I recently posted about Active Directory Unification
. The main points were (1) that there is value in AD consolidation and (2) that there's a right way to do it to meet the intended goals.
Sander Berkouwer posted earlier this month on Active Directory attribute integrity
. He makes the point that with all the tools Microsoft provides to enable tighter management of identities and access (FIM, ADFS, ADRMS, DAC), Active Directory Cleanup is more important than ever. Berkouwer writes:
"When these attributes are inconsistent, access to files, apps, partners and cloud functionality becomes inconsistent. If you think it won’t happen to you, think twice. During the first internal Microsoft deployment of Dynamic Access Control, attribute inconsistency was the first encountered problem."
Most people that I speak with jump into the benefits that cleanup
will have on the AD Unification process
. The reality is that the real value of cleanup is enabling the right functionality and access controls after the unification process is complete. (Of course, as I wrote
, it's never really complete - it's not a onetime event
It's worth making the distinction.
When I define unstructured data to people in the Identity Management space, I think the key distinguishing characteristic is that there is no entitlement store with which an IAM or IAG solution can connect to gather entitlement information.
On File Systems, for example, the entitlements are distributed across shares & folders, inherited through the file tree structure, applied through group memberships that may be many levels deep, and there's no common security model to make sense of it.
has the best scanner in the industry (I've seen it go head-to-head in POC's
) to gather users, groups, and permissions across unstructured data environments and the most flexible ability to perform analysis that (1) uncovers high-risk conditions (such as open file shares, unused permissions, admin snooping, and more
), (2) identifies content owners, and (3) makes it very simple to consume information on entitlements (by user, by group, or by resource
It's a gap in the identity management landscape and it's beginning to show up on customer agendas. Let us know if we can help
. Now, here's a pretty picture:
The dump_resource function in dird/dird_conf.c in Bacula before 5.2.11 does not properly enforce ACL rules, which allows remote authenticated users to obtain resource dump information via unspecified vectors.