:

143610035BAF04425847B007.mumbai-m[.]site

835710065BAF04425847B007.mumbai-m[.]site

376110095BAF04425847B007.mumbai-m[.]site

Network Communication

Figure 9 shows example network communications between a POWRUNER backdoor client and server.


Figure 9: Example Network Communication

In the example, the POWRUNER client sends a random GET request to the C2 server and the C2 server sends the random number (99999999990) as a response. As the response is a random number that ends with ‘0’, POWRUNER sends another random GET request to receive  an additional command string. The C2 server sends back Base64 encoded response.

If the server had sent the string “not_now” as response, as shown in Figure 10, POWRUNER would have ceased any further requests and terminated its execution.


Figure 10: Example "not now" server response

Batch Commands

POWRUNER may also receive batch commands from the C2 server to collect host information from the system. This may include information about the currently logged in user, the hostname, network configuration data, active connections, process information, local and domain administrator accounts, an enumeration of user directories, and other data. An example batch command is provided in Figure 11.


Figure 11: Batch commands sent by POWRUNER C2 server

Additional Use of POWRUNER / BONDUPDATER

APT34 has used POWRUNER and BONDUPDATER to target Middle East organizations as early as July 2017. In July 2017, a FireEye Web MPS appliance detected and blocked a request to retrieve and install an APT34 POWRUNER / BONDUPDATER downloader file. During the same month, FireEye observed APT34 target a separate Middle East organization using a malicious .rtf file (MD5: 63D66D99E46FB93676A4F475A65566D8) that exploited CVE-2017-0199. This file issued a GET request to download a malicious file from:

hxxp://94.23.172.164/dupdatechecker.doc.

As shown in Figure 12, the script within the dupatechecker.doc file attempts to download another file named dupatechecker.exe from the same server. The file also contains a comment by the malware author that appears to be an apparent taunt to security researchers.


Figure 12: Contents of dupdatechecker.doc script

The dupatechecker.exe file (MD5: C9F16F0BE8C77F0170B9B6CE876ED7FB) drops both BONDUPDATER and POWRUNER. These files connect to proxychecker[.]pro for C2.

Outlook and Implications

Recent activity by APT34 demonstrates that they are capable group with potential access to their own development resources. During the past few months, APT34 has been able to quickly incorporate exploits for at least two publicly vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2017-11882) to target organizations in the Middle East. We assess that APT34’s efforts to continuously update their malware, including the incorporation of DGA for C2, demonstrate the group’s commitment to pursing strategies to deter detection. We expect APT34 will continue to evolve their malware and tactics as they continue to pursue access to entities in the Middle East region.

IOCs

Filename / Domain / IP Address

MD5 Hash or Description

CVE-2017-11882 exploit document

A0E6933F4E0497269620F44A083B2ED4

b.txt

9267D057C065EA7448ACA1511C6F29C7

v.txt/v.vbs

B2D13A336A3EB7BD27612BE7D4E334DF

dUpdateCheckers.base

4A7290A279E6F2329EDD0615178A11FF

hUpdateCheckers.base

841CE6475F271F86D0B5188E4F8BC6DB

cUpdateCheckers.bat

52CA9A7424B3CC34099AD218623A0979

dUpdateCheckers.ps1

BBDE33F5709CB1452AB941C08ACC775E

hUpdateCheckers.ps1

247B2A9FCBA6E9EC29ED818948939702

GoogleUpdateschecker.vbs

C87B0B711F60132235D7440ADD0360B0

hxxp://mumbai-m[.]site

POWRUNER C2

hxxp://dns-update[.]club

Malware Staging Server

CVE-2017-0199 exploit document

63D66D99E46FB93676A4F475A65566D8

94.23.172.164:80

Malware Staging Server

dupdatechecker.doc

D85818E82A6E64CA185EDFDDBA2D1B76

dupdatechecker.exe

C9F16F0BE8C77F0170B9B6CE876ED7FB

proxycheker[.]pro

C2

46.105.221.247

Has resolved mumbai-m[.]site & hpserver[.]online

148.251.55.110

Has resolved mumbai-m[.]site and dns-update[.]club

185.15.247.147

Has resolved dns-update[.]club

145.239.33.100

Has resolved dns-update[.]club

82.102.14.219

Has resolved ns2.dns-update[.]club & hpserver[.]online & anyportals[.]com

v7-hpserver.online.hta

E6AC6F18256C4DDE5BF06A9191562F82

dUpdateCheckers.base

3C63BFF9EC0A340E0727E5683466F435

hUpdateCheckers.base

EEB0FF0D8841C2EBE643FE328B6D9EF5

cUpdateCheckers.bat

FB464C365B94B03826E67EABE4BF9165

dUpdateCheckers.ps1

635ED85BFCAAB7208A8B5C730D3D0A8C

hUpdateCheckers.ps1

13B338C47C52DE3ED0B68E1CB7876AD2

googleupdateschecker.vbs

DBFEA6154D4F9D7209C1875B2D5D70D5

hpserver[.]online

C2

v7-anyportals.hta

EAF3448808481FB1FDBB675BC5EA24DE

dUpdateCheckers.base

42449DD79EA7D2B5B6482B6F0D493498

hUpdateCheckers.base

A3FCB4D23C3153DD42AC124B112F1BAE

dUpdateCheckers.ps1

EE1C482C41738AAA5964730DCBAB5DFF

hUpdateCheckers.ps1

E516C3A3247AF2F2323291A670086A8F

anyportals[.]com

C2

KUELEKEA MWISHO WA MWAKA TUNATEGEMEA MASHAMBULIZI MTANDAO ZAIDI

Nikizungumza na kundi maalum katika vikao vinavyoendelea nimewasilisha ujumbe wa Tahadhari ambapo Uma umetahadharishwa juu ya mashambulizi takriban Milioni hamsini (50 Milioni) duniani kote katika kipindi cha sikukuu yatakayo gharimu kati ya Dola 50 – Dola 5’000 kwa kila shambulizi.

Matarajio hayo ni kutokana na matumizi makubwa ya mtandao katika kufanya miamala mbali mbali ya manunuzi ya bidhaa katika kipindi hiki cha sikukuu ambapo watu wengi duniani kote wamekua wakinunua vitu mbali mbali kwa wingi kwa njia ya mitandao.

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Kwa mujibu wa ripoti ya kitelijensia ya matishio mtandao, iliyo wasilishwa na NTT Security – Imeeleza uwepo wa takriban utengenezwaji wa tovutiMilioni moja na nusu zenye mlengo wa kurubuni  kila mwezi ambazo baadhi yao zinadumu kati ya masaa ma nne had inane na kutoweka. Hili niongezeko la asilimia 74 (74%) kulinganisha na takwimu za miezi sita iliyopita.




Maangalizo kadhaa ya muhimu ambayo watumia mitandao wanatakiwa kuzingatia ili walau kupunguza wimbi hili la uhalifu mtandao ni kama ifuatavyo:-

Jiepushe kutumia Wi-Fi za bure unapofanya miamala kwa njia ya mtandao.

Kua makini na program tumishi unazopakua mtandaoni – hakikisha zinatoka katika vyanzo vyenye sifa njema na kuaminika.

Usisambaze mtandaoni taarifa zako binafsi ikiwa ni pamoja na Nywila (neon siri)
Hakikisha unatumia neon siri (Nywila) madhubuti ili kujiepusha na udukuzi unaoweza kukukuta.

Upokeapo jumbe mtandaoni zenye mlengo wa ushawishi wa kukupatia zawadi na kukutaka ufungue viambatanishi, Usifungue viambatanishi hivyo kwani wahalifu mtandao wanatumia fursa hii kusambaza virusi vinavyoweza kukuletea athari mbali mbali ikiwemo kupelekea wizi mtandao.

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NEWS BRIEF:
"In the first half of 2017, 1.9 billion data records were either lost or stolen through 918 cyber-attacks. Most of the attacks used ransomware, a malware that infects computers and restricts access to files in exchange for a ransom"
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Kakikisha vifaa vyako unavyotumia kwa ajili ya mtandao (Simu, Tableti , Komputa yako na vinginevyo) vimewekwa Ant-Virus iliyo ndani ya wakati na pia una sakinisha (Install patches) mara tu zinapo tolewa.

 Jijengee tabia ya kupitia taarifa fupi za miamala (Bank statement) na unapo ona kuna muamala usio utambua utoe taarifa mara moja kwa hatua Zaidi.

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UPDATES:
" We have seen many incidents using anti-forensics tools and methods in an effort to erase signs of their presence and increase the time they are able to explore the network before they are detected, commonly known as “dwell time”.
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Aidha, Kwa Upande Mwingine - Baroness Shields (Mshauri wa waziri mkuu wa uingereza) ametoa wito kwa wabunge wa nchini humo kuacha mara moja tabia ya kuweka wazi maneno yao ya siri (Nywila) au kuwapatia wasaidizi wao.



Akizungumza nao, Aliwaeleza wakiona kuna umuhimu basi wasaidizi wao watapatiwa maneno siri yao (Nywila) pale wanapo wahudumia katika kazi zao.